Portuguese Economic Journal, 2016, Volume 15, Nº 2
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- Special issue on energy economics : demand, prices, and welfare. Editor’s introductionPublication . Soares, Isabel; Afonso, Óscar
- Does final energy demand in Portugal exhibit long memory? A fractional integration analysisPublication . Belbute, José Manuel; Pereira, Alfredo MarvãoIn this paper, we measure the degree of fractional integration in final energy demand in Portugal using an ARFIMA model with and without adjustments for seasonality. We consider aggregate energy demand as well as final demand for petroleum, electricity, coal, and natural gas. Our findings suggest the presence of long memory in all of the components of energy demand. All fractional-difference param- eters are positive and lower than 0.5 indicating that the series are stationary, although with mean reversion patterns slower than in the typical short-run processes. These results have important implications for the design of energy policies. As a result of the long-memory in final energy demand, the effects of temporary policy shocks will tend to disappear slowly. This means that even transitory shocks have long lasting effects. Given the temporary nature of these effects, however, permanent effects on final energy demand require permanent policies. This is unlike what would be suggested by the more standard, but much more limited, unit root approach, which would incorrectly indicate that even transitory policies would have permanent effects.
- Oil prices and stock returns : nonlinear links across sectorsPublication . Pinho, Carlos; Madaleno, MaraWe present evidence of an asymmetric relationship between oil prices and stock returns. The two regime multivariate Markov switching vector autoregressive (MSVAR) model allow us to capture the state shifts in the relationship between regional stock markets and sectors. Results suggest that oil price risk is significantly priced in the sample used. The impact is asymmetric with respect to market phases, and regimes have been associated with world economic, social and political events. Our study also suggests asymmetric responses of sector stock returns to oil price changes and different transmission impacts depending on the sector analyzed. There is a high causality from oil to sectors like Industrials and Oil & Gas. Companies inside the Utilities sector were more able to hedge against oil price increases between 2007 and 2012. Historical crisis events between 1992–1998 and 2003–2007 do not seem to have affected the relationship between oil and sector stock returns, given the higher probability of remaining smoother. For all sectors there seems to be a turn back to stability from 2012 onwards. Finally, investors gain more through portfolio diversification benefits built across, rather than within sectors.
- Welfare effects of unbundling under different regulatory regimes in natural gas marketsPublication . Brandão, António; Pinho, Joana; Resende, Joana; Sarmento, Paula; Soares, IsabelIn this paper, we develop a theoretical model that enriches the literature on the pros and cons of ownership unbundling vis-a`-vis lighter unbundling frameworks in the natural gas markets. For each regulatory framework, we compute equilibrium outcomes when an incumbent firm and a new entrant compete a` la Cournot in the final gas market. We find that the entrant’s contracting conditions in the upstream market and the transmission tariff are key determinants of the market structure in the downstream gas market (both with ownership and with legal unbundling). We also study how the regulator must optimally set transmission tariffs in each of the two unbundling regimes. We conclude that welfare maximizing tariffs often require free access to the transmission network (in both regulatoy regimes). However, when the regulator aims at promoting the break-even of the regulated transmission system operator, the first-best tariff is unfeasible in both regimes. Hence, we study a more realistic set-up, in which the regulator’s action is constrained by the break-even of the regulated firm (the transmission system operator). In this set-up, we find that, for a given transmission tariff, final prices in the downstream market are always higher with ownership unbundling than with legal unbundling.