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Quantos forem os livros de Direito do Ambiente que abrirmos, quantas serão as definições que encontraremos para ambiente. Isso não significa que não possa haver dissonâncias quanto à sua construção conceitual, senão que, partindo de premissas muitos distintas, os conceitos destoam em extremos de alcance, sendo ora hipertrofiados demais, englobando um universo ilimitado de elementos constitutivos, ora consideravelmente constritos, a ponto de restringir ambiente a apenas um único elemento. Ainda não há nenhum consenso, nem jurisprudencial, nem normativo e, muito menos doutrinário, do que seja ambiente. Essa não é uma discussão puramente terminológica ou conceitual. Se o objeto mais elementar deste ramo, que justifica sua autonomia e razão de ser, ainda é impreciso, como lograr definir o seu escopo de proteção e regulação? Não sendo despiciendos os efeitos adversos dessa (ausência de) delimitação do núcleo conceitual do Direito do Ambiente, este trabalho almeja perscrutar a origem dessa celeuma persistente e determinante para a sua eficácia. Compreender o que é e o que dever ser ambiente em termos jurídicos não só traz repercussões sobre a circunscrição do objeto, mas também do objetivo de um domínio criado para – supostamente – dedicar-se à sua prossecução. A partir de um procedimento monográfico, de cunho exploratório e qualitativo, revisitamos o que parecia um intocável consenso sobre as raízes do Direito do Ambiente e marcamos uma posição teórica acerca do que entendemos por seu paradigma científico fundante, objeto de estudo e autonomia. O ecocentrismo nos habilita a afirmar que o núcleo conceitual do Direito do Ambiente não pode ser outro, senão o ambiente natural (a Natureza) e os seus componentes naturais (fauna, flora, ar, água, solo e subsolo). É a Natureza, a beneficiária do dever constitucional (fundamental e tarefa) de defesa e proteção, que compartilham mutuamente o Estado e a coletividade.
The more environmental law books we open, the more definitions of the environment we'll find. This doesn't mean that there can't be disagreement about its conceptual construction, but rather that, starting from very different premises, the concepts differ in their extreme scope, sometimes being overly hypertrophied, encompassing an unlimited universe of constituent elements, sometimes being considerably narrowed down to the point of restricting the environment to a single element. There is still no consensus on what the environment is, either in jurisprudence or in law, let alone in doctrine. This is not a purely terminological or conceptual debate. If the most fundamental object of this field, which justifies its autonomy and raison d'être, is still imprecise, how can its scope of protection and regulation be defined? The negative effects of this (lack of) delimitation of the conceptual core of environmental law are not insignificant, and this work aims to investigate the origins of this persistent and decisive controversy for its effectiveness. The understanding of what the environment is and what it should be in legal terms has repercussions not only on the circumscription of the object, but also on the objective of a domain created - presumably - to dedicate itself to its pursuit. Using a monographic, exploratory, and qualitative approach, we revisited the seemingly untouchable consensus on the roots of environmental law and established a theoretical position on what we understood to be its founding scientific paradigm, object of study, and autonomy. Ecocentrism allows us to state that the conceptual core of environmental law can be none other than the natural environment (nature) and its natural components (fauna, flora, air, water, soil, and subsoil). Nature is the beneficiary of the constitutional duty (both fundamental and a role) of defense and protection shared by the State and the community.
The more environmental law books we open, the more definitions of the environment we'll find. This doesn't mean that there can't be disagreement about its conceptual construction, but rather that, starting from very different premises, the concepts differ in their extreme scope, sometimes being overly hypertrophied, encompassing an unlimited universe of constituent elements, sometimes being considerably narrowed down to the point of restricting the environment to a single element. There is still no consensus on what the environment is, either in jurisprudence or in law, let alone in doctrine. This is not a purely terminological or conceptual debate. If the most fundamental object of this field, which justifies its autonomy and raison d'être, is still imprecise, how can its scope of protection and regulation be defined? The negative effects of this (lack of) delimitation of the conceptual core of environmental law are not insignificant, and this work aims to investigate the origins of this persistent and decisive controversy for its effectiveness. The understanding of what the environment is and what it should be in legal terms has repercussions not only on the circumscription of the object, but also on the objective of a domain created - presumably - to dedicate itself to its pursuit. Using a monographic, exploratory, and qualitative approach, we revisited the seemingly untouchable consensus on the roots of environmental law and established a theoretical position on what we understood to be its founding scientific paradigm, object of study, and autonomy. Ecocentrism allows us to state that the conceptual core of environmental law can be none other than the natural environment (nature) and its natural components (fauna, flora, air, water, soil, and subsoil). Nature is the beneficiary of the constitutional duty (both fundamental and a role) of defense and protection shared by the State and the community.
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Direito do ambiente Direitos fundamentais Ecocentrismo Pós-modernidade Teses de mestrado - 2025 Environmental law Ecocentrism Fundamental rights Post-modernity
