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Publicação
The Politics of Minister Retention in Presidential Systems: Technocrats, Partisans, and Government Approval
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
This article examines the impact of presidential approval and individual minister profiles on minister turnover. It claims that, in order to prioritize sustainable policy performance and cabinet loyalty, government chiefs protect and remove technocrats, partisans, and outsider ministers conditional on government approval. The study offers an operational definition of minister profiles that relies on fuzzy-set measures of technical expertise and political affiliation, and tests the hypotheses using survival analysis with an original dataset for the Argentine case (1983–2011). The findings show that popular presidents are likely to protect experts more than partisan ministers, but not outsiders.
Descrição
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Contexto Educativo
Citação
Camerlo, M., Pérez-Liñán, A. (2015). The Politics of Minister Retention in Presidential Systems: Technocrats, Partisans, and Government Approval. Comparative politics, 47(3), pp. 315-333. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041515814709310
Editora
The City University of New York