Repository logo
 
Publication

Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment

dc.contributor.authorPais, Joana
dc.contributor.authorPintér, Ágnes
dc.contributor.authorVeszteg, Róbert F.
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-31T20:09:00Z
dc.date.available2022-10-31T20:09:00Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractIn a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.citationPais, Joana, Ágnes Pintér, and Róbert F. Veszteg.(2020). "Decentralized matching markets with (out) frictions: a laboratory experiment." Experimental Economics, Vol. 23, No.1: pp. 212-239.pt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10683-019-09606-1pt_PT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25870
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherSpringerpt_PT
dc.subjectDecentralized Marketspt_PT
dc.subjectTwo-Sided Matchingpt_PT
dc.subjectStabilitypt_PT
dc.subjectEfficiencypt_PT
dc.subjectLaboratory Experimentspt_PT
dc.titleDecentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experimentpt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
JPAIS, APINÉR, RFVESZTEG.2019.pdf
Size:
627.03 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: