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Publication
O problema da fundamentação da validade dos limites da liberdade de expressão do pensamento face ao discurso de ódio
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| 3.24 MB | Adobe PDF |
Abstract(s)
A falta de clareza e objetividade com a qual o discurso de ódio tem sido tratado gera graves problemas de ordem fundamental. Tem sido comum, ainda nas democracias consideradas mais sólidas, a volta de um debate sobre a censura e sobre como a liberdade de expressão tem, perigosamente, caído em desuso em alguns círculos. Esta perspectiva nos desperta a preocupação com a preservação da liberdade de expressão a fim de evitar que ela se torne uma espécie de direito de segunda categoria. O presente trabalho trata do problema da fundamentação da validade dos limites da liberdade de expressão face aos discursos de ódio. Conforme defendemos, estes discursos encontram-se fora do âmbito de proteção do direito de livre manifestação do pensamento, e para justificar tal posição, mostrou-se necessária, de maneira preliminar, a estruturação de um conceito que demonstrasse exatamente o significado de discurso de ódio, pois, como podemos observar, o que está difundido na doutrina e refletido nos diversos ordenamentos jurídicos é uma ideia vaga e abstrata que traz apenas insegurança e injustiça. Injustiça, principalmente porque permite a punição de meras opiniões, e insegurança porque põe em causa, além de um direito/valor essencial para a democracia, um mecanismo garantidor de todos os outros direitos fundamentais. Após a concretização do conceito de discurso odioso, foi possível justificar as razões pelas quais ele não merece espaço no debate público. Conforme concluímos, o discurso de ódio atinge toda a sociedade, uma vez que exclui o indivíduo vítima dele, pois suas atitudes concretas de discriminação têm o condão de retirar direitos, e não “apenas” de causar abusos, insultos ou de denigrir alguém. Tais atitudes se encontram, portanto, no plano da negação do respeito cognitivo e atingem a própria integridade social.
The lack of clarity and objectivity with which hate speech has been treated generates serious fundamental problems. It has been common, even in democracies considered more solid, to return to a debate about censorship and how freedom of expression has dangerously fallen out of favor in some circles. This perspective raises our concern with the preservation of freedom of expression in order to prevent it from becoming a kind of second-rate right. This study deals with the problem of justifying the limits of freedom of expression when facing hate speech. As we argue, these speeches are not included in the scope of protection of the right to free expression of thought, and to justify such a position, it was necessary, in a preliminary way, to structure an objective concept that exactly demonstrated the meaning of hate speech, because, as we can see, what is widespread in the doctrine and reflected in the different legal systems is a vague and abstract idea that brings only insecurity and injustice. Injustice, mainly because it allows the punishment of opinions, and insecurity because it calls into question, in addition to an essential right/value for democracy, a mechanism that guarantees all other fundamental rights. After the implementation of the concept of hate speech, it was possible to justify the reasons why it does not deserve space in the public debate. As we conclude, hate speech affects the whole of society, since it excludes the individual-victim, as their concrete attitudes of discrimination have the power to remove rights, and not "just" to cause abuse, insults or denigrate someone. Such attitudes are, therefore, at the level of denial of cognitive respect and affect social integrity itself.
The lack of clarity and objectivity with which hate speech has been treated generates serious fundamental problems. It has been common, even in democracies considered more solid, to return to a debate about censorship and how freedom of expression has dangerously fallen out of favor in some circles. This perspective raises our concern with the preservation of freedom of expression in order to prevent it from becoming a kind of second-rate right. This study deals with the problem of justifying the limits of freedom of expression when facing hate speech. As we argue, these speeches are not included in the scope of protection of the right to free expression of thought, and to justify such a position, it was necessary, in a preliminary way, to structure an objective concept that exactly demonstrated the meaning of hate speech, because, as we can see, what is widespread in the doctrine and reflected in the different legal systems is a vague and abstract idea that brings only insecurity and injustice. Injustice, mainly because it allows the punishment of opinions, and insecurity because it calls into question, in addition to an essential right/value for democracy, a mechanism that guarantees all other fundamental rights. After the implementation of the concept of hate speech, it was possible to justify the reasons why it does not deserve space in the public debate. As we conclude, hate speech affects the whole of society, since it excludes the individual-victim, as their concrete attitudes of discrimination have the power to remove rights, and not "just" to cause abuse, insults or denigrate someone. Such attitudes are, therefore, at the level of denial of cognitive respect and affect social integrity itself.
Description
Keywords
Liberdade de Expressão Discurso de Ódio Reconhecimento Freedom of Speech Hate Speech Recognition