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Os acordos pay for delay: uma análise problemática à luz do direito europeu da concorrência e do direito de propriedade industrial
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A presente dissertação versa sobre os acordos pay for delay e os desafios que estes colocam ao direito europeu da concorrência, atentas as idiossincrasias do setor farmacêutico na proteção da inovação através da concessão de um direito de patente à empresa de medicamentos de referência.
Partindo da articulação entre o regime dos direitos de propriedade intelectual e o direito da concorrência, procede-se a uma análise da concorrência no setor farmacêutico, entre empresas de medicamentos de referência e empresas de medicamentos genéricos, procurando entender a racionalidade na génese da celebração dos acordos pay for delay.
Na senda dos sucessivos inquéritos setoriais sobre a concorrência no setor dos farmacêutico que a Comissão Europeia lançou mão na última década, a (i)licitude dos acordos pay for delau é apreciada numa perspetiva prática, com particular enfoque na análise dos casos Lundbeck, Servier e, mais recentemente, Generics , que constituem marcos fundamentais na aplicação das normas de Direito Europeu da Concorrência, no setor farmacêutico.
This paper deals with pay for delay agreements and the challenges that they pose to European competition law, taking into account the idiosyncrasies of the pharmaceutical sector and the protection of innovation through the granting of a patent right to the reference drug company. Setting off from the articulation between the legal regime of intellectual property rights and competition law, we proceed to an analysis of competition in the pharmaceutical sector, between reference companies and generic companies, looking for the rationality in the genesis of the celebration of the pay for the delay agreements. In the wake of successive sector inquiries on competition in the pharmaceutical sector that the European Commission has launched in the last decade, the (un)lawfulness of the pay for delay agreements is appreciated from a practical perspective, with particular focus on the analysis of the cases Lundbeck, Servier and , more recently, Generics, which are fundamental milestones in the application of the rules of European Competition Law, in the pharmaceutical sector.
This paper deals with pay for delay agreements and the challenges that they pose to European competition law, taking into account the idiosyncrasies of the pharmaceutical sector and the protection of innovation through the granting of a patent right to the reference drug company. Setting off from the articulation between the legal regime of intellectual property rights and competition law, we proceed to an analysis of competition in the pharmaceutical sector, between reference companies and generic companies, looking for the rationality in the genesis of the celebration of the pay for the delay agreements. In the wake of successive sector inquiries on competition in the pharmaceutical sector that the European Commission has launched in the last decade, the (un)lawfulness of the pay for delay agreements is appreciated from a practical perspective, with particular focus on the analysis of the cases Lundbeck, Servier and , more recently, Generics, which are fundamental milestones in the application of the rules of European Competition Law, in the pharmaceutical sector.
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Direito da concorrência Propriedade industrial Acordo pay for delay Patentes farmacêuticas Medicamentos genéricos Abuso de posição dominante Teses de mestrado - 2021