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The State in Court : the economic effects of fee-shifting rules in Spain when suing the government
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Following the recent public debate concerning the situation of the Judicial system in Spain, the paper analyses the special position of the State in Court, essentially with reference to suits brought by individuals against the State before Spanish first instance Courts, although international Courts are touched as well. The analysis focuses on the incentives to litigate and to settle in a dispute with the State, focusing on the State’s special procedural rules and the fee-shifting rules applied in the Spanish Justice system. The asymmetries in favor of the State reduce the incentives to litigate against the State, but also reduce the settlement range in order to achieve out-of-Court settlements.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
State as defendant Procedural privileges Legal fees Fee-shifting rules Litigation Settlement Loser-pays-all Each-pays-his-own
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Gómez, Fernando, Anna Ginès-Fabrellas e Ignacio Marín-García (2009). "The State in Court : the economic effects of fee-shifting rules in Spain when suing the government". Portuguese Economic Journal, 8(3):183-203
Editora
Springer Verlag