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Cenários para a Cooperação Energética entre a China e a Turquia: Uma abordagem da Teoria dos Jogos
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Esta tese analisa as condições para uma efectiva cooperação energética sino-turca, centrando-se no papel da Ásia Central. Explora a forma como as necessidades energéticas, os interesses mútuos e os desafios moldam esta parceria, avaliando o significado estratégico e geopolítico de iniciativas como a Belt and Road Initiative e a Organização de Cooperação de Xangai na sua cooperação. Os interesses geopolíticos divergentes contribuem para o sucesso limitado da cooperação energética entre a China e a Turquia. Estes factores incluem a o foco da China na Ásia Central, a posição geopolítica histórica da Turquia entre o Ocidente e o Oriente, os desafios associados às infra-estruturas energéticas da Turquia e o financiamento necessário. O papel da Turquia como um importante centro energético, o fato de a aTurquia ser membro da NATO, os desequilíbrios comerciais com a China, a concorrência na Ásia Central e as influências de potências como os Estados Unidos, a Rússia, a União Europeia e o Irão impedem ainda mais uma cooperação eficaz.
O enquadramento teórico desta tese é o institucionalismo neoliberal, uma teoria que destaca a forma como as instituições internacionais influenciam o comportamento dos Estados e incentivam a cooperação. O institucionalismo neoliberal mostra como estas instituições se alinham com as preferências dos países, criam incentivos ao cumprimento das regras e oferecem enquadramentos de controlo e aplicação. Facilitam o fluxo de informação, reduzem as barreiras à comunicação e resolvem conflitos, conduzindo a acordos mutuamente benéficos. No âmbito deste quadro teórico, a tese analisa o papel potencial de várias instituições na promoção da cooperação energética e estratégica entre a China e a Turquia, nomeadamente a Belt and Road Initiative e a Organização de Cooperação de Xangai. A escolha destas instituições pode ser justificada por vários factores. A Belt and Road Initiative, por um lado, reforça o desenvolvimento de infra-estruturas e o investimento, impulsionando a conetividade regional. Reforça o crescimento económico e a influência global da China, apoiando simultaneamente a parceria energética com a Turquia. A Organização de Cooperação de Xangai, por outro lado, proporciona uma plataforma para a segurança energética, o comércio e o investimento, promovendo projectos e iniciativas energéticas conjuntas. Apoia a cooperação sustentável entre fornecedores e consumidores de energia e coopera com países e organizações internacionais para enfrentar desafios energéticos comuns. Além disso, a Organização de Cooperação de Xangai tem como objetivo criar um panorama energético seguro e interligado na sua área de influência.
Para além do Institucionalismo Neoliberal, esta tese utiliza também a Teoria dos Jogos como quadro teórico, a fim de examinar as interações estratégicas entre decisores racionais na cooperação e na concorrência internacionais. Ao modelar e prever comportamentos, avaliar resultados e analisar a tomada de decisões na cooperação energética entre a China e a Turquia, a Teoria dos Jogos identifica possíveis cenários de cooperação, potenciais barreiras e incentivos ao cumprimento, servindo como uma ferramenta valiosa para analisar esta cooperação energética.
A tese apresenta dois argumentos. Em primeiro lugar, argumenta que o acordo energético de 2009 - o Memorando de Entendimento - entre a China e a Turquia, embora significativo, não garante uma cooperação energética bilateral efectiva. O Memorando de Entendimento mostra a vontade dos dois países de cooperar no sector da energia e destaca os investimentos em países terceiros como parte desta parceria.
No entanto, carece de uma estratégia de aplicação clara. O Memorando de Entendimento requer disposições para um empenhamento sustentado e medidas de criação de confiança para transformar efetivamente as intenções numa cooperação energética substancial e duradoura. O segundo argumento da tese é que os interesses partilhados nos recursos energéticos da Ásia Central e a importância estratégica desta região podem facilitar a cooperação sino-turca através de investimentos conjuntos, alinhando os seus objectivos de segurança energética e geopolíticos, ao mesmo tempo que tiram partido de forças complementares para aproveitar o potencial económico da região, criando confiança mútua e promovendo a estabilidade regional.
Em termos metodológicos, a tese parte de um paradigma positivista. Utiliza uma metodologia mista, integrando métodos qualitativos e quantitativos. Por um lado, esta tese utiliza a Teoria dos Jogos como método quantitativo, a fim de identificar relações causais através da análise de variáveis. A variável independente são as condições de cooperação e a variável dependente é a cooperação energética. Este método avalia o impacto da variável independente na variável dependente e fornece provas para apoiar ou refutar os argumentos acima referidos. Ao utilizar a Teoria dos Jogos, esta tese analisa quantitativamente as interações estratégicas e a tomada de decisões entre actores racionais, nomeadamente a China e a Turquia. A Teoria dos Jogos ajuda a compreender o comportamento cooperativo e competitivo, simula resultados baseados em estratégias racionais e nas preferências dos países, e avalia cenários de cooperação energética. A Teoria dos Jogos permite compreender a viabilidade e as limitações de várias estratégias de cooperação, possibilitando uma análise pormenorizada das alternativas de cooperação energética entre a China e a Turquia.
Para examinar os comportamentos não cooperativos e a racionalidade da tomada de decisões na cooperação energética entre a China e a Turquia, a tese utiliza dois modelos da Teoria dos Jogos, nomeadamente a Batalha dos Sexos e o Dilema do Prisioneiro. Estes modelos ajudam a ilustrar e a analisar as interações estratégicas, os conflitos de interesses e o potencial de colaboração ou de concorrência entre os dois países. O modelo da Batalha dos Sexos mostra situações em que os actores concordam com um objetivo mas divergem na sua execução. Trata-se de dois actores que colaboram para um objetivo comum, apesar de preferências diferentes. No contexto da Batalha dos Sexos, a tese simula dois resultados: tanto a China como a Turquia investem na Ásia Central, com a Turquia a considerar os investimentos domésticos locais em energia como uma opção secundária, ou ambos os países se concentram nos investimentos na Turquia, levando a China a abandonar o projeto energético na Ásia Central. Uma vez que estes resultados não reflectem uma situação de cooperação viável, a tese explora variações adicionais do modelo da Batalha dos Sexos para identificar condições efectivas de cooperação, nomeadamente através da integração de várias simulações no âmbito do Equilíbrio de Nash.
Para avaliar a sustentabilidade de um acordo energético através de investimentos na Ásia Central e, em alternativa, na Turquia, a tese utiliza o Dilema do Prisioneiro. O modelo do Dilema do Prisioneiro sublinha que os actores que agem em interesse próprio consideram frequentemente a cooperação desvantajosa, principalmente quando um coopera e o outro não. Isto resulta num resultado menos favorável para o jogador que coopera do que se ambos tivessem agido de forma egoísta. Esta situação evidencia um conflito entre a racionalidade individual e a racionalidade colectiva, em que a atração de desertar para obter um ganho pessoal mais elevado quando o outro jogador coopera é mais convincente, apesar dos benefícios mútuos da cooperação.
Por outro lado, a tese emprega uma metodologia qualitativa, baseada numa análise aprofundada da literatura secundária relativa ao estudo de caso da parceria energética entre a China e a Turquia, a fim de obter informações pormenorizadas e examinar as condições para uma colaboração energética eficaz. Esta abordagem melhora a compreensão das relações causais, identifica caraterísticas distintivas e contribui para uma compreensão abrangente da parceria energética entre os dois países. O estudo de caso sobre a cooperação energética entre a China e a Turquia permite uma análise aprofundada da dinâmica, dos desafios e das oportunidades da relação, oferecendo uma visão pormenorizada do contexto único e das complexidades desta parceria bilateral, ao mesmo tempo que avança implicações práticas para a cooperação energética internacional.
As conclusões da presente tese e os contributos para a literatura são múltiplos. Em primeiro lugar, uma cooperação energética eficaz entre a China e a Turquia na Ásia Central exige que a Turquia reforce o seu papel estratégico no Middle Corridor, aproveitando os laços históricos e culturais regionais e forjando alianças através de investimentos e projectos conjuntos mutuamente benéficos. Para ser bem sucedida na Ásia Central, a Turquia deve navegar habilmente na complexa região geopolítica, gerindo as suas relações com actores influentes como a Rússia e o Irão, ao mesmo tempo que se deve esforçar por melhorar a sua posição regional e evitar consequências adversas por parte da China.
Em segundo lugar, a China e a Turquia devem harmonizar os seus objectivos na Ásia Central. A tese recomenda que se enfrentem os desafios da cooperação reforçando a posição geoestratégica da Turquia, formando alianças com os países da Ásia Central, atraindo o investimento chinês em infra-estruturas energéticas e gerindo o complexo ambiente geopolítico da Ásia Central. Dada a localização estratégica da Turquia e a sua participação ativa em iniciativas como o Middle Corridor, é crucial para ambos os países não só alinharem-se com a Blt and Road Initiative da China, mas também assegurarem a implementação eficaz dos objectivos da Belt and Road Initiative.
Em terceiro lugar, a China pode promover a cooperação energética com a Turquia, investindo nas infra-estruturas energéticas nacionais turcas, nomeadamente nas energias renováveis, e oferecendo apoio tecnológico para a diversificação, em consonância com a Belt and Road Initiative. Os projectos de investimento conjunto na exploração, produção e transporte de energia na Ásia Central podem reforçar a cooperação, respondendo a desafios como a concorrência, a presença económica limitada da Turquia e o financiamento da reestruturação das infra-estruturas energéticas da Ásia Central. A Belt and Road Initiative e a Organização de Cooperação de Xangai proporcionam enquadramentos para a cooperação, enquanto que as reservas de energia da Ásia Central e a importância do Middle Corridor criam um ambiente favorável para a cooperação.
Em quarto lugar, a China pode, independentemente da Turquia, aceder aos recursos energéticos da Ásia Central. No entanto, a cooperação com a Turquia é útil devido aos laços históricos e ao potencial da Turquia como rota de trânsito para as exportações de energia para a Europa, em consonância com os objectivos geopolíticos da China. A Turquia depende da China para cobrir as suas necessidades energéticas e aceder aos recursos da Ásia Central. A influência significativa da China na Ásia Central permite à Turquia diversificar as suas importações de energia, reduzindo a sua dependência da Rússia. Os investimentos e a experiência chineses em infra-estruturas energéticas podem ajudar a Turquia a desenvolver um acesso eficaz à energia da Ásia Central, reforçando a segurança energética e os objectivos de desenvolvimento turcos.
Ao combinar a Teoria dos Jogos e o Institucionalismo Neoliberal, esta tese contribui para as lacunas da literatura sobre a cooperação energética entre a China e a Turquia. Em primeiro lugar, vai além da tradicional perspetiva centrada no Ocidente relativamente ao papel das instituições internacionais, testando a aplicabilidade do Institucionalismo Neoliberal a instituições não ocidentais. De facto, a tese desafia a noção de independência institucional, analisando a influência da política externa chinesa na Belt and Road Initiative e na Organização de Cooperação de Xangai, salientando a forma como as instituições afetam a diversidade política e cultural dos países não ocidentais. Em segundo lugar, recorrendo aos modelos da Batalha dos Sexos e do Dilema do Prisioneiro, a tese aplica pela primeira vez a Teoria dos Jogos para analisar os processos de tomada de decisão estratégica da China e da Turquia e para elaborar condições para uma cooperação energética efectiva.
This thesis examines the conditions for effective Sino-Turkish energy cooperation, focusing on Central Asia's role. It explores how energy needs, mutual interests, and challenges shape this partnership, assessing the strategic and geopolitical significance of initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in their cooperation. Divergent geopolitical interests contribute to the limited success of energy cooperation between China and Turkey. These factors include China's primary focus on Central Asia, Turkey's historical geopolitical position between and orientation toward the West and the East, the challenges associated with Turkey's energy infrastructure and the required funding. Turkey's role as a significant energy hub, and concerns about Turkey's NATO alignment, trade imbalances with China, competition in Central Asia, and influences from powers like the United States, Russia, the European Union, and Iran further impede effective cooperation. The theoretical framework of this thesis is Neoliberal Institutionalism, a perspective that highlights the significance of international institutions in influencing behaviour and encouraging cooperation. It shows how these institutions align with countries' preferences, create compliance incentives, and offer frameworks for monitoring and enforcement. They facilitate information flow, reduce communication barriers, and resolve conflicts, leading to mutually beneficial agreements. Under this theoretical framework, the thesis analysis the potential role of several institutions in promoting energy and strategic cooperation between China and Turkey, namely the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The choice of these institutions can be justified by several factors. The Belt and Road Initiative, on the one hand, enhances infrastructure development and investment, boosting regional connectivity. It strengthens China's economic growth and global influence while supporting energy the partnership with Turkey. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, on the other hand, provides a platform for energy security, trade, and investment negotiations, promoting joint energy projects and initiatives. It supports sustainable cooperation between energy suppliers and consumers and cooperates with countries and international organisations to address common energy challenges. Additionally, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation aims to create a secure and interconnected energy landscape in its area of influence. Besides Neoliberal Institutionalism, this thesis also uses Game Theory as a theoretical framework, in order to examine strategic interactions among rational decision-makers in international cooperation and competition. By modelling and predicting behaviours, assessing outcomes, and analysing decision-making in energy cooperation between China and Turkey, Game Theory identifies possible cooperation scenarios, potential barriers, and incentives for compliance, serving as a valuable tool for analysing this energy cooperation. The thesis presents two arguments. First, it argues that the 2009 energy agreement – the Memorandum of Understanding – between China and Turkey, while significant, does not guarantee effective bilateral energy cooperation. The Memorandum of Understanding shows both countries' willingness to cooperate in the energy sector and highlights investments in third-party countries as part of this partnership. However, it lacks a clear implementation strategy. The Memorandum of Understanding requires provisions for sustained commitment and trust-building measures to effectively transform intentions into substantial and lasting energy cooperation. The second argument of the thesis is that shared interests in Central Asia's energy resources and the strategic significance of this region can facilitate Sino-Turkish cooperation through joint investments, aligning their energy security and geopolitical objectives while leveraging complementary strengths to harness the region's economic potential, building mutual trust, and promote regional stability. In terms of methodology, the thesis departs from a positivist paradigm. It employs a mixed methods approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative methods. On the one hand, this thesis employs Game Theory as a quantitative method, in order to identify causal relationships by analysing variables. The independent variable is the conditions for cooperation, and the dependent variable is energy cooperation. This method assesses the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable and provides evidence to support or refute the above-mentioned arguments. By utilising Game Theory, this thesis aims to quantitatively analyse strategic interactions and decision-making among rational actors, namely China and Turkey. This framework helps to understand cooperative and competitive behaviour, simulates outcomes based on rational strategies and countries’ preferences, and evaluates energy cooperation scenarios. Game Theory provides insights into the feasibility and limitations of various cooperation strategies, allowing for a nuanced examination of alternatives for energy cooperation between China and Turkey. In order to examine the non-cooperative behaviours and decision-making rationality in China and Turkey's energy cooperation, the thesis employs two Game Theory models, namely the Battle of the Sexes and the Prisoner's Dilemma. These models help to illustrate and analyse strategic interactions, conflicts of interest, and the potential for collaboration or competition between the countries. The Battle of the Sexes model shows situations where actors concur on a goal but differ on its execution. It involves two actors collaborating towards a common objective, despite varying preferences. In the Battle of the Sexes context, the thesis simulates two outcomes: both China and Turkey invest in Central Asia, with Turkey considering local domestic energy investments a secondary option, or both countries focus on investments on Turkey, prompting China to abandon the Central Asia energy project. Since these outcomes do not reflect a workable cooperative situation, the thesis explores additional Battle of the Sexes model variations to identify effective conditions for cooperation, namely by integrating various simulations within the Nash Equilibrium. To assess the sustainability of an energy agreement through investments in Central Asia and, alternatively, Turkey, the thesis uses the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma model emphasises that players acting in self-interest often find cooperation disadvantageous, mainly when one cooperates and the other does not. This results in a less favourable outcome for the cooperating player than if both had acted selfishly. This situation underscores a conflict between individual and collective rationality, where the attraction of defecting for a higher personal gain when the other player cooperates is more compelling despite mutual benefits from cooperation. On the other hand, the thesis employs a qualitative methodology, based on an in-depth analysis of secondary literature pertaining to the case study of China-Turkey energy partnership, in order to gain detailed insights and examine conditions for effective energy collaboration. This approach enhances the understanding of causal relationships, identifies distinctive features, and contributes to a comprehensive grasp of the energy partnership between both countries. The case study on China-Turkey energy cooperation enables an in-depth analysis of the relationship's dynamics, challenges, and opportunities, offering detailed insights into the unique context and complexities of this bilateral partnership, while providing practical implications for international energy cooperation. The findings of this thesis and contributions to literature are multiple. First, effective China-Turkey energy cooperation in Central Asia requires Turkey reinforcing its 'Middle Corridor' strategic role, leveraging regional historical and cultural ties, and forging alliances through mutually beneficial joint investments and projects. In order to succeed in Central Asia, Turkey must employ skilful navigation of the complex geopolitical region, managing its associations with influential actors such as Russia and Iran, while striving to enhance its regional position and avoiding adverse repercussions from China. Second, China and Turkey must harmonise their Central Asian objectives. The thesis recommends tackling cooperation challenges by enhancing Turkey's geostrategic position, forming alliances with Central Asian countries, attracting Chinese investment in energy infrastructure, and managing the complex Central Asian geopolitical environment. Given Turkey's strategic location and active participation in initiatives such as the Middle Corridor, it is crucial for both countries to not only align with China's Belt and Road Initiative but also to ensure the effective and targeted implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative's goals. Third, China can promote energy cooperation with Turkey by investing in Turkish domestic energy infrastructure, particularly renewables, and offering technological support for diversification, aligning with the Belt and Road Initiative. Joint investment projects in energy exploration, production, and transportation in Central Asia can enhance their cooperation, addressing challenges like competition, Turkey's limited economic presence, and funding for restructuring Central Asia energy infrastructure. The Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation provide frameworks for cooperation, while Central Asia's energy reserves and the Middle Corridor's importance create a favourable environment for cooperation. Fourth, China can, independently from Turkey, access Central Asia’s energy resources. Still, cooperation with Turkey is helpful because of historical ties and Turkey's potential as a transit route for energy exports to Europe, aligning with China's geopolitical objectives. Turkey depends on China to cover its energy needs and access to Central Asian resources. China's significant influence in Central Asia enables Turkey to diversify its energy imports, reducing its dependency on Russia. Chinese investments and expertise in energy infrastructure can assist Turkey in developing efficient access to Central Asian energy, bolstering Turkish energy security and development goals. By combining Game Theory and Neoliberal Institutionalism, this thesis contributes to the literature gap on China-Turkey energy cooperation. First, it goes beyond the traditional Western-centric perspective of the role of international institutions by testing the applicability of Neoliberal Institutionalism to non-Western institutions. Indeed, the thesis challenges the notion of institutional independence by analysing the influence of Chinese foreign policy on the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, highlighting how institutions operate in the political and cultural diversity of non-Western countries. Second, using the Battle of the Sexes and the Prisoner’s Dilemma models, the thesis applies Game Theory for the first time in order to analyse China and Turkey’s strategic decision-making processes and elaborates conditions for effective energy cooperation.
This thesis examines the conditions for effective Sino-Turkish energy cooperation, focusing on Central Asia's role. It explores how energy needs, mutual interests, and challenges shape this partnership, assessing the strategic and geopolitical significance of initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in their cooperation. Divergent geopolitical interests contribute to the limited success of energy cooperation between China and Turkey. These factors include China's primary focus on Central Asia, Turkey's historical geopolitical position between and orientation toward the West and the East, the challenges associated with Turkey's energy infrastructure and the required funding. Turkey's role as a significant energy hub, and concerns about Turkey's NATO alignment, trade imbalances with China, competition in Central Asia, and influences from powers like the United States, Russia, the European Union, and Iran further impede effective cooperation. The theoretical framework of this thesis is Neoliberal Institutionalism, a perspective that highlights the significance of international institutions in influencing behaviour and encouraging cooperation. It shows how these institutions align with countries' preferences, create compliance incentives, and offer frameworks for monitoring and enforcement. They facilitate information flow, reduce communication barriers, and resolve conflicts, leading to mutually beneficial agreements. Under this theoretical framework, the thesis analysis the potential role of several institutions in promoting energy and strategic cooperation between China and Turkey, namely the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The choice of these institutions can be justified by several factors. The Belt and Road Initiative, on the one hand, enhances infrastructure development and investment, boosting regional connectivity. It strengthens China's economic growth and global influence while supporting energy the partnership with Turkey. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, on the other hand, provides a platform for energy security, trade, and investment negotiations, promoting joint energy projects and initiatives. It supports sustainable cooperation between energy suppliers and consumers and cooperates with countries and international organisations to address common energy challenges. Additionally, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation aims to create a secure and interconnected energy landscape in its area of influence. Besides Neoliberal Institutionalism, this thesis also uses Game Theory as a theoretical framework, in order to examine strategic interactions among rational decision-makers in international cooperation and competition. By modelling and predicting behaviours, assessing outcomes, and analysing decision-making in energy cooperation between China and Turkey, Game Theory identifies possible cooperation scenarios, potential barriers, and incentives for compliance, serving as a valuable tool for analysing this energy cooperation. The thesis presents two arguments. First, it argues that the 2009 energy agreement – the Memorandum of Understanding – between China and Turkey, while significant, does not guarantee effective bilateral energy cooperation. The Memorandum of Understanding shows both countries' willingness to cooperate in the energy sector and highlights investments in third-party countries as part of this partnership. However, it lacks a clear implementation strategy. The Memorandum of Understanding requires provisions for sustained commitment and trust-building measures to effectively transform intentions into substantial and lasting energy cooperation. The second argument of the thesis is that shared interests in Central Asia's energy resources and the strategic significance of this region can facilitate Sino-Turkish cooperation through joint investments, aligning their energy security and geopolitical objectives while leveraging complementary strengths to harness the region's economic potential, building mutual trust, and promote regional stability. In terms of methodology, the thesis departs from a positivist paradigm. It employs a mixed methods approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative methods. On the one hand, this thesis employs Game Theory as a quantitative method, in order to identify causal relationships by analysing variables. The independent variable is the conditions for cooperation, and the dependent variable is energy cooperation. This method assesses the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable and provides evidence to support or refute the above-mentioned arguments. By utilising Game Theory, this thesis aims to quantitatively analyse strategic interactions and decision-making among rational actors, namely China and Turkey. This framework helps to understand cooperative and competitive behaviour, simulates outcomes based on rational strategies and countries’ preferences, and evaluates energy cooperation scenarios. Game Theory provides insights into the feasibility and limitations of various cooperation strategies, allowing for a nuanced examination of alternatives for energy cooperation between China and Turkey. In order to examine the non-cooperative behaviours and decision-making rationality in China and Turkey's energy cooperation, the thesis employs two Game Theory models, namely the Battle of the Sexes and the Prisoner's Dilemma. These models help to illustrate and analyse strategic interactions, conflicts of interest, and the potential for collaboration or competition between the countries. The Battle of the Sexes model shows situations where actors concur on a goal but differ on its execution. It involves two actors collaborating towards a common objective, despite varying preferences. In the Battle of the Sexes context, the thesis simulates two outcomes: both China and Turkey invest in Central Asia, with Turkey considering local domestic energy investments a secondary option, or both countries focus on investments on Turkey, prompting China to abandon the Central Asia energy project. Since these outcomes do not reflect a workable cooperative situation, the thesis explores additional Battle of the Sexes model variations to identify effective conditions for cooperation, namely by integrating various simulations within the Nash Equilibrium. To assess the sustainability of an energy agreement through investments in Central Asia and, alternatively, Turkey, the thesis uses the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma model emphasises that players acting in self-interest often find cooperation disadvantageous, mainly when one cooperates and the other does not. This results in a less favourable outcome for the cooperating player than if both had acted selfishly. This situation underscores a conflict between individual and collective rationality, where the attraction of defecting for a higher personal gain when the other player cooperates is more compelling despite mutual benefits from cooperation. On the other hand, the thesis employs a qualitative methodology, based on an in-depth analysis of secondary literature pertaining to the case study of China-Turkey energy partnership, in order to gain detailed insights and examine conditions for effective energy collaboration. This approach enhances the understanding of causal relationships, identifies distinctive features, and contributes to a comprehensive grasp of the energy partnership between both countries. The case study on China-Turkey energy cooperation enables an in-depth analysis of the relationship's dynamics, challenges, and opportunities, offering detailed insights into the unique context and complexities of this bilateral partnership, while providing practical implications for international energy cooperation. The findings of this thesis and contributions to literature are multiple. First, effective China-Turkey energy cooperation in Central Asia requires Turkey reinforcing its 'Middle Corridor' strategic role, leveraging regional historical and cultural ties, and forging alliances through mutually beneficial joint investments and projects. In order to succeed in Central Asia, Turkey must employ skilful navigation of the complex geopolitical region, managing its associations with influential actors such as Russia and Iran, while striving to enhance its regional position and avoiding adverse repercussions from China. Second, China and Turkey must harmonise their Central Asian objectives. The thesis recommends tackling cooperation challenges by enhancing Turkey's geostrategic position, forming alliances with Central Asian countries, attracting Chinese investment in energy infrastructure, and managing the complex Central Asian geopolitical environment. Given Turkey's strategic location and active participation in initiatives such as the Middle Corridor, it is crucial for both countries to not only align with China's Belt and Road Initiative but also to ensure the effective and targeted implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative's goals. Third, China can promote energy cooperation with Turkey by investing in Turkish domestic energy infrastructure, particularly renewables, and offering technological support for diversification, aligning with the Belt and Road Initiative. Joint investment projects in energy exploration, production, and transportation in Central Asia can enhance their cooperation, addressing challenges like competition, Turkey's limited economic presence, and funding for restructuring Central Asia energy infrastructure. The Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation provide frameworks for cooperation, while Central Asia's energy reserves and the Middle Corridor's importance create a favourable environment for cooperation. Fourth, China can, independently from Turkey, access Central Asia’s energy resources. Still, cooperation with Turkey is helpful because of historical ties and Turkey's potential as a transit route for energy exports to Europe, aligning with China's geopolitical objectives. Turkey depends on China to cover its energy needs and access to Central Asian resources. China's significant influence in Central Asia enables Turkey to diversify its energy imports, reducing its dependency on Russia. Chinese investments and expertise in energy infrastructure can assist Turkey in developing efficient access to Central Asian energy, bolstering Turkish energy security and development goals. By combining Game Theory and Neoliberal Institutionalism, this thesis contributes to the literature gap on China-Turkey energy cooperation. First, it goes beyond the traditional Western-centric perspective of the role of international institutions by testing the applicability of Neoliberal Institutionalism to non-Western institutions. Indeed, the thesis challenges the notion of institutional independence by analysing the influence of Chinese foreign policy on the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, highlighting how institutions operate in the political and cultural diversity of non-Western countries. Second, using the Battle of the Sexes and the Prisoner’s Dilemma models, the thesis applies Game Theory for the first time in order to analyse China and Turkey’s strategic decision-making processes and elaborates conditions for effective energy cooperation.
Descrição
Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Relações Internacionais