Mata, AndréCruz, Francisco Soares Pedroso Correia da2023-01-032023-01-0320212021-06-18http://hdl.handle.net/10451/55581Dissertação de mestrado, Psicologia (Área de especialização em Cognição Social Aplicada), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Psicologia, 2021Previous research shows that laypeople believe that science is more capable of explaining some psychological phenomena than others. People think that science can explain thoughts and feelings associated with low introspective access (e.g., read a map), but cannot account for high-introspection phenomena (e.g., falling in love; Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2018, 2019). Moreover, people believe that science is more capable of explaining other people’s minds than theirs, particularly for high-introspection domains (Mata et al., 2020). The present thesis aims to explore a potential reason behind these lay beliefs: intuitive dualism (i.e., individuals’ innate tendency to split the world in material and immaterial portions, in minds and bodies). In Studies 1a and 1b, participants rated the extent to which ten psychological domains were associated with both material and immaterial parts of people, as well as the extent to which science could explain said phenomena. In Studies 2a and 2b, participants judged the materiality of each phenomenon, through both gut responses and slow reflected ones. The present thesis concludes that: (a) not all psychological phenomena are considered equally material; (b) the extent to which a phenomenon is considered material is associated with its introspective access (high vs. low); (c) dualistic conceptions are intuitive (i.e., more evident in fast vs. slow responses); (d) the more a phenomenon is associated with an immaterial part of people, the less it is believed to be explainable through science. Overall, this pattern of results suggests that lay beliefs about what science can explain are driven by intuitive dualism.engEpistemologiaCrença na ciênciaIntrospecçãoDualismoTeses de mestrado - 2021master thesis203270584