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Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon

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Lying, computers and self-awareness
Publication . Castro, Paulo
From the initial analysis of John Morris in 1976 about if computers can lie, I have presented my own treatment of the problem using what can be called a computational lying procedure. One that uses two Turing Machines. From there, I have argued that such a procedure cannot be implemented in a Turing Machine alone. A fundamental difficulty arises, concerning the computational representation of the self-knowledge a machine should have about the fact that it is lying. Contrary to Morris’ claim, I have thus suggested that computers – as far as they are Turing Machines – cannot lie. Consequently, I have claimed that moral agency attribution to a robot or any other automated AI system, cannot be made, strictly grounded on imitating behaviors. Self-awareness as an ontological grounding for moral attribution must be evoked. This can pose a recognition problem from our part, should the sentient system be the only agent capable of acknowledging its own sentience.
Louis de Broglie Realistic Research Program and the experimental detection of Quantum Waves
Publication . Croca, J. R.; Castro, P.; Gatta, M.; Moraeira, R. N.
We give a brief historical review of Louis de Broglie realistic research program as developed in Lisbon’s research group about nonlinear quantum physics. We propose and discuss “yes-no” type experiments to physically detect quantum waves, independently of the associated corpuscles. Thus, deciding if they are real physical perturbations or mere probability waves. We finally present a possible technological application for the detection of such waves in quantum communication.

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Entidade financiadora

Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia

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6817 - DCRRNI ID

Número da atribuição

UID/FIL/00678/2019

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