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Guerra da Crimeia (1853-1856). A Rússia e a tentativa de controlo das rotas marítimas de acesso às águas quentes
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Em 1853, a Grã-Bretanha e a França, juntaram-se, numa aliança com o Império Otomano contra o Império Russo, ficando esta conhecida como a Guerra da Crimeia (1853-1856). Numa quezília entre a França e a Rússia, sobre a gestão dos Lugares Sagrados, em Jerusalém, pelas Igrejas Católica e Ortodoxa, uma guerra de projeção global tornou-se inevitável, quando esta situação rapidamente escalou para uma disputa estratégica pelo domínio dos Estreitos de Bósforo e Dardanelos.
Devido à inexistência de documentos que permitam, atualmente, comprovar os interesses estratégicos russos, face ao Mar Negro, apenas um complexo contexto de expansão territorial secular, em direção à Crimeia permitem reconhecer que a Rússia, de facto tinha uma estratégia naval que, a partir de finais do séc. XVIII ficou centrada em garantir controlo sobre os Estreitos, o que viria a torná-la a potência hegemónica do Mar Negro.
Finda a Guerra, ao Czar Alexandre II assumiu uma humilhante derrota política, aceitando um conjunto de limitações estratégicas, para prosseguir com a sua política. No entanto, em poucos anos, conseguiu reagir a essas limitações, voltando a ameaçar o status quo na bacia do Mar Negro, em virtude da prossecução dos seus objetivos estratégicos.
In 1853, an alliance made up of Great Britain and France joined the Ottoman Empire in a war against the Russian Empire, known as the Crimean War (1853 1856). In a dispute between France and Russia over the management of the Holy Places in Jerusalem by the Cat holic and Orthodox Churches, a war on a global scale became inevitable, when this situation quickly escalated into a strategic dispute for dominance of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. Due to the lack of documents that currently allow us to prove Russian strategic interests in the Black Sea, only a complex context of centuries old territorial expansion towards Crimea allows us to recognize that Russia, in fact, had a n aval s trategy which, from of the end of the century. XVIII focused on ensuring control over the Straits, which would make it the hegemonic power of the Black Sea. After the War, Russia suffered a humiliating political defeat, accepting a set of strategic limitations to continue its policy. However, in a few years, it managed to react to these limitations, once again threatening the status quo in the Black Sea basin, due to the pursuit of its strategic objectives.
In 1853, an alliance made up of Great Britain and France joined the Ottoman Empire in a war against the Russian Empire, known as the Crimean War (1853 1856). In a dispute between France and Russia over the management of the Holy Places in Jerusalem by the Cat holic and Orthodox Churches, a war on a global scale became inevitable, when this situation quickly escalated into a strategic dispute for dominance of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. Due to the lack of documents that currently allow us to prove Russian strategic interests in the Black Sea, only a complex context of centuries old territorial expansion towards Crimea allows us to recognize that Russia, in fact, had a n aval s trategy which, from of the end of the century. XVIII focused on ensuring control over the Straits, which would make it the hegemonic power of the Black Sea. After the War, Russia suffered a humiliating political defeat, accepting a set of strategic limitations to continue its policy. However, in a few years, it managed to react to these limitations, once again threatening the status quo in the Black Sea basin, due to the pursuit of its strategic objectives.