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FROM TROY TO AŠŠUR: CAVALRY AND WAR (14TH TO 8TH CENTURIES BC)

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In memoriam of

Professor Doctor António Ramos dos Santos

(1956-2020)

"O império assente sobre a administração e o exército
é uma grande novidade no quadro político do
Próximo-Oriente antigo, […]".

SANTOS, António Ramos dos, "O sistema de
Administração do Império Aqueménida", *Cadmo*,
15, 2005, pp. 41.

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I leave here my imprint of regret dedicated to my Professor António Ramos dos Santos with a quote from one of the most beautiful and important poetic-literary texts in the Ancient Near East and Human History, the Epic of Gilgameš:

> "[*ar-ši? ib-ra-am? ma*]-˹*li*˺-*kam*!˹*a*˺-[*n*]*a-k*[*u*] [*ša a-ta-ma-ru-šu*? *i-n*] *a šu-*˹*na-tim*˺/ I [have acquired a friend, a] counsellor, [the one that I kept seeing in] dreams"[1]

[1] OBIII, col.i, 24-25.

And finally, I want to show gratefulness to my advisors Professor Doctor José Varandas and Professor Doctor Nuno Simões Rodrigues for accepting to guide me on this long journey. Despite of everything, they did not let this project fall into oblivion.

Resumo

A problemática histórica do conflito micénico-troiano que ecoa na eternidade do imaginário da história da Homem, tem em si, milénios de abordagens, teorias e conjeturas. Interligando-se com circunstâncias históricas um tanto belicosas como as Incursões dos "Povos do Mar" que tiveram o seu aterrador percurso de Micenas ao Delta, as Invasões Dóricas, a Desagregação do Império Hitita, ou até, a criação e expansão do Império Assírio.

Neste sentido, todos estes contextos e momentos históricos poderão ter tido uma importância singular naquilo que foi a criação do primeiro corpo de cavalaria do Mundo Antigo. Tendo a Assíria ficado de fora das consequências das devastações provocadas pelas Incursões dos "Povos do Mar", a presente Dissertação apresenta assim o *casus belli*. Todavia, a temática não se esgota nem na Assíria nem nas circunstâncias históricas de cada acontecimento, o processo é transversal e aprofundado.

Tiglath-pileser I foi o precursor desta criação que toldou o Próximo Oriente Antigo, principalmente na guerra, e, que rapidamente se difundiu por todo o mundo conhecido, pois a domesticação e o uso do cavalo já uma realidade antiga. Como o tratado de equitação de Kikkuli o demonstra, como era treinado um cavalo para a guerra e como que terá sido usado com os carros de guerra. Porém, o binómio tirou partido dessas técnicas, adaptando-as.

A cavalaria teve uma evolução que atingiu o seu auge no século VIII a.C. no reinado de Sennacherib. Deste modo, a cavalaria teve um processo complexo e moroso para se tornar autónoma passando por várias reformas – que atravessaram alguns dos mais importantes reinados na formação do Império Assírio – tronando-se as "asas" do exército. Por isso, foi necessário enfatizar cada uma das reformas e políticas militares no seio do processo de expansão, a vários níveis como por exemplo na hierarquia, autonomia, *modus operandi*, equipamento, representação e inovação. Concluído que a importância da cavalaria assíria não se esgota no mundo e na história da Assíria, mas sim, permanecendo na tradição militar de cavalaria que atravessou milénios até aos nossos dias. A sua dimensão simbólica e relevância é fortificada em cada conflito, batalha, guerra e avanço bélico. O leão assírio tem asas (*aladlammû*).

Abstract

The historical problematic of the Mycenaean-Trojan conflict that echoes in the eternity of the imaginary of the history of Men, has, millennia of approaches, theories, and conjectures. Intertwining with somewhat bellicose historical circumstances such as the Incursions of the "Sea Peoples" that had their terrifying journey from Mycenae to the Delta, the Doric Invasions, the Disintegration of the Hittite Empire, or even the creation and expansion of the Assyrian Empire.

In this sense, all these contexts and historical moments may have had a unique importance in what was the creation of the first corps of cavalry in the Ancient World. As Assyria was left out of the consequences of the devastation caused by the Incursions of the "Sea Peoples", the present Dissertation thus presents the *casus belli*. However, the theme is not exhausted either in Assyria or in the historical circumstances of each event, the process is transversal and in-depth.

Tiglath-pileser I was the forerunner of this creation that overshadowed the Ancient Near East, especially in war, and which quickly spread throughout the known world, as the domestication and use of the horse was already an ancient reality. As Kikkuli's Riding Treatise demonstrates, how a horse was trained for war and how it must have been used with war chariots. However, the binomial took advantage of these techniques, adapting them.

The Cavalry had an evolution that reached its peak in the 8th BC in the reign of Sennacherib. Thus, the cavalry had a complex and time-consuming process to become autonomous, going through several reforms – which crossed some of the most important reigns in the formation of the Assyrian Empire – becoming the "wings" of the army. Therefore, it was necessary to emphasize each of the reforms and military policies within the expansion process, at various levels such as hierarchy, autonomy, *modus operandi*, equipment, representation, and innovation.

To finalize that the importance of Assyrian cavalry is not exhausted in the world and in the history of Assyria, but rather, remaining in the military tradition of cavalry that has crossed millennia until the present day. Its symbolic dimension and relevance are strengthened in every conflict, battle, war, and warlike advance. The Assyrian – *aladlammû* – lion has wings.

Palavras-chaves

Tróia – Assíria – Cavalaria – Cavalos – Guerra

Key Words

