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Compreendendo o significado moral e cognitivo do fenómeno do vitimizador feliz : um estudo exploratório em crianças de 6-7 anos
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Nos últimos dez anos, o estudo das emoções que as crianças atribuem em actos de
vitimização tem sido um tem a de muito interesse dentro da literatura sobre o desenvolvimento
sócio-moral da criança. De modo contra-intuitivo, os estudos têm mostrado que, em certa altura
do seu desenvolvimento, as crianças esperam que um transgressor se sinta bem (i.e., vitimizador
feliz), não mal (i.e., vitimizador infeliz), embora reconheçam que tal transgressor cometeu
previamente uma efectiva transgressão moral. É bastante surpreendente, contudo, que os estudos
anteriores não tenham procurado compreender de um modo relativamente sistemático o
significado cognitivo e moral possivelmente envolvido nas emoções positivas e negativas que as
crianças atribuem em contextos de vitimização. O objectivo central desta dissertação de
mestrado é contribuir para a clarificação de tal significado e, portanto, ajudar a compreender
melhor o próprio fenómeno do vitimizador feliz/infeliz.
Oitenta crianças entre os 6 e os 7 anos foram confrontadas inicialmente com duas
histórias de transgressões m orais (i.e., roubar um chocolate; empurrar um colega do baloiço).
Metade das crianças foram solicitadas a atribuir emoções positivas ou negativas ao vitimizador
numa condição ou questão factual (i.e., Como se sente o vitimizador no fim da história e
porquê?)-, as outras crianças atribuíram emoções numa questão ou condição deôntica (i.e., Como
se deve sentir o vitimizador no fim da história e porquê?). As atribuições de emoções positivas e
negativas das crianças foram depois relacionadas com a sua competência para coordenarem
afirmações/negações numa prova Piagetiana de afirmação/negação (Piaget, 1974) e com o seu
sentido de justiça nalgumas histórias da escala de heteronomia/autonomia moral de Kurtines e
Pimm (1983).
Os resultados mostraram que (a) o fenómeno do vitimizador feliz foi significativamente
mais baixo na condição deôntica do que na factual; (b) este resultado foi também visível nas
justificações das crianças, já que estas tenderam a invocar razões orientadas moralmente na
condição deôntica e orientadas materialmente na condição factual; (c) o fenómeno do
vitimizador feliz/infeliz não esteve tão articulado com a competência das crianças para
coordenarem afirmações/negações de tipo Piagetiano quanto tinham os previsto; e (d) embora o
fenómeno do vitimizador infeliz tenha evidenciado alguma articulação com o sentido de
autonomia moral das crianças, tal articulação foi menos forte do que nós prevíamos.
A descoberta de que a atribuição de emoções positivas feita pelas crianças em contextos
de vitimização diminui de modo significativo quando elas são indagadas de um ponto de vista
deôntico ou normativo lança algumas dúvidas sobre a ideia assumida por diversos investigadores
de que tal padrão de atribuição é inerentemente imoral; ajuda a compreender resultados
contraditórios de estudos anteriores; e coloca alguns problemas às teorias de desenvolvimento
moral de Kohlberg com o de Turiel.
Over the last ten years, children’s attribution of emotions to victimizers has been a topic of interest in the literature on the child s socio-moral development. In a counter- intuitive way, studies have shown that, at a certain point in their development, children expect a victimizer to feel good (i.e., a happy victimizer) rather than bad (i.e., an unhappy victimizer), even though they recognize that the victimizer performed an immoral act. Rather surprisingly, previous studies have not tried to understand in a relatively systematic way the cognitive and moral meaning possibly involved in the child’s attribution of positive and negative emotions in acts of victimizations. The main goal of this master’s dissertation is to make a contribution to clarify this meaning and, hence, to help us understand better the happy/unhappy victimizer phenomenon. Eighty children aged 6 and 7 were first presented with two hypothetical moral transgressions/stories (i.e., stealing a chocolate; pushing someone off a swing). Half of the children were asked to attribute positive or negative emotions to the victimizer in a factual condition or question (i.e., How does the victimizer feel at the end of the story, and why?), and the other children attributed emotions in a deontic question or condition (i.e., How should the victimizer feel at the end of the story, and why?). Children’s attribution of positive and negative emotions to the victimizer was further related to their capacity to coordinate affirmations and negations on a Piagetian affirmation/negation task (Piaget, 1974), and to their heteronomous/autonomous moral orientation as assessed through some stories of Kurtines and Pimm ’s (1983) moral development scale. The results showed that (1) the happy victimizer phenomenon was significantly lower in the deontic than the factual condition; (2) this finding was also visible in children’s justifications because they tended to invoke morally oriented reasons in the deontic condition, and outcome oriented reasons in the factual condition; (c) the happy/unhappy phenomenon was not so related to children’s coordination of (Piagetian) affirmations and negations as we had predicted; and (d) the association of children’s attribution of negative emotions with their m oral autonomy was less strong than we also predicted. Our finding that children’s attribution of positive emotions decreases significantly when they are questioned in a deontic or normative perspective casts some doubts on several researchers’ assumption that such an attributional pattern is inherently immoral; helps us understand some contradictory findings in past studies; and raises some problems to both Kohlberg’s and Turiel’s views on the child’s moral development.
Over the last ten years, children’s attribution of emotions to victimizers has been a topic of interest in the literature on the child s socio-moral development. In a counter- intuitive way, studies have shown that, at a certain point in their development, children expect a victimizer to feel good (i.e., a happy victimizer) rather than bad (i.e., an unhappy victimizer), even though they recognize that the victimizer performed an immoral act. Rather surprisingly, previous studies have not tried to understand in a relatively systematic way the cognitive and moral meaning possibly involved in the child’s attribution of positive and negative emotions in acts of victimizations. The main goal of this master’s dissertation is to make a contribution to clarify this meaning and, hence, to help us understand better the happy/unhappy victimizer phenomenon. Eighty children aged 6 and 7 were first presented with two hypothetical moral transgressions/stories (i.e., stealing a chocolate; pushing someone off a swing). Half of the children were asked to attribute positive or negative emotions to the victimizer in a factual condition or question (i.e., How does the victimizer feel at the end of the story, and why?), and the other children attributed emotions in a deontic question or condition (i.e., How should the victimizer feel at the end of the story, and why?). Children’s attribution of positive and negative emotions to the victimizer was further related to their capacity to coordinate affirmations and negations on a Piagetian affirmation/negation task (Piaget, 1974), and to their heteronomous/autonomous moral orientation as assessed through some stories of Kurtines and Pimm ’s (1983) moral development scale. The results showed that (1) the happy victimizer phenomenon was significantly lower in the deontic than the factual condition; (2) this finding was also visible in children’s justifications because they tended to invoke morally oriented reasons in the deontic condition, and outcome oriented reasons in the factual condition; (c) the happy/unhappy phenomenon was not so related to children’s coordination of (Piagetian) affirmations and negations as we had predicted; and (d) the association of children’s attribution of negative emotions with their m oral autonomy was less strong than we also predicted. Our finding that children’s attribution of positive emotions decreases significantly when they are questioned in a deontic or normative perspective casts some doubts on several researchers’ assumption that such an attributional pattern is inherently immoral; helps us understand some contradictory findings in past studies; and raises some problems to both Kohlberg’s and Turiel’s views on the child’s moral development.
Descrição
Tese de mestrado em Psicologia (Desenvolvimento Humano), apresentada à Universidade de Lisboa, através da Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação, 2003
Palavras-chave
Desenvolvimento socio-moral Crianças Transgressão moral Vitimização Emoções Teses de mestrado - 2003