



Universidade de Lisboa
Faculdade de Letras

Philosophical Contributions to Architecture: the Case of Affectivity.
The Concept of “*Stimmung*” as Fundament of Dwelling the Architecture.

Mestrado em Filosofia

Martín Eugenio Pacheco Magallanes

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Doutor Federico Lauria

Abstract

This proposal seeks to integrate into the contemporary discussion of affectivity. Affective life will be the fundament used to develop an answer to the question of how the human person dwells in architecture. We will use Edmund Husserl's (1859-1938) explanation of the experience of affective life through the concept of sentiment. These arguments are found mostly in the recent publication of one of his previously unpublished writings, "Studies on the Structure of Consciousness" (2021). This explanation is developed from the metaphor of the concept "*Stimmung*" (or "attunement" in English), an idea that we will later relate to Xavier Zubiri's (1898-1983) explanation of the concept of sentiment mostly in his text "*Inteligencia sentiente*" (1980) and in "Philosophical Reflections on the Aesthetic" (1975). In this way, the word "*Stimmung*" acquires a meaning related to the verb "being" ("*estar*" in Spanish), giving rise to the concept "*atemperamiento*", which will be related to the concept *Stimmung* used by Husserl. This relationship will inevitably lead us to the idea of a radical experience of "being", merging with the indissolubility of the verb "being" in relation to affective life. This "radical being in reality" can be interpreted as linked to architecture from the philosophical perspective of "dwelling". For this, we will use the contributions of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) mostly in his text "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951) and "Being and Time" (1927), where he also uses the concept "*Stimmung*" to refer to affective life, but at the same time introduces the word "*Befindlichkeit*" which will complement his analysis. Thus, the three authors will be united by the same sense of the word "*Stimmung*". In conclusion, the aim of this research is to affirm that when we dwell in architecture, we do so affectively, because the human person can only dwell while "being in the architecture."

Key words: Affectivity, *Stimmung*, Dwelling, Heidegger, Husserl, Zubiri.

Resumo

Esta proposta procura integrar-se na discussão contemporânea sobre a afetividade. A vida afetiva será o fundamento utilizado para desenvolver uma resposta à questão de como a pessoa humana habita a arquitetura. Utilizaremos a explicação de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) sobre a experiência da vida afetiva através do conceito de sentimento. Estes argumentos encontram-se sobretudo na recente publicação de um dos seus escritos inéditos, “Estudos sobre a estrutura da consciência” (2021). Esta explicação desenvolve-se a partir da metáfora do conceito “*Stimmung*” (ou “*attunement*” em inglês), ideia que posteriormente relacionaremos com a explicação de Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) sobre o conceito de sentimento principalmente no seu texto “*Inteligencia sentiente*” (1980) e em “Reflexões Filosóficas sobre a Estética” (1975). Desta forma, a palavra “*Stimmung*” adquire um significado relacionado com o verbo “*estar*” (“*estar*” em espanhol), dando origem ao conceito “*atemperamiento*”, que estará relacionado com o conceito de *Stimmung* utilizado por Husserl. Esta relação conduzir-nos-á inevitavelmente à ideia de uma experiência radical do “ser”, fundindo-se com a indissolubilidade do verbo “*estar*” em relação à vida afetiva. Este “*estar* radical na realidade” pode ser interpretado como ligado à arquitetura na perspetiva filosófica do “habitar”. Para tal, utilizaremos os contributos de Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) principalmente nos seus textos “Construir Habitar Pensar” (1951) e “Ser e Tempo” (1927), onde também utiliza o conceito “*Stimmung*” para se referir à vida afetiva, mas ao mesmo tempo introduz a palavra “*Befindlichkeit*” que complementar a sua análise. Assim, os três autores estarão unidos pelo mesmo sentido da palavra “*Stimmung*”. Concluindo, o objetivo desta pesquisa é afirmar que quando habitamos na arquitetura, fazemo-lo afetivamente, pois a pessoa humana só pode habitar enquanto “está na arquitetura”.

Palavras-chave: Afetividade, *Stimmung*, Habitar, Heidegger, Husserl, Zubiri.

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El hombre, dicen, es un animal racional.

No sé por qué no se haya dicho que es un animal afectivo o sentimental

(Men, they say, it's a rational animal.

I don't know why it hasn't been said that he is an affective or sentimental animal)

Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo - Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1912)

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Introduction

There is a word that stands out in our title, the word “*Stimmung*”. This is a word of German origin that we will translate as “attunement”, but to reach that conclusion we will have to take a journey through the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, Xavier Zubiri, and Martin Heidegger. In view of this, we ask ourselves, does Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of the “*Stimmung*” have aspects of intentionality as in Husserl? Husserl’s philosophy is marked by the phenomena we receive from our experiences with objects, but when Husserl talks about affective life it will not be just any object and it will seem that “sentiment” does not have the same intentionality as any other human phenomenon. Addressing the question, Martin Heidegger’s concept of “*Stimmung*”, commonly translated as “mood” has connections with Husserl’s notion of “intentionality”, but Heidegger departs directly from Husserl’s approach in certain respects, as well as in others it comes very close, for we must remember that Heidegger was a disciple of Husserl. In Husserl’s phenomenology, “intentionality” refers to the idea that consciousness is always directed toward something, a thing, an object, or a concrete reference; This would be the structure of experience in which our inner life or state of mind deals with a reference, be it a thought, a perception, or in our case, a sentiment. In this intentional relationship with the experienced world, the meaning of things is manifested, which permeates all our actions in terms of our being conscious. This means that our mind is directed towards things or objects, or phenomena that occur in the world, hence the word “intentionality”, because our mind tends towards objects.

For Heidegger, the “*Stimmung*” is part of the way in which human beings go through the “*Gerworfenheit*”, that is, of being thrown into the world, but as we will see it is more complex than that, since different processes intervene in our relationship with existence. In his important work, “Being and Time” (1927), Heidegger describes the affective life, starting from the “*Stimmung*”, but also from the word “*Befindlichkeit*” as a previous form and any other way of being in the world. In relation to Husserl, instead of being an intentional act of consciousness, *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung* attune us to the world before any active process. It has more to do with how we find ourselves in the world and how the world reveals itself to us through our affective experience. However, the *Stimmung* is also present in Husserl’s

work, as he also used it to describe the affective life since the *Stimmung* is part of the processes that make up sentiment. The point is that Husserl's explanation of sentiment has intentionality as the protagonist, and as we said, this has an active engagement of consciousness towards objects, while *Stimmung* in Heidegger is prior to any activity of consciousness, since it is not something that we consciously direct but it is an experience in which we cannot stop being inside once it throws us into the world. In other words, *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit* force us to be in attunement with things and the world.

In this first introductory moment we will not explain the differences between Heidegger's *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*, but he uses both to describe how it is that human beings are at all times in a relationship with the world. This relationship will have ontological but also ontic conditions, due to the radicality of existence exercised in our being, or as Heidegger would say, in our being as "*Dasein*", since *Befindlichkeit* is part of its ontological structure. On the other hand, Husserl's *Stimmung*, in describing the relationship between consciousness and the environment (as objects), focuses more on epistemological issues on the description of how we relate to experiences of the world, and not as in Heidegger who deals with a description of how we experience existence. Returning to the previous point, the *Stimmung* by its condition past any epistemology begins before acting intentionally. However, for Husserl the sentiment is not entirely intentional, since it has a certain indescribable quality that is not even very clear, since in his attempt to objectify sentiments it seems that *Stimmung* would have that quality of attunement that Heidegger comments years later, since both notions capture experience in tonal form escaping the mere predisposition to receive them. Just as Heidegger deals with this in his "Being and Time", Husserl deals with it in his "Study on the Structure of Consciousness", which was never published when Husserl was alive, being until not long ago, an unpublished text (2021). Here Husserl deals with affective life, a theme to which he did not explicitly refer in his work published during his lifetime; so that this will be our main source to deal with the theme of affective life in Husserl. We will realize that the intentionality related to Husserl's *Stimmung* and the *Stimmung* related to Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit* address the way in which we attune into the world, both in the sense of our orientation towards the world, and our "encounter" (*sich befinden*) in the world.

But within this relationship between teacher and student, there is one more member, since Xavier Zubiri (Spanish philosopher, of Basque origin) was a contemporary of these two thinkers, in fact he studied as a student of both Husserl and Heidegger, which is not surprising that he has somewhat similar approaches to these philosophers. So Zubiri also had a particular word to describe this human experience, that is, through the word “*atemperamiento*”¹ (in Spanish). As we said, Heidegger’s concept of *Stimmung* (attunement) does have connections with Husserl’s notion of *Stimmung* (as sentiment), and it also has connections with Zubiri’s “*atemperamiento*” (attunement). “*Atemperamiento*” characterizes all human acts, which means that “sentient intelligence” is always committed to reality, because we cannot stop being in reality; This would be another way of analyzing man, no longer as “intentionality”, or as “being”, but as “reality”, but in any case, a phenomenological way of drawing conclusions. Xavier Zubiri’s concept of “*atemperamiento*” can be analyzed complementarily in relation to both Husserl’s notion of *Stimmung* from the point of view of sentiment, and with Heidegger’s concept of *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung*. Although Zubiri’s thought diverges from Heidegger and Husserl, he integrates certain aspects of each, developing a distinctive vision within his philosophical proposal. Zubiri was influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger, and uses the term “*atemperamiento*” to describe a particular way in which the human being relates dynamically to the environment, the world, things, or to others, but ultimately, to reality. For Zubiri, “tempering”² refers to how the affectivity and intellect of the human being are attuned to reality. It is a way of being-in-the-world that implies a kind of attunement or adjustment with reality.

Zubiri emphasizes that human beings are not mere passive recipients of reality, nor do we impose our conceptual or eidetic structures on it. Rather, through “*atemperamiento*” we are always involved in the world in a sentimental way. This participation shapes the way we experience and understand reality. “*Atemperamiento*” is linked to Zubiri’s broader metaphysical project of understanding the human being as a reality open to the intellect,

¹ Word that comes from the Spanish word “*temperie*” and in turn from *temperies* in Latin and refers to temperature. But also, to the metaphor of notes or tones that implies being within the sensitive experience with reality.

² This may be a rudimentary way of translating Zubiri’s “*atemperamiento*”, considering the Latin root “*temperies*”.

constantly resonating with the world around him. For example, without being intentional, but like Husserl's intentionality, tempering recognizes the active role it plays in "being in reality", since from there our volition is also configured, which is directed towards the world. For Zubiri, however, and in a different way from Husserl, this directionality is not only mental, since it implies a deeper attunement that includes sentiments, as an affective relationship with reality. Thus, while Zubiri accepts that human beings are always "oriented" towards the world, he goes beyond Husserl by emphasizing that this orientation is not merely a mental act but an existential attunement to reality. Husserl emphasizes describing the intentional structure of consciousness, where the mind is always directed toward objects in a structured way. Zubiri's tempering goes beyond this dualistic structure. For him, there is no strict division between the act of experiencing or "apprehension" and the object experienced. *Atemperamiento*, on the other hand, implies an immediate, dynamic and fluid engagement with reality that is at the same time affective, merging the subject and the object in a unified existential experience.

That is why Zubiri's tempering is in some respects closer to Heidegger's *Stimmung* than to Husserl's *Stimmung*. Both Zubiri and Heidegger emphasize the original way in which we find ourselves in attunement with reality and with the world, respectively. Just as Heidegger's *Stimmung* refers to an attunement that reveals the world to us in an existential way in an ontic way, Zubiri's "*atemperamiento*" highlights how human beings are attuned to reality not only through intellectual reflection but through a primordial symptom with the real. Like Heidegger, Zubiri sees human beings as fundamentally situated in the world, from the *sein-in-der-Welt*, but in a more radical way through the verb "*estar*" in Spanish. For Zubiri, his encounter with reality is not only a matter of thinking or acting from "being" but a deeper existential attunement. Zubiri's tempering emphasizes the dynamic and adaptive nature of this attunement: it is not static, but a continuous process of adjustment to reality. This goes beyond Heidegger's *Stimmung*, which tends to focus on the mood, like quality of attunement without emphasizing its dynamic and adaptive aspects. That is why it is important to complement Heidegger's *Stimmung* with the subsequent development he makes with respect to the verb "to dwell", which resembles Zubiri's philosophy in this sense.

Also, while both Heidegger's *Stimmung* and Zubiri's "*atemperamiento*" imply an affective attunement with the world, "*atemperamiento*" integrates the affective dimensions more explicitly. For Zubiri, human attunement with reality implies not only an affective tone (as in the *Stimmung*), but also a rational and intellectual commitment to reality. This makes *atemperamiento* a deeper concept that combines aspects of the sensitivity and intelligence of our being-in-the-world. Zubiri's *atemperamiento* is a unique concept that bridges the gap between the intentionality of Husserl's *Stimmung* and the existential attunement of Heidegger's *Stimmung*. Although he shares with Husserl the idea that human beings are always directed towards reality, he deepens it by emphasizing the affective nature of this commitment, in line with Heidegger's *Stimmung*, since it is above all ontological and ontic. However, Zubiri goes beyond both by presenting this commitment as a dynamic and continuous process of attunement and adjustment with reality, which combines both affective and intellectual aspects in a unified way of being, this would be a more open metaphysical perspective.

Just as we said, Heidegger's concept of "dwelling" (*Wohnen*) plays an important role in his later philosophy, especially in relation to the way in which human beings relate to their experience of the world, the work we use to carry out this research is a lecture that Heidegger gave in 1951, as we see almost 25 years after the publication of "Being and Time" in 1927 (*Sein und Zeit*). Here it is mentioned that "dwelling" means a way of being in the world that involves more than mere physical habitation; it reflects a commitment to be in attunement with the world, as Heidegger mentions, with the "*Geviert*", the quaternity formed by mortals, the world, the sky and the gods. When this relates to Husserl's *Stimmung*, Zubiri's "*atemperamiento*", and Heidegger's own earlier concept of *Stimmung*, the verb "*dwel*" offers a broader existential framework that links these concepts in different ways. For example, Husserl emphasizes the structure of consciousness that is always directed toward something: every act of consciousness involves an object, and when connected to the idea of dwelling, intentionality can be seen as the active, conscious engagement that humans have with their environment as "*Umwelt*" as Jacob von Uexküll³ would put it. In Husserl's framework, dwelling would be interpreted as the continuous and deliberate interaction

³ Castro, 2021, p. 14.

between the subject and the world, shaped by intentional acts that are affective. The human being “dwells” the world by intentionally relating, and therefore, affectively with it, constantly directing experiences towards objects, molding and structuring reality through this phenomenological process. However, this understanding of dwelling may be limited from Heidegger’s perspective because it remains primarily cognitive: it focuses on how humans represent or understand the world through intentional acts. In contrast, Heidegger’s notion of dwelling implies a more primal existential attunement that goes beyond representational thinking.

On the other hand, Zubiri’s concept of *atemperamiento* expands on the *Stimmung* related to Husserl’s intentionality by integrating sensibility and intelligence as unified with reality, since intelligence and reality are congeners:

“It is impossible to have an intrinsic priority of knowledge over reality or of reality over knowledge. Knowledge and reality are at their very root strictly and rigorously congeneric. There is no priority of one over the other”⁴.

For Zubiri, human beings not only know about the world, but are affectively and existentially in attunement with reality. When related to Heidegger’s dwelling, Zubiri’s “*atemperamiento*” is more closely aligned with an active and adaptive process of dwelling. In Zubiri’s vision, dwelling could be seen as the attunement of the “tonic modification” of the notes that the human being experiences in his environment. The way one “dwells” is through this dynamic interplay between sensitivity, intelligence, and environment, which is never static but always evolves as the individual relates to reality. This implies a process of becoming, where dwelling is a continuous task of remaining in attunement and adjustment with the world. Zubiri’s perspective also offers an existential interpretation of dwelling, in which human beings are not only thinkers but also sensitive and beings in constant rearrangement to their environment. This is much closer to Heidegger’s own understanding of dwelling as a fundamental mode of being-in-the-world.

⁴ Zubiri, 1998, p. 10.

Heidegger's earlier notion of *Stimmung* provides a more immediate connection with his later concept of dwelling, from the logic of *Befindlichkeit*. The *Stimmung* describes the original and affective state that reveals the world to us under a certain tone, shaping our way of encountering beings and phenomena. In this sense, the *Stimmung* is a way of being in attunement with the world, much as dwelling is a way of tuning into the *Geviert*. In Heidegger's work "Building Dwelling Thinking", "dwelling" becomes an existential way of dwelling the world, where human beings are called to be in attunement with quaternity. *Stimmung* plays a role in this, as it shapes the way the world is revealed to us, through the attunement of our being-in-the-world, which directly influences the way we dwell. For example, this attunement affects the depth and quality of our living, which translates into well-being or discomfort. The *Stimmung*, therefore, can be seen as the attunement through which we dwell the world. Just as *Stimmung* attunes us to the world, dwelling reflects a deeper and more sustained way of being in attunement, it is a deeper and more continuous commitment to the world that reflects care and concern for quaternity, and ultimately with our own existence.

Heidegger's concept of dwelling provides a way to synthesize the differences between Husserl's *Stimmung*, Zubiri's "*atemperamiento*," and Heidegger's *Stimmung-Befindlichkeit* relationship. Or to put it another way, which is our thesis: the concept of *Stimmung* is the fundament of dwelling, because through it the original experience of our existence, which is eminently affective, is unified. Dwelling is the culmination of both affective attunement and the commitment of intelligence, and reflects a way of being in the world, not only physically but existentially. Chapter one will describe what *Stimmung* is for Husserl in the framework of affectivity, since Husserl makes his explanation of affective life through the concept of sentiment. The second chapter will describe what *atemperamiento* is for Zubiri, based on the understanding that man's intelligence and sensitivity are congener components that are into reality, hence it is important to consider the verb *being* in our premises. The third chapter will address the distinction between Heidegger's word *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*, and then develop the concept of "dwelling". Once this philosophical journey on affectivity has been made, we will be able to give our considerations regarding architecture, since relating Heidegger's concept of "dwelling" and its connections with Husserl's *Stimmung*, Zubiri's

atemperamiento and *Stimmung-Befindlichkeit* with the theory of architecture can offer a deep insight into how architecture is more than just physical structures. In dwelling architecture there is a deeper existential and philosophical relationship between human beings and their environment. Architecture, in this sense, becomes a way of structuring human life in the world, from an eminently affective perspective.

Architecture should facilitate an authentic way of *being* in the world, where human beings live in attunement with their environment, taking care of the quaternity. It's about more than just providing shelter; it is about creating the conditions where people can live authentically. In architectural theory, this notion of dwelling is key to understanding how these conditions are designed not only for function but also for human experience, or ultimately for affectivity. This includes well-being to those who are going to experience architecture, in that sense phenomenological architecture, influenced by Heidegger, focuses on how spaces make people feel and experience their environment in a way that is beneficial to their existence. Architects and architectural theorists such as Peter Zumthor and Wolfgang Meisenheimer, whom we cite in this research, emphasize the sensory experience and the affective connection of the designs, in order to generate the conditions that allow the dwellers to have well-being in their daily lives, because we cannot stop *being* dwelling.

The *Stimmung* can be directly applied to how architecture shapes the affective and existential experience of those who dwell in it. Just as *Stimmung* refers to the way the world reveals itself to us through an attunement, architecture creates attunements and sets the tone for human experiences. The concept of "atmosphere" in architecture is a very important concept at this point. The sensation that architecture transmits through its tones, be it its light, texture, materiality or proportions, has repercussions on the affectivity of those who dwell it. Architects like Zumthor and Meisenheimer talk about how architecture creates a specific attunement or feel that shapes the way people experience a place. *Stimmung* in architecture involves an affective experience, for example, of how light filters into a room, the textures of walls, the sound of the outside through an open window, or the way a corridor communicates us from one room to another. Relating *Stimmung* to architecture leads to a perspective of architecture as an existential discipline. It is not simply a matter of constructing

buildings, but of creating the experiential conditions that are beneficially in attunement with our affectivity so that they foster a deeper human connection with the world, because care for our environment will make our lives better.

Chapter 1. Edmund Husserl's contributions to affective life, the importance of the concept of "*Stimmung*"

A. 1. An approach to affective life, the case of sentiments

This first section intends to approach an understanding of the concept of sentiment from the contributions of *Stimmung*'s concept, so that in this way we can interpret sentiment as a concept that has a unity of meaning. We will situate ourselves in the current context using the work that Edmund Husserl published during his lifetime, but also in the recent publication of one of his unpublished writings "*Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*" (Studies on the Structure of Conscience [2020-2021]), which has enriched the contemporary debate on sentimental life. In this way, we will be able to see the phenomenological implications that make it possible to open up to other areas of philosophy, such as philosophy or architecture theory.

Throughout the history of Western philosophical thought, the interpretation of the sentimental aspect of the human animal has been relegated to a reduced space, or even to one less important than the rational-logical one. The language was very limited, because the polysemy of words to characterize this human aspect made the definitions not precise, and therefore, the understanding of the concept of sentiment was very rudimentary. At the dawn of classical thought it was believed that man possessed only two great faculties, the "*nous*" (intelligence), and the "*orexis*" (desire), but not an autonomous faculty related purely to sentiment. This thought was developed over time by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Saint Augustine, as it entered the Middle Ages it acquired a much more precise identity⁵.

Although the word sentiment has a very notable Latin root, its ideation is the result of a language from the beginnings of the Romance language, Old French, and its first known record is from the sermons of Bernard of Clairvaux (1090 - 1153) at the end of the twelfth century through the spelling "*sentement*", which we could understand as the mental faculty

⁵ Zubiri, 1992, p. 328.

of receiving physical impressions. For the Cistercian monk it was necessary to differentiate the types of love, such as spiritual love which was a physical cognitive experience (*amor sapiens*). In relation to this, Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248 - 1298), a French Franciscan, would say that the soul feels in a certain spiritual way that passes through the bodily senses, and there must be some word that expresses it. This is how, from this Romance vernacular word “*sentement*”, he constructs in Latin (with a technical purpose) the new word “*sentimentum*” (union of the verb “*sentio*” and the suffix “*mentum*”); which will spread throughout the Western tradition in its different variants⁶.

However, this new linguistic resource was not enough to motivate further research related exclusively to the concept of sentiment as an affective life. Rather, we can find conclusions from research related to other topics from which an approach to the concept of sentiment can be deduced, but we do not see a concrete development focused on it. This can be evidenced in the case of authors such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Francisco Suárez, or René Descartes. It was only in much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that it received a technical philosophical treatment, in philosophers such as Gottlob Schulze, Moses Mendelsohn, Johannes Tetens, or Immanuel Kant⁷. Although, we must emphasize a distinction, we exclude moral sentimentalism, since the sense of “sentimentality” is an expression of moral sensation, it is not an exclusive development of the concept of sentiment as such, but a moment in the history of ethics.

In this descriptive journey it is essential to highlight the second half of the nineteenth century, since it is a moment where we can find a systemic philosophical resource to deal with the concept of sentiment. In the context of the birth of modern psychology, and carrying out a review of medieval “intentional non-existence”, Franz Brentano developed a theory of the concept of intentionality that would later be decisive in the twentieth century for the phenomenology inaugurated by Edmund Husserl. With this new philosophical method, Husserl develops a theory of the concept of sentiment that has not been very well known until

⁶ Biron-Ouellet, 2020. Free notes.

⁷ Zubiri, 1992, p. 331.

now, but which is being rediscovered, however, it should be noted that the twentieth century has been the most fruitful in developing a “theory of sentiment”.

A. 2. Background on the study of sentiments in Husserl

We will begin by noting a historical fact, Edmund Husserl gave more attention to the publication of his works related to intellectual acts than to his writings on sentimental and volitional life. Although we can find sources for this problem in the “Logical Investigations” (1900-1901), we can also do so in multiple references of his extensive work, but it is not entirely explicit that he dedicates himself to delving into sentimental life. On the contrary, this is confirmed by a series of manuscripts compiled by Ludwig Landgrebe, which under Husserl’s express request he systematized for an eventual project. However, this work was never published because, as we said, it was not a priority for Husserl. These manuscripts were mostly developed between 1909 and 1916 approximately, during his stay in Göttingen, plus a series of complements dated up to 1924. However, Landgrebe ended up editing them by typing in 1926, under the title of “*Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*” (Studies on the Structure of Consciousness).⁸⁹ It is a text divided into four volumes: “Understanding and Object”, “Sentiment and Value”, “Will and Action”, and the last one, an analytical appendix; which during 2020 were released individually so that in 2021 they were edited jointly by the Husserliana, in its volume 43, under the edition of Ullrich Melle and Thomas Vongehr.

It should be emphasized, however, that there are important writings collected between 1893 and 1894, which under the title “*Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass*” (Perception and Attention [1893-1912]), also deal with the need for further explanation of the intentional direction of sentimental dispositions with respect to this matter¹⁰. A theme that was already installed in contemporary German philosophy in Husserl’s time, an example is the contribution of “*Tonpsychologie*” (“The Psychology of Sound” [1883 Vol I -1890 Vol II]) by Carl Stumpf, since consequently it was the first time that Husserl

⁸ Quepons, 2016 a, p. 89.

⁹ From this moment on we will call them “*Studien*”.

¹⁰ Quepons, 2021, pp. 2-3.

explicitly uses in his notes a word closely related to sentiment, the concept of *Stimmung*¹¹. Also, one of the most relevant topics is the discussion born from the reading of the work “*Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen*” (The Consciousness of Sentiment [1911]) by Moritz Geiger in relation to the consciousness of sentiment, since Geiger affirmed that the analysis of sentiments is not possible because they cannot be objectified since this causes the sentiment to be lost as it is, in other words, the vision of those who would like to objectify it would distort its independent unity. In response, Husserl points out that sentiment can be an object and can be observed from its experience¹²; although, that will be a matter that we will see later.

Complementing this context, we cannot fail to mention the figure of Wilhelm Dilthey (1874-1911), since he was the one who properly introduced the concept of *Stimmung* into the philosophical tradition from an experiential conception relating it to the surrounding world¹³, for Dilthey the *Stimmung* would designate a unity between man and the world, something like a disposition of life that precedes any objective apprehension even becoming a relationship that reaches the existential aspect. Thus, we would say that Husserl, under this context of affective life, will give sentiment the characteristic of being an experience of meaning that has a certain intentional dynamism when shared with other experiences referred to multiple intentional objects, this would be the intentional reference of sentiments, their non-explicit relationship towards the world that surrounds a consciousness, contributing to the formation of meaning from an affective situation¹⁴.

Without delving into Husserl’s concept of experience (“*Erlebnis*” or “living experience” in English), we will say that its origin helps us to understand what is conveyed in the experience of an affective experience, since both concepts would be deeply significant experiences between them. Starting by mentioning that the Husserl’s concept of “experience”, in Spanish is a new word, it did not exist, it is a concept that dates back to a translation made only in

¹¹ Quepons, 2016 a, p. 106.

¹² Quepons, 2015, p. 162.

¹³ When we speak of “surrounding world”, we do so in the sense of the closest environment of the human animal, something that can be related to the word “*Umwelt*” to refer to the human process of stimulus-elicitation-response.

¹⁴ Quepons, 2016 b, p. 6.

1913, by José Ortega y Gasset (the concept of “*vivencia*”) to the precisely already existing German word “*Erlebnis*”¹⁵. Which, in Ortega’s words, would mean: “everything that comes with such immediacy to myself, that it becomes part of it, is an experience”. In line with Ortega’s translation, the oldest testimony of the concept comes from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who, in 1827, constructs this concept by describing the experience he obtained from having made a trip¹⁶.

In relation to this everyday use made by Hegel as a consequence of a journey, the concept will later be officially defined by Dilthey in 1907, as something immediately real and significant, something that is linked by its relevance to a totality of meaning for our own life. In this way, in his posthumous writings of 1927, Dilthey will eminently relate the “*Erlebnis*” with autobiographical literature, since through the reading of this personal account it will be possible to show the personal understanding of life itself¹⁷. For this reason, the original meaning of the word “experience” in German within this metaphor offers us to live the personal story of another in our self, so that this will be truly real and meaningful. In a parallel sense, the affective life, which is transposed in the meaning of *Stimmung*, offers us to live the story of our surrounding world from another metaphor, music, because to understand our environment we must be in attunement with its tonalities to also influence those tones.

Without going any further, and as a further antecedent, we have as testimony a letter dated October 22, 1927, written by Martin Heidegger in which he acknowledges having read the “*Studien*”, and comments that this new work by Husserl contains important contributions to the study of emotions and correspondingly would be a contribution to the study of intentional psychology. Heidegger, however, will never mention this in his published works, on the contrary, around the same time as his reading of the “*Studien*,” in *Sein und Zeit* (Being and Time [1927]) he will explicitly assert that making a philosophy of the *Stimmung* represents an area of philosophy that is still incipient. However, with Husserl’s interpretation of Dilthey, we already have some idea of what *Stimmung* could mean, since it would be related to an

¹⁵ Husserl’s concept of “experience”, “*Erlebnis*” had no translation into Spanish, which is why José Ortega y Gasset created the concept of “*vivencia*” for its translation.

¹⁶ Galindo, 2016, p. 86-88.

¹⁷ Galindo, 2016, p. 92-93.

affective disposition of life in consciousness, which, although it may lack a particular object, may have intentionality since it is open to the experiences of the surrounding world.

A. 3. Intentionality as the starting point of the sentimental

We can begin Husserl's approach from his understanding of intentionality, that is, from an understanding that sees intentionality as the main characteristic of mental phenomena, and that through its analysis seeks to explain the actualization of the experiences that develop in the mind. It is in this direction that Husserl will begin by questioning the distinction made by his teacher Franz Brentano (1838-1917) about the existence of the two kinds of phenomena he distinguishes, those that are physical and psychic phenomena, precisely to emphasize the importance he will give to "sensory sentiments" (*Gefühlsempfindung*).¹⁸ This is due to the dispute he installs over Brentano's notion of phenomenon¹⁹, understanding it as something that occurs in the context of the distinction between modern psychology and the natural sciences, where his theory of internal and external perception is involved. But we will not dwell on this, since the reason for alluding to the notion of phenomenon is to explain what Husserl develops in his "Logical Investigations" (1900), to expose the existence of phenomena that do not correspond to either of the two kinds of categories that Brentano develops, that is, physical phenomena and psychic phenomena²⁰.

The "sensory sentiments" are first published in paragraph 15 of Husserl's fifth logical investigation:

"Thus, for example, the joy of a happy event is surely an act. But this act, which is in fact not a mere intentional character, but a concrete and *eo ipso* complex experience, comprises in its unity not only the representation of the joyful event and the character of an act of pleasure referred to it, but the representation is linked to a sensation of

¹⁸ All the authors cited in the bibliography use different translations for this word. But we will opt for its more literal translation of "sensory sentiments", without delving into the word "*Empfindung*", which alludes to its relative in English "sentience".

¹⁹ This is a subject that he deals with in his work "Logical Investigations" (1900).

²⁰ Fisette, 2021, pp. 222-223.

pleasure, which is apprehended and localized on the one hand as the affective excitement of the psychophysical subject who feels and on the other hand as an objective property: the event appears as if bathed in a pink veil, pleasure appears as something in the event. The event thus colored with pleasure, as such, is only now the foundation for the joyful turning, for pleasure, for pleasure, or whatever it may be called. Likewise, a sad event is not merely represented in its cosmic content and connection, in what belongs to it in and of itself as an event, but appears clothed with the subjective coloration of sadness. The same sensations of displeasure which the empirical ego refers to itself and locates in itself (as pain in the heart) are referred, in the affective apprehension of the event, to the event itself. These references are purely representative; an essentially new mode of intention lies only in being hostilely repelled, in active displeasure, etc. The sensations of pleasure and pain can endure, while the characteristics of the act built on them disappear.”²¹

It also counts as his first published reference on the contents of affective experience in phenomenological perspective, however, we must consider that there are more phenomena involved in sentimental life. To explain it in relation to Brentanian theory, Husserl will say that Brentano has an incomplete understanding of the concept of sentiment (*Gefühl*), because in the formation of *Gefühl* we can find a greater number of conceptual resources for the definition that makes up its unity; at first, we find “sensory sentiments”, then “emotions” (or affective acts [*Gefühlakte*])²², and finally to the *Stimmung*.

However, in this section we will focus on the relationship between sensory sentiments and emotions, since there is a fundamental difference between them that contributes to a better understanding of each of these affective classifications of sentiment. On the one hand, sensory sentiments have the character of being a state of consciousness, being considered as quasi-physical phenomena, while emotions have the character of being acts, that is, they

²¹ Logical Investigations. Translation made by Manuel García Morente and José Gaos in Husserl (1982), pp. 509-510, to the Spanish language, and later made freely by us to English.

