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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
In writing this book, we had two main motivations, one theoretical and one practical.
In the last years, our understanding of portfolio allocation in presidential
democracies has improved substantially. However, as we argued in Chapter 1,
one of the main goals of this book has been to identify and try to overcome what
we see as basic theoretical limitations in this literature. First, we wanted to revise
what we call the “partisan expectation” or the expectation that government coalitions
express specific legislative coalitions. The assumption that presidents make
decisions about the allocation of cabinet portfolios based on their legislative
goals lies at the center of most theories of portfolio allocation in presidential
systems. One implication of this assumption for research has been a disproportionate
focus on the partisan dimension of ministerial appointments. In this book,
however, we have argued for relaxing the partisan assumption and recognizing
that portfolio allocation allows presidents to manage not only the need for legislative
support, but also the need for technical expertise and political loyalty.
Description
Keywords
Portfolio allocation Presidential democracies
Pedagogical Context
Citation
Martínez-Gallardo, C., Camerlo, M. (2017). Portfolio allocation in the Americas: a recap. In Camerlo, M., Martínez-Gallardo, C. (Eds.), Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets: Comparative Analysis in the Americas, pp. 207-220