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A escalar a montanha. Uma análise crítica da Teoria Tripla de Parfit
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O objectivo desta tese é o de defender o consequencialismo de regras como fundamento da moralidade, reconhecendo, simultaneamente, um papel essencial ao contratualismo kantiano de motivação para a moralidade e ao contratualismo scanloniano de clarificação da imparcialidade e de ferramenta de decisão.
A investigação parte da proposta de uma teoria tripla de Derek Parfit defendida na sua obra On What Matters. Esta proposta originou e continua a originar diversas críticas, tanto ao nível das alterações que o autor propõe à teoria moral kantiana e à teoria scanloniana, como à conciliação das mesmas. Esta discussão constitui o ponto de partida para a análise das referidas críticas, bem como das questões que têm sido vistas como inconciliáveis entre deontologistas e consequencialistas. Defende-se que as teorias deontológicas
apresentam fragilidades naquilo que consideram ser as suas vantagens relativamente às teorias consequencialistas, nomeadamente, na defesa de restrições e opções de acção, ou nos casos resultantes da agregação. Pelo contrário, uma teoria consequencialistas de regras, baseando-se nas melhores consequências, consegue defender tanto a existência de restrições como de opções à forma como o agente deve agir, assim como a aplicação da agregação em certos casos. Defende-se, ainda, que a teoria de Scanlon sofre de uma debilidade essencial de inadequação explicativa, mas que, embora não sendo adequada como fundamento da moralidade, pode ter um papel importante como ferramenta de decisão ao clarificar a forma como a imparcialidade deve ser entendida. Por sua vez, a teoria contratualista
kantiana, tal como Parfit a defende, pode ter um papel importante de motivação dos agentes para agirem moralmente. Finalmente, sendo uma teoria de valor determinante para a avaliação das melhores consequências, analisa-se a relação do bem-estar com a moralidade nomeadamente ao nível dos factores que têm importância na valoração de um estado de coisas, como a igualdade, o mérito e a prioridade para os mais desfavorecidos. Defende-se que, se a noção de bem-estar não for entendida de uma forma muito estrita, o bem-estar é o valor fundamental da moralidade, desde que seja dada prioridade aos mais desfavorecidos.
The aim of this thesis is to defend rule consequentialism as the most suitable theory for the foundation of morality. At the same time, the essential roles of Scanlon’s theory of clarifying aggregation and as a decision tool and of kantian contractualism of motivating morality are recognized. The research starts from Parfit’s proposal of a triple theory, defended on On What Matters [2011]. This proposal has given rise to and continues to give rise to various criticisms, both in terms of the changes that the author proposes to kantian moral theory and scanlonian theory, and the reconciliation of the two. This discussion forms the starting point for the analysis of the aforementioned criticisms, as well as the issues that have been seen as irreconcilable between deontologists and consequentialists. It is argued that deontological theories have weaknesses in what they consider to be their advantages over consequentialist theories, namely, in the defence of constraints and options to action, or in the cases resulting from aggregation. In contrast, a consequentialist theory of rules, relying on best consequences, is able to defend both the existence of constraints and options to how the agent should act, as well as the application of aggregation in certain cases. It is further argued that Scanlon's theory suffers from an essential weakness of explanatory inadequacy, but that while it is not adequate as a foundation of morality, it can play an important role as a decision tool by clarifying how impartiality should be understood. In turn, kantian contractualist theory, as Parfit argues it, can play an important role in motivating agents to act morally. Finally, as a theory of value is determinant for the evaluation of the best consequences, the relationship between well-being and morality is analysed, namely at the level of factors that have importance in the valuation of a state of affairs, such as equality, merit and priority for the worst off. It is argued that, if the notion of well-being is not understood in a very strict way, well-being is the fundamental value of morality, provided that priority is given to the worst off.
The aim of this thesis is to defend rule consequentialism as the most suitable theory for the foundation of morality. At the same time, the essential roles of Scanlon’s theory of clarifying aggregation and as a decision tool and of kantian contractualism of motivating morality are recognized. The research starts from Parfit’s proposal of a triple theory, defended on On What Matters [2011]. This proposal has given rise to and continues to give rise to various criticisms, both in terms of the changes that the author proposes to kantian moral theory and scanlonian theory, and the reconciliation of the two. This discussion forms the starting point for the analysis of the aforementioned criticisms, as well as the issues that have been seen as irreconcilable between deontologists and consequentialists. It is argued that deontological theories have weaknesses in what they consider to be their advantages over consequentialist theories, namely, in the defence of constraints and options to action, or in the cases resulting from aggregation. In contrast, a consequentialist theory of rules, relying on best consequences, is able to defend both the existence of constraints and options to how the agent should act, as well as the application of aggregation in certain cases. It is further argued that Scanlon's theory suffers from an essential weakness of explanatory inadequacy, but that while it is not adequate as a foundation of morality, it can play an important role as a decision tool by clarifying how impartiality should be understood. In turn, kantian contractualist theory, as Parfit argues it, can play an important role in motivating agents to act morally. Finally, as a theory of value is determinant for the evaluation of the best consequences, the relationship between well-being and morality is analysed, namely at the level of factors that have importance in the valuation of a state of affairs, such as equality, merit and priority for the worst off. It is argued that, if the notion of well-being is not understood in a very strict way, well-being is the fundamental value of morality, provided that priority is given to the worst off.
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Palavras-chave
Scanlon, Thomas, 1940- - Moral Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 - Moral Parfit, Derek - 1942-2017. On what matters Moral Consequencialismo Contrato social Teses de doutoramento - 2022