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Os paradoxos de Adão : a antropossociogénese e a filogénese da justiça no Tratado da Natureza Humana de David Hume
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Resumo(s)
Na Segunda Parte do Livro Terceiro do seu Tratado da Natureza Humana (1740), o jovem
David Hume (1711-1776) procura mostrar como o sistema das “três regras de justiça” tem uma
origem “artificial” a partir do estabelecimento de uma “convenção” entre os membros da
primeira sociedade humana. Para esse efeito, é levado a esboçar uma História Natural da
Sociedade Humana. Esta História Natural tem como fundamento a tese de que a socialidade é
um traço essencial da natureza humana e expõe o processo de antropossociogénese e o correlato
processo de filogénese da justiça. No entanto, a dupla teoria humeana sobre a origem da
sociedade humana e sobre a origem das três regras gerais de justiça no seio dessa sociedade
origina dois problemas sob a forma de paradoxos, a que chamámos os “Paradoxos de Adão”:
O Paradoxo dos Genitores In-Gerados e o Paradoxo da Sociedade Humana In-Humana. Na
segunda parte do nosso trabalho, procuramos encontrar uma resposta “humeana” para estes
dois problemas. Para esse efeito, mostramos (1) que Hume teria aceitado uma solução
evolucionista darwiniana para os dois paradoxos e (2) que as teorias humeanas da
antropossociogénese e da filogénese da justiça podem efetivamente ser corrigidas –
eliminando-se os “Paradoxos de Adão” – pela adoção de uma perspetiva evolucionista
darwiniana. Teremos assim encontrado uma solução “humeana” para os “Paradoxos de Adão”
e resgatado as teorias de Hume sobre a antropossociogénese e sobre a filogénese da justiça para
um uso eventual numa Meta-Ética de cariz evolucionista.
In the Second Part of the Third Book of A Treatise of Human Nature (1740), a young David Hume (1711-1776) shows how the system of the “three rules of justice” has an “artificial” origin rooted in the establishment of a “convention” between the members of the first human society. To this end, Hume elaborates a Natural History of Human Society. This Natural History is grounded on the thesis that sociality is an essential trait of human nature. It describes the process of anthroposociogenesis and the related process of the phylogenesis of justice. However, the double humean theory concerning the origin of human society and the origin of the three general rules of justice in that society originates two problems configurated into two paradoxes, hereby called “Adam’s Paradoxes”: The Paradox of the Parents without Parents and the Paradox of the Un-Human Human Society. In the second part of our work, we try to find a “humean” solution to these two problems. For this purpose, we show (1) that Hume would have accepted a Darwinian evolutionist solution for the two paradoxes and (2) that the humean theories of anthroposociogenesis and phylogenesis of justice may, in fact, be corrected – eliminating both “Adam’s Paradoxes” – by the adoption of a Darwinian evolutionist perspective. In this way, we will have found a “humean” solution to Adam’s Paradoxes and may have ransomed Hume’s important theories about the anthroposociogenesis and the phylogenesis of justice so that both may be eventually used in an evolutionist Meta-Ethics.
In the Second Part of the Third Book of A Treatise of Human Nature (1740), a young David Hume (1711-1776) shows how the system of the “three rules of justice” has an “artificial” origin rooted in the establishment of a “convention” between the members of the first human society. To this end, Hume elaborates a Natural History of Human Society. This Natural History is grounded on the thesis that sociality is an essential trait of human nature. It describes the process of anthroposociogenesis and the related process of the phylogenesis of justice. However, the double humean theory concerning the origin of human society and the origin of the three general rules of justice in that society originates two problems configurated into two paradoxes, hereby called “Adam’s Paradoxes”: The Paradox of the Parents without Parents and the Paradox of the Un-Human Human Society. In the second part of our work, we try to find a “humean” solution to these two problems. For this purpose, we show (1) that Hume would have accepted a Darwinian evolutionist solution for the two paradoxes and (2) that the humean theories of anthroposociogenesis and phylogenesis of justice may, in fact, be corrected – eliminating both “Adam’s Paradoxes” – by the adoption of a Darwinian evolutionist perspective. In this way, we will have found a “humean” solution to Adam’s Paradoxes and may have ransomed Hume’s important theories about the anthroposociogenesis and the phylogenesis of justice so that both may be eventually used in an evolutionist Meta-Ethics.