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No processo civil, as teorias sobre a competência do juiz para decidir da qualificação de afirmações factuais como verdadeiras ou falsas para efeitos de um concreto processo (i.e., da qualificação de factos como provados ou não provados) e sobre a fundamentação dessa decisão encontram-se eivadas de subjetivismo e psicologismo, quer ao nível da linguagem, quer do conteúdo. Tal situação deriva, por um lado, da evolução histórica do papel do juiz, da prova e da fundamentação nas decisões dos Tribunais, desde o Império Romano do Ocidente até à atualidade. Por outro lado, é perpetuada pela profusa realização de estudos sobre a decisão e sua fundamentação que se encontram mergulhados numa confusão entre os contextos de descoberta e de justificação, que estão acriticamente comprometidos com a clássica distinção entre matéria de facto e matéria de direito e que se encontram em conflito com o entendimento moderno do conhecimento proposicional oferecido pela Epistemologia. O resultado prático deste estado da arte é a proliferação de decisões jurisprudenciais com fundamentações crípticas, vazias, circulares ou genericamente insuficientes, que turvam as verdadeiras razões de uma decisão ou escondem a insuficiência dos elementos do processo com base nos quais é tomada, não permitindo a realização das finalidades constitucionais da fundamentação e a tutela de posições normativas que cabe aos Tribunais assegurar. O presente estudo pretende realizar uma análise puramente normativa e epistemológica da decisão jurisdicional de qualificação de afirmações factuais como verdadeiras ou falsas para efeitos de um concreto processo e da sua fundamentação. Pretendemos, a final, identificar os critérios de suficiência da fundamentação da decisão de qualificação de afirmações factuais como verdadeiras ou falsas para efeitos de um concreto processo, exclusivamente através da interpretação das fontes normativas que consagram exigências de fundamentação das decisões dos Tribunais e das fontes normativas que regulam, direta ou indiretamente, a competência do juiz para a qualificação, discricionária ou vinculada, de afirmações factuais como verdadeiras ou falsas. Esta análise permite construir um sistema móvel de critérios de suficiência da fundamentação da decisão de qualificação de afirmações factuais como verdadeiras ou falsas em sede processual, que guie o julgador na identificação dos elementos que devem constar da fundamentação de uma decisão, para que ela possa ser compreensível para os seus destinatários e permita o auto e heterocontrolo da sujeição do juiz à lei, da sua independência e da ingerência da decisão em esferas jurídicas concretas. São elementos móveis autónomos desse sistema: (a) a vinculatividade/discricionariedade da decisão; (b) a ingerência da decisão em esferas jurídicas concretas; (c) a complexidade/ simplicidade da causa; (d) a compreensibilidade da decisão para os seus destinatários. São subelementos desse sistema, porque não autónomos face aos elementos indicados: (a) a relevância axiológico-normativa da posição jurídica afetada; (b) a extensão da ingerência em esferas jurídicas concretas; (c) as características particulares dos sujeitos afetados pela decisão; (d) o caráter provisório ou definitivo da decisão final; (e) os standards de prova; (f) os princípios dispositivo e da autorresponsabilidade das partes. A identificação e uniformização da aplicação de critérios de suficiência da fundamentação permite um reforço da fundamentação das decisões jurisdicionais, estreitando as margens de discricionariedade do Tribunal e fornecendo a base de um enquadramento teórico, cujo desenvolvimento oferece coordenadas para a construção de critérios decisórios mais concretos, aplicáveis a constelações de casos. Este desenvolvimento teórico-prático possibilita a diminuição de fundamentações obscuras, manipuladas, circulares ou genericamente insuficientes, com óbvio ganho ao nível da compreensibilidade e da aceitabilidade racional ou razoabilidade das decisões e, em última linha, da certeza e segurança jurídicas.
