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The importance of being incongruent : how memorable would an uncultured librarian be : towards a resolution of the apparent discrepancy between expectancy-based illusory correlations and incongruency effects
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Even with the benefit of hindsight and after more than 10
years, Hastie and Kumar's results (Hastie & Kumar, 1979) can
still strike us as unexpected. And given the state of the art
in cognitive and social psychology at that time, they must have
seemed then even more surprising. It is little wonder, thus,
the sheer amount of relevant research and ideas they triggered.
The above mentioned results are, of course, the
"incongruency effect," that is, information incongruent with an
expectancy is better recalled than congruent information. The
reasons for the unexpectedness of this effect lie in the
convergent support that had been accumulating for the view of
the social perceiver as someone with a very distinct aversion
for dissonance (Festinger, 1957; but see also Pina Prata,
1976), belief or stereotype change (Allport, 1954; Hamilton &
Rose, 1980), impression revision (Anderson & Hubert, 1963;
Asch, 1946), hypothesis disconfirmation (Bruner & Potter, 1964;
Mynatt, Doherty & Tweeney, 1977; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972)
or information unrelated to an activated schema (Rummelhart &
Ortony, 1977) .
Nevertheless, expected or not, the incongruency effect is
now quite respectable, robust, reasonably well documented and
delimited (for reviews see Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Stangor & McMillan, 1992;
Wyer, 1989; Wyer & Srull, 1986, 1989). This fact alone made
conceptual attempts to reconcile the incongruency effect with
the several "congruency biases" just referred to (e.g., belief
perseverance, confirmation bias or schema filter) almost
unavoidable. Unfortunately there are reasons to believe that
these efforts have not been completely successful in achieving
the desired reconciliation. A more detailed discussion of them
will be provided in a later section.
In this dissertation a new attempt to develop a
satisfactory solution for the dilemma at hand will be made.
The solution will be specifically targeted at one of the
effects apparently incompatible with the incongruency effect -
the expectancy-based illusory correlation, that is, the
tendency to overestimate the frequency of occurrences that are
congruent with a previously held expectancy (Hamilton & Rose,
1980; see also Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969, 1971). The
reasons for focusing on a specific effect and for choosing this
particular one, are: i) the fact the illusory correlation
effect, like the incongruency effect, is very robust; ii) the
similarity of the Hamilton and Rose (1980) experimental
paradigm with the one used by Hastie and Kumar (1979) ; and iii)
the belief that attempting the integration will provide a
deeper understanding of both effects.
This introduction will first briefly present the Hastie-Srull experimental paradigm, the typical pattern of results
and the basic characteristics of the Hastie-Srull model.Then,
a section of the dissertation will deal with previous attempts
to reconcile the incongruency effect with discrepant results
and another section to the related topic of the interconnections
between memory and judgment. Next, the illusory
correlation effect will be presented succinctly, a new
conceptual integration will be attempted and finally four
experiments targeted at this integration will be reported.
Descrição
Tese de doutoramento em Psicologia (Psicologia Social), apresentada à Universidade de Lisboa através da Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação, 1993
Palavras-chave
Processos cognitivos Personalidade Atitudes Comportamento social Psicologia social Teses de doutoramento - 1993