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Abstract(s)
As assimetrias híbridas consistem em disparidades na qualificação e tratamento fiscal de entidades e instrumentos financeiros em dois ou mais Estados, que conduzem a diferentes resultados fiscais, como a dupla dedução e a dedução sem inclusão. Estas disparidades são há muito exploradas pelos sujeitos passivos, que através do planeamento fiscal agressivo, desenvolvem operações transfronteiriças recorrendo a entidades e instrumentos financeiros híbridos, de modo a obterem resultados fiscais mais vantajosos. Porém, o problema não está apenas nos sujeitos passivos, sendo que também os Estados entram numa concorrência fiscal prejudicial, numa autêntica race to the bottom, que fomenta a elisão fiscal. Nos últimos anos, verificou-se um avanço no combate às assimetrias híbridas conduzido pela Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Económico (OCDE) e pela União Europeia, que têm procurado ativamente soluções destinadas à sua neutralização, tendo-se percebido que é necessária uma resposta coordenada por parte dos Estados. Assim, a presente dissertação estuda a origem do problema, as soluções adotadas, bem como as suas limitações, através da análise da Ação 2 do Projeto BEPS da OCDE, da Diretiva (UE) 2016/1164 do Conselho, de 12 de julho (ATAD I), da Diretiva (UE) 2017/952 do Conselho de 29 de maio de 2017 (ATAD II), e ainda das regras destinadas a neutralizar os efeitos das assimetrias híbridas consagradas no Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Coletivas. Embora as limitações que se verificavam relativamente à Ação 2 tenham sido, em parte, ultrapassadas pelas ATAD I e II, através da sua transposição pelos Estados-Membros, a origem das assimetrias híbridas, que se prende com os conflitos de qualificação das entidades e dos instrumentos financeiros nos diferentes Estados mantém-se, pelo que, é possível antecipar que nos próximos anos ainda se discuta a eficácia das medidas adotadas.
Hybrid mismatches consist of disparities in the qualification and tax treatment of entities and financial instruments in two or more States, which lead to different tax results, such as double deduction and deduction without inclusion. These disparities have been exploited by taxpayers for a long time, whom, through tax transactions, have developed cross-border operations using hybrid entities and financial instruments to obtain more advantageous tax results. However, the problem is not just the taxpayers, the States also engage in harmful tax competition, in an authentic race to the bottom, which encourages the tax avoidance. In the past few years, there has been progress in the fight against hybrid mismatches led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union, which have actively searched for solutions aimed at neutralizing them, having realized that a coordinated response by the States is needed. Thus, this dissertation studies the origin of the problem, the solutions adopted, as well as its limitations, through the analysis of the Action 2 of the OECD BEPS Project, the Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I), the Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), and the rules designed to neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatches enshrined in the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Code. Although the limitations that existed in relation to Action 2 were, in part, overcome by ATAD I and II, through their transposition by the Member States, the origin of the hybrid mismatches, which is linked to the qualification conflicts of the entities and financial instruments in different States remains. Therefore, it is possible to anticipate that in the coming years the effectiveness of the adopted measures will still be discussed.
Hybrid mismatches consist of disparities in the qualification and tax treatment of entities and financial instruments in two or more States, which lead to different tax results, such as double deduction and deduction without inclusion. These disparities have been exploited by taxpayers for a long time, whom, through tax transactions, have developed cross-border operations using hybrid entities and financial instruments to obtain more advantageous tax results. However, the problem is not just the taxpayers, the States also engage in harmful tax competition, in an authentic race to the bottom, which encourages the tax avoidance. In the past few years, there has been progress in the fight against hybrid mismatches led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union, which have actively searched for solutions aimed at neutralizing them, having realized that a coordinated response by the States is needed. Thus, this dissertation studies the origin of the problem, the solutions adopted, as well as its limitations, through the analysis of the Action 2 of the OECD BEPS Project, the Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I), the Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), and the rules designed to neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatches enshrined in the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Code. Although the limitations that existed in relation to Action 2 were, in part, overcome by ATAD I and II, through their transposition by the Member States, the origin of the hybrid mismatches, which is linked to the qualification conflicts of the entities and financial instruments in different States remains. Therefore, it is possible to anticipate that in the coming years the effectiveness of the adopted measures will still be discussed.
Description
Keywords
Direito fiscal Instrumentos financeiros Elisão fiscal IRC Concorrência fiscal Teses de mestrado - 2024 Tax law Financial instruments Tax avoidance Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Tax competition
