Portuguese Economic Journal, 2011, Volume 10, Nº 3
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- Costly horizontal differentiationPublication . Correia-da-Silva, João; Pinho, JoanaWe study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation.
- Barriers to technological adoption in Spain and PortugalPublication . Cassou, Steven P.; Oliveira, Emanuel Xavier deSince 1945, both Spain and Portugal have experienced significant market transformations. These countries were both led by dictators for many years until the mid 1970s when each moved toward more democratic governments and more open markets. As a result, each experienced significant changes in output with Spain’s becoming a model for proper market based transformations. Although Portugal’s transformation has been less impressive it experienced improvements too. This paper uses a Parente and Prescott (J Polit Econ 102(2), 298–321, 1994; 2000) type model to investigate the recent transformations in each of these countries and quantify the extent to which barriers to technological adoption may have played for these two development experiences. Our results indicate that from 1945 to 2003 these barriers have fallen considerably but remain high, and are somewhat higher in Portugal than in Spain.
- Risk externalities in a payments oligopolyPublication . Nilssen, ToreI discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.