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Random matching in the college admissions problem
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Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilibria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibria where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Matching College Admissions Problem Stability Random Mechanism
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Pais, Joana.(2008) "Random matching in the college admissions problem". Economic Theory, Vol. 35, No.1: pp. 99-116.
Editora
Springer