²² As in the translation of “sensory sentiments”, something similar happens with the concept of “*Gefühlsakt*”, since all the authors cited in the bibliography use different translations, but we will stay with the translation of “emotion”, as it is more differentiating and significant when interpreting the theory.

would be psychic phenomena in this way since they are characterized by having an intentional reference to a particular object²³. When we speak of having the character of being acts, we must interpret it in the Husserlian phenomenological sense, since acts are understood as intentional experiences, which strictly speaking becomes a position with respect to the way in which consciousness addresses objects. Therefore, we could say that there are as many kinds of acts as there are forms of relationship with respect to objects, in other words, emotions would be intentional states that necessarily refer to an object.

Within Husserl's work, between 1911 and 1920, it is possible to find fragments collected in the second part of the "*Studien*", where he again develops the argument of the distinction between these two affective classifications, or rather, reiterates that only emotions are those that possess intentionality and sensory sentiments do not. However, he will go further by adding that this affective classification would not have sensory qualities²⁴ in relation to the content of consciousness either, since they must be understood as "figurative contents", as is understood, for example, taste or tactile sensations²⁵. In this way, sensory sentiments would become something like a fulcrum for an affective experience.

At this point, the difficulty for Husserl will be to be able to maintain a unity between these classifications of sentiment, because as we have pointed out, sensory sentiments are not intentional experiences and emotions are. In short, it is not because they lack intentionality that sensory sentiments cease to exert their influence on the experiential process of sentiment, since they effectively participate in the formation of intentional affective acts. Thus, they anticipate the experience of emotions²⁶, and as they are a condition of possibility for emotion, they will also be for the formation of sentiment²⁷, because as we said, the unity of the explanation of the concept will enable us to refer to the definition of sentiment as a concept with intentionality.

²³ Crespo, 2016, pp. 607-608.

²⁴ Quality in the sense of "*qualia*" as the content of consciousness.

²⁵ Fisette, 2021, pp. 226.

²⁶ This has to do with Husserl's reaction to Moritz Geiger's (1911) approaches to the intentionality of sentiments.

²⁷ Ziri6n, 2019, pp. 127-128.

A. 4. Translation of the *Stimmung* concept

We will begin this section with the translation of the word *Stimmung* because so far it has not been translated by virtue of the fact that the reader could find some sense of the concept in the previous explanation, however, in the first instance we will give a brief explanation of its meaning in a broad sense and then turn to Husserl's explanation. The word *Stimmung* has its origin in German culture. Its etymology differs significantly from the translation made into other living languages; it is common for its use to be done without a translation. It derives from the Germanic root *Stimme* (voice), which is related to the ancient Greek word, *stoma* (mouth). Its initial use was in relation to music and musical instruments, because it described tuning. Its use proliferated in the eighteenth century also through its verbalization *stimmen* (to tune), and its adjective *stimming* (harmonious). Hence, it can be understood as a word that is related to the translation of the meaning of two similar Latin words, *temperamentum* and *consonantia*, which would refer to a context related to sound, tuning, or music, but hence it also has an open meaning, since it can be understood in other aspects as a metaphor of tonality²⁸. Outside the world of music, in the mid-eighteenth century it was used in the world of aesthetics and philosophy, as it referred to being in attunement with something in a mental way. That is why within academic use its translation has been the concept mood in English, because it has the same Germanic root as *Gemüt*, a word that refers to the faculties of the mind, and consequently to "moods"²⁹.

Below we will briefly take a tour of this world of aesthetics and philosophy to which we have referred: Kant, in his *Critique of Judgment* [1790] to solve the problem of beauty, uses the *Stimmung* as a dispositional aesthetic concept, since he wanted to communicate that a sentiment has a universal character, and the metaphor of music served for that because the faculties of understanding and imagination with the *Stimmung* they are tuned in harmony, so that experience is not limited to subjectivity, but allows for universal objectivity³⁰. Schiller, in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* [1793], says that it is an aesthetic disposition of the

²⁸ Quepons, 2016 a, p. 86.

²⁹ Thonhauser, 2021, pp. 1249-1250.

³⁰ Kant, 1993, p. 64.

mind that is not determined by sense or reason, and that it gives us the freedom to determine what is beautiful³¹. Schopenhauer, in *The World as Will and Representation* [1819], says that it is an internal disposition that frees us from the will in order to access an aesthetic state of mind, thus he states that the artist can show that state of mind in his work in a universal way from mental attunement³². Carus, in *Nine Letters on Landscape Painting* [1831], we see that there is a semantic expansion of the musical metaphor, since now the *Stimmung* as the attunement of life is the same one that has a correspondence with the attunements that occur in nature³³. Nietzsche, in *On Moods* [1864], defines it as a complex sentiment that allows us to understand the inner life from the felt experience of the external world³⁴. Dilthey, in *Theory of the Conceptions of the World* [1880], defines it as a vital sentiment of a global character that constitutes a particular perspective of the world³⁵. Riegl, in *The States of Mind as the Content of Modern Art* [1899], is a communicable state of mind and a modern phenomenon, it is a sentiment of harmony that overcomes chaos³⁶. Lukács, in *The Soul and Forms* [1910], points out that it is a state of interiority that is so radical that it must be separated from the outside, thus introducing the concept of *Atmosphäre* (atmosphere) as a representation of what physical things radiate, that is, as the representation of a less abstract world and limited to the content of events that are integrated into an external unity. like watching an opera. The *Stimmung* remaining exclusively as “state of the soul” or “tonality of the soul”,³⁷ in this way both concepts are united by opposing meanings³⁸. Simmel, in *Philosophy of Landscape* [1913], does not reduce it to a state of mind as the unity of aesthetic constituents, but seeks to make them one with the parts that constitute the unity of a physical landscape, this is an anthropological perspective of the surrounding experience³⁹. Heidegger, in *Being and Time* [1927], is not only referring to an affective state, it consists of how everyone makes themselves present to us, however, he distinguishes it from *Befindlichkeit* which he uses as

³¹ Schiller, 1982, p. 141.

³² Schopenhauer, 1972, pp. 231-232.

³³ Carus, 2002, pp. 91-94.

³⁴ Thonhauser, 2021, p. 1254.

³⁵ Dilthey, 1960, p. 82.

³⁶ Riegl, 1929, pp. 30-33.

³⁷ da Silva, 2016, p. 66.

³⁸ Lukács, 2015, pp. 117-118.

³⁹ Simmel, 2007, pp. 26-27

an attunement, since *Stimmung* will move away from its initial etymological meaning and will become a mood⁴⁰.

In a totally colloquial use of the German language in the twenty-first century, *Stimmung* could be summed up in that on which the interiority of the self and external reality (psychic or physical) differs, being phenomena isolated from each other. In the course of these definitions, it is possible to note how the relationship between the sensible world and physical exteriority is taking shape, as well as the emergence of the concept of atmosphere as the obverse of the concept of *mood* in English⁴¹. All these keys lead us to the possibility of interpreting affectivity as the experience of an inner experience and at the same time of a physical reality. But as we said, from a literal sense, in modern languages it can be translated as “*estado de ánimo/humor*” (mood) in Spanish, “*mood*” in English, or “*humeur*” in French, as we can verify in the authors cited in this research. However, we will continue to develop the metaphor of tonality, to see it as a tonal unit that unites us with the environment, just as if we could imagine the nuances that are reflected in the range of colors that exist in a painting, the visual tone installs us in the unity of a landscape. This would be another way of understanding tonality, we would no longer do it only in relation to music from the auditory sense, but we could also do it in relation to the arts. Another form would be that of a meteorological tone such as temperature, since the climate that always surrounds us manifests itself through warm or icy tones. The choice that we will use as a translation of the word *Stimmung* is used and developed by Ignacio Quepons⁴², which although it will take the sense of the auditory metaphor of tonality and not to use the idea of “state of mind” that Husserl also uses from a more literal point of view in the term “*Gemütsutand*”; Ultimately, the use of “temper of mind” is preferable. But from our perspective we will say that it could remain as “tonality of mood” or “*attunement*”,⁴³ in relation precisely to the metaphor of the visual sense or the sense of the temperature of the environment in terms of being a mood disposition

⁴⁰ Heidegger, 1997, pp. 158-164.

⁴¹ Bude, 2017, pp. 138-139.

⁴² See his articles in the bibliography of this research.

⁴³ In Xavier Zubiri, this will be what is known as “affective sentiment” or “*atemperamiento*”.

linked to the color or comfort of a landscape (surrounding world), since Husserl will finally also use metaphors referring to light and affective coloration⁴⁴.

A. 5. The *Stimmung* as a metaphor

We said that sensory sentiments are not intentional experiences because they would not be directed to an object, and they would not have sensory qualities in the content of consciousness because they would be figurative contents. In this sense, it is concluded that emotions would be acts understood as intentional experiences, because they would take a position on the content of consciousness. Now, the *Stimmung* would be an experience that generates a sentimental expansion over its surrounding world, to appear as a disposition towards an experience, but without an explicit intentional reference to any particular object. The tonality of mood, then, determines our relationship with the surrounding world, because they can provide us with the tone or color with which the modes of being of our mental states are characterized. The metaphor of music or color would be present, and the “attunement” would generate a range of colors in the play of affective lights that unfold in the surrounding world, tinting or illuminating the indeterminate objects of sentiment (the object of the *Gefühl* that Husserl speaks), but at the same time everything that surrounds the experience⁴⁵.

However, the question of intentionality in the experience of sentiment still remains without a conclusive answer. When we referred to the need for a unity of meaning in order to define the concept of sentiment, it is in relation to the unity of the very idea of intentionality, as we have already pointed out in the affective classifications of sentiment, between sensory sentiments (unintentional) and emotions (intentional), leaving the tonality of mood as a state that projects on the surrounding world sentimental tonalities without explicit intentional reference. We will now see some attempts to clarify this relationship, in “Perception and Attention” (*Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass* [1893-1912]), and in the second part of the compilation of the “*Studien*” (*Teilband II. Gefühl und Wert. Texte aus dem Nachlass* [1896-1925]).

⁴⁴ Quepons, 2016 a, p. 83.

⁴⁵ Fisette, 2021, pp. 227-228.

One of Husserl's first texts on affective life is "Perception and Attention", a work that we mentioned at the beginning of the research, and which questions what was developed by Carl Stumpf in his "Psychology of Sound" ("*Tonpsychologie*" [1883 Vol I -1890 Vol II]). Here Husserl makes a description of the tonality of mood when it is manifested in a religious ceremony, since that experience positions the participant in a horizon of meaning to the point of shaking him:

"The *Stimmung* has taken hold of the soul in such a way that a permanent sentiment dominates and at the same time there is a willingness to receive new stimuli and justifications through 'everything and everyone'. Then acts of the same kind arise again and again, new impulses of pleasure (*Lust*) or sadness (*Trauer*), and there is also a continuous sentiment that is not related to the present contents and often not to the past ones either. Sometimes we wake up with a sentiment of unhappiness that doesn't leave us, we're sad and we don't know what."⁴⁶

This would be a case where the *Stimmung* reveals certain sentiments involved in that shocking experience, such as pleasure or sadness⁴⁷, and by arousing these sentiments, it is understood as a willingness to continue receiving stimuli at the moment in which it is also maintained in a movement linked to the sentiment. but which we cannot locate because it only subsists to strengthen the whole of the experience in its unity⁴⁸.

Another case that we can mention is a writing that appears in the second part of the "*Studien*", which is also contemporary to the text "Ideas I" (1913). In this passage he seeks to describe the function of sentiments in relation to consciousness, from the fact of valuing and from the delivery of value, and with this, to describe correspondingly the function of "attunement". This awareness of valuing is due to an attitude that is evaluative, and that therefore, is positioned towards the object of value from the liking or disliking that it represents. Husserl,

⁴⁶ See Husserl, 2014, p. 176.

⁴⁷ Husserl uses the words pleasure and sadness, but he does not clarify whether these responses are emotions or sentiments.

⁴⁸ Quepons, 2016 b, p. 8.

in order to clarify this description of the difference between valuing and the “giving of value”, uses joy as an object as an example:

“By joy we mean the affect, the elicitation that emanates from the object of value as such, the intentionality of this affect is obviously different from that of the capture of value: namely, the “intentional” relation of the affect of joy to that which makes me happy (is) different from that of pleasure in the thing. To maintain value is a direction towards the valued object, in liking I turn towards the object, and in any case (if attention is not necessary), while the pleasure is there, there is consciousness, there is also a grounded awareness of the object. On the other hand, the affected arouse of joy is not directional awareness of the object of value aroused. It is a relationship with this object as something that arouses, as something that motivates. It comes from a pleasant object, but it is not directed to the object that aroused it.”⁴⁹

Joy will be positioned in what he calls “affected sentiment” (*Gefühlsaffekte*), which in turn would be the explanation of the expansion of sentiment in the surrounding world from the metaphor of tonality. This must be understood from the point of view of the arousing that occurs because of the excitement of one’s own joy, which is not consciousness directed at the object of value that is aroused, but its relation to the object is to understand it as its own arouser. In short, the joy that was aroused is fundamentally due to the appearance of the valuable object, and in this process, consciousness has its intentionality, but not in the sense of the intentionality of value, since value is not subordinated to the arouse of the affectivity that joy produces. That would be the distinction of intentionality between the joy aroused and the evaluative consciousness, then the “attunement” manifests itself as an expansion of the sentiment that colors all the objects of the surrounding world. When we talk about a coloration of objects, it is due to the pleasure that an “attunement” awakens, since it acts as a sentiment from the metaphor of color, radiating a light that colors the objects, hence the intentional reference of that sentimental character since it shows the trigger of joy and the objects of the surrounding world⁵⁰.

⁴⁹ Husserl, 2020, p. 110.

⁵⁰ Quepons, 2016 c, pp. 88-91.

In another passage, Husserl develops the relation of life expectancy to the personal future, wherein the vague intentionality of the *Stimmung* is not directed at any particular object, nor is it directed at a past elicitation experience that can remain in the present of the surrounding world as a long-lasting coloration of tones. but it is positioned as an expectation of totality with respect to life itself:

“It must be immediately noted that human life (in its form of the prominent reference to a broad future and finally for the full man to total life) is always kept in suspense between successes and failures, always, therefore, in danger and worry, and to that extent it is justified to designate life in its temper as a life in the care of life.” “Care” [*Sorge*] is in general an expression that in its sense indicates in advance the whole of life”.⁵¹

The context of this proposal develops in the understanding of life as potential from the present temporal experience, this means that in the present there can be favorable situations for my sentimental experience to increase, but with the condition that the present that is lived is associated with a possible future and always considering that this future may not prosper. To respond to this approach, Husserl concludes that the anticipation of the personal future develops in the tempered unity of the mind (*Stimmung*), which later manifests itself as care (*Sorge*)⁵² for oneself. In this way, life is understood as a totality that remains attentive to the possibility of the favorable, but also in permanent attention to the worrisome, the unfavorable, because in that sense worry is an expression that anticipates the whole of life⁵³.

⁵¹ See Husserl, 1931, under the nomenclature of A VI 34/22.

⁵² This determination may remind us of what Martin Heidegger develops in “*Being and Time*” on the concept of *Sorge*, so we should not rule out that Husserl was aware of such a proposal.

⁵³ Quepons, 2016 a, pp. 103-104.

A. 6. The practical opening of sentiments

We can notice that Husserl on many occasions seems to identify the metaphor of the coloration of the play of light with the tonality of mood, going so far as to affirm that the unity of sentimental coloration is the tonality of mood⁵⁴. It is a disposition as an attitude of optimism or pessimism about the direction of life experience, because it is positioned as a way of *being* referred to the world, that is its intentionality, to be in a place that “tones” my own experience, this would be Husserl’s proposal towards sentimental life. And as a unity of sentiment, it has the characteristic of spreading from thing to thing, from object to object, from subject to subject, as long as the affection of like or dislike lasts, even when the object is no longer present, the absence of the thing will not diminish the tonality of the color of the valuation. Thus, the tonality of mood must be understood as a unit of sentiment motivated by different types of valuation as well as different value reactions⁵⁵. This results in a *Stimmung* referring to the character of the person, but also to other units of meaning in the world not only surrounding but also referring to the relationship with culture, something like the coloration of the “*Weltanschauung*” or vision of the world itself. So, the *Stimmung* in its relationship with sentiment installs us in the valuation of the situated reality that is life itself, with the sentiment we make a “*Sitz im Leben*”, a radical *being* in life that acts as a horizon of valuation in reference to my character and my affective dispositions⁵⁶.

Now, the integral constitution of the human animal not only has a sentimental reality, let us not forget that in the “*Studien*” Husserl also develops a theory about the will, since apparently the conclusions of his theory of sentiment would be closely related to the conscious acts that represent the choice of what is pleasant, which can represent an opening towards the area of philosophy related to ethics, but it is necessary to make certain achievements in this regard. As with the example of the joy and pleasure that this good represents to me, in order to want it you not only need to follow the will of “wanting the good”, but you also need to know what it is that you want, and this practical resolution works in choosing freely. This is how wanting

⁵⁴ Quepons, 2016a, p. 87.

⁵⁵ Marcos del Cano, 2019, p. 820.

⁵⁶ Quepons, 2016 a, p. 108.

joy would work, but not so much good. The theme of ethics is good, not pleasure, joy or happiness. Certain things are freely willed because they are good, hence the moral bond is generated. So, the good in morality is not generated because one wants something good, but rather, it is generated because something is good and that is why it is loved. That is, you want something good, but not from the clamor that that something is good because it is loved.

Without possibilities, the capacity for choice and therefore the moral capacity cannot be developed; and these possibilities depend on things. That is, it is in things that the intentional place of goodness resides. Everyone seeks the best among things according to their possibilities to survive. Then, we will also understand that a moral praxis depends on freedom by opting from the possibilities, the one who reaches the good often thinks that this must be joy. But many times, good does not equal joy because one must choose between possibilities freely, not capriciously. So, you should choose not the option that you find good because it makes you happy (capriciously), but freely for the options that are good in themselves. Let us now understand that the will is the one that wills, however, consciousness is not simply will. Then we cannot limit ourselves only to the morality that is found in our volition.

This is the link between sentiment and volition, the choice will be, therefore, an eminently integral act of the human animal, because the option for pleasure and volition and the ethical act are not the same, because many times we opt for something that we consider as bad, although correspondingly, this cannot be something good, and consequently, not wanted either. Now that something may be esteemed as the best in view of the joyful, and this is where the evil would be a deficient cause of choice, because the evil cannot be an efficient cause of volition. In short, you must opt for an option that may be bad, and not something good, that is, you can opt for something that you do not want. In this sense, “attunement” or *Stimmung* can appear in the most varied situations that need an effort of context or attunement in the tones, this is how one can settle sentimentally in the experiences, within the tonal expansion that involves settling in a concrete situation from the choice between what is happy or what is good⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ Zárrega, 2014, pp. 221-223.

Chapter 2. Reality and “*estar*” as conditions of “*atemperamiento*”, Xavier Zubiri’s proposal

B. 1. Xavier Zubiri’s philosophical parameters regarding affective life

This first section of the chapter is important because it opens us to the meaning of affective life, and as a common thread we use the concept of sentiment. And, this second chapter will not be different, because based on the proposals he makes to Husserl on the relationship between intelligence and sensibility, we can make a kind of philosophical archaeology, in the sense that his concerns about this relationship are reflected in those who were his students, Heidegger and Zubiri. Although we could undoubtedly take this concern back to the dawn of philosophy in its Greek origins:

“One thing, we are told, is to feel, another to intellect. This approach to the problem of intelligence contains at its core an affirmation: to understand is posterior to sentiment, and this posteriority is an opposition. It was the initial thesis of philosophy since Parmenides, which has been gravitating unperturbedly, with a thousand variants, over the whole of European philosophy.”⁵⁸

This is a very pertinent distinction for our research, because for us and for Zubiri’s thought, sensibility is not opposed to intelligence, but both things are part of a single act. This act will be named by Zubiri as “sentient intelligence”, which will be understood as a structure and not as the relationship of two faculties⁵⁹. A factor that is present in Husserl’s philosophy but not in Zubiri’s, is what happened during modern philosophy, since it was believed that the essence of intelligence was made up of consciousness, or the relationship between the subject and the object, the awareness of something to which we refer. And from this perspective, when we talk about the concept of sentiment, for Zubiri sentiment would not be a subjective way of sentiment, nor would it have traits of intentionality like Husserl⁶⁰:

⁵⁸ Zubiri, 1988, p.11-12.

⁵⁹ Bulo, 2013, p. 93.

⁶⁰ Malo, 1999, p. 112-113.

“Sentiment is *atemperamiento* to reality, to a reality that is certainly of sentiment and is present to it.

This “being-of”, this sentiment “of” reality, does not mean, in other words, a causal connection. It is not that reality is the cause of sentiments. Nor is it that sentiments are intentional phenomena. What is meant by intentionality there? Is the mere intentional reference understood, as Husserl says, to something being correlated with an act of mine? Certainly not. The sentiments are most likely unintentional in this regard. Sentiments are not connected with reality in a causal way, nor in an intentional way, but in a much more elementary form, which I call “genitive,” as when it is said, for example, that the idea is the idea-reality. Similarly I say that sentiment is sentiment-of-reality.”⁶¹

When Zubiri mentions that sentiments are connected to reality in a genitive way, he means that the notes felt by the subject as acts, belong to reality and not merely to the subject, because: “It is reality itself that is saddening, that is joyful, that can be kind, unfriendly or hateful. It is not only about the acts or the states that this reality arouses in me.”⁶² For a moment let us focus our attention on the most important word perhaps for Zubiri’s entire philosophy, since it would be a word more relevant than truth, intelligence or sensitivity, even than “being”. This is the word “reality”, and by the way, we see it reiterated in this last quote. Now, when we “enter into” this word, we will say that Zubiri’s proposal argues with Heidegger’s ontology and Husserl’s phenomenology, but at the same time it is still a metaphysical and phenomenological proposal⁶³. Zubiri’s proposal is articulated in metaphysics, since reality is a fundamental part of its framework, and his thought can be called a “metaphysical anthropology”.⁶⁴ When we think of the word metaphysics in contemporary philosophy, we relate it to “being”, but this is not the case in Zubiri’s thought, since metaphysics is eminently related to the word “reality”. But when we talk about

⁶¹ Zubiri, 1992, p. 336-337.

⁶² Zubiri, 1992, p. 337.

⁶³ Villa, 2013, p. 118.

⁶⁴ Sierra, 2012, p. 600.

metaphysics, is it the same to talk about being as it is about reality? ⁶⁵ Zubiri will say that it is not that the human being is a “comprehend of being”, but that the human being is an “animal of realities”:

“For Phenomenology, the primary and fundamental is always and only consciousness, as an entity in which and only in which things are given in what they truly are. Heidegger overcomes the idea of consciousness through the idea of understanding, and he overcomes the idea of the “giving” of things through the idea of φαίνεσθαι [“to show itself”], of appearing in the sense of showing oneself. This showing is showing oneself as “being”. “Being” is then the possibility of things showing themselves and of man understanding them. Thus the radical of man becomes the understanding of being. Now, this is untenable, first, because man’s primary function is not to understand being, but to deal sensibly with the reality of things.”⁶⁶.

From this quote it can be deduced that Zubiri’s philosophy is a “metaphysical philosophy” because it is articulated in relation to reality, but it does not withstand a only anthropological interpretation even if it were transcendental, for Zubiri the phenomenological and metaphysical approach are inseparable⁶⁷. So, what are we talking about when we refer to Xavier Zubiri’s philosophy? As if it were clay, Zubiri malfunctions Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s ontology to create a “noology.”⁶⁸ This new concept that we introduce in our research has to do with a certain “material phenomenology” that incorporates the character of reality from which phenomena are presented to us, or in Zubirian language they are updated to us, since:

“Actuality is a *being*, but a *being* present from oneself, from one’s own reality. That is why actuality belongs to the very reality of the actual, but it does not add to it, nor

⁶⁵ Cornejo, 2023, 107.

⁶⁶ Zubiri, 1985, p. 452-453.

⁶⁷ Tirado, 2019, p. 1135 and 1137.

⁶⁸ Espinoza & Lombardo, 2019, p. 1157.

does it take away, nor does it modify any of its real notes. Well, human intellection is formally a mere actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence.”⁶⁹

This “*being present*” (“*estar*” in Spanish) with respect to something real is so in a certain tone, or in other words, the actuality of the real is always tonal. For example, sentiment always contains a reference to reality, because it is a way of really *being* in reality. This implies two perspectives within Zubiri’s analysis of human intellection, a “genetic” perspective, and a “formal” perspective. In our research we will follow the genetic perspective, which begins by understanding that man is in life as an animal⁷⁰, therefore, in turn we will analyze sentiment from its relationship with animal sentiment and from its relationship with reality⁷¹.

B. 2. The road to animality

We will begin the path towards the anthropological understanding of Xavier Zubiri, through the three types of matter he discusses: those that are differentiated by their degrees of stability. The first will be elementary matter, understood as the essence of particles (such as photons and electrons). The second type, bodily matter, which can be found in atoms and molecules (such as bodies in their different physical states). The third and final type is the biological matter of living beings, which enjoys greater stability than corporeal matter, arising at the same time from it. In this way, through the potentialities of the systematization of matter⁷², two types of molecules emerge: first, the inorganic molecules that are the result of the systematization of atoms. But also, the latter, which are equally inorganic and undergoing a systematization that will represent the highest stage in the stabilization of matter, give rise to organic molecules⁷³. Now, organic molecules as the highest stage of the stabilization of inorganic matter, give way to what will result as biological matter that will constitute what living beings are. However, we will now see that Zubiri comprises two types of biological

⁶⁹ Zubiri, 1998, p. 13.

⁷⁰ Malo, 1999, p. 112.

⁷¹ Carrera, 2021, p. 16.

⁷² Zubiri, 1998a, p. 451.

⁷³ Zubiri, 1996, pp. 640-643.

matter, since it should not be identified only as a living organism, before it and as the first stage is living matter⁷⁴. Zubiri will understand from the sciences a parallelism between physics and biology, between what would be the distinction between elementary particles and bodies; and correspondingly, the distinction between living matter and organism.

Zubiri is convinced that “living matter proceeds from, and is nothing more than the end of the evolution of, matter that is not alive.”⁷⁵ The second type of biological matter then, we will understand as an organism, as is the case with plants and animals, that is, not living matter, but living matter. The organism refers to the body, since the parts of it are called “organs”; so that a body is a structure made up of organs that have the unity of a functional combination, where “the parts (organs) determine the function of the whole (organism), and the whole (organism) determines the function of the parts (organs)”.⁷⁶ We will say, therefore, that the basic unit of an organism will be the cell, which bases its principle on living matter, since it is a product of the systematization of the latter. When founded as a principle, it is then deduced that life supposes a principle, which is mainly the orientation of actions towards unity; but since they are biochemical actions of molecular structures, the orientation is anticipating the orientation of the structures⁷⁷. Consequently, because of this identity between the living being and its structures, the actions of its structures are the actions of the living being itself⁷⁸. The word to understand life as a principle, then, is the concept of substantiveness, which is the explanation of how the primary unity of the intrinsically respective notes, make the living being the primary unit of their respective structures. To refer to the living being as a primary unit, Zubiri also uses the word “totality,” which is more clarifying than substantiveness. The living being is, and functions as, a totality⁷⁹. By functioning as a totality, the living being is constitutionally sufficient. Well, from the perspective of a philosophy of human nature, we will stop to understand the sentient process

⁷⁴ Zubiri, 1998a, pp. 53-54.

⁷⁵ Zubiri, 1989, p. 177.

⁷⁶ Zubiri, 1998a, p. 453.

⁷⁷ Zubiri, 1996, p. 663.

⁷⁸ Zubiri, 1996, 667.

⁷⁹ Zubiri, 1996, 671.

of the animal, an organism that is living matter, on three levels: its act of apprehension, its underlying habitude and its essential structures⁸⁰.

B. 3. The sentient process of the animal

To analyze this first level of the sentient process that is the act of apprehension, we have to take into account that the animal is in one way or another in relation to the things of its environment or *Umwelt* (in German) a concept elaborated by Jacob von Uexküll, and of which Zubiri will take as a reference to develop his theory of “formality”. as we shall see, his influence was decisive⁸¹. The apprehension used by Zubiri is similar to the apprehension of Uexküll’s *Umwelt* in that the biological subject apprehends through levels of functionality. The particular situation in which the animal finds itself is due to the action of things, since, in turn, its own physico-chemical action creates a situation for itself⁸². For interaction to take place, the animal must obviously be able to “apprehend” its environment. Zubiri’s interpretation of apprehension is:

“... an act of capturing what is present, a capture in which I am aware of what is captured. It is an act in which what is present to me is captured in a precise and formal way because it is present to me.”⁸³

And since the animal can apprehend what is present only through its sense-organs, then we will say that apprehension will be a sensible act, that is, it triggers the sentient; for this reason, apprehension must be strictly called sensuous apprehension⁸⁴. Our understanding of sentiment will be that of apprehending or capturing something that is present, a unity, a unitary process, which “consists in the intrinsic and radical unity, in the indissoluble unity of its three moments, of elicitation, tonic modification, and response... the three moments in their essential and indissoluble unity are what strictly constitutes sentiment.”⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Catalán, 2009, p. 749.

⁸¹ Castro, 2021, p. 14.

⁸² Zubiri, 1996, p. 539.

⁸³ Zubiri, 1980, p. 23.

⁸⁴ Zubiri, 1980, p. 31.

⁸⁵ Zubiri, 1980, p. 30.

The first moment will be that of elicitation, which occurs when the animal apprehends something; this refers to anything captured by the animal's sensory organs within its environment. That is to say, apprehension is the moment of elicitation, because without it the sentient process could not occur. Without it could not be possible, but neither could it be without the stimulus. So more precisely, we will say that elicitation is the reception of stimuli, and this reception is formally stimulation. Therefore, apprehension, strictly speaking, arouses a sensation that triggers, in turn, the second moment⁸⁶. The context to understand the second moment is the animal's state of equilibrium. This state has an essential internal quality known as "vital tone."⁸⁷ Since the "tonic" modification (of the tone) occurs when the apprehension of something alters the vital tone; and this alteration is specifically the stimulation produced by apprehension, that is, the awakening. But in the context of the second moment, we will understand the stimulation referred to as affection, because, when there is an alteration in the vital tone, it is that the apprehension of stimuli occurs. The third and final moment will be the response; which is specifically a vital act, since "in general terms, the proper thing for the purposes of life is to give rise to a vital act".⁸⁸ This lies in the fact that it is the natural solution to a problem that affects the life of the animal itself, that is, a vital problem that modifies the state of balance of the animal creating a new situation that forces the animal to change the way it was living before the alteration of its vital tone, to continue living now in a different way, that is, in a way that is given as survival. Since a vital problem involves two aspects: "on the one hand, to continue living; on the other hand, to do so in a new situation. It is the conflict between that survival and this novelty."⁸⁹

"Habitude" is the second level of the sentient process, which is deeper than the description of the survival of living beings. Habitude refers to the way in which living beings have to deal with things:

⁸⁶ Catalán, 2009, p. 751.

⁸⁷ Zubiri, 2006, p. 41.

⁸⁸ Zubiri, 1996, p. 536.

⁸⁹ Zubiri, 1996, 539.

“Every living person has a primary way of dealing with things and with himself, prior to his possible situations and responses. This way of dealing with things and with oneself is what I call *habitude*.”⁹⁰

Habitude underlies the act of apprehension of the animal, more specifically, every elicitation by things and every response on the part of the living being presupposes a *habitude*, since as the fundament of the system of arousing and responding, *habitude* is “consubstantial” with the living being. We will also say that *habitude* underlies each action, it is not properly an action, but it is a “primary attitude”,⁹¹ so it will formally define the type of life of the living being, that is, whether it is a plant, an animal or a human being, everything will depend on its way of dealing with things. It is on this plane of actions (that of the elicitation-response) that this most radical plane is manifested, since every living person has a primary way of dealing with things and with himself prior to all his possible arouses and responses⁹². In conclusion, we can understand that *habitude* is the basis of every possibility and formal mode of elicitation, tonic modification and response, because while in the response the matter is given as a vital problem, in *habitude* this problem is not such, but only has it or does not have it; each one with a different *habitude*, and at the same time this causes things to be presented from a particular formality. That is to say, *habitude* makes the thing remain in a certain “respect” for the living, that is, actualized, and “the character of things thus actualized in this respect is what he has called formality.”⁹³ Correspondingly, the *habitude* of sensitivity will determine the degree of independence of the stimulus (formalization), making possible the specific mode of apprehension of animals. However, this is not the last level of understanding of the animal, since the place is occupied by that of the essential structures⁹⁴.

The last level of approach to the sentient process of the animal is not *habitude* because “underneath this way of confronting the living with things, and precisely to make it possible, to determine it, the living being has its own structures. And these *structures* are what

⁹⁰ Zubiri, 2006, p. 44.

⁹¹ Zubiri, 1996, p. 547.

⁹² Zubiri, 2006, p. 6.

⁹³ Rodero, 2008, p. 34.

⁹⁴ Catalán, 2009, p. 759.

determine the habitude within which the arouses and responses are inscribed.”⁹⁵ Zubiri will understand that the sentient process and habitude present the animal in its operative moment, while the structures present it in its constitutive moment⁹⁶. The structures will determine the actions of the animal, and they will do so following a certain norm of reaction, according to the degree of evolution of each animal, since each one has its own system of actions, which consists of the type of responses that each one can give when stimulated. In turn, these structures have a biochemical composition that regulates their reaction pattern, which remains relatively constant over the course of the animal’s life⁹⁷. For this reason, Zubiri says that “the response to this is, therefore, always *classed* (system of action) and *regulated* (norm of reaction) by its structures”.⁹⁸

B. 4. From the formalization of animality to its hyper-formalization

We will begin by saying that the animal, because it has sensitivity, will possess a nervous system whose centralization will continue as it evolves. This centralization will refer to the process by which nerve cells are systematized, that is, they form a system that is mainly responsible for receiving, coordinating, and transmitting impulses. Centralization will culminate in the formation of the brain, the main component of the central nervous system⁹⁹. And this component, or rather “organ”, will be the organ *par excellence* of “formalization”, this formation will create the enormous diversity of situations with which the animal has to deal¹⁰⁰. Thus, due to formalization, sensation is transformed into perception, which is the apprehension of a closed unit of notes. However, the difference in perception lies in the respective degrees of formalization of the animals: the more advanced the degree of formalization, the greater the animal’s ability to perceive the various notes organized into independent units¹⁰¹.

⁹⁵ Zubiri, 1989, p. 174.

⁹⁶ Zubiri, 2006, p. 46.

⁹⁷ Catalán, 2009, p. 768.

⁹⁸ Zubiri, 1996, p. 635.

⁹⁹ Catalán, 2009, p. 770.

¹⁰⁰ Güell, F. Murillo, J, 2015, p. 125.

¹⁰¹ Zubiri, 1980, p. 38.

Now, then, we can argue that man, being affected unitarily by the sensible content and by the formality of reality, on the one hand will not only be so sensibly or biologically, and on the other hand only intellectually:

“Intelligibility and sentiment are only two components of a single structure that executes a single, complex act, but one, the act of sentient intellection. Everything biological *is* in the intellectual man as everything intellectual *is* in the biological man.”¹⁰²

In short, we have this opening of reality from the things that stimulate us; because sentiment is not an act that is born by finishing it because we do not feel in our brain, but the sensation is produced when the process is already executed and not when it is executed, in other words, and in this example of Zubiri; in the same way that the meaning of a sentence is when the last syllable is pronounced, but not “in” the last syllable¹⁰³. That is, it is not that I feel, but that I am feeling, and in turn these stimuli that are felt, arouse and sustain the neurofunctional activity of the cerebral cortex.

Zubiri refers to this moment in the morphological complexity of the nervous system as hyperformalization, which consists of the formation of neural structures that are found in abundance only in the human brain¹⁰⁴, “hyperformalization, opens the field of the real. In this process, we feel the stimulus as real, we feel it intellectually, it is sentient intelligence.”¹⁰⁵ Well, within the dynamics of the formalization of the sentient process of the animal, Zubiri will formulate that man would be an animal with greater formalization capacities, that is, he would be an animal with a hyperformalized process, due to the evolution of the species in a specific way and in correspondence with its nervous system, its brain. Therefore, hyperformalization would give man the specific way of understanding the structure of the physical world as well as the sensation of his own body, exclusively and notably by hyperformalization itself. That is why Zubiri did not call it a particular intellection or a

¹⁰² Rodero, 2008, pp. 26-28.

¹⁰³ Zubiri, 1998a, p. 531.

¹⁰⁴ Zubiri, 1980, p. 73.

¹⁰⁵ Güell, F. Murillo, J, 2015, p. 126.

specific sensation, but a “sentient intelligence,” a faculty that is human and made possible by hyperformalization, that is, “primarily apprehending reality as reality.” The “living” will be a hyper-formalized feeling given in man, a truly feeling, a feeling of reality¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁷.

It will be deduced from the effect caused by formalization, that as a constitutive moment of the sentient process, it can never be a speculative process, but on the contrary, it will be one that is always taking place in the real, “a moment of apprehension anchored in a structural moment of the animal organism itself.”¹⁰⁸ However, it is necessary to know that there also comes a time in evolution when the animal reaches such an advanced degree of formalization that the unity of a feeling is threatened, since its nervous system at that moment cannot provide the animal with the resources to respond adequately to the stimulus. This moment will be understood as only physiological, and we will talk about superformalization, because the animal has the capacities to transform stimulation into reality or not, the moment is restrictive, if it has them it can now be called hyperformalization, but if not, the animal will disappear in one way or another¹⁰⁹. To put it more appropriately and conclusively: it is only with hyper-formalization that we are in the presence of the “emergence of intelligence.”¹¹⁰ Because of the constitutive character of structures, it is the structural development that is unique to the human nervous system that will have significant repercussions in terms of habitude and processes of feeling. Therefore, consequently, the most proper or formal property that man possesses in his habitude, the one that will be installed in the human being as sentient intelligence: “Sentient intelligence: this is the radical habitude properly human in its confrontation with things. The formality in which things remain in this habitude... it is reality”.¹¹¹ In the opposite direction of the habitude of sensitivity of animals, since formally apprehending reality is not through mere stimulation that determines a response.

¹⁰⁶ Monserrat, J., 2005, pp. 59-60.

¹⁰⁷ Here we are talking about a feeling, not a sentiment.

¹⁰⁸ Zubiri, 1980, p. 45.

¹⁰⁹ Rodero, 2008, p. 38.

¹¹⁰ Zubiri, 1998a, p. 478.

¹¹¹ Zubiri, 1998a, p. 37.

Let us thus understand that Zubiri will also insist throughout his work that the formality of reality is essentially different from the formality of mere stimulus¹¹². For formality has to do with the way in which things are presented to the biological subject in the act of sensory apprehension. The mere stimulus as formalization acquires an inferior character, as von Uexküll himself already detailed:

“It is not only theoretically possible, but also very plausible, that the complexity of a starfish’s note is the only thing used in the world of the scallop to create an object, and that from it only isolated and unrelated stimuli remain.”¹¹³

In relation to this, in man, formalization, insofar as it is hyperformalized, will always be of reality and not of mere stimulus. Thus, the act of understanding things as reality (in itself) is the formal act of intelligence, but this act that is intellective is also constitutively sentient, since the only access to reality is through the senses, as early as the Middle Ages it was said “there is nothing in the intellect that has not first passed through the senses”. This human habitude in turn transforms the constituent moments of the sentient process of the animal now as a human animal into sentient intellection (ex mere elicitation), sentiment (ex mere tonic modification), and volition (ex mere response).¹¹⁴ In short, due to the hyperformalization of the human nervous system, we will say that only man is essentially an “animal of realities”,¹¹⁵ and in relation to this, we will explain that he is also the only one who from his nature can open himself to technology.

As we said, the human nervous system is a means by which we access reality, in it the process that Zubiri has called hyperformalization takes place, at that moment it is no longer a mere animal formality, to understand it better, we will add that there are different levels of zoological complexity in the structures of the nervous system, this is how Zubiri exemplifies it:

¹¹² Zubiri, 1998 a, p. 57.

¹¹³ Castro, 2021, p. 15. Quote used by Óscar Castro. Jacob von Uexküll, Jakob. 1934 [1921]. *Ideas for a biological conception of the world*, Ramón María Tenreiro (trans.). Madrid: Espasa-Calpe. Col. Biblioteca de Ideas del Siglo XX.

¹¹⁴ Zubiri, 1980, p. 283.

¹¹⁵ Catalán, 2009, p. 779.

“The chimpanzee apprehends “things” much more diverse and rich than those apprehended by a starfish. Hence, the range of appropriate responses to a highly formalized elicitation may be much more varied than it is in the less formalized animal.”¹¹⁶

Being able to infer now, that if there are different levels of complexity in the nervous system, and therefore in formalization, there will also be different responses, because as Zubiri says:

“Formalization is a functional organizational structure of the nervous system. And this is not something that is limited to perception. By virtue of formalization, the whole system of sensible apprehensions, tonic affections, and responses (the unity of which constitutes the function of sentiment) takes on new contents.”¹¹⁷

With this, we will affirm that the response of the hyperformalized nervous system will be a conditioned response to a number of possibilities. This is when we will talk about the appearance of technology in its relationship with the human animal, since the possibilities that manifest themselves to it make it a problem to respond to, since this content will be precisely a problem related to intelligence in its relationship with the environment (*Umwelt*).

The environment is given to animals as a medium where things cannot manifest as problems, but where things only sign each other due to the closed system of their biological structure of formality (stimulus-elicitation-response): “Animal signs signify the response or responses. So in this list of signed responses, the animal biologically selects the answer it is going to give.”¹¹⁸ Animals are animals precisely because they are animated by that mere dynamism of necessarily moving through the stimulating environment that makes them mark the stimuli, it is a responsive being, with a mere constant and circular formality that must necessarily respond to its *Umwelt*. In humans, on the other hand, the response is not merely to sign the stimuli: “Throughout the zoological series, thanks to formalization, the animal

¹¹⁶ Zubiri, 1980, p. 69.

¹¹⁷ Zubiri, 1998a, p. 501.

¹¹⁸ Zubiri, 1980, p. 72.

feels its stimuli as a “note-sign” increasingly independent of the animal itself; that is, he feels the stimulus as something that is increasingly detached from the apprehended. But this formalization reaches a point, so to speak, extreme. The stimulus has finally been presented as something so independent of the animal, so far from it, that it ends up being totally detached from it: “formalization has been changed into hyper-formalization.”¹¹⁹ That is when the human happens, because the nature of hyper-formalization makes the stimulus that it signs become something too far from the act of apprehension of the human animal, in other words, the environment is no longer a means but is now a world and the mere stimulus is now reality, since the human apprehends things as problems independent of his act of apprehension¹²⁰.

B. 5. “*Atemperamiento*”, sentiment, and “*estar*”

The sensitive physical character in Zubiri is expressed in the concept of “*atemperamiento*”, which Zubiri analyzes mainly in his work “Philosophical Reflections on the Aesthetic” (1975), here he indicates that from sentiment there is a moment of human “apprehension” in which the sentient intelligence is tempered to reality¹²¹. Zubiri agrees with Heidegger that together with intelligence and will there is a third faculty of the human animal, and that is sentiment. Sentiment makes use of the reality of the world through sentient intelligence. *Sentiment*, in this sense, actualizes a dimension of the real for which the will and intelligence would be blind, this is not a subjective state caused by the encounter with the real, but would be an *attunement* to reality¹²². This does not mean that intellection, volition, and *sentiment* are three numerically independent acts, but that they are three moments of the same act of apprehension of reality. As we said, in *sentiment* there is an actualization of reality, i.e. the real is actualized in our “tonic modification”, this is a way of actualizing oneself as a way of being tempered to it. *Sentiment* is not only an affective content, but we are accommodated in that content within *being* in reality. And just as Husserl or Heidegger insofar as *sentiments* are of liking or disliking, in Zubiri they will be based on this accommodation in reality, since

¹¹⁹ Zubiri, 1980, p. 69-70.

¹²⁰ Espinoza, Moya, Vilches, 2018, p. 134.

¹²¹ Espinoza & Lombardo & Vilches, 2017, p. 181.

¹²² Tirado, 2019, p. 1140-1141.

the real is actualized in *sentiment* as *atemperamiento*. This is what Zubiri says about *sentiment*: “Sentiment is, in my opinion, a way of really being in reality, or if you like, it is really sentiment in reality. This is essential.”¹²³ That is why it is not something subjective as it is not for Heidegger, the apprehension of reality has a tonal character, and that moment of relationship with reality is where reality eminently manifests, it is called by Zubiri as “*temperie*”, within the arrangement of reality is in the moment of fruition (or tasting) of the real by which we are accommodated or not to it¹²⁴. This is what the modification of the vital tone is about, it is not pure stimulation of the process of arouse and response, it goes from the tonic affection to what is the *atemperamiento* of the real:

“The same thing happens with sentiment. Sentiment is *atemperamiento* to reality. Underlying it, then, is a confrontation with the real; well understood, a *atemperamiento* confrontation. Now, this confrontation is a habitude that is underlying the “affection”. When there is nothing but stimulation, there is nothing but affection: it is the stimulus way of being tonically in the inciting stimulation. But man suspends this stimulus moment, retaining the moment of inciting stimulation, and is thus affected by the stimulating reality. This staying is no longer a mere tonic affection for stimulation, but *atemperamiento* to reality. Now this *atemperamiento* is a non-stimulus way of being affected by the stimulant and its stimulation. Hence, there are no “superior” sentiments to others that are “inferior” or sensitive, but there are only some sentiments: human sentiments, whose essence is to be an affecting sentiment. We are tempered to the real and by what really stimulates us in tonic affection. The affective sentiment is a single faculty, constitutively composed of two powers. Sentiment and stimulation tonic animal. In every sentiment, then, there are also two moments: a specific moment, that which is the “content” of *atemperamiento*, and a non-specific moment of an attuned reality. It is tempered by the real tonic stimulation. Thus in sentiment there is also a double dimension of transcendence: transcendence from the stimulating tonic to its (stimulating) reality, and transcendence from the

¹²³ Zubiri, 1992, p. 332-333.

¹²⁴ Vargas & Colomer, 2019, p. 1114-1115.

invigorating reality to the entire field of the real. Reality is transcendental not only as apprehensible and as determinable, but also as *atemperamiento*.”¹²⁵

Thus, sentiment is a single faculty with two powers, sentiment and animal tonic modification. From this perspective, every sentiment involves a moment of reality, since “sentiment is to be tempered by reality”¹²⁶, reiterating it on the same page:

“*Atemperamiento* does not mean a tempered man, nor does it mean here only to be moderate, to be restrained in his reactions, but, as the dictionary says about *atemperamiento*, it consists in “accommodating one thing to another.” Well, the way of being tonically accommodated to reality is that in which sentiment formally consists.”¹²⁷

It is the way of being tonically accommodated to reality, possessing a direct reference to reality, making it present as *atemperamiento*. *Temperie* is a term coined by Zubiri that alludes to the entire realm of reality, not just pitched reality. Sentiments would be moments of our tonic modification that temper us to reality as *temperie*, which present us to the *atemperamiento* confrontation with reality from the accommodation¹²⁸. To conclude this section, it is necessary to emphasize that when Zubiri uses the expression that sentiment is “the way of being tonically accommodated to reality”, he is referring to a verb that is alien but at the same time present in other languages, I am referring to the verb “to be” in Spanish (*ser/estar*). This is far from the variants of modern languages. That is why it is useful to make the following quote, to understand the depth it conveys:

“[In *euskera* or Basque — the oldest Iberian-Pyrenean language — the verb *izan* (*ser*) is distinguished from the verb *egon* (*estar*). Basque is not a Romance language, nor does it have a Hellenic root. It is likely that it had such an influence on the Iberian Peninsula that perhaps this distinction between “*ser*” and “*estar*” comes from it, a

¹²⁵ Zubiri, 1998a, p. 38-39.

¹²⁶ Zubiri, 1992, p.335.

¹²⁷ Zubiri, 1992, p. 335.

¹²⁸ Carrera, 2021, p. 18.

distinction that does not exist in Greek. However, if we follow the Latin way, the oldest vestige of this verb is found in the poetic Latin of Virgil (*Aeneis*. 1, 646), who uses the *store* as a temporal concretion of the verb *esse*]. The verb “*estar*” is currently only found in the Indo-European languages spoken in the Pyrenees mountains to the south, as is the case of the Castilian language, today the Spanish language, in which *ser* and *estar* are not synonymous. “*Estar*” would apparently point to a passing form of “*ser*”; It is not the same, for example, “to be sick” (*estar* in Spanish) as to be sick (*ser* in Spanish). There the momentary is distinguished from the permanent, thus pointing to a temporal modulation of the act of being: “*estar*” as “being now (*ser* in Spanish)”. “*Estar*” would thus manifest a strong or accentuated way of being, used in those cases in which the being hardens its act and concretizes it in something physical temporalized *hic et nunc*. At first glance, the way of understanding being would then pass through a temporality of being; this would be the *ratio cognoscendi* or way of knowledge to understand what it means to be. However, in fact we come to think of being because we are already in reality, so that being would be, rather, a modulation of *estar*.”¹²⁹

The verb “*estar*” (to be in English) in Zubiri’s philosophy is always present, after “reality” it may be the trigger for his entire philosophy. It is a verb that has an unsuspected potential for all disciplines; so much so, that “Being” would no longer be the gravitating thing of our way of seeing the world, because through the understanding of reality we can say that “Being” (in the sense of *ser*) is only a “modulation of *estar*”. So, we would have to rethink our way of analyzing, metaphysically, ontologically or phenomenologically everything, in a deeper way.

¹²⁹ Zárrega, 2014, p. 21-22.

Chapter 3. Dwelling as linked to affective life, Martin Heidegger's proposal

C. 1. Martin Heidegger's proposal for the affective life

We begin this third part of our research by returning to a concept that we used extensively in the first chapter. At the beginning is where we talked about Husserl's perspective on affective life. Well, this is a concept intimately linked to affectivity, which is a fundamental part of this thesis, this concept is the: *Stimmung*. When we referred to the definition of the word *Stimmung* we did so in reference to its etymology, but also to how this idea developed over the centuries in areas of knowledge such as aesthetics and philosophy. We make this historical journey briefly to Martin Heidegger, to better understand the use within which it occurs in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. We then dedicate the entire chapter 2 of this research to see its implications in Xavier Zubiri's philosophy of "being" and "sentiment". Now we will begin this chapter 3 from the distinction made by Heidegger, and which we previously stated: the "*Stimmung*" is not only referring to an affective state, it consists of how everyone makes themselves present to us, however, he distinguishes it from *Befindlichkeit* which he uses as an attunement, since *Stimmung* will move away from its initial etymological meaning and will become only a state of mind"¹³⁰. This will be the purpose of this section: to understand the repercussions of this distinction, in order to be able to interpret affectively what we will see in detail in the next section. Since the second section of this third chapter will bring our proposal closer to the Philosophy of Architecture, all this from the concept of "dwelling" in the thought of Martin Heidegger in his work "Building Dwelling Thinking".

C. 2. The distinction between *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*

Our analysis of Martin Heidegger's thought will not be directed to the totality of his work, nor to the importance of ontology and metaphysics in the systematicity of his philosophy. The analysis that we will carry out in this section is with respect to what Heidegger wants to

¹³⁰ This quote is from the definition we provided in the fourth section of the first chapter, on pages 28 and 29 of this thesis.

communicate to us about affective life from a phenomenological point of view. When we refer to affective life, we refer, as with Husserl or Zubiri, to affective tones. Affectivity is a theme that is found in Heidegger's work in a transversal way, as is the case of his work "Augustine and Neoplatonism" of 1921, then we see that he deals with affectivity in a conference on 'The concept of time' in 1924, or in his magnum opus "Being and Time" of 1926, in addition to "Contributions to philosophy" made between 1936 and 1938, and the Zollikon Seminars of 1966¹³¹; as well as when he speaks of the meaning of *Stimmung*, in "The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics" carried out between 1929 and 1930¹³². However, we will refer to analyze what Heidegger wrote mainly in "Being and Time", because it is in that work that he analyzes *Da-sein* (to be there) as linked to affectivity in the sense that interests us, but also because *Dasein* is related to the meaning that Zubiri gives to the verb to be in Spanish. We can find this information precisely in section 29 of "Being and Time", entitled "*Das Da-sein als Befindlichkeit*" (*Dasein* as *Befindlichkeit*), where he speaks specifically about affectivity.

It is important to note that in the previous paragraph we have used the word affectivity and the concept of *Stimmung* separately to mark a distinction, since Heidegger integrates a new word to explain affectivity, this is *Befindlichkeit*. It is important to emphasize this because the authors who comment on Heidegger make different interpretations when translating these concepts. To clarify these premises, we will state the following: *Stimmung* for Heidegger is not the same as for Husserl or Zubiri, on the other hand, *Befindlichkeit* is closer to what Husserl or Zubiri postulate, as a moment of sentiment or as *atemperamiento*, respectively. Along with this, it is necessary to make an additional clarification, certain authors have criticized Heidegger for not being clear when referring to affective phenomena, since he has incurred ambiguities when using the words mood, emotion, sentiment¹³³, or simply does not analyze the relationship between them¹³⁴. It is plausible to speak of the existence of a

¹³¹ Kahlmeyer & dos Santos, 2020, p. 180.

¹³² Stolorow, 2014, p. 5.

¹³³ Ibid., 2014, p. 7.

¹³⁴ Elpidorou, 2015, p. 668.

“superposition” or polysemy within Heidegger’s sense of the *Stimmung*, since his work includes aspects of emotions, passions or sentiments¹³⁵.

Before entering the analysis, we will briefly review the possible translations of *Befindlichkeit* in relation to the *Stimmung* and their objective implications. To do this, we will use sources made in the last 10 years from the original in German and considering translations into English, since as we said, together with the *Stimmung* it is a fundamental concept to understand affectivity in the thought of Martin Heidegger. In consideration of the analysis of the relationship between these two words, we have compiled nine essays that speak specifically to us about this distinction. In chronological order it is as follows, and starting with *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung* respectively: Stolorow (2014), tells us that *Befindlichkeit* is “how-one-finds-oneself-ness”, while *Stimmung*, “mood”.¹³⁶ Freeman for his part, in the same year 2014, as “attunement” and *Stimmung* for “mood”.¹³⁷ Elpidorou & Freeman (2015) translates it as “attunement”, and *Stimmung* as, “mood”.¹³⁸ Gilardi (2015) as “find-yourself”, and *Stimmung*, “mood”.¹³⁹ Guidi (2017), for “attunement”, and *Stimmung*, for “mood”.¹⁴⁰ Zocchi (2017) also translates it as “disposition”, while *Stimmung* no longer as “mood”, but as “affective tonality” or “atmosphere”.¹⁴¹ A first time, dos Santos (2019) as “affective disposition”, “affection” or “affectivity”, and *Stimmung* also as “affective tonality”.¹⁴² On a second occasion, now in company, Kahlmeyer & dos Santos (2020) translates it as “find-yourself” or “affectivity”, and *Stimmung*, again as “affective tonality”.¹⁴³ Vieira (2023) uses the translation of “affectivity”, while for *Stimmung*, “mood temper” or “atmosphere”.¹⁴⁴

At this moment we see the verification of certain objective facts. First, that during the last ten years, these authors analyzing the distinction of these two concepts, do not follow a single

¹³⁵ Vieira, 2023, p. 39-40.

¹³⁶ Stolorow, 2014, p. 8.

¹³⁷ Freeman, 2014, p. 447.

¹³⁸ Elpidorou & Freeman, 2015, p. 662.

¹³⁹ Gilardi, 2015, p. 99.

¹⁴⁰ Guidi, 2017, p. 1599.

¹⁴¹ Zocchi, 2017, p. 51-52.

¹⁴² dos Santos, 2019, p. 133-134.

¹⁴³ Kahlmeyer & dos Santos, 2020, p. 181.

¹⁴⁴ Vieira, 2023, p. 38 and p. 48.

pattern. Second, that *Stimmung* is no longer translated merely as “mood”, since the authors have come to the agreement that “mood” is insufficient to translate this concept. We argue that by making the decision to translate it in this way, it could be related to psychological contexts, which would be inappropriate within the philosophical context of Heidegger’s difference from *Befindlichkeit*. Third implication, that the *Stimmung* for Heidegger, and as in Husserl or Zubiri, is not merely “mood”. Fourth, that the translations between *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit* intersect, that is, there are authors who translate both *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit* by a kind of “attunement”. Fifth, it is noted that the translation of these words among specialists does not have consensus.

That said, we can now make our analysis based on what we discussed at the beginning of this section, go to the sources themselves in “Being and Time”, where Heidegger uses these concepts in relation to “*Dasein*”. This is also in consideration of two premises; the first, as we said in the first chapter, that Heidegger was a reader of Husserl’s unpublished work on affectivity, the word *Stimmung* being also part of his German culture, and the second, that the *Stimmung* is a word that occurs in the context of *Dasein*, which is related to Zubiri’s understanding of the verb to be and the affective life. In short, while some translate *Befindlichkeit* as “attunement”, at the same time others translate “*Stimmung*” as “affective tonality”, which implies a quasi-synonymy in its meaning. This is a problem, because we need to define this phenomenological process clearly, since our proposal is that Heidegger uses the *Stimmung* like Husserl and Zubiri, in a similar sense, but not identical, because the *Befindlichkeit* would also have characteristics of the *Stimmung* of Husserl and Zubiri. The affectivity that we point out in Husserl and Zubiri’s *Stimmung* would be distributed in Heidegger’s philosophy both in the word *Stimmung* and in the *Befindlichkeit*.

When we refer to “Da-sein” (literally being-there in English), we do so because Heidegger creates this word from the German to speak of the human being, since he understands it differently from traditional metaphysical categories such as the case of “substance”, rather, he understands it in ontological terms as necessary structures of human existence, that is, of structures that constitute the way in which the human being exists in the world¹⁴⁵. Having

¹⁴⁵ Freeman, 2014, p. 448.

made this clarification, we will begin our analysis in progressive order according to our interest in highlighting the difference between *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit* and contextualizing this progression between our proposal and our bibliography. The first thing is that if we use “Being and Time” as the beginning of the explanation of *Befindlichkeit*, it will be necessary to relate it to the existentials of *Dasein*. For Heidegger, existentials are the basic structures of existence, those that are united “equiprimarily” in the ontological structure of *Dasein*, care (*Sorge* in German), which unifies and reveals the being-in-the-world of *Dasein* as temporal¹⁴⁶, Heidegger reiterates it multiple times in “Being and Time”, here we see some of his affirmations regarding structure: “care is the totality of the structural whole of the constitution of *Dasein*”¹⁴⁷, or also with respect to the being of *Dasein*: for, “in care is contained the being of *Dasein*”.¹⁴⁸ On the one hand, he describes it as a fundamental constitution: “The fundamental constitution of *Dasein* became visible as care.”¹⁴⁹ But at the same time, it is a structural constitution:

“In the first determination of this structural framework, it was shown that, with respect to the articulation of this structure, it was necessary to take the ontological question even further, until the integrating unity of this structural multiplicity was revealed. The original unit of the structure of care is temporality.”¹⁵⁰

And as we can see, temporality as care articulates the structure: “The original ontological foundation of the existentiality of *Dasein* is temporality. Only from it is the articulated structural totality of *Dasein*’s being as care existentially comprehensible.”¹⁵¹ This structure is in turn based on four existential structures: *Befindlichkeit*, understanding (*Verstehen*), discourse (*Rede*), and fall (*Verfallenheit*). When we mention that they are “equiprimarily” united, we mean that each existential separately is a unique and incomplete moment in the

¹⁴⁶ Elpidorou & Freeman, 2015, p. 663.

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, 1997, p. 253.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 251.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 270.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 344.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 254.

ontological constitution of *Dasein*, this means that each separately is involved in all, since they are inseparably linked¹⁵².

It is in these structures that “openness (*Erschlossenheit*) is constituted”,¹⁵³ which for Heidegger is what opens us to the world. However, it is necessary to make a distinction first, since the ontological structures to which we allude manifest themselves ontically depending on the way in which *Dasein* is found in the world. In other words, the ontological dimension of structures are precedents and necessary for existence, while the ontic dimension refers to behavior with the world and things¹⁵⁴. In the case of *Befindlichkeit* it would open us to *Stimmung*, and it is through which we attune in to ourselves and to the world¹⁵⁵, this is how Heidegger begins section §29 of “Being and Time” dedicated to *Befindlichkeit*, we will also quote it in German to see from the first source the use of these words:

“*Was wir ontologisch mit dem Titel Befindlichkeit anzeigen, ist ontisch das Bekannteste und Alltäglichsste: die Stimmung, das Gestimmtsein.*”¹⁵⁶

“What in the ontological order we designate with the term *Befindlichkeit* is ontically the most well-known and everyday: the *Stimmung*.”¹⁵⁷

As we can see, when Heidegger refers to the *Stimmung* he refers to it as the process following the *Befindlichkeit*, without specifying whether it is a sentiment or an emotion, hence the most generic thing is to relate it to a state of mind¹⁵⁸. It would be something like the experience (lived experience) of mere affectivity to the extent that there is for us an openness to being-in-the-world (*Dasein*), as Heidegger explicitly says:

“*Die Stimmung hat je schon das In-der-Welt-sein als Ganzes erschlossen und macht ein Sichrichten auf... allererst möglich*”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵² Elpidorou & Freeman, 2015, p. 664-665.

¹⁵³ Heidegger, 1997, p. 352.

¹⁵⁴ Elpidorou & Freeman, 2015, p. 663.

¹⁵⁵ This is the world where the phenomena that affect our affective life manifest themselves.

¹⁵⁶ Heidegger, 1967, p. 134.

¹⁵⁷ Heidegger, 1997, p. 158.

¹⁵⁸ Stolorow, 2014, p. 8.

¹⁵⁹ Heidegger, 1967, p. 137.

“The *Stimmung* has always opened being-in-the-world in its entirety and makes possible for the first time a direction towards...”.¹⁶⁰

There is even a bodily attunement with the world, as we have mentioned, Heidegger says that: “*Befindlichkeit* is a fundamental existential mode as *Dasein* is it’s There.”¹⁶¹ With the above quote, we are referring to the fact that because *Befindlichkeit* passes through *Stimmung* is that we can experience the world and ourselves, that is, also how we find ourselves, that is not a mere state of mind but is a *conditio sine qua non* for its possibility, affecting how things manifest themselves to us¹⁶².

Heidegger rejects the modern model of the relationship between subject and object, because he wants to avoid referring to existence from consciousness, and therefore, from intentionality. In this sense, this approach is opposed to Husserl’s, since the ontological approach is premundane. That is where the *Befindlichkeit* would be and not the *Stimmung*, as some commentators claim¹⁶³. Referring to this regard, the judgment on the investigation:

“Its purpose is in line with a fundamental ontology. Consequently, when we ask thematically about *being-in*, we do not intend in any way to put an end to the originarity of this phenomenon by deriving it from others, that is, by subjecting it to an inadequate form of analysis, to an analysis that would resolve it in its elements. But the inderivability of an original phenomenon is not exclusive of a possible multiplicity of constitutive ontological characteristics. If such characteristics appear, they will be existentially co-original. The phenomenon of the co-originary of constitutive moments has often gone unnoticed in ontology, as a result of an uncontrolled methodological tendency to seek the origin of each and every thing in an elementary ‘first principle’.”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Heidegger, 1997, p. 161.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 163.

¹⁶² Freeman, 2014, p. 446.

¹⁶³ Zocchi, 2017, p. 49.

¹⁶⁴ Heidegger, 1997, p. 156.

This is a turning point, since Heidegger tries not to separate the same phenomenon, he tries to describe between *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*. But *Befindlichkeit* is the ontological structure of our existence that manifests ontically as *Stimmung*. This ontological perspective, as *Stimmung*, does not presuppose a causal relationship between the objective world and the *Befindlichkeit* as a subjective state¹⁶⁵. On the one hand, as *Dasein*, *Stimmung* colors our experiences, but at the same time in a certain sense determines them as mundane experiences¹⁶⁶, since *Dasein* is ontologically determined by *Befindlichkeit*, which means that *Dasein* is in each case in a certain *Stimmung*. This means that *Dasein* is always in attunement with a tone of existence, which is opposed to the idea of subjectivity that would restrict this phenomenon. And this “being in attunement” refers us to two aspects. On the one hand, the encounter communicates to us the verbal sense of the noun *Befindlichkeit*, through the verb “*befinden*”, since it can be understood by “*sich befinden*”, which would mean precisely as a “to find in a certain way” either physically or affectively. By this we mean an encounter from the *Befindlichkeit*, which is why it is in an ontological dimension, but we also do it from its ontic counterpart *Stimmung*, since both are fundamental in the openness of *Dasein*. These structures have three fundamental aspects in this openness: firstly, the throwing into existence (*Geworfenheit*), making the second possible, which makes us open to the world, to others and to ourselves; and third, they show us our experience in the relationship with things. Heidegger shares with us a sentence in which these two concepts are involved with each other with respect to this fundamentally affective openness: “*Die Gestimmtheit der Befindlichkeit konstituiert existenzial die Weltoffenheit des Daseins*”¹⁶⁷ (The being attuned [*Gestimmtheit*] of the *Befindlichkeit* constitutes existentially the opening to the world of *Dasein*”¹⁶⁸), resulting in the statement that Heidegger already told us: “The *Stimmung* has always opened being-in-the-world in its totality, and makes possible for the first time a direction towards...”¹⁶⁹.

