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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181– 185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient.
Description
Keywords
Endogenous timing Mixed oligopoly Semipublic firms Cournot competition
Pedagogical Context
Citation
Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos e María Begoña Garzón (2010). "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms". Portuguese Economic Journal, 9(2):97-113
Publisher
Springer Verlag