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Essa investigação se propõe a analisar a reprovação penal do conflito de interesses na gestão empresarial dos administradores de entidades comerciais. Como uma problemática expressão das condutas cometidas em conflito de interesses, encontra-se o recebimento de remunerações indevidas pelos administradores societários. Assim, tratar-se-á o problema da legalidade dessas remunerações atribuídas aos administradores privados, quando ultrapassarem o socialmente admissível. Questionando-se a introdução de princípios da ética econômica ao interno do direito penal, demonstrar-se-ão as respostas penais atualmente existentes para solucionar o conflito de interesses dos administradores societários.
Desse modo, analisar-se-ão os crimes de infidelidade patrimonial e corrupção no setor privado, com especial ênfase para o âmbito empresarial. Ainda, em uma abordagem preventiva, tratar-se-ão, também, das demais formas de regulação da atividade econômica, para além dos meios penais, com destaque para a regulação responsiva e a autorregulação regulada. Considerar-se-á o papel dessas especiais modalidades de autorregulação para solucionar o conflito de interesses no interno das entidades empresariais e a sua relevância para o Direito Penal Empresarial.
Em termos gerais, o conflito de interesses na gestão empresarial se caracteriza pela contrariedade aos interesses da entidade representada. Por sua vez, a sua incriminação apenas se legitima a partir de uma concepção material do conflito de interesses, na medida em que se exige a verificação de um prejuízo aos interesses representados. Esses interesses poderão assumir natureza individual, no caso de lesão ao patrimônio da entidade comercial e/ou dos sócios e acionistas, como ocorre no crime de infidelidade patrimonial. Ou, além dos interesses individuais do representado, as consequências penais da conduta podem adquirir caráter supraindividual, quando se colocar em perigo o regular funcionamento do mercado, interesse tutelado pelo delito de corrupção no setor privado.
A tipificação desses delitos no ordenamento jurídico-penal de cada país depende da sua própria sistemática, a fim de apresentar coerência e racionalidade entre si. Nessa investigação, essa demonstração será realizada à luz do direito penal brasileiro, que, de um modo geral, ainda não contém essas incriminações, com exceções de casos muito específicos.
This investigation aims to analyze the penal reproach of conflicts of interest in the corporate management of administrators of commercial entities. One prominent aspect of misconduct in conflicts of interest is the receipt of undue compensation by corporate administrators. Consequently, this research will address the legality of such compensation when it exceeds socially acceptable limits, questioning the incorporation of principles from economic ethics into criminal law. It will also explore the current criminal legal responses to resolve conflicts of interest among corporate administrators. Furthermore, it will examine crimes of embezzlement and corruption in the private sector, with a specific focus on the corporate environment. Additionally, in a preventive approach, it will discuss other forms of regulating economic activity beyond the realm of criminal law, including responsive regulation and regulated self-regulation. The role of these specialized forms of self-regulation in resolving conflicts of interest within corporate entities and their significance in Business Criminal Law will be considered. In a general sense, conflicts of interest in corporate management involve actions contrary to the interests of the represented entity. Their criminalization is only justified from a material conception of conflicts of interest, which necessitates the verification of harm to the interests being represented. These interests can assume an individual nature, such as when the entity's or partner’s and shareholders' assets are harmed, as in the case of embezzlement. Alternatively, beyond the individual interests of the represented entity, the criminal consequences of the conduct may have a broader impact when they endanger the regular functioning of the market, an interest protected by the offense of corruption in the private sector. The criminalization of these offenses in the criminal legal systems of individual countries depends on their respective legal frameworks to ensure coherence and rationality. In this investigation, this demonstration will be carried out within the context of Brazilian criminal law, which, in general, lacks such criminalizations, with a few very specific exceptions.
This investigation aims to analyze the penal reproach of conflicts of interest in the corporate management of administrators of commercial entities. One prominent aspect of misconduct in conflicts of interest is the receipt of undue compensation by corporate administrators. Consequently, this research will address the legality of such compensation when it exceeds socially acceptable limits, questioning the incorporation of principles from economic ethics into criminal law. It will also explore the current criminal legal responses to resolve conflicts of interest among corporate administrators. Furthermore, it will examine crimes of embezzlement and corruption in the private sector, with a specific focus on the corporate environment. Additionally, in a preventive approach, it will discuss other forms of regulating economic activity beyond the realm of criminal law, including responsive regulation and regulated self-regulation. The role of these specialized forms of self-regulation in resolving conflicts of interest within corporate entities and their significance in Business Criminal Law will be considered. In a general sense, conflicts of interest in corporate management involve actions contrary to the interests of the represented entity. Their criminalization is only justified from a material conception of conflicts of interest, which necessitates the verification of harm to the interests being represented. These interests can assume an individual nature, such as when the entity's or partner’s and shareholders' assets are harmed, as in the case of embezzlement. Alternatively, beyond the individual interests of the represented entity, the criminal consequences of the conduct may have a broader impact when they endanger the regular functioning of the market, an interest protected by the offense of corruption in the private sector. The criminalization of these offenses in the criminal legal systems of individual countries depends on their respective legal frameworks to ensure coherence and rationality. In this investigation, this demonstration will be carried out within the context of Brazilian criminal law, which, in general, lacks such criminalizations, with a few very specific exceptions.
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Palavras-chave
conflito de interesses remunerações indevidas infidelidade patrimonial corrupção no setor privado ética dos negócios conflicts of agency executive compensation embezzlement corruption in the private sector business ethics
