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A improbabilidade da jurisdição constitucional : a Constituição como norma em questão
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Esta dissertação busca tratar do problema da jurisdição constitucional a partir do questionamento sobre as possibilidades de adjudicação do conflito político pela aplicação jurídica de normas constitucionais. Para tanto, é apresentada uma distinção entre os sentidos constitutivo e prescritivo de constituição, sendo a defesa de uma justiça constitucional que concentra poder para decidir tida como um marco característico da segunda abordagem. Antes de discutir as possibilidades de aplicação jurisdicional da constituição, é apresentado o conceito de legalismo, que explica a predileção por decidir conflitos dentro de formas jurídicas em detrimento da política. Já como foco central do trabalho, são discutidas três vias teóricas que apresentam modelos para o juiz constitucional: uma via objetivista, que busca limitar a moralização das decisões do julgador; uma via procedimentalista, associada a John Hart Ely, que busca construir uma alternativa de solução constitucional pautada na atuação do juiz em prol do bom funcionamento dos procedimentos de decisão político-democráticos; e, por fim, discute-se a solução de Ronald Dworkin, denominada pelo autor de leitura moral da
constituição, segundo a qual não há alternativa para a jurisdição constitucional que não envolva a solução de desacordos entre diferentes compreensões de princípios de moralidade política. A conclusão é a de que o exercício de uma função que pode ser compreendida como jurisdição constitucional por tribunais é improvável. O principal motivo que se identifica para tal é que a prática de tribunais constitucionais dificilmente pode ser considerada uma prática de natureza jurisdicional, de forma que não será possível, em grande parte das circunstâncias, uma adjudicação do conflito político. A partir da crítica de Fernando Atria, apresenta-se ainda que a contradição entre a função política e a forma jurisdicional que caracteriza os tribunais constitucionais provoca problemas para a prática política.
This dissertation aims to study the problem of the constitutional jurisdiction starting from the doubt about the possibilities of adjudicating a political conflict via the application of constitutional norms. To do so, a distinction between the constitutive and the prescriptive comprehensions of a constitution is advanced, in a way in which the defense of courts that are attributed with considerable power to decide is held as a paradigmatic characteristic of the latter. Before discussing the possibilities of the legal application of the constitution, the concept of legalism, is presented as an explanation of the preference for deciding conflicts via legal forms instead of politics. As the main discussion, three theorical models for the constitutional judge are presented: the first is the objectivist, which aims to limit the moral content of the official’s decisions; the second is the proceduralist, which is mainly associated with the work of John Hart Ely, and aims to present an alternative for constitutional adjudication that is mainly preoccupied with the democratic procedures of political decision; at last, Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the constitution is brought forth as a theory according to which there is no alternative for the constitutional jurisdiction that does not involve solving disagreements between different understanding of principles of political morality. To conclude, the practice of a function that might be understood as constitutional jurisdiction by courts is said to be improbable. The main identified reason is that the function constitutional courts play can hardly be considered one of a legal nature, in a way that makes it hard, in a lot of cases, to consider its practice as the adjudication of the political conflict. To conclude, taking Fernando Atria’s critique, the problems that stem from the contradiction between the political function and the legal form of constitutional courts is displayed.
This dissertation aims to study the problem of the constitutional jurisdiction starting from the doubt about the possibilities of adjudicating a political conflict via the application of constitutional norms. To do so, a distinction between the constitutive and the prescriptive comprehensions of a constitution is advanced, in a way in which the defense of courts that are attributed with considerable power to decide is held as a paradigmatic characteristic of the latter. Before discussing the possibilities of the legal application of the constitution, the concept of legalism, is presented as an explanation of the preference for deciding conflicts via legal forms instead of politics. As the main discussion, three theorical models for the constitutional judge are presented: the first is the objectivist, which aims to limit the moral content of the official’s decisions; the second is the proceduralist, which is mainly associated with the work of John Hart Ely, and aims to present an alternative for constitutional adjudication that is mainly preoccupied with the democratic procedures of political decision; at last, Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the constitution is brought forth as a theory according to which there is no alternative for the constitutional jurisdiction that does not involve solving disagreements between different understanding of principles of political morality. To conclude, the practice of a function that might be understood as constitutional jurisdiction by courts is said to be improbable. The main identified reason is that the function constitutional courts play can hardly be considered one of a legal nature, in a way that makes it hard, in a lot of cases, to consider its practice as the adjudication of the political conflict. To conclude, taking Fernando Atria’s critique, the problems that stem from the contradiction between the political function and the legal form of constitutional courts is displayed.
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Palavras-chave
Jurisdição constitucional Teoria da constituição Controlo de constitucionalidade Teoria do direito Teses de mestrado - 2021