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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
As visões tradicionais sobre os estereótipos consideram-nos estruturas estáveis
armazenadas na memória e recuperadas intactas, enquanto as visões mais recentes
enfatizam a fluidez e flexibilidade dos estereótipos, propondo que estes são construídos com
base no conjunto de conhecimentos disponível num determinado momento. Contudo, pouca
ou nenhuma investigação foi feita para determinar quão estáveis podem ser estas estruturas
de conhecimento. Nas três experiências seguintes, é feita uma estimativa da estabilidade dos
estereótipos e das crenças individuais sobre grupos sociais. O método usado consistiu em
pedir aos sujeitos que desempenhassem as mesmas tarefas de recuperação em duas
sessões separadas por duas semanas. Em cada sessão da Experiência I, foi pedido aos
participantes que listassem atributos de grupos sociais com base nos seus estereótipos e
com base nas suas crenças pessoais. A correlação média entre os conteúdos produzidos nas
duas sessões foi .51, para os estereótipos, e .52, para as crenças individuais. Os resultados
são consistentes com a ideia de que a representação de uma determinada categoria social
varia substancialmente intra sujeito. Colocou-se também a hipótese que, porque se supunha
que os exemplares tivessem um maior efeito nas descrições baseadas em crenças
individuais, os estereótipos fossem mais estáveis do que as crenças individuais, e essa
hipótese foi infirmada. A Experiência II revelou resultados semelhantes, utilizando outros
grupos sociais. Na Experiência III, em vez de listar atributos, foi pedido aos sujeitos que
gerassem instâncias de grupos sociais. Semelhantemente, a correlação média entre as
instâncias geradas nas duas sessões foi apenas modesta, .57. Em conjunto, estes resultados
ilustram a instabilidade substancial das representações de categorias sociais intra
individualmente, o que sugere que as estruturas de conhecimento invariantes que muitos
investigadores procuram identificar são meras ficções. E que alguma estabilidade temporal
que se verificou nas representações de uma categoria ficou a dever-se aos atributos verbais
considerados mais centrais e às instâncias consideradas mais típicas para a descrição da
mesma, e não aqueles atributos e instâncias periféricos. São discutidas implicações destes
resultados para as teorias sobre como são representados mentalmente os grupos sociais.
Traditional views regard stereotypes as stable structures that are retrieved from memory intact, whereas more recent views contend that stereotypes are constructed at the time that they are evoked and are thus relatively flexible. However, little or none research has been done to determine how reliably such information can be retrieved from memory. In the next three experiments, an estimate of reliability of stereotypes and personal beliefs about social groups was made. The method used was to ask subjects to perform the same retrieval task in each of two sessions separated by two weeks. In each session of Experiment I, participants were asked to list characteristics of social groups based on their stereotypes and based on their personal beliefs. The mean correlation between the contents of the two sessions was found to be .51, for stereotypes, and .52, for personal beliefs. The results are consistent with the idea that representation of a given social category varies substantially within-subjects. It was also hypothesized that, because exemplars would have a stronger effect on descriptions of personal beliefs, stereotypes would be more reliable than personal beliefs, and this hipothesis was disconfirmed. Experiment II indicated similar results with other social groups. In Experiment III, instead of listing characteristics, the subjects were asked to generate instances of social groups. Similarly, the mean correlation between the contents of the two recalls was found to be only modest, .57. Taken together, these findings illustrate substantial within-subject instability in social category representation. This suggests that the invariant knowledge structures that many researchers attempt to identify are merely fictions. And that some stability found in social category representation was due to characteristics and instances considered central to her description, and not to peripheral ones. Implications of these findings for theories about how social groups are represented mentally are discussed.
Traditional views regard stereotypes as stable structures that are retrieved from memory intact, whereas more recent views contend that stereotypes are constructed at the time that they are evoked and are thus relatively flexible. However, little or none research has been done to determine how reliably such information can be retrieved from memory. In the next three experiments, an estimate of reliability of stereotypes and personal beliefs about social groups was made. The method used was to ask subjects to perform the same retrieval task in each of two sessions separated by two weeks. In each session of Experiment I, participants were asked to list characteristics of social groups based on their stereotypes and based on their personal beliefs. The mean correlation between the contents of the two sessions was found to be .51, for stereotypes, and .52, for personal beliefs. The results are consistent with the idea that representation of a given social category varies substantially within-subjects. It was also hypothesized that, because exemplars would have a stronger effect on descriptions of personal beliefs, stereotypes would be more reliable than personal beliefs, and this hipothesis was disconfirmed. Experiment II indicated similar results with other social groups. In Experiment III, instead of listing characteristics, the subjects were asked to generate instances of social groups. Similarly, the mean correlation between the contents of the two recalls was found to be only modest, .57. Taken together, these findings illustrate substantial within-subject instability in social category representation. This suggests that the invariant knowledge structures that many researchers attempt to identify are merely fictions. And that some stability found in social category representation was due to characteristics and instances considered central to her description, and not to peripheral ones. Implications of these findings for theories about how social groups are represented mentally are discussed.
Descrição
Tese de mestrado em Psicologia (Psicologia Cognitiva) apresentada à Universidade de Lisboa através da Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação, 2001
Palavras-chave
Estereótipos Crenças individuais Grupos sociais Cognição social Teses de mestrado - 2001
