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O regime da clemência no direito da concorrência
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Os cartéis assumem uma das formas mais gravosas das práticas anti concorrenciais atendendo à subversão do normal funcionamento do mercado e dos danos daí resultantes, quer para os consumidores, quer para os concorrentes das empresas que integram estas organizações.
O secretismo que caracteriza a formação e o funcionamento organizacional dos cartéis torna-os praticamente indetetáveis, pelo que a investigação por iniciativa das autoridades da concorrência é insuficiente para o seu desmantelamento. É neste contexto que surgem os programas de clemência, enquanto forma de deteção destas práticas restritivas horizontais, que são promovidos pelas autoridades dos diversos Estados que adotaram este mecanismo legal.
Com o presente trabalho pretende-se proceder à análise do regime da clemência, quer no contexto europeu, quer no nacional, nomeadamente no que se refere às condições de concessão deste programa e aos benefícios que as empresas colaborantes podem obter caso denunciem o cartel que integram.
Da mesma forma pretende-se analisar a sua eficácia questionando-se se será o único meio de combate a estes acordos horizontais ou se, porventura, medidas como a criminalização e o agravamento das coimas aplicáveis coadjuvarão no cumprimento das regras da concorrência.
Questiona-se a motivação do recurso a este instituto, bem sabendo que a partir do momento em que se torne pública a decisão no processo investigatório dos cartéis, as empresas ficam sujeitas a que os lesados pela atividade cartelista possam vir deduzir ações de responsabilidade civil contra todos os membros dos cartéis, com vista ao ressarcimento dos danos daí resultantes. Referimo-nos ao denominado private enforcement e à sua articulação com o regime da clemência, no sentido de apurar se é possível a sua coexistência sem que, por um lado, se desvirtue o regime da clemência e as empresas sejam compelidas a denunciar e, por outro, sem que os lesados deixem de exercer os seus direitos.
Cartels activities assume one of the most damaging anticompetitive practices in the market regular running. It inflicts serious impairments on the consumers as well as on the corporations that compete with those integrating the cartels. The distinctive secrecy cloak around the cartels establishment and operation are nearly untraceable. Thus, investigation led by the proper competition law authorities is still insufficient in order to fully dismantle cartels. Within these circumstances, leniency policies emerge as legal mechanisms for detection and examination of such horizontal agreements, being promoted in several countries. In this present work, the leniency regimes within the national and European contexts are analysed, particularly in terms of the requirements and benefits offered to the applying companies. Equally, the effectiveness of leniency policies is thoroughly probed in this dissertation, rising and addressing further questions. For example, if leniency regimes are the only possible means of contesting the horizontal agreements, or if additional criminal actions concerted with substantial increase of the penalties would be more successful in protecting and defending the competition law. The motivation behind the application of companies to take advantage from the leniency policy is also questioned in this work. A stand-alone action, or an action that follows on a public enforcement decision, may activate private enforcement which, in its turn, is a litigation on the establishment of an antitrust infringement. Then, imposition of injunctive reliefs and recovery of the damages suffered may be decided by the court. Consequently, the co-existence between private enforcement and the leniency policy is explored since it is equally important that companies provide intel but all those penalised by antitrust enforcement can exercise their rights.
Cartels activities assume one of the most damaging anticompetitive practices in the market regular running. It inflicts serious impairments on the consumers as well as on the corporations that compete with those integrating the cartels. The distinctive secrecy cloak around the cartels establishment and operation are nearly untraceable. Thus, investigation led by the proper competition law authorities is still insufficient in order to fully dismantle cartels. Within these circumstances, leniency policies emerge as legal mechanisms for detection and examination of such horizontal agreements, being promoted in several countries. In this present work, the leniency regimes within the national and European contexts are analysed, particularly in terms of the requirements and benefits offered to the applying companies. Equally, the effectiveness of leniency policies is thoroughly probed in this dissertation, rising and addressing further questions. For example, if leniency regimes are the only possible means of contesting the horizontal agreements, or if additional criminal actions concerted with substantial increase of the penalties would be more successful in protecting and defending the competition law. The motivation behind the application of companies to take advantage from the leniency policy is also questioned in this work. A stand-alone action, or an action that follows on a public enforcement decision, may activate private enforcement which, in its turn, is a litigation on the establishment of an antitrust infringement. Then, imposition of injunctive reliefs and recovery of the damages suffered may be decided by the court. Consequently, the co-existence between private enforcement and the leniency policy is explored since it is equally important that companies provide intel but all those penalised by antitrust enforcement can exercise their rights.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Direito da concorrência Cartéis Programa de clemência Private enforcement Teses de mestrado - 2020