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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Research on dual-process theories of judgment makes abundant use of reasoning problems
that present a conflict between Type 1 intuitive responses and Type 2 rule-based responses. However,
in many of these reasoning tasks, there is no way to discriminate between the adequate and inadequate
use of rules based on logical or probabilistic principles. To experimentally discriminate between the
two, we developed a new set of problems: rule-inadequate versions of standard base-rate problems
(where base rates are made irrelevant). Across four experiments, we observed conflict sensitivity
(measured in terms of response latencies and response confidence) in responses to standard baserate problems but also in responses to rule-inadequate versions of these problems. This failure to
discriminate between real and merely apparent (or spurious) conflict suggests that participants often
misuse statistical information and draw conclusions based on irrelevant base rates. We conclude that
inferring the sound use of statistical rules from normatively correct responses to standard conflict
problems may be unwarranted when this kind of reasoning bias is not controlled for.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Dual-process theory Reasoning Judgment Bias Metacognition
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Ferreira, M. B., Soro, J. C., Reis, J., Mata, A., & Thompson, V. A. (2022). When type 2 processing misfires: The Indiscriminate use of statistical thinking about reasoning problems. Journal of Intelligence, 10(4), 109. https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence10040109
Editora
MDPI
