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O direito do acusado ao confronto das testemunhas de acusação na produção da prova penal
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O presente estudo tem como propósito analisar o direito ao confronto e sua relação com a produção da prova penal. De forma geral, trata-se do direito fundamental do acusado de confrontar as testemunhas de acusação no processo criminal. Tal direito se desdobra e se relaciona com outros importantes direitos: (i) produção da prova testemunhal em audiência pública; (ii) presenciar a produção da prova testemunhal (“right to be present”); (iii) produção da prova testemunhal na presença do julgador do mérito da causa; (iv) determinação às testemunhas do compromisso de dizer a verdade; (v) desvendar a verdadeira identidade das testemunhas; (vi) inquirição das fontes de prova testemunhal desfavoráveis, no momento de sua produção. Daí que denominamos, numa visão macro, como o paradigma do direito ao confronto.
Inicialmente normatizado na sexta emenda da Constituição norte-americana, atualmente encontra-se previsto em diversos tratados internacionais de direitos humanos.
A análise de sua origem histórica e os fundamentos político-jurídicos que ensejaram o seu nascimento é de suma importância para definir um conteúdo universal e concretizar sua aplicação em diversos ordenamentos jurídicos, entre eles, Portugal e Brasil. Ademais, traçamos uma diferença entre o direito ao confronto e a “hearsay rule”, outro instituto originário de países do common law, que faz parte das regras de exclusão probatória (“exclusionary rules”) e tem como objetivo evitar que elementos produzidos anteriores ao processo ingressem no conjunto probatório e possam ser valorados pelo julgador. Para pontuar esta diferença, debruçamo-nos no estudo de uma decisão paradigmática da Suprema Corte norte-americana que resgatou a autonomia do direito ao confronto frente à “hearsay rule”, realçando sua natureza constitucional.
Após, analisa-se como o Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos interpreta o direito ao confronto e enfrenta as eventuais restrições a tal direito diante de casos envolvendo testemunhas anônimas e ausentes para, ao final, tecer as críticas necessárias.
Nos capítulos seguintes, a tarefa é buscar os possíveis fundamentos jurídicos do direito ao confronto nos ordenamentos de Portugal e Brasil e um estudo das normas relacionadas à produção da prova no processo criminal nestes países sob à luz do direito ao confronto.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the right to confrontation and its relation to the production of the criminal evidence. In general, it is the fundamental right of the accused to confront prosecution witnesses in criminal proceedings. This right unfolds and relates to other important rights: (i) to produce testimonial evidence in a public hearing; (ii) to witness the production of testimonial evidence (“right to be present”); (iii) to produce testimonial evidence before the judge handling the case; (iv) to assert the witnesses' commitment to speak the truth; (v) to unveil the true identity of the witnesses; (vi) to examine the unfavorable sources of evidence at the time of its production. Hence we call, in a macro view, the paradigm of the right to confrontation. Initially regulated in the sixth amendment of the US Constitution, it is currently assured by several international human rights treaties. The analysis of its historical origin and the political and juridical foundations that gave rise to it are of paramount importance in defining a universal content and concretizing its application in various legal systems, including Portugal and Brazil. In addition, we draw a distinction between the right of confrontation and the hearsay rule, another institute originated in Common Law countries, which is part of the exclusionary rules intended to avoid the inclusion of elements produced prior to the process on the body of evidential elements and also to prevent the judge from evaluating those elements. To point out this difference, we focus on the study of a paradigmatic decision of the US Supreme Court that rescued the autonomy of the right to confrontation, highlighting its constitutional nature. Afterwards, we analyze how the European Court of Human Rights deals with the right to confrontation and faces possible restrictions to it in cases involving anonymous and absent witnesses, in order to make the necessary criticisms about the court’s interpretation concerning this right. In the following chapters, the task is to seek the possible legal basis of the right to confrontation in the Portuguese and Brazilian legal systems and also to study the norms related to the production of evidence in criminal process in these countries under the light of the right to confrontation.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the right to confrontation and its relation to the production of the criminal evidence. In general, it is the fundamental right of the accused to confront prosecution witnesses in criminal proceedings. This right unfolds and relates to other important rights: (i) to produce testimonial evidence in a public hearing; (ii) to witness the production of testimonial evidence (“right to be present”); (iii) to produce testimonial evidence before the judge handling the case; (iv) to assert the witnesses' commitment to speak the truth; (v) to unveil the true identity of the witnesses; (vi) to examine the unfavorable sources of evidence at the time of its production. Hence we call, in a macro view, the paradigm of the right to confrontation. Initially regulated in the sixth amendment of the US Constitution, it is currently assured by several international human rights treaties. The analysis of its historical origin and the political and juridical foundations that gave rise to it are of paramount importance in defining a universal content and concretizing its application in various legal systems, including Portugal and Brazil. In addition, we draw a distinction between the right of confrontation and the hearsay rule, another institute originated in Common Law countries, which is part of the exclusionary rules intended to avoid the inclusion of elements produced prior to the process on the body of evidential elements and also to prevent the judge from evaluating those elements. To point out this difference, we focus on the study of a paradigmatic decision of the US Supreme Court that rescued the autonomy of the right to confrontation, highlighting its constitutional nature. Afterwards, we analyze how the European Court of Human Rights deals with the right to confrontation and faces possible restrictions to it in cases involving anonymous and absent witnesses, in order to make the necessary criticisms about the court’s interpretation concerning this right. In the following chapters, the task is to seek the possible legal basis of the right to confrontation in the Portuguese and Brazilian legal systems and also to study the norms related to the production of evidence in criminal process in these countries under the light of the right to confrontation.
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Processo penal Prova penal Testemunha Teses de mestrado - 2019