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Publicação
Desacordo
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Resumo(s)
Discordamos sobre todo o tipo de coisas: o que existe, como as coisas
funcionam, o que fazer, de que gostamos, etc. Entre os vários tipos
de desacordo discutidos em debates filosóficos contemporâneos
encontram-se os desacordos irrepreensíveis, os desacordos meramente
verbais, e os desacordos entre pares. Os diferentes tipos de desacordo
dão lugar a diversos problemas filosóficos. Há filósofos que defendem
que se o desacordo sobre uma questão é irrepreensível, então talvez
não haja verdades objectivas sobre essa questão, e que se um desacordo
é meramente verbal, então não existe nenhum problema real em discussão.
Algumas consequências destes tipos de desacordo concernem a
objectividade dos problemas em causa. Outras consequências concernem
a racionalidade das nossas crenças, como quando aprendemos que um
par epistémico não concorda connosco. Este artigo resume a discussão
filosófica contemporânea sobre o desacordo meramente verbal, o desacordo
irrepreensível, e o desacordo entre pares.
Abstract: We disagree about all sorts of things: what there is, how thing s work, what to do, what we like, etc. Among the various kinds of disagree- ment that have been in focus in recent philosophical debates are: faut- less disagreements, where noone appears to be wrong, merely ver bal disagreements, and peer disagreements. These various kind s raise dif- ferent philosophical issues. Some philosophers claim that if a disagree- ment is faultless, then there are no objective truths about t he topic of the disagreement, and that if a disagreement is merely verba l, then there is no real problem under discussion. These kinds of verdi ct about a possible disagreement have impact on the objectivity of the problems at stake. Other kinds of problems raised by disagreement are less con- cerned with the objectivity of its subject matter than with t he rational- ity of beliefs over some subject matter, for instance in cases of peer epis- temic peer disagreement. This article sumarizes the current disc ussion over the philosophical problems raised by these types of dis agreement: merely verbal disagreement , faultless disagreement , and peer disagreement.
Abstract: We disagree about all sorts of things: what there is, how thing s work, what to do, what we like, etc. Among the various kinds of disagree- ment that have been in focus in recent philosophical debates are: faut- less disagreements, where noone appears to be wrong, merely ver bal disagreements, and peer disagreements. These various kind s raise dif- ferent philosophical issues. Some philosophers claim that if a disagree- ment is faultless, then there are no objective truths about t he topic of the disagreement, and that if a disagreement is merely verba l, then there is no real problem under discussion. These kinds of verdi ct about a possible disagreement have impact on the objectivity of the problems at stake. Other kinds of problems raised by disagreement are less con- cerned with the objectivity of its subject matter than with t he rational- ity of beliefs over some subject matter, for instance in cases of peer epis- temic peer disagreement. This article sumarizes the current disc ussion over the philosophical problems raised by these types of dis agreement: merely verbal disagreement , faultless disagreement , and peer disagreement.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Desacordo verbal Deflacionismo ontológico Desacordo Irrepreensível Relativismo Desacordo entre pares
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Branquinho,J. e Santos,R. (eds), Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisboa: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
Editora
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa