Publicação
Improving schools through school choice : An experimental study of deferred acceptance
| dc.contributor.author | Klijn, Flip | |
| dc.contributor.author | Pais, Joana | |
| dc.contributor.author | Vorsatz, Marc | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-31T20:52:20Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-10-31T20:52:20Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’ true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches, we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle. | pt_PT |
| dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.citation | Klijn, Flip, Joana Pais, and Marc Vorsatz.(2020). "Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance" .Economics Letters, Vol .186: 108853. | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25871 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | School Choice | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Matching | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Deferred Acceptance | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | School Quality | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Stability | pt_PT |
| dc.title | Improving schools through school choice : An experimental study of deferred acceptance | pt_PT |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | article | pt_PT |