In civil procedure, theories about the judge's competence to decide whether to qualify intra-procedural factual statements as true or false (i.e., to qualify facts as proven or not proven) and about the grounds for his decision are riddled with subjectivism and psychologism, both at the level of language and content. This situation derives, on the one hand, from the historical evolution of the role of the judge, evidence, and reasoning in the courts’ decisions since the Roman Empire to the present day. On the other hand, it is perpetuated by profuse legal studies on the decision and its reasoning which are immersed in a confusion between the context of discovery and the context of justification, are uncritically committed to the classic distinction between fact and law and conflict with the modern understanding of propositional knowledge offered by Epistemology. The practical result of this state of the art is the proliferation of court decisions with cryptic, empty, circular or generally insufficient grounds, which obscure the true reasons for a decision or hide the insufficiency of the elements on the basis of which the decision is taken, not allowing the achievement of the constitutional purposes of the justification and the protection of the normative positions that the courts are responsible for ensuring. The present study intends to carry out a purely normative and epistemological analysis of the court’s decision to qualify intra-procedural factual statements as true or false and its reasoning. Ultimately, we aim to identify the sufficiency criteria for the reasoning of the decision that qualifies factual statements as true or false for the purposes of a specific procedure, exclusively through the interpretation of the normative sources that enshrine the requirements for the substantiation of the courts' decisions and the normative sources that regulate, directly or indirectly, the judge's competence to qualify, discretionarily or legally, the factual statements of a case as true or false. This analysis allows the construction of a mobile system of sufficiency criteria for justifying the decision of qualification of factual statements as true or false, for the purposes of a specific procedure, guiding the judge in the identification of the elements that ought to be included in the justification, so that it is comprehensible to its recipients and allows self- and hetero-control of the judge's subjection to the law, of his independence and of the interference of the decision in concrete legal spheres. The autonomous moving elements of this system are: (a) the bindingness/ discretionality of the decision; (b) the interference of the decision in concrete legal spheres; (c) the complexity/ simplicity of the cause; (d) the comprehensibility of the decision for its recipients. The sub-elements of this system, not autonomous in relation to the appointed elements, are the following: (a) the axiological-normative relevance of the affected legal position; (b) the extent of the interference in concrete legal spheres; (c) the particular characteristics of the subject directly affected by the decision; (d) the provisional or definitive nature of the final decision; (e) the standards of proof; (e) the dispositive principle and the principle of self-responsibility of the parties. The identification and standardization of sufficiency criteria of justification allows for a reinforcement of the justification of court decisions, narrowing the court's margins of discretion and providing the basis of a theoretical framework, the development of which offers coordinates for the construction of more concrete decision-making criteria, applicable to constellations of cases. This theoretical-practical development makes it possible to reduce obscure, manipulated, circular or generally insufficient justification, with obvious gains in terms of comprehensibility and rational acceptability of decisions and, ultimately, legal certainty and security.
In civil procedure, theories about the judge's competence to decide whether to qualify intra-procedural factual statements as true or false (i.e., to qualify facts as proven or not proven) and about the grounds for his decision are riddled with subjectivism and psychologism, both at the level of language and content. This situation derives, on the one hand, from the historical evolution of the role of the judge, evidence, and reasoning in the courts’ decisions since the Roman Empire to the present day. On the other hand, it is perpetuated by profuse legal studies on the decision and its reasoning which are immersed in a confusion between the context of discovery and the context of justification, are uncritically committed to the classic distinction between fact and law and conflict with the modern understanding of propositional knowledge offered by Epistemology. The practical result of this state of the art is the proliferation of court decisions with cryptic, empty, circular or generally insufficient grounds, which obscure the true reasons for a decision or hide the insufficiency of the elements on the basis of which the decision is taken, not allowing the achievement of the constitutional purposes of the justification and the protection of the normative positions that the courts are responsible for ensuring. The present study intends to carry out a purely normative and epistemological analysis of the court’s decision to qualify intra-procedural factual statements as true or false and its reasoning. Ultimately, we aim to identify the sufficiency criteria for the reasoning of the decision that qualifies factual statements as true or false for the purposes of a specific procedure, exclusively through the interpretation of the normative sources that enshrine the requirements for the substantiation of the courts' decisions and the normative sources that regulate, directly or indirectly, the judge's competence to qualify, discretionarily or legally, the factual statements of a case as true or false. This analysis allows the construction of a mobile system of sufficiency criteria for justifying the decision of qualification of factual statements as true or false, for the purposes of a specific procedure, guiding the judge in the identification of the elements that ought to be included in the justification, so that it is comprehensible to its recipients and allows self- and hetero-control of the judge's subjection to the law, of his independence and of the interference of the decision in concrete legal spheres. The autonomous moving elements of this system are: (a) the bindingness/ discretionality of the decision; (b) the interference of the decision in concrete legal spheres; (c) the complexity/ simplicity of the cause; (d) the comprehensibility of the decision for its recipients. The sub-elements of this system, not autonomous in relation to the appointed elements, are the following: (a) the axiological-normative relevance of the affected legal position; (b) the extent of the interference in concrete legal spheres; (c) the particular characteristics of the subject directly affected by the decision; (d) the provisional or definitive nature of the final decision; (e) the standards of proof; (e) the dispositive principle and the principle of self-responsibility of the parties. The identification and standardization of sufficiency criteria of justification allows for a reinforcement of the justification of court decisions, narrowing the court's margins of discretion and providing the basis of a theoretical framework, the development of which offers coordinates for the construction of more concrete decision-making criteria, applicable to constellations of cases. This theoretical-practical development makes it possible to reduce obscure, manipulated, circular or generally insufficient justification, with obvious gains in terms of comprehensibility and rational acceptability of decisions and, ultimately, legal certainty and security.
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Keywords
Processo civil Convicção do juiz Fundamentação Matéria de facto Prova Teses de doutoramento - 2024