Now, according to Heidegger there are different kinds of *Stimmung*, and only a few would

¹⁶⁵ Guidi, 2017, p. 1602.

¹⁶⁶ Freeman, 2014, p. 452.

¹⁶⁷ Heidegger, 1967, p. 137.

¹⁶⁸ Our translation to English of the original German quote.

¹⁶⁹ Heidegger, 1997, p. 161.

make this openness possible, such as amazement (*Erstaunen*), anguish (*Angst*), or boredom (*Langeweile*).¹⁷⁰ From this we can deduce that there are different kinds of “*Stimmung*”, which make up a quasi-hierarchy in our way of relating to each other; that is why it is also complex to analyze the *Stimmung*, since Heidegger does not make it clear whether we are referring to sentiments, emotions, moods or even passions. What is clear is that they give access to evaluative experiences, as we had also pointed out in the previous chapters of our research with respect to Husserl’s use of the concept of *Stimmung* itself, or in Zubiri with “*atemperamiento*”, since affectivity impels us to a situation of like or dislike. And this act of throwing is proper to *Befindlichkeit*, which is why our proposal states that it is plausible to translate *Befindlichkeit* as “affectivity”. From its Latin roots, it is possible to refer to the use that Heidegger himself makes in his early work (The Concept of Time [1924]), since he translates the Augustinian “*affectio*” by *Befindlichkeit*, which would be equivalent to “being corporally affected”, which designates the opening of the fundamental structure of *Dasein*¹⁷¹. But this was not his first attempt to translate the meaning of *Befindlichkeit*, for originally in the lessons of the winter semester of 1921-1922, in “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle”, he attempts to articulate the formal structure from the concept of “*Reluzenz*” (relucency), to try to vindicate the Aristotelian doctrine of *πάθη* (*páthê* in Greek, “being affected”) which in 1924 deals with Aristotle’s “Rhetoric”, but in that instance he uses *Befindlichkeit* to translate *διαθεσις* (disposition).¹⁷²

As we can see, in the same year, he uses the *Befindlichkeit* both to translate the Augustinian *affectio* and for the Aristotelian *διαθεσις*, and in turn in “Being and Time” of 1927, with an even deeper meaning, but even to have certain cryptic nuances. In any case, we prefer the Augustinian version of the translation, since it refers us to the corporeal, and therefore, to *Dasein* incarnate, which in turn will bring us closer and closer to the Heidegger of the second half of the twentieth century, and to his concept of “*Wohnen*” (dwelling). Heidegger was not a thinker alien to his time, since during the first half of the twentieth century, other philosophers also found the irruption of the body necessary in philosophy, as an example, Miguel de Unamuno, as early as 1912:

¹⁷⁰ Escudero, 2009, p. 159.

¹⁷¹ Kahlmeyer & dos Santos, 2020, p. 182.

¹⁷² Escudero, 2009, p. 53-54.

“Philosophy is a human product of every philosopher, and every philosopher is a man of flesh and blood who addresses other men of flesh and blood like himself. And do what you will, philosophize, not with reason alone, but with your will, with your sentiments, with your flesh and bones, with your whole soul and with your whole body. Man philosophizes.”¹⁷³

Returning to Heidegger, the second aspect of this “being in attunement” brings us directly to the next section of our research and intersects with the importance of corporeality to which we are referring. This fundamentally ontological quality of *Befindlichkeit*, which installs us in the world through *Stimmung* in an ontic way, is manifested through tonalities that permeate *Dasein*. This impregnation of shades refers to a coloration of tones towards *Dasein*, which under our translation of the *Befindlichkeit* would be an impregnation or coloration of “affective” tones towards *Dasein*. Now, when we refer to a “coloring of affective tones” we do so because it is the moment of “encounter”, and in that sense, being in attunement with that “coloration of affective tones” is when the *Stimmung* manifests itself as being part of the process, this time, ontic. The *Stimmung*, in an ontic way, would attune us into the “coloration of affective tones” that the *Befindlichkeit* ontologically impels us. Here we recall, respectively, the parallel of Husserl’s use of “coloration” and “*Stimmung*,” or Zubiri’s “tonic modification” and “*atemperamiento*.” In this way, for Heidegger, *Dasein* in these conditions is always in attunement with the colorations of affective tones, this relationship would indicate a concave and convex of the same phenomenon from its ontological-ontic sense¹⁷⁴. This reminds us of our brief historical journey of the word *Stimmung*, because in 1910, Lukács uses the *Stimmung* to describe what happens in the outside world and introduces the word “atmosphere” to describe what happens inside, as if it were a “tonality of the soul” inside. In no case are we elaborating a simile between Heidegger’s ontological-ontic elaboration, but it is relevant, since the word “atmosphere” would come to nourish the possibility of the relationship between *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung*, because although we said that there is no exterior-interior or subject-object relationship as in modernity or in

¹⁷³ de Unamuno, 1962, p. 28.

¹⁷⁴ Kahlmeyer, 2020, p. 191.

intentionality as a phenomenon of consciousness, it is the same Heidegger who in “The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics”, of the Freiburg winter course of 1929-1930, where he uses the word atmosphere (“*Atmosphäre*” in German) to indicate that the *Stimmung* could be understood as atmosphere, as Heidegger states:

“Es scheint so, als sei gleichsam je eine *Stimmung* schon da, wie eine Atmosphäre, in die wir je erst eintauchten und von der wir dann durchstimmt würden”.¹⁷⁵

“It seems as though an *Stimmung* is in each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through”.¹⁷⁶

We can say that Heidegger’s *Stimmung* is in many ways an atmosphere, since it opens us to the world and contains what surrounds us¹⁷⁷. So much so, that it could also contain the affective dimension of *Befindlichkeit*, which would then be able to amalgamate these two concepts to give a definitive unity to the same phenomenon. This is where Zubiri’s “*atemperamiento*” comes in to relate deeply to Heidegger’s *Stimmung* as atmospheric, because just as being-in-the-world as Dasein has ontological-ontic structures that make its openness possible, the fundament of Zubiri’s thought is that this openness is given as radical from the verb to be.

C. 3. The interpretation of the verb “dwelling”

In this part of our research, we will talk about what is meant by “dwelling” in the thought of Martin Heidegger, specifically in his work “*Bauen Wohnen Denken*” (Building Dwelling Thinking). This section does not attempt to describe the entire content of this work, nor to relate the content to Heidegger’s systematic philosophy. That said, our interest is to relate Heidegger’s explanation of the verb “to dwell” with respect to Architecture from what we have developed in the distinction of the concepts of *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*. But at the

¹⁷⁵ Heidegger, 1983, p. 100.

¹⁷⁶ Our translation to English from the German original.

¹⁷⁷ Zocchi, 2017, p. 52.

same time, at a later time, relate this result to the philosophy of Husserl and Zubiri that we have developed in the previous chapters. Now, first of all, it is necessary to contextualize the moment in which Heidegger writes this philosophical work, or rather, when he presents these philosophical ideas orally. For the work “Building Dwelling Thinking”, before thinking of it as a written work, must first be considered as an oral presentation in a conference, we will explain this below.

First of all, we will analyze the statement made by Christian Norberg-Schultz, a renowned architect, phenomenologist and theorist of architecture, who tells us that Heidegger did not write any text on architecture, but he did write on the art of building¹⁷⁸. We partially agree with that statement. There are those who claim that Heidegger does not write about architecture, but about the relationship between building and dwelling, and consequently about the type of thought and “being” that is present in that relationship, this from three works: “Building Dwelling Thinking”, “The Thing” (1949) and “Poetically Man Dwells” (1951). In these works, Heidegger gives examples in relation to constructions such as bridges or houses, from an everyday sense of man’s relationship with built things¹⁷⁹. On the other hand, there are those who affirm that in his work “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1938) it can be concluded that there is a theoretical reflection on architecture, since it deals with temples and monuments as landmarks that open us to the truth of being¹⁸⁰. Even that his work “Art and Space” (1969) would be an input for the Theory of Architecture, but under our reading, in this work Heidegger talks about the understanding of construction as art and its impact on man, and not fundamentally about dwelling in relation to architecture. Returning to Norberg-Schultz’s statement, and explaining why we partially agree with his explanation, we affirm that Heidegger in both “The Thing” and “Poetically Man Dwells” establishes the fundamentals of content more in metaphysics and ontology, than in the descriptive and concrete exemplification of a phenomenological theory of architecture. This is fundamental in relation to our research, and therefore, it is important to make this clarification before continuing with the context of when this oral presentation, called “Building Dwelling Thinking”, was made.

¹⁷⁸ Norberg-Schultz, 2008, p. 94.

¹⁷⁹ Grierson, 2010, pp. 24-25.

¹⁸⁰ Sabrovsky, 2006, p. 74.

Complementing that, and as Norberg-Schultz affirms, it is also the same Heidegger who at the beginning of “Building Dwelling Thinking” explicitly says that he does not seek to discover architectural ideas, the first paragraph of the text is very clear:

“In these pages we want to think about dwelling and building. This thinking about building does not intend to discover architectural ideas or much less to give rules to construction. This attempt to think does not see building from the perspective of architecture and technique, but seeks to trace construction in that realm to which everything that is belongs.”¹⁸¹

However, our reading will be risky because we affirm that, although Heidegger declares it and does not intend to “discover architectural ideas”, it is plausible to affirm that there is inevitably a direct theorization of architecture, since in our opinion the most characteristic of architecture is what is hidden in “dwelling”, a verb that Heidegger deals with profusely throughout the work. But if we say that it is inevitable that the content of this work has a “Theory of architecture”, why does Heidegger make this statement? The answer can be found in the context in which Heidegger makes this oral presentation entitled: “Building Dwelling Thinking”. This presentation was held on August 5, 1951, in a hall attended by numerous architects and engineers, and was held within the scope of the “*Darmstadt Symposium*”, which took place between 1950 and 1975. The one that summons us was entitled “Man and Space”, and it was of a public nature, so that it is not only that specialists have attended¹⁸². The purpose of this forum was to discuss proposals for urban regeneration, with the attendance of architectural theorists such as: Peter Behrens, Heinrich Tessenow, Walter Gropius, Hans Scharoun, Mies van der Rohe, Bruno Taut, Alvar Aalto, Rudolf Schwarz, Hans Poelzig and Le Corbusier¹⁸³. It should be added that intellectuals such as philosophers José Ortega y Gasset and Hans-Georg Gadamer also attended, as well as Otto Bartning, director of the Weimar School of Architecture, who was in charge of the conference. This oral presentation was published in the proceedings of the conference, and was later published by

¹⁸¹ Heidegger, 2015, p. 11. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

¹⁸² Pedragosa, 2011, p. 361.

¹⁸³ Anderson, 2021, p. 7.

Heidegger in 1954, along with other of his works under the title “Lectures and Articles”.¹⁸⁴ We conclude that, although Heidegger did not want to formally address architecture, either because of the moment, the place, the audience, or the mere fact that he only did not want to enter architecture; the content of his presentation went beyond the philosophical discipline, and effectively entered the Theory of Architecture, so we can then qualify it as a transdisciplinary work.

We commented that the purpose of this conference had been the urban regeneration of the city, but what is the basis for this statement? The reason is that one-fifth of the homes in Germany had been destroyed during World War II. Consequently, thinkers wanted to find answers to the challenges that society was going through at the time, there was a housing crisis. Well, it is in this context that Heidegger’s philosophical contributions in relation to Architecture burst in¹⁸⁵. And at this moment we emphasize again that Heidegger’s work, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, is one of the philosophical sources of the Theory of Architecture, which also becomes relevant in modern and postmodern architectural thought¹⁸⁶, since, under our reading, phenomenology formally entering the study of architecture, contributes to the contemporary debate on how to make architecture. To conclude these preambles and return to the cause of the conference —the housing crisis— we will begin our philosophical analysis. But Heidegger does not enter directly into the subject of the verb to dwelling in relation to this crisis, but mentions it implicitly at the end of the entire lecture, in the last paragraph:

We try to meditate on the fundament of dwelling. The next step would be the question: what is the situation of dwelling in a time as precarious as ours? Everywhere we hear about the housing shortage, and rightly so. It is not only talking; remedies are also sought. An attempt is made to remedy this need by procuring housing, promoting the construction of houses, planning the entire architectural enterprise. But no matter how hard and painful, however serious and dangerous the lack of housing may be, the real scarcity of dwelling does not consist simply in the absence of housing. The real

¹⁸⁴ Hidalgo, 2013, p. 57.

¹⁸⁵ Da Silva, 2023, p. 474.

¹⁸⁶ Holst, 2014, p. 53.

shortage of housing is older than the world wars and their destruction, older even than the increase in the earth's population and the situation of the industrial workers. The real hardship of dwelling consists in the fact that mortals always have to go back to search for the essence of dwelling, that they have to first learn to dwell. What would happen if man's uprooting consisted in the fact that man does not yet meditate on his own penury of dwelling as penury? However, as soon as man meditates on uprooting, it is no longer a misery. Thinking about it and taking it into account, uprooting is the only exhortation that calls mortals to dwell. But how else can mortals respond to this call if not by attempting on their part, from themselves, to bring dwelling to the fullness of their essence? Mortals achieve this when they build from dwelling and think for dwelling¹⁸⁷.

If we say that this last paragraph of the text is a synthesis of the fundament of the work, we would not be being entirely imprecise, since it is possible to unravel the central problem of Heidegger's approach in his indirect reference to the housing crisis. We identify this trigger in the concept of penury, since it is linked to questioning the essence or fundament of dwelling¹⁸⁸. Heidegger exemplifies this position with circumstances that do not address the fundament of dwelling, such as the mere construction and destruction of houses, or the increase in population and the industrial question. Now, although the 1951 symposium was motivated by the "housing shortage", it does not mean that Heidegger considers that having a home is the fundament of dwelling. At this point it is important to note that certain commentators point out that the triggering concept of thinking about the fundament of dwelling is uprooting (*Heimatlosigkeit*), because in this way penury would disappear¹⁸⁹. We see in the text that uprootedness is a factor in the problem of dwelling, as Heidegger mentions: "uprooting is the only exhortation that calls mortals to dwell."¹⁹⁰ However, when we think of uprooting, we must also think that it has an affective dimension, and in view of this, it is as if hardship preceded that particular sentiment. The hardship would be related to a previous, initial discomfort, a suffering; so, the real problem would not be the sentiment of

¹⁸⁷ Heidegger, 2015, p. 50-51. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

¹⁸⁸ Vallejo, 2012, p. 55.

¹⁸⁹ Pedragosa, 2011, p. 375.

¹⁹⁰ Heidegger, 2015, p. 49. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

uprootedness, but the penury¹⁹¹. With this analysis it is not that we say that the fundament of dwelling is penury, on the contrary, penury is the primary trigger of the problem, because in its antipodes, the fundament of dwelling is related to well-being.

As we will see below, this well-being or this fundament of dwelling is in the concept of “preserving and taking care” (*Schonen*), almost identical to the “care” (*Sorge*) used in “Being and Time”. In other words, this fundament of dwelling is a path towards the care of our being-in-the-world¹⁹², but also of a preservation of the world, Heidegger says in the lecture: “The fundamental feature of dwelling is this preserving and taking care.”¹⁹³¹⁹⁴ For practical purposes we will not differentiate the translation between “*Schonen*” and “*Sorge*”. As we said, this idea is not unknown to us, because in the previous section we saw how Heidegger had used it in “Being and Time”, being a concept that unified the so-called “existentials”: *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen* (understanding), *Rede* (discourse), *Verfallenheit* (fall). But we must note that there is about 25 years of difference in the use of this idea between these two works, and in a certain way Heidegger’s thought had nuances in its use, because in this case the emphasis would no longer be placed on time, but on *Geviert* (quaternity), which has four components: the earth, the sky, the divine and the mortal.¹⁹⁵ This is how Heidegger states:

“To take care of the quaternity, to save the earth, to receive heaven, to wait for the divine, to guide mortals, this fourfold care is the simple essence of dwelling. Thus, genuine constructions imprint their stamp on the essence of dwelling and provide a home to this essence.”¹⁹⁶

Heidegger’s interest is to show that quaternity gives us something to think about (*denken*) about where we are going to dwell, moreover, within this approach there is no separation and duality between nature (world) and man¹⁹⁷. Just as the existentials were components of the

¹⁹¹ Hidalgo, 2013, p. 61.

¹⁹² Miranda, 2022, p. 110.

