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Abstract(s)
In May 1967, the delegations were engaged in the last phase of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, the
Kennedy Round, in Geneva. The European Economic Community
(EEC) – represented by the European Commission – and the other
GATT members were frantically bargaining over the last crucial tariff
concessions. The negotiations concerning the chemical sector were particularly
thorny. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was attempting
to stretch the negotiations out until the very end in order to obtain
greater concessions from the United States. While the ministry pursued
its strategy, Pierre Millet, the President of the French Union des Industries
Chimiques (UIC), the French chemical industry association, was in
constant direct contact with the Commission, which was negotiating on
behalf of the EEC member states. He expressed his support for a quick
resolution to the outstanding issues and informed the Commission of
the changing position of the French ministry. At the same time, Millet
sent detailed reports to the French ministry on the state of the negotiations
in Brussels and Geneva, showing that he was better informed
than the Quai d’Orsay. The French foreign ministry expressed its irritation
over Millet’s bilateral contacts, as they appeared to weaken the
official French bargaining position. It complained about the situation,
for which it blamed the Commission, and demanded that Millet keep
out of the negotiations – to no avail, however.
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Pedagogical Context
Citation
Coppolaro, L. (2012). Developing a “European Strategy”: business groups and the EEC trade policy-making in the Kennedy Round. In W. Kaiser & J.H. Meyer (eds.), Societal Actors in European Integration: From Polity-Building to Transnational Politics and Policy-Making (pp. 84-105). Basingstoke: Palgrave
