Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Os subsídios de desemprego tradicionais diminuem o custo associado ao desemprego,
mas ao mesmo tempo criam incentivos no sentido do prolongamento da duração do
desemprego. Este efeito desincentivador poderia ser eliminado ou drasticamente
reduzido se os indivíduos internalizassem o custo do seu desemprego. A presente tese
de dissertação simula a aplicação em Portugal de um sistema de subsídios de
desemprego geridos em contas individuais (SDCI) em moldes semelhantes ao proposto
por Feldstein e Altman (1998) e mais recentemente retomado por Kling (2006). Neste
sistema os indivíduos depositam uma percentagem do seu salário numa conta individual
gerida em capitalização, à qual recorrem para financiar as suas prestações de
desemprego, mantendo inalterados os níveis de protecção social assegurados pelos
actuais subsídios de desemprego (cenário base). Caso o montante detido na conta seja
insuficiente para pagar as prestações, o Estado emprestará o montante necessário.
Aquando da reforma, as contas com saldo acumulado positivo ficam na posse do
indivíduo, sendo os saldos negativos perdoados pelo Estado. Assim, os indivíduos
podem reforma-se com um saldo positivo diminuindo os incentivos ao prolongamento
ineficiente de experiências de desemprego, pois estas são financiadas através das suas
próprias prestações pagas. A exequibilidade do sistema depende da percentagem de
indivíduos que conseguem financiar o seu próprio desemprego. As simulações de
aplicação do SDCI, recorrendo à carreira contributiva hipotética estimada a partir de
uma amostra de indivíduos do Inquérito ao Emprego, concluem pela sua viabilidade no
cenário base, pois cerca de 2/3 dos indivíduos concluiriam a sua vida activa com saldos
positivos acumulados. São também analisados os efeitos redistributivos da mudança do
actual sistema para o SDCI e verifica-se que, em média, esta mudança traria benefícios
para os indivíduos de todos os quintis de rendimento, embora fosse potencialmente
regressiva, com os indivíduos de maiores rendimentos a beneficiarem mais com a
alteração.
It is commonly argued that unemployment subsidies decrease the cost associated with unemployment at the expense of creating an incentive to increase the duration of unemployment. This adverse effect could be eliminated or drastically reduced if individuals bore the cost of their own unemployment. The present thesis simulates the adoption of a system of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISA) for Portugal using the methodology proposed by Feldstein and Altman (1998) and more recently developed by Kling (2006). In this system individuals save a percentage of their wage in an individual pre-funded account and draw their unemployment benefits from the amounts deposited in those accounts. In the baseline scenario the unemployment benefits are the same as under the traditional system so that social protection levels remain unchanged. In case the amount deposited in the individual account is insufficient to finance the benefits the State will lend the necessary funds. Positive accumulated balances are transferred to individuals at retirement age whilst the negative balances are forgiven. Therefore, individuals retiring with a positive balance in their accounts have no incentive to inefficiently extend the duration of their unemployment spells as they will be the sole financiers of their own unemployment periods. The viability of the UISA ultimately depends on individuals being able to finance their own unemployment. The simulation of the UISA was performed on the hypothetic lifetime labour market histories of individuals estimated from a representative sample taken from the Employment Survey and concluded that the SDCI of the baseline scenario can be considered as viable since 2/3 of individuals would reach their retirement age with positive balances on their accounts. The redistributive impact of a change from the traditional system to the UISA is also considered and on average individuals from all income quintiles would benefit from the change, although this change could be regressive as better off individuals would benefit more from it. Keywords: unemployment insurance, individual accounts, unemployment duration, wage determination models, simulation models, job search.
It is commonly argued that unemployment subsidies decrease the cost associated with unemployment at the expense of creating an incentive to increase the duration of unemployment. This adverse effect could be eliminated or drastically reduced if individuals bore the cost of their own unemployment. The present thesis simulates the adoption of a system of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISA) for Portugal using the methodology proposed by Feldstein and Altman (1998) and more recently developed by Kling (2006). In this system individuals save a percentage of their wage in an individual pre-funded account and draw their unemployment benefits from the amounts deposited in those accounts. In the baseline scenario the unemployment benefits are the same as under the traditional system so that social protection levels remain unchanged. In case the amount deposited in the individual account is insufficient to finance the benefits the State will lend the necessary funds. Positive accumulated balances are transferred to individuals at retirement age whilst the negative balances are forgiven. Therefore, individuals retiring with a positive balance in their accounts have no incentive to inefficiently extend the duration of their unemployment spells as they will be the sole financiers of their own unemployment periods. The viability of the UISA ultimately depends on individuals being able to finance their own unemployment. The simulation of the UISA was performed on the hypothetic lifetime labour market histories of individuals estimated from a representative sample taken from the Employment Survey and concluded that the SDCI of the baseline scenario can be considered as viable since 2/3 of individuals would reach their retirement age with positive balances on their accounts. The redistributive impact of a change from the traditional system to the UISA is also considered and on average individuals from all income quintiles would benefit from the change, although this change could be regressive as better off individuals would benefit more from it. Keywords: unemployment insurance, individual accounts, unemployment duration, wage determination models, simulation models, job search.
Description
Mestrado em Economia
Keywords
Subsídios de Desemprego Contas Individuais Duração de Desemprego Modelos de Determinação de Salários Modelos de Simulação Procura de Emprego Unemployment Insurance Individual Accounts Unemployment Duration Wage Determination Models Simulation Models Job Search
Pedagogical Context
Citation
Rodrigues, Ricardo Jorge Alcobia Granja (2007). “Subsídios de desemprego geridos em contas individuals: uma aplicação a Portugal”. Dissertação de Mestrado. Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão.