Publicação
Competitive vertical integration
| dc.contributor.author | Pontes, José Pedro | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-10-12T13:46:34Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-10-12T13:46:34Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1993 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we assess that sufficient conditions for full vertical integration in a duopoly hold if marginal costs are constant and quantities are strategic substitutes. That is to say: vertical integration by both duopolists is an equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative game under fairly general assumptions. Two conditions lie behind this result. The first one, is that, if all firms are disintegrated, it pays off for a producer and a distributor to merge unilaterally. The second one, assuming that merging decisions take place sequentially, is that it is profitable for the remaining upstream-downstream firms to follow vertical integration. However, if the firms can reach a binding agreement on vertical structures, they will prefer to remain disintegrated: profit of an integrated firm under full vertical integration is smaller than the sum of producer's and distributor's profits when all firms are disintegrated. | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Pontes, José Pedro (1993). "Competitive vertical integration". Estudos de Economia, Volume XIV, Nº1 : pp. 3-14 | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/9453 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.publisher | Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Industrial Economics | |
| dc.subject | Duopoly | |
| dc.subject | Vertical Integration | |
| dc.subject | Competition | |
| dc.subject | Econometric Model | |
| dc.title | Competitive vertical integration | pt_PT |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.conferencePlace | Lisboa | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.endPage | 14 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.issue | 1 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.startPage | 3 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.title | Estudos de Economia | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.volume | XIX | pt_PT |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | article | pt_PT |