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Cegueira deliberada
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A doutrina da “cegueira deliberada” surgiu em Inglaterra, em 1861, e, desde então, tem despoletado, quer na jurisprudência quer na doutrina, diversas opiniões acerca do seu conceito e alcance, não só nos países da Common Law, como também em países do Civil Law.
No Civil Law, a lógica da imputação dolosa pressupõe sempre a existência de um elemento cognitivo. Todavia, a lógica tradicional anglo-saxónica baseia-se na ideia de que um desconhecimento provocado é tão censurável quanto uma atuação praticada de forma consciente - a denominada "tese da igual culpabilidade".
Através do presente estudo pretende-se analisar conceptualmente esta figura no sentido de perceber se estamos perante um conceito inovador e digno de autonomia face aos demais institutos vigentes no nosso atual modelo de imputação subjetiva, ou se, ao invés, estamos perante uma doutrina meramente supérflua e redundante.
Nesta medida, é feita uma análise no sentido de perceber se a sua eventual importação para o Civil Law comporta algum conflito com algumas das noções mais ou menos assentes e consolidadas no nosso modelo de imputação subjetiva (nomeadamente o conceito de “dolo”) ou com alguns dos princípios que norteiam o nosso Direito Penal.
Bem como, será feito um juízo crítico sobre se o modelo de imputação subjetiva vigente no nosso sistema jurídico é suficiente para dar uma resposta satisfatória à totalidade dos comportamentos penalmente proibidos.
Tratando-se de uma doutrina oriunda de um diferente sistema jurídico, a sua eventual importação encontra-se necessariamente sujeita a limites, de modo a garantir uma observância do princípio da adequação do Direito às necessidades reais da sociedade em que se dispõe a vigorar.
Deste modo, no âmbito do Civil Law, a maioria dos autores rejeita uma tese que permita uma punição por dolo sem que se verifique a existência do elemento cognitivo, havendo apenas uma minoritária doutrina que aceita, com muitas matizes e num conjunto muito limitado de circunstâncias, a possibilidade da existência de uma doutrina nestes moldes.
The "willful blindness" doctrine arose in England in 1861, and has since triggered, in both jurisprudence and doctrine, multiple opinions about its concept and scope, not only in Common Law countries, but also in countries of Civil Law. In Civil Law, the logic of an imputation based on a malevolent misconduct always presupposes the existence of a cognitive element. However, the traditional Anglo-Saxon logic is based on the idea that deliberate ignorance is as objectionable as a consciously practice - the so-called "equal culpability thesis." The present study intends to analyze conceptually this figure in the sense of perceiving if we are facing an innovative concept and worthy of autonomy regarding other institutes contained in our current mens rea model, or if instead, we are dealing with a merely superfluous and redundant theory. Thus, an analysis is made of whether its importation into Civil Law entails any conflict with some of the more or less settled and consolidated notions in our mens rea model or with some principles that guide our Criminal Law. As well as, a critical judgment will be made as to understand if the mens rea model in our legal system is sufficient to give a satisfactory answer to the totality of the prohibited criminal behaviors. Since its a theory generated from a different legal system, its possible importation is necessarily subject to limits, in order to ensure compliance with the principle of the adequacy of the law to the real needs of the society in which it is to be in force. Thus, in the Civil Law, the majority of authors reject a thesis that allows a punishment on a malevolent misconduct basis without the existence of the cognitive element, and there is only a minority that accepts, in a very limited set of circumstances, the possibility of the existence of a theory in these terms.
The "willful blindness" doctrine arose in England in 1861, and has since triggered, in both jurisprudence and doctrine, multiple opinions about its concept and scope, not only in Common Law countries, but also in countries of Civil Law. In Civil Law, the logic of an imputation based on a malevolent misconduct always presupposes the existence of a cognitive element. However, the traditional Anglo-Saxon logic is based on the idea that deliberate ignorance is as objectionable as a consciously practice - the so-called "equal culpability thesis." The present study intends to analyze conceptually this figure in the sense of perceiving if we are facing an innovative concept and worthy of autonomy regarding other institutes contained in our current mens rea model, or if instead, we are dealing with a merely superfluous and redundant theory. Thus, an analysis is made of whether its importation into Civil Law entails any conflict with some of the more or less settled and consolidated notions in our mens rea model or with some principles that guide our Criminal Law. As well as, a critical judgment will be made as to understand if the mens rea model in our legal system is sufficient to give a satisfactory answer to the totality of the prohibited criminal behaviors. Since its a theory generated from a different legal system, its possible importation is necessarily subject to limits, in order to ensure compliance with the principle of the adequacy of the law to the real needs of the society in which it is to be in force. Thus, in the Civil Law, the majority of authors reject a thesis that allows a punishment on a malevolent misconduct basis without the existence of the cognitive element, and there is only a minority that accepts, in a very limited set of circumstances, the possibility of the existence of a theory in these terms.
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Direito penal Imputação Ignorância Dolo Direito comparado Teses de mestrado - 2019