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Decisões de compromissos da comissão europeia sobre violações antitruste : uma análise de seus impactos sobre as empresas em posição dominante
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Resumo(s)
A presente pesquisa analisa as Decisões de Compromissos da Comissão Europeia em casos de violações antitruste envolvendo Empresas em Posição Dominante, com foco em seus impactos sobre o comportamento e a dinâmica competitiva dessas empresas no mercado. O estudo parte da fundamentação teórica da Teoria dos Jogos e da Regulação Econômica para compreender as estratégias empresariais e o papel das Agências Reguladoras na promoção da concorrência. O capítulo 1 apresenta uma revisão crítica da Teoria dos Jogos, destacando conceitos como Equilíbrio de Nash e o Dilema dos Prisioneiros, bem como as principais Teorias da Regulação aplicáveis ao ambiente concorrencial. Essa base teórica serve para contextualizar as práticas estratégicas das empresas e a importância dos mecanismos de controle regulatório, em especial no âmbito da concorrência. No segundo capítulo, são abordados os conceitos de Mercado Relevante e Abuso de Posição Dominante, além da evolução histórica, inclusive institucional, e das práticas da Comissão Europeia no tratamento desses casos. Destaca-se o papel crescente das decisões de compromissos como instrumento alternativo à aplicação tradicional de sanções, visando uma solução eficiente e célere dos conflitos concorrenciais. O último capítulo consiste na análise de casos emblemáticos envolvendo empresas como Google, Microsoft, Intel, Qualcomm, Facebook (Meta) e Amazon. São examinados os termos dos compromissos negociados, avaliando sua eficiência em promover a concorrência, estimular a inovação e minimizar os impactos negativos para o mercado, conforme a Política da Concorrência para a União Europeia. Por fim, conclui que as Decisões de Compromissos representam uma ferramenta relevante para Comissão Europeia e as Empresas em Posição Dominante, ao permitir soluções flexíveis e menos litigiosas para violações da concorrência, embora sua eficácia dependa da adequada implementação e monitoramento dos acordos firmados, de forma a garantir efeitos concretos e permanentes, ao enfrentar as anomalias investigadas.
This research analyzes the Commitment Decisions of the European Commission in antitrust violation cases involving Dominant Position Companies, focusing on their impacts on the behavior and competitive dynamics of these companies in the market. The study is grounded in the theoretical framework of Game Theory and Economic Regulation to understand corporate strategies and the role of Regulatory Agencies in promoting competition. Chapter 1 presents a critical review of Game Theory, highlighting concepts such as Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as the main theories of Regulation applicable to the competitive environment. This theoretical foundation serves to contextualize companies’ strategic practices and the importance of regulatory control mechanisms, especially in the scope of competition. The second chapter addresses the concepts of Relevant Market and Abuse of Dominant Position, along with the historical and institutional evolution and the European Commission’s practices in handling these cases. It emphasizes the growing role of commitment decisions as an alternative instrument to traditional sanction enforcement, aiming for an efficient and swift resolution of competitive conflicts. The final chapter consists of an analysis of emblematic cases involving companies such as Google, Microsoft, Intel, Qualcomm, Facebook (Meta), and Amazon. The negotiated commitment terms are examined, evaluating their effectiveness in promoting competition, stimulating innovation, and minimizing negative market impacts in line with the European Union Competition Policy. Finally, it is concluded that Commitment Decisions represent a relevant tool for both the European Commission and Dominant Firms, as they allow for flexible and less litigious solutions to competition violations. However, their effectiveness depends on the proper implementation and monitoring of the agreements reached, in order to ensure concrete and lasting effects in addressing the investigated anomalies.
This research analyzes the Commitment Decisions of the European Commission in antitrust violation cases involving Dominant Position Companies, focusing on their impacts on the behavior and competitive dynamics of these companies in the market. The study is grounded in the theoretical framework of Game Theory and Economic Regulation to understand corporate strategies and the role of Regulatory Agencies in promoting competition. Chapter 1 presents a critical review of Game Theory, highlighting concepts such as Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as the main theories of Regulation applicable to the competitive environment. This theoretical foundation serves to contextualize companies’ strategic practices and the importance of regulatory control mechanisms, especially in the scope of competition. The second chapter addresses the concepts of Relevant Market and Abuse of Dominant Position, along with the historical and institutional evolution and the European Commission’s practices in handling these cases. It emphasizes the growing role of commitment decisions as an alternative instrument to traditional sanction enforcement, aiming for an efficient and swift resolution of competitive conflicts. The final chapter consists of an analysis of emblematic cases involving companies such as Google, Microsoft, Intel, Qualcomm, Facebook (Meta), and Amazon. The negotiated commitment terms are examined, evaluating their effectiveness in promoting competition, stimulating innovation, and minimizing negative market impacts in line with the European Union Competition Policy. Finally, it is concluded that Commitment Decisions represent a relevant tool for both the European Commission and Dominant Firms, as they allow for flexible and less litigious solutions to competition violations. However, their effectiveness depends on the proper implementation and monitoring of the agreements reached, in order to ensure concrete and lasting effects in addressing the investigated anomalies.
Descrição
Direito e Prática Jurídica, 2025
Palavras-chave
Comissão Europeia Abuso de posição dominante Direito da concorrência Teoria dos jogos Regulação económica Teses de mestrado - 2025