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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Previous research shows that laypeople believe that science is more capable of explaining
some psychological phenomena than others. People think that science can explain thoughts
and feelings associated with low introspective access (e.g., read a map), but cannot account
for high-introspection phenomena (e.g., falling in love; Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2018, 2019).
Moreover, people believe that science is more capable of explaining other people’s minds
than theirs, particularly for high-introspection domains (Mata et al., 2020). The present thesis
aims to explore a potential reason behind these lay beliefs: intuitive dualism (i.e., individuals’
innate tendency to split the world in material and immaterial portions, in minds and bodies).
In Studies 1a and 1b, participants rated the extent to which ten psychological domains were
associated with both material and immaterial parts of people, as well as the extent to which
science could explain said phenomena. In Studies 2a and 2b, participants judged the
materiality of each phenomenon, through both gut responses and slow reflected ones. The
present thesis concludes that: (a) not all psychological phenomena are considered equally
material; (b) the extent to which a phenomenon is considered material is associated with its
introspective access (high vs. low); (c) dualistic conceptions are intuitive (i.e., more evident
in fast vs. slow responses); (d) the more a phenomenon is associated with an immaterial part
of people, the less it is believed to be explainable through science. Overall, this pattern of
results suggests that lay beliefs about what science can explain are driven by intuitive
dualism.
Descrição
Dissertação de mestrado, Psicologia (Área de especialização em Cognição Social Aplicada), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Psicologia, 2021
Palavras-chave
Epistemologia Crença na ciência Introspecção Dualismo Teses de mestrado - 2021
