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- “Einbildungsfähigkeit”, “Einbildungskraft” e “Imagination” na antropologia kantiana. Notas para uma dissociação terminológicaPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.Emergentes não raras vezes nas Lições de Antropologia de Kant, os termos “Einbildungskraft”, “Einbildungsfähigkeit” e “Imagination” são comummente tomados – e, prova maior disto mesmo, traduzidos – como um só. O presente artigo propõe-se pôr em causa e demonstrar a incorrecção desta abordagem. Bem pelo contrário, estamos em crer que, no âmbito da antropologia kantiana, em primeiro lugar, “faculdade de imaginação” e “capacidade de imaginação” não são uma e a mesma coisa, antes significam diferentes estratos, diferentes dimensões conceptuais na compreensão do processo de representação humana; em segundo lugar, também “faculdade de imaginação”, enquanto “Einbildungskraft”, não é o mesmo que o seu correspondente na “Imagination”, antes duas dimensões de um e o mesmo problema antropológico, o problema por excelência do acto de representar, que surge entre o mundo e o designar humano. Tais distinções, que, assim o cremos, requerem uma compreensão mas também uma tradução mais criteriosa do que até aqui, trazem a uma mais distinta luz o modo como Kant estrutura e ordena as diferentes fases do processo da imaginação humana, e salienta aquelas que, para o filósofo, são as diferentes potencialidades desta última.
- Heaven on earth. On systematicity and aesthetic pleasure in Kant’s Universal Natural HistoryPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.In addition to its intense and innovative cosmological dialogue with predecessors, Kant’s Theory of the Heavens (1755) and its systematising goal tell us something more about the young Kant’s thoughts concerning humanity and the world. We intend 1) to show how Kant’s approach to the question of the order of the universe finds a middle path between the extremes of theology and naturalism; b) to show how purposiveness [Zweckmäβigkeit] exemplifies this middle path, and how this progressive resistance is a theoretical device to which Kant would frequently resort; c) to examine the extent to which the discernment of purposiveness and its theoretical order are felt by us as a singular aesthetic pleasure.
- “The being outside of being, within being”. The question of human consciousness in Novalis’ “fichte-studien”Publication . Silva, Fernando M. F.The question of human consciousness is a crucial part of Novalis’ aim of construing a self-critique of the I, or critique of human identity, as it is proposed in his “Fichte-Studien” (1795-1796). Namely, this question is an intermediary stage in said critique, serving as proof for Novalis’ theory of the opposites, the fundamental stage, and his position on philosophizing, the final stage of this endeavor, which will be at the basis of his whole philosophical system; and as such, it is a topic of great importance, as it is not only a link in a chain of thought which aims at proving the organicity or living heterogeneity - and not Fichte’s machine-like homogeneity - of the human but is also a key topic towards the resolution of Novalis’problem of philosophy as an existential problem. Given this, the present article intends to situate the question of human consciousness in the framework of Novalis’greater scope of a critique of the I; and from then, to comment on Novalis’own position on the problem of human consciousness, as it is stated in the formula “Consciousness is the Being outside of Being, within Being”; a position which further separates the young poet from Fichte, as it renders him closer and closer to other young idealists, such as Hölderlin or Schelling.
- “What man makes of himself,” “What nature makes of man.” On Kant’s cosmopolitical via media between theory and practicePublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.The main point of our study is that the Kantian problem of a suitability between theory and practice, one of the key issues in Kant’s practical thinking in general, was erroneously perceived not only by those who defended it, and conceived of its possibility, but also by those who denied it and defended its impossibility. Our position, conversely, is that Kant, upon approaching a seemingly irresoluble problem, was forced to conceive of a via media, an “intermediate member of connection” between theory and practice; an alternative which, in our view, does not arise out of mere necessity, rather is intimately interconnected from the mid-1770s onwards with the formation of Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges (to be found throughout Kant’s academic activity), a scheme which, in its tridimensionality, establishes Pragmatic Anthropology as a third dimension of human knowledge and therefore as the only suitable soil for the dialogue between theory and practice, beyond the mere possibility or impossibility of the problem. This proposition, we hope, will enable us to ascertain what Kant envisages by the “talent of nature”, the special “act of the power of judgment” that is to serve as connecting member between theory and practice; to explain how Anthropology is to be seen as the natural abode for this mediating interplay; and, finally, to better position, as well as delimit, the scope of Kant’s anthropo-cosmological view of Man in the World, which is to be seen precisely between the merely rational of theory and the merely empirical of practice.
- Returning to itself, in itself: on the meta-hermeneutic dimension of Fichte’s principle of identityPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.Despite its general omission, the “Aenesidemus-Review” stands among a pair of fundamental texts for the initial conception of Fichte’s philosophy. The present article intends to show just how fundamental the “Aenesidemus-Review” is in this scope; namely, we intend to prove the key role the “Aenesidemus-Review” has in establishing a theoretical dialogue, as well as a positional confrontation, between Fichte, Schulze, and Reinhold; how the main problem from thence arisen is a problem of a hermeneutic nature, inasmuch as it deals with the language and the communicability between concept and idea, as well as idea and human spirit (or lack thereof); and hence, how the “Aenesidemus-Review”, and its main problem, subsequently stimulate Fichte for further reflection on the topic: how, from this small writing, Fichte sets out to acquire a new first, uninterpretable, and hence universally communicable principle for all philosophy: the principle of identity.
- “A Superior Anthropological Perspective.” On Kant’s anthropo-cosmological conception of idealPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.The topic of the ideal, that is, the topic of the possible or impossible human attainment of the absolute is ascribed divergent treatments throughout Kant’s work. Namely, it is either promptly accepted as possible by the critical Kant, and seen as something attainable by a means other than an infinite approximation (which would indeed imply a violation of autonomy, but denies the genuineness of the ideal), or it is rejected as impossible by the non-critical Kant, that is, it is seen as something attainable only through an infinite approximation (which would involve an unconditional acceptance of heteronomy, but safeguards the authenticity of an aspiration to the ideal). Yet, the topic of the ideal receives a new, if not conciliatory, at least mutually explanatory approach in Kant’s Anthropology. Here – such is our proposition – Kant proposes a terminus medius between both conceptions of ideal, insofar as he is led to ponder on the mutual benefits of an autonomic possibility and an heteronomic impossibility of an infinite progression in thought; something which Kant proposes under the form of an almost-infinite, or an almost perennial, yet finite duration, to be endured until the attainment of an almost unreachable, yet indeed reachable practical ideal. A terminus medius which, we hope to prove, is none other than that at the root of Kant’s proposition of Pragmatic Anthropology as a mediating science in Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, and which therefore may be ultimately seen as the embodiment of Kant’s anthropo-cosmological, or indeed cosmopolitical dimension of thought, as expressed in Kant’s political and/or historical writings.
- “A maximum in its kind”. The problem of the absolute between Novalis and KantPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.The problem of the absolute, in its religious, political, aesthetic and/or philosophical scopes, is one of the fundamental propeller springs of 18th century thought, especially in Kant’s time and until the period of German Idealism. This paper intends to approach the problem in its philosophical-aesthetic dimension and to discern how the problem of thinking or experiencing the absolute, in the form of philosophical systematicity, as it was legated by Kant and his generation, was one of the main theoretical questions received by a whole generation of young authors. In order to best demonstrate this, we chose the example of the poet and philosopher Novalis. Our objective is, therefore, to investigate how openly, or how negatively Novalis read Kant’s proposition of the a priori and the critical edifice based upon it, and to render evident Novalis’ negation of the possibility of experiencing the absolute but in an “infinite approximation”. We also seek to suggest what could have been Kant’s reply to the objections, namely, an anthropological reply that might have shown the full reach of Kant’s conception of his critical edifice and his philosophical reflection, which might have displayed a new dimension of the reflection on the human in Kant, and thus might have partially exempted the philosopher from the reproaches of his younger readers. Finally, we want to present both Novalis’ and Kant’s (to a certain extent) surprisingly close conception of poetry as the key for the philosophical problem of the absolute.
- “Here (...) Practical Anthropology becomes pure art”: Kant on the distinction between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic AnthropologyPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology, and their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their respective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in theirapparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism.
- Sentimento e reflexão : crítica da identidade nos «Fichte-studien» de NovalisPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.; Justo, José Miranda, 1951-No início da sua produção filosófica, a partir do Outono de 1795, o poeta Novalis colige uma longa série de anotações fragmentárias sobre a doutrina da ciência de Fichte, recolhidas sob a ampla designação «Fichte-Studien». Muitos, e não menos importantes são os temas aí abordados, todos versando a filosofia de Fichte. Mas este conjunto de manuscritos não serve o exclusivo propósito de ler criticamente a teoria fichteana, e muito menos o pensamento filosófico de Novalis nasce com os «Fichte-Studien»; o problema que preside à primeira filosofia de Novalis, e que impregna estes seus manuscritos, é um problema maior, um conflito espiritual entre contrários, a saber, poesia (vida) e filosofia, ou sentimento e reflexão, que Novalis vinha experienciando desde que frequentara as lições de Reinhold sobre Filosofia Elementar, em Jena (1790), que viria a ser decisivamente acentuado pela Doutrina da Ciência, de Fichte (a partir de 1793), e que só então vem a ser trabalhada nos «Fichte-Studien». Nesta dissertação, procurar-se-á expor como Novalis resolve o seu conflito espiritual sob a forma de uma teoria dos contrários, à luz da leitura do mesmo problema em Reinhold e Fichte. A conclusão a que Novalis sobre isto chega é a hipótese de um dinamismo recíproco, uma alternância viva e cumulativa entre contrários, a qual originará o Eu, e o lançará para a sua compreensão reflexiva de si próprio; a saber, a proposta de unir sentimento e reflexão, constituintes essenciais do Eu enquanto ser de contrários, sob a forma de uma união na desunião, na qual coexistem a um tempo a impossibilidade real de unir os contrários e a possibilidade ideal de o fazer; uma proposta que levará Novalis a cindir-se dos seus Professores, e que dele requer uma profunda reflexão sobre a necessidade de repensar os conceitos de Eu, da identidade e do próprio pensar – uma genuína crítica da identidade –, que paulatinamente talha a imagem de Novalis como um pensador autónomo e original no seio do Idealismo Alemão. Por fim, e porque o problema dos contrários é de facto um problema entre poesia e filosofia, e ainda porque os «Fichte-Studien» servem justamente o objectivo de acentuar o conflito espiritual do poeta mediante a filosofia, Novalis transporá este mesmo dinamismo recíproco da união na desunião dos contrários para a questão do filosofar. No filosofar, enquanto pensar natural do humano, se procurará ver a possibilidade de um superior estrato de auto-compreensão do Eu: por um lado, na constatação de que Eu e filosofia nascem no mesmo momento, e que nesse momento ambos ganham uma actividade subjectiva, mas rompem também com a unidade originária, que sempre tentarão recuperar através dessa mesma actividade, e através do pensar dos contrários; por outro, na recondução da questão dos contrários, da noção de dinamismo recíproco, ao pensar filosófico, segundo o que à possibilidade de a filosofia alcançar o absoluto da reunião dos contrários, sempre se opõe a impossibilidade disto mesmo; por fim, à conclusão de que à filosofia e ao Eu não resta senão progredir por uma saciação relativa do absoluto, ou uma aproximação infinita a este, uma insuficência que para Novalis se traduzirá numa tendência de auto-supressão, de morte do pensar e da linguagem da filosofia, que por fim levará a um gradual apagamento e dissolução da imagem do Eu. Esta dissolução, este fim de curso da filosofia, dirá Novalis, é uma transição para uma nova consciência, uma nova linguagem, uma nova vida do Eu – a reescrição de uma nova existência poiética do Eu, que para este significa o retorno possível a uma idade áurea do ser humano, e para Novalis a resolução possível do seu conflito espiritual.
- «An infinitely growing pact with oneself»: Novalis on the origin of philosophyPublication . Silva, Fernando M. F.The present article seeks to inquire the nature of Novalis’ difficult relation with philosophy. By founding this relation in a primordial spiritual conflict, wherein philosophy is the cause and the solution for the latter, as well as in an inescapable mythical understanding, wherein philosophy is at the same time necessary, and yet necessarily expendable, we intend to prove Novalis’ own seemingly contradictory, yet infinitely productive concept of philosophizing: one where philosophizing is a ductile, organic way of dealing with the problem between the human being and the absolute. Furthermore, we wish to prove how this is most visibly considered in the sub-problem of the origin of philosophy, which sets the tone for Novalis’ remaining philosophical edifice and inscribes him as one of the leading opposers of a systematic philosophy — and hence, as an advocator of the impossibility of attaining the absolute through philosophy.