¹⁹³ Heidegger, 2015, p. 21. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

¹⁹⁴ In German, the same bilingual edition of 2015, says: “*Der Grundzug des Wohnens ist dieses Schonen*”.

¹⁹⁵ Rodríguez, 2015, p. 159-160.

¹⁹⁶ Heidegger, 2015, p. 43. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

¹⁹⁷ Vallejo, 2012, p. 55.

totality of “*Dasein*”, and within which “care” unified and revealed them temporarily, the *Geviert* is not that it is the essence or fundament of dwelling, but that they are its components from the relationship of “care”¹⁹⁸, it is thus that we could refer to the *Geviert* as formed by “equiprimordial” concepts. By dwelling the world, mortals take care of the *Geviert*, or, in other words, caring is a dynamic way, an active form of “*Dasein*”,¹⁹⁹ and in the exercise there will be a mutual care between the world and mortals, since the earth, the sky and the divine also participate actively once the wheel of dwelling begins to turn²⁰⁰. Dwelling implies a work, a desire to live, because when Heidegger refers to mortals, it is with respect to humans: “The way you are and I am, the way we humans are on earth is the *buan*, the dwelling. To be a human being means: to be on earth as a mortal, that is, to dwell. The old word *bauen* tells us that man is in so far as he dwells.”²⁰¹.

At this moment we see a new word entering our research, for in the above quote the word “*buan*” appears. This word has an etymology that directs Heidegger’s explanation of the depth of the verb to dwell, but at the same time hides an etymological relationship based on the conjugation of the verb “to be” in German. The word “*buan*” is no longer in use, etymologically it comes from Old High German, which in addition to meaning “to build” meant “to dwell”.²⁰² But why does Heidegger use this word to explain the depth of what it is to “dwell”? Because in today’s German the word for “build” is “*bauen*”, and its origin goes back to the word “*buan*”, which as we said, in addition to meaning “to dwell” also meant “to build”, but it not only meant to dwell, but it also made you think about where you were going to stay²⁰³. From this important relationship we see that their meanings intersect, since the modern word “*bauen*” (to build) originally also meant “to dwell”, as Heidegger states: “To build originally means to dwell. Where the word build still speaks in its original sense, it also tells how far the fundament of dwelling goes.”²⁰⁴ In other words, with the passage of time the meaning of dwelling of “*bauen*” was blurred in everyday language, and it was only as

¹⁹⁸ Paniagua & Roldán, 2015, p. 446.

¹⁹⁹ Acevedo, 2017, p. 192.

²⁰⁰ Pedragosa, 2011, p. 363.

²⁰¹ Heidegger, 2015, p. 15 and p. 17. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

²⁰² Acevedo, 2017, p. 191.

²⁰³ Saldanha & Klautau, 2016, 149.

²⁰⁴ Heidegger, 2015, p. 15. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

“build”, and along with it, it did not remain with the sense of thinking (*denken*) about how we are going to remain in the world.

Now, we must also consider the relationship of the verb “*buan*” and the verb “to be” in German, the word “*sein*”, since it would also have another relationship of importance with respect to “dwelling”. The conjugation in the first-person singular of the verb “*sein*” plus the pronoun is “*ich bin*” (I am), or the conjugation of the second person singular plus the pronoun is “*du bist*” (you are), with this Heidegger confirms that the “*sein*” is now “*bin*” or “*bist*”. From this perspective, he links the “*bin*” or “*bist*” (or also the imperative form “*bis*”) with “dwell”, since he argues that these conjugations of the verb “*sein*” come from the same root as “*bauen*”, therefore, both meanings would be compatible with his conclusions. In fact, Heidegger states that when we say “*ich bin*” (I am) we mean “*ich baue*” (I build), so there is a homologous sense between “I am”, “I dwell”, and “I build”. It can be concluded that we are in the world dwelling, in each extension of our being, in the most daily of our lives, since “being” and “dwelling” are identical²⁰⁵. Heidegger says: “What then does *ich bin* [I am] mean? The old word *bauen*, to which the *bin* belongs, answers: ‘*ich bin*’, ‘*du bist*’ means ‘I dwell’, ‘you dwell’”.²⁰⁶ Since Heidegger’s explanation, we have pointed out two characteristics of the verb “*bauen*”, but for us it is necessary to develop one more.

Once we have analyzed the verb to build as “*bauen*” and its relation to the verb “to dwell,” we will turn our attention to the verb to dwell itself, since Heidegger again resorts to the etymology of its original in German to give his explanation:

“But what is the essence of dwelling? Let us listen once more to what the language tells us: the old Saxon word ‘*wunon*’ and the Gothic ‘*wunian*’ mean — like the old *bauen* — to remain, to linger. But the Gothic word ‘*wunian*’ says more clearly how this remaining is experienced. *Wunian* means: to be satisfied and at peace; to be brought to peace, to remain in it. The word “peace” [*Friede*] indicates the free [*das*

²⁰⁵ Mansur, 2017, p. 10.

²⁰⁶ Heidegger, 2015, p. 15. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

Freie], *das Frye*; and *fry* means preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, that is, guarded. To free means to preserve properly.”²⁰⁷

This etymology of “*wohnen*” tells us that while the Gothic meant “to stay”, it also at the same time meant “to be at peace”, a peace that was related to liberating, which in turn meant “to preserve”, so that “to dwell” originally meant a kind of care²⁰⁸. And this type of care has to do with taking care of the *Geviert*, which is where things are presented, therefore, by taking care of the *Geviert*, you also allow yourself to be taken care of by things²⁰⁹, caring in this sense is therefore building and dwelling²¹⁰. To live would be to take time for things, and architecture must be seen as something that is within the *Geviert*, since building integrates the *Geviert*. Architecture as a built thing, therefore, must preserve the *Geviert*, since this in turn is the fundamental characteristic of “dwelling”.²¹¹ Things, or “thing-architecture” embodies our *Stimmung-Befindlichkeit*²¹², generating a “genuine dwelling” from our care to the *Geviert*²¹³. This is an affective way of interpreting the verb to dwelling in Heidegger, it is novel and different from the traditional ones with respect to “poetically dwelling the world” or analyzing the work with respect to the problem of “technique and modernity”, as well as to contemporary criticisms, as is the case of Levinas²¹⁴.

²⁰⁷ Heidegger, 2015, p. 19. (Our translation, from the German and Spanish versions to English).

²⁰⁸ Singh, 1997, p. 254.

²⁰⁹ Pedragosa, 2011, p. 375.

²¹⁰ Mansur, 2017, p. 11.

²¹¹ da Silva, 2023, p. 477.

²¹² Norberg-Schultz, 2008, p. 103.

²¹³ Vallejo, 2012, p. 58.

²¹⁴ Sabrovsky, 2006, p. 75.

Final considerations

The content of this proposal sought to make affectivity a way of understanding the world, and today this has gained importance in circles specialized in Philosophy (or Theory) of Architecture. For just as when we speak of *Stimmung* in Husserl, *atemperamiento* in Zubiri, or *Stimmung-Befindlichkeit* in Heidegger, what these words want to communicate has been disseminated using a word that has remarkable similarities with what we have explained. I am referring to the study of “atmospheres”. When we talk about “atmosphere” we refer to a concept that has a well-defined history in Western culture and that has been developed multidisciplinary in different areas of knowledge since the seventeenth century²¹⁵. This concept was used in certain human constructions such as the arts or sciences, and also has historical precedents in the study of the built space of architecture, even to the present day. This analysis that is currently being developed is based on written sources such as books, magazines, articles, among others; mostly related to the world of Philosophy, but also with attention to Philology, Aesthetics, History of Art.

By taking this historical journey to understand the affective dimension found in the built space, it is understood that currently atmospheres are considered a fundamental characteristic to describe the sensibility found in architecture. In this way, there will be an enrichment to the technical perspective of the scientific advances of construction, being a complement²¹⁶. Therefore, our thesis of sentimental and tempered dwelling is a contribution to these studies that are related to Philosophy with Architecture. We can find formal precedents of this phenomenon in Architecture only in the nineteenth century, as in the case of Heinrich Wölfflin, who in his work “Prolegomena for a Psychology of Architecture” [1886] explicitly mentions that there is an affective factor in architecture and this is developed in the atmospheres:

“The subject of these observations is the question that has always seemed extremely strange to me. How is it possible that architectural forms can be the expression of a

²¹⁵ Thonhauser, 2021, p. 1250.

²¹⁶ Havik, 2019, p. 3.

state of mind, of an atmosphere? [...] We describe the effect we received, as an impression. And to have that impression on us as an expression of the object. Then we can solve the problem. Also say it this way: How can architectural forms be expressed?²¹⁷

Atmospheres lead us to experience affections that judge architectural forms by their physical and immaterial appearance, so consequently we can affirm that each architectural work that exists will also have an atmosphere that reviews it, because, just like a person, each architectural work has its own personality or physical manifestation of mental processes. In short, architecture would be defined by our experience, and from the atmospheres we would make its assessment through the conditions offered by architecture to grant well-being or discomfort²¹⁸. The atmosphere would be a specific notion that considers the affective as linked to the requirements of the human body. It is a word that encompasses all the characteristics of our “sentimental and tempered dwelling”.

As we mentioned, this is a formal precedent in architecture, but, as it is in the nineteenth century, it is possible to go back to the fourteenth century, and also find precedents of architectural works in the Italian Renaissance onwards²¹⁹, or even go further back in time and find these precedents in the work of Vitruvius who lived in the 1st century BC. Since there are certain architectural cases that confirm the appearance of atmospheres as a constructive resource, could be from the fourteenth century through the Renaissance, Humanism, Baroque, and Neoclassical, until reaching Modern Architecture, or in the case since there is a record of some architectural treatise as in the case of Vitruvius. Other things is that, the researchers emphasize the period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since that is where an autonomy of atmospheres as part of the architectural discipline will be more evidently configured. And no longer with precedents, but with registers, it is possible to indicate the first formal encounters of atmospheres as a constructive resource. In that case, these records are generated from the second half of the twentieth century to the present day; as is the case of two contemporary architects who developed their written and architectural

²¹⁷ Wölfflin, 2017, pp. 59-60. (Our translation, from the German versions to English).

²¹⁸ Duff, 2010, p. 891.

²¹⁹ Hulmi, 2022, p. 4.

work during this period and who made the atmosphere a formal resource to make architecture. They are the German architect Wolfgang Meisenheimer [1933-] and the Swiss architect Peter Zumthor [1943-].

In fact, and just as Wölfflin made his proposals to analyze the structure of atmospheres in their relationship with the forms of architecture, Meisenheimer would come to question this same problem again:

“If behind architecture we conceive it as a space for life and development of the self, —as it may be from subjective parameters—, the question of the affected self cannot be dispensed with, that makes an “impression” on us, as Wölfflin says”.²²⁰

In our time the concept of atmosphere is gaining more and more popularity within the architectural literature, and this has been in part thanks to the famous Swiss architect Peter Zumthor, who offers a description of the experience of being affected by the built space, and that is precisely where the atmosphere would develop. From a pragmatic point of view, one does not need to be a philosopher or an architect to know what an atmosphere is, as Zumthor himself says: “We all know what an atmosphere is. As in our impression of knowing a person.”²²¹ Under this premise, atmospheres exceed the territory of architecture and intersect with a multiplicity of human phenomena. This is one of our motivations for future research, to philosophically analyze all the possibilities that atmospheres offer, so that the rigor of this analysis serves as an input for the territory of the Theory of Architecture, and to be able to investigate if indeed atmospheres gain an autonomy and identity that can be objectified at the time of making architecture at a given moment in the History of Architecture. A research proposal that extends to our thesis of “sentimental and tempered dwelling” is precisely to emphasize that the consolidation of the construction of atmospheres in architecture obtains autonomy, identity and independence as objectifiable study material from the twentieth century to the present, that is, there is a philosophical opening for the world of built space that is architecture.

²²⁰ Meisenheimer, 2004, p. 10.

²²¹ Zumthor, 2006, p. 11.

For these purposes, we will say that the space built as the basis of human life and relationships is not neutral, since it contains a number of ways in which human experience reacts. The result of the experience of architecture manifests itself as an affective phenomenon, because in the final analysis, architecture would be the life of a place²²². One way to explain and perhaps solve this problem is through the use of “atmospheres”, which are a spatial phenomenon, and are mainly constituted by two aspects: the first and from the architectural perspective, is that they are constituted by the materiality of the built space, and the second, from the philosophical perspective, is that they are constituted by our affective life, which is a bodily reality. Atmospheres are then born as a spatial phenomenon that mediates between these two factors²²³.

However, how do we describe this intermediate spatial phenomenon? Making use of the philosophy of Husserl, Zubiri and Heidegger we can say that it is an affective, noological and metaphysical phenomenon. Atmospheres do not have precise physical limits, since they are manifesting dynamically in those who experience them, they occur in a relational context that depends on changing factors²²⁴. For example, a restaurant will not offer the same atmosphere if the food, drink, or company changed to what it was the day before, that atmosphere cannot be easily reproduced. Again, when we talk about atmospheres, we are talking about the phenomena that occur in our encounter with things, or how things are actually shown to us. That is why there is a need to determine what is happening in this complex experience, because our interest will be to affirm that “the atmosphere can be treated as an independent entity”.²²⁵ But, even more, we affirm that the atmosphere can be an independent and objectifiable entity in the field of architecture that has already manifested itself in a certain period of the History of Architecture. Faced with this, the following problem arises: if each built space has an atmosphere, at what point does it begin to build explicitly with the intention of creating an atmosphere? And what conditions must be met for that to happen.

²²² Schönhammer, 2018, p. 141.

²²³ Böhme, 2013, p. 28.

²²⁴ Rauh, 2018, p. 12.

²²⁵ Stec, 2020, p. 107.

To do this, it is necessary to investigate the History of Architecture to get clues about how atmospheres generate this independence in the field of architecture. To do this, it will be necessary to answer what are the factors that generate the atmospheres at certain times, but also to look for the effects that the atmospheres generate in us, since both the factors of generation and the effects of the atmospheres would be an “extension of human identity to our environment”.²²⁶ Along with this problem, we will be able to theorize about where we can find the atmospheres within the built space. Is it in the materials that make up the structure? Or is it that perhaps the atmospheres are in the form given to building materials. Perhaps the answer can be found in colors, or perhaps also in light, materials, etc²²⁷. In short, the central question of the extension of our research to the world of Philosophy of Architecture is how are atmospheres constructed in Architecture? This will have to be investigated when analyzing the different historical periods, since perhaps there are factors that are immutable in time and that make it possible to build architectural atmospheres from an objective, that is, universal perspective. In this way, we will be able to conclude that the construction of atmospheres will be a reference for architecture, from the twentieth century to the present day, through the analysis of the evolution of this idea, and consequently we will be able to answer whether the built space can be analyzed by our affectivity²²⁸.

This projection of our research is important to make visible in a clear and distinct way this theory, which refers to how architecture influences the affective experience of users of the built space. To contextualize their importance, we will say that there are precedents in the recent history of Architecture, which were unable to generate forms to express advances to traditional models. However, this has not solved the need for people to achieve affective well-being within architectural atmospheres²²⁹. It is therefore important to contribute to the contemporary debate by developing this hypothesis. Because the study of a systematization of affectivity in the Philosophy of Architecture is fundamental, and the main one is because it is part of changes in the ways of analyzing architecture, architectural atmospheres are

²²⁶ Bloomer, Moore, Yudell, 1977, p. 131.

²²⁷ Böhme, 2017, p. 75.

²²⁸ Canepa, 2023, p. 43.

²²⁹ Pérez-Gómez, 2016, p. 9.

something new in their relationship with philosophy. Another focus of interest is because it analyzes and makes known theorists who develop these ideas, since they should be more disseminated, since these theoretical constructs contribute to the general well-being of people, since ultimately architecture impacts the affectivity of a person who is experiencing a built area. This systematization serves so that those who are interested in architecture can think about built spaces not only in their practical uses but also in terms of the enrichment that architecture produces in the lives of the people who dwell those spaces also in terms of nature²³⁰. It is also appropriate to make a possible projection of this philosophical research, because the theme within which it unfolds is inserted within the discourse of the new architectural language of the twenty-first century, such as the concept of ecology²³¹. And also because most of the authors who study this subject are in their full professional maturity. His ideas are currently diversifying. Another factor to consider would be to analyze the written work and architectural work of authors who are still alive, and to a certain extent have not retired from public life, and who work philosophically and architecturally on the subject of atmospheres, as is the case of Peter Zumthor and Wolfgang Meisenheimer.

²³⁰ Chandler, 2011, p. 555.

²³¹ Güleç, 2024, p.14.

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