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O conflito entre a Necessidade e a Liberdade na Freiheitsschrift de F.W.J. von Schelling
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Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände), redigida em 1809 por F.W.J.
von Schelling (1775-1854), constitui uma das obras mais importantes e influentes, não
apenas no período do chamado Idealismo Alemão, mas na filosofia alemã pós-kantiana em
geral. Este escrito inaugura o período intermédio (1809-1821) do pensamento
schellinguiano, declara a transição efectuada entre o Identitätssystem e a filosofia da
liberdade e antecipa muitas das posições que Schelling apenas completará na sua
Spätphilosophie. A presente dissertação procura exibir o modo como, nesse tratado,
Schelling se debruça sobre a problemática da integração da liberdade humana num sistema.
Sob a mira do autor está o modo como Jacobi e Schlegel concluem pela incompatibilidade
entre as noções de liberdade e sistema a partir da afirmação de que o único possível sistema
da razão é o panteísmo, o qual é, no entanto, um fatalismo. Contra esta equação, Schelling
mostra que a feição fatalista que o panteísmo pode, de facto, adquirir, em nada se deve ao
que é essencial nesta doutrina, i.e. a imanência das coisas em Deus: a dependência
intrínseca a esta imanência não suprime a autonomia, e o que, no Espinosismo, foi
responsável pelo necessitarismo, não foi a noção de imanência, mas, outrossim, o modo
mecânico de representação da natureza. Aprofundando a essência do panteísmo, a
Freiheitsschrift vai pensar a processão do homem em e a partir de Deus como uma autorevelação
do segundo através do primeiro, levantando a noção central de absolutidade
derivada enquanto lugar conceptual da liberdade humana num sistema. Assegurado este
lugar conceptual, Schelling descreve o exercício efectivo da liberdade humana como
repetição do absoluto: esta solução unifica a liberdade com a necessidade ao permitir,
através de um acto de auto-determinação transcendental da vontade, a coexistência do
determinismo com a responsabilidade.
The Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Matters Connected Therewith (Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschliche Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände) written by F.W.J. von Schelling (1775-1854) in 1809, is one of the most important and influential works, not only in the period of so-called German Idealism, but in post-Kantian German philosophy in general. It inaugurates the middle period (1809-1821) of Schelling’s thought, it declares the transition between the Identitätssystem and the Philosophie der Freiheit and anticipates many of the positions that Schelling would later adopt in his Spätphilosophie. This dissertation seeks to show how Schelling addresses the problem of integrating human freedom into a system in this 1809 treatise. It focuses on how Jacobi and Schlegel conclude that the concepts of freedom and system are incompatible, basing their rationale on the assertion that the only possible system of reason is pantheism, which is, however, fatalism. Against this equation, Schelling shows that the fatalistic aspect that pantheism can acquire is in no way related to what is essential in this doctrine, i.e. the immanence of things in God: the intrinsic dependence brought about by immanence does not suppress autonomy, and what was responsible for the necessitarianism in Spinoza’s system was not the notion of immanence, but rather its mechanical way of representing nature. Deepening the investigation on essence of pantheism, the Freiheitsschrift will think of the procession of man in and from God as a self-revelation of the latter through the former, thus raising the central notion of derived absoluteness as the conceptual place of human freedom in a system. Having secured this conceptual place, Schelling describes the effective exercise of human freedom as a repetition of God’s act of creation: this solution unites freedom and necessity by allowing, through an act of transcendental self-determination of the will, the coexistence of determinism and responsibility.
The Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Matters Connected Therewith (Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschliche Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände) written by F.W.J. von Schelling (1775-1854) in 1809, is one of the most important and influential works, not only in the period of so-called German Idealism, but in post-Kantian German philosophy in general. It inaugurates the middle period (1809-1821) of Schelling’s thought, it declares the transition between the Identitätssystem and the Philosophie der Freiheit and anticipates many of the positions that Schelling would later adopt in his Spätphilosophie. This dissertation seeks to show how Schelling addresses the problem of integrating human freedom into a system in this 1809 treatise. It focuses on how Jacobi and Schlegel conclude that the concepts of freedom and system are incompatible, basing their rationale on the assertion that the only possible system of reason is pantheism, which is, however, fatalism. Against this equation, Schelling shows that the fatalistic aspect that pantheism can acquire is in no way related to what is essential in this doctrine, i.e. the immanence of things in God: the intrinsic dependence brought about by immanence does not suppress autonomy, and what was responsible for the necessitarianism in Spinoza’s system was not the notion of immanence, but rather its mechanical way of representing nature. Deepening the investigation on essence of pantheism, the Freiheitsschrift will think of the procession of man in and from God as a self-revelation of the latter through the former, thus raising the central notion of derived absoluteness as the conceptual place of human freedom in a system. Having secured this conceptual place, Schelling describes the effective exercise of human freedom as a repetition of God’s act of creation: this solution unites freedom and necessity by allowing, through an act of transcendental self-determination of the will, the coexistence of determinism and responsibility.