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Authors
Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
This article analyses the impact of populist right-wing parties (PRWPs) on
welfare state reforms in Western Europe in the light of the trade-off that they
face between office and votes. On the one hand, PRWPs appeal to
traditionally left-leaning blue-collar “insiders” supportive of social
insurance schemes. On the other hand, they have only been able to take part
in government as junior coalition partners with liberal or conservative
parties who are more likely to retrench these very same welfare programs. In
this context, the article argues that these parties have to choose between
betraying their electorate (and losing votes), and betraying their coalition
partners (and losing office). When they choose office, it enables welfare state
retrenchment by allowing their coalition partners to curtail left-wing
opposition, but entails high electoral costs for PRWPs. When they choose
votes, it generates deadlock and potentially jeopardises their participation in
government. The paper draws on a comparative analysis of pension reforms
during three periods of government participation of PRWPs: the Schüssel I
and II cabinets in Austria (2000-2006), the Rutte I cabinet in the Netherlands
(2010-2012) and three pension reforms in Switzerland between 1995 and
2010. The analysis draws on original primary material and interviews.
Description
Keywords
radical right parties, welfare state reform, pensions, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland.
Pedagogical Context
Citation
Afonso, A. (2015). Choosing Whom to Betray: Populist Right-Wing Parties, Welfare State Reforms and the Trade-Off Between Office and Votes. European Political Science Review, 7(2), 271-292. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773914000125