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Normatividade, naturalidade e necessidade
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Abstract(s)
Porventura, o principal problema a enfrentar em Filosofia Normativa é aquele que designarei de ‘problema da compatibilidade’: as normas têm duas características essenciais, a necessidade e a violabilidade, que parecem ser incompatíveis. De acordo com a primeira das características intrínsecas das normas, se p é obrigatório, então p tem de ser verdadeira. De acordo com a segunda das características intrínsecas das normas, mesmo sendo p obrigatório, p pode não ser verdadeira.
A capacidade para acomodar esta aparente natureza paradoxal das normas constitui o teste derradeiro de verdade de uma tese em Filosofia Normativa. Defendo que só uma tese passa este teste: a semântica condicional, fortemente inspirada no que Husserl diz nas Investigações Lógicas.
Esta tese rivaliza directamente com a semântica dos mundos ideais, surgida a par do desenvolvimento da Lógica Deôntica no século XX. Para a semântica dos mundos ideais, ‘p é obrigatório’ significa ‘p é uma verdade em todos os mundos possíveis que são os ideais’. Como o mundo atual não é um mundo ideal, fica explicado o facto de p poder não ser verdadeira no mundo atual, mesmo havendo necessidade.
E se o mundo atual for um mundo ideal? Continua a não haver violabilidade: a verdade de ‘p é obrigatório’ no mundo atual garante a verdade de ‘p’ no mundo atual. Seguindo a semântica dos mundos ideais, as normas são invioláveis em todos os mundos ideais.
Nesta dissertação, defendo que o termo ‘necessário’ é ambíguo e que, no contexto normativo, é usado de um modo particular: não designa o conceito modal de necessidade mas o conceito de indispensabilidade. Dizer que p é normativamente necessário é o mesmo que dizer que p é indispensável (para alguma coisa). Ora, é possível que ‘p’ seja indispensável e falsa simultaneamente.
Arguably the main problem in Normative Philosophy is (my words) ‘the compatibility problem’: norms have two essential characteristics, necessity and violability, which appear to be incompatible. If necessity is an intrinsic property of norms, the, if p is obligatory, p must be true. But if violability is also an intrinsic property of norms, even though is true that p is obligatory, p may not be true. The capacity to accommodate this (apparently) paradoxical nature of norms is the ultimate test of truth in Normative Philosophy. I argue that only one theory passes that test: the conditional semantics, already present in Husserl’s remarks about normativity in his Logical Investigations. This theory directly rivals ideal worlds semantics, which appeared alongside the development of the Deontic Logic in the twentieth century. According to ideal worlds semantics ‘p is obligatory’ means ‘p is true in every possible ideal world’. Since the actual world is not an ideal world, ‘p’ may be false in the actual world, even though its truth is a necessity. But there is still no violability. Let’s imagine that the actual world is an ideal world. Then, according to ideal worlds semantics, the truth of ‘p is obligatory’ in the actual world warrants the truth of ‘p’ in the actual world: the obligation of p becomes inviolable. Norms, in general, according to ideal worlds semantics, are inviolable in every ideal world. I argue that words like ‘necessary’ are ambiguous and, in the normative context, are used in a particular manner: it does not designate the modal concept of necessity, it designates the concept of indispensability – to say that p is normatively necessary is to say that p is indispensable for something else. And it is possible for p to be indispensable and false simultaneously.
Arguably the main problem in Normative Philosophy is (my words) ‘the compatibility problem’: norms have two essential characteristics, necessity and violability, which appear to be incompatible. If necessity is an intrinsic property of norms, the, if p is obligatory, p must be true. But if violability is also an intrinsic property of norms, even though is true that p is obligatory, p may not be true. The capacity to accommodate this (apparently) paradoxical nature of norms is the ultimate test of truth in Normative Philosophy. I argue that only one theory passes that test: the conditional semantics, already present in Husserl’s remarks about normativity in his Logical Investigations. This theory directly rivals ideal worlds semantics, which appeared alongside the development of the Deontic Logic in the twentieth century. According to ideal worlds semantics ‘p is obligatory’ means ‘p is true in every possible ideal world’. Since the actual world is not an ideal world, ‘p’ may be false in the actual world, even though its truth is a necessity. But there is still no violability. Let’s imagine that the actual world is an ideal world. Then, according to ideal worlds semantics, the truth of ‘p is obligatory’ in the actual world warrants the truth of ‘p’ in the actual world: the obligation of p becomes inviolable. Norms, in general, according to ideal worlds semantics, are inviolable in every ideal world. I argue that words like ‘necessary’ are ambiguous and, in the normative context, are used in a particular manner: it does not designate the modal concept of necessity, it designates the concept of indispensability – to say that p is normatively necessary is to say that p is indispensable for something else. And it is possible for p to be indispensable and false simultaneously.
Description
Keywords
Norma (Moral) Valores (Filosofia) Teses de doutoramento - 2020