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Authors
Abstract(s)
Esta dissertação examina a agência dos Estados-Membros na UEM na formulação do neoliberalismo e sua lógica inerente de competição internacional, empregando um paradigma de teoria crítica. Baseada em uma ontologia que vê as estruturas econômicas e políticas como mutuamente constitutivas, e em uma epistemologia que enfatiza o papel das relações de poder na formação do conhecimento, este estudo adota uma metodologia crítica para investigar a interação entre as ações dos estados e as políticas neoliberais dentro da UEM.
Aplicando a estrutura teórica de Leo Panitch e Sam Gindin, a dissertação explora como a UEM – e especificamente a Comissão Europeia – representa apenas um estandarte político para o compromisso dos Estados-Membros com o neoliberalismo, em vez de uma verdadeira organização supranacional capaz de impor parâmetros fiscais específicos. Em consonância com esta perspetiva, a dissertação investiga como os estados agem não apenas como implementadores passivos de reformas neoliberais, mas como agentes ativos na construção e perpetuação do neoliberalismo.O estudo de caso principal foca na Itália, analisando como as autoridades italianas têm navegado pelas oportunidades da adesão à UEM para implementar reformas neoliberais. O caso italiano é particularmente ilustrativo das contradições entre a disciplina fiscal supranacional e o clima de negócios competitivo nacional, demonstrando que as autoridades nacionais, embora operando com déficits excessivos, podem ganhar a confiança dos investidores internacionais para atrair capital. Para enriquecer a análise, Alemanha e França são examinadas como estudos de caso comparativos. As autoridades alemãs e francesas têm sido capazes de criar um clima de negócios favorável para os investidores internacionais enquanto operam com dívida pública e déficit público geral excessivos.
A dissertação, portanto, destaca a importância da agência estatal no projeto neoliberal, chamando por uma apreciação mais crítica e nuançada da agência dos Estados-Membros na formação da ordem neoliberal baseada no mercado competitivo dentro da UEM.
This dissertation examines the agency of Member States within the Economic and Monetary Union in making neo-liberalism and its inherent logic of international competition, employing a critical theory paradigm. Grounded in an ontology that views economic and political structures as mutually constitutive, and an epistemology that emphasises the role of power relations in shaping knowledge, this study adopts a critical methodology to interrogate the interplay between states’ actions and neo-liberal policies within the Economic and Monetary Union. Applying Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin's theoretical framework, the dissertation explores how the Economic and Monetary Union – and specifically the European Commission – represents a mere political banner to Member States’ commitment to neo-liberalism and its logic of international competition rather than an actual supra-national organisation able to enforce specific fiscal parameters. Consistently, the dissertation explores how states act not merely as passive implementers of neo-liberal reforms but as active agents in the construction and perpetuation of neo-liberalism. The primary case study focuses on Italy, analysing how Italian authorities have navigated the opportunities of the Economic and Monetary Union’s membership to implement neo-liberal reforms. The Italian case is particularly illustrative of the contradictions between supra-national fiscal discipline and national competitive business climate, demonstrating that national authorities, while running excessive deficits, can win the trust international investors to attract capital. To enrich the analysis, Germany and France are examined as comparative case studies. German and French authorities have been able to create a favourable business climate for international investors while running excessive general government debt and general government deficit. The dissertation thus underscores the significance of state agency in the neoliberal project, calling for a more critical and nuanced appreciation of the agency of Member States in shaping the neo-liberal competitive market-based order within the Economic and Monetary Union.
This dissertation examines the agency of Member States within the Economic and Monetary Union in making neo-liberalism and its inherent logic of international competition, employing a critical theory paradigm. Grounded in an ontology that views economic and political structures as mutually constitutive, and an epistemology that emphasises the role of power relations in shaping knowledge, this study adopts a critical methodology to interrogate the interplay between states’ actions and neo-liberal policies within the Economic and Monetary Union. Applying Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin's theoretical framework, the dissertation explores how the Economic and Monetary Union – and specifically the European Commission – represents a mere political banner to Member States’ commitment to neo-liberalism and its logic of international competition rather than an actual supra-national organisation able to enforce specific fiscal parameters. Consistently, the dissertation explores how states act not merely as passive implementers of neo-liberal reforms but as active agents in the construction and perpetuation of neo-liberalism. The primary case study focuses on Italy, analysing how Italian authorities have navigated the opportunities of the Economic and Monetary Union’s membership to implement neo-liberal reforms. The Italian case is particularly illustrative of the contradictions between supra-national fiscal discipline and national competitive business climate, demonstrating that national authorities, while running excessive deficits, can win the trust international investors to attract capital. To enrich the analysis, Germany and France are examined as comparative case studies. German and French authorities have been able to create a favourable business climate for international investors while running excessive general government debt and general government deficit. The dissertation thus underscores the significance of state agency in the neoliberal project, calling for a more critical and nuanced appreciation of the agency of Member States in shaping the neo-liberal competitive market-based order within the Economic and Monetary Union.
Description
Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Ciência Política
Keywords
Teoria Crítica Neoliberalismo Competição União Europeia Estados-Membros Critical theory Neo-liberalism competition European Union Member States