Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment

Pais, Joana; Pintér, Ágnes; Veszteg, Róbert F.

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25870

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Authors

Pais, Joana

Pintér, Ágnes

Veszteg, Róbert F.

Abstract(s)

In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.

Keywords

Decentralized Markets Two-Sided Matching Stability Efficiency Laboratory Experiments

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25870

Citation

Pais, Joana, Ágnes Pintér, and Róbert F. Veszteg.(2020). "Decentralized matching markets with (out) frictions: a laboratory experiment." Experimental Economics, Vol. 23, No.1: pp. 212-239.