A carregar...
Publicação
Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
| Nome: | Descrição: | Tamanho: | Formato: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 345.81 KB | Adobe PDF |
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Traditional gift-exchange experiments were designed with corner equilibria so that evidence of
positive reciprocity could not be disentangled from one-sided errors. Our first treatment replicates the
traditional design and finds that effort is an increasing function of wage for mid-range wage offers,
but this relationship is not significant for high and low offers. The second treatment has an interior
equilibrium, asymmetric marginal costs of reciprocity (positive and negative) and lower efficiency
gains. There is evidence of a decrease in the deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
However, there is still significant reciprocal behavior (positive and negative).
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Trust Reciprocity Gift-Exchange Games Incomplete Contracts Labor Relations
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Pereira, Paulo Trigo; Nuno Silva and João Andrade e Silva .(2006). “Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Vol. 59, No. 3 : pp. 406–422. (search PDF at sciencedirect.com in 2020)
Editora
Elsevier