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Epistemic Akrasia and Constraints on the Formation of Beliefs: An essay on the characterization and rationality of epistemic akrasia
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Acrasia epistémica é a contraparte teórica de um fenómeno que tem despertado a curiosidade
de filósofos com um interesse em raciocínio prático desde Aristóteles. Contudo,
quando comparada com a sua contraparte prática, a acrasia epistémica percorreu uma viagem
muito mais curta na história da filosofia. Apesar do facto de o debate sobre acrasia
epistémica apenas ter começado a ganhar tracção nas últimas décadas, não é frequente
(pelo menos, não o suficiente) o recurso ao progresso feito ao longo de milénios sobre o
problema da acrasia prática (salvo algumas excepções). Neste ensaio, começarei por fazer
um levantamento das principais abordagens à acrasia epistémica disponíveis na literatura,
antes de apresentar a minha proposta: que uma teoria que explica a acrasia epistémica ao
apelar à maneira como crenças são formadas sobre diferentes tipos de constrangimentos
pode ser expandida com sucesso para explicar casos de acrasia epistémica com resultados
igualmente bem sucedidos. Terminarei mostrando como esta proposta pode ser integrado
no programa da racionalidade limitada, providenciado, portanto, um enquadramento a
partir do qual a racionalidade de casos de acrasia epistémica pode ser avaliada.
Epistemic akrasia is the theoretical counterpart of a phenomenon that has sparked the curiosity of philosophers with an interest in practical reasoning since Aristotle. However, when compared to its practical counterpart, epistemic akrasia has travelled a much shorter journey in the history of philosophy. Despite the fact that the debate on epistemic akrasia has only started to gain traction in the last few decades, it has not often (at least, not often enough) resorted to the progresses made over millennia on the problem of practical akrasia (with some exceptions). In this essay, I’ll start by surveying the main approaches to epistemic akrasia available in the literature, before presenting my proposal: that a theory that explains practical akrasia by appealing to the way in which beliefs are formed under different kinds of constraints can be successfully expanded to explain cases of epistemic akrasia with the same success. I’ll finish by showing how this proposal can then be integrated into the program of bounded rationality, thus providing a framework from within which the rationality of cases of epistemic akrasia can be assessed.
Epistemic akrasia is the theoretical counterpart of a phenomenon that has sparked the curiosity of philosophers with an interest in practical reasoning since Aristotle. However, when compared to its practical counterpart, epistemic akrasia has travelled a much shorter journey in the history of philosophy. Despite the fact that the debate on epistemic akrasia has only started to gain traction in the last few decades, it has not often (at least, not often enough) resorted to the progresses made over millennia on the problem of practical akrasia (with some exceptions). In this essay, I’ll start by surveying the main approaches to epistemic akrasia available in the literature, before presenting my proposal: that a theory that explains practical akrasia by appealing to the way in which beliefs are formed under different kinds of constraints can be successfully expanded to explain cases of epistemic akrasia with the same success. I’ll finish by showing how this proposal can then be integrated into the program of bounded rationality, thus providing a framework from within which the rationality of cases of epistemic akrasia can be assessed.
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Vontade Crença (Psicologia) Racionalidade Teses de mestrado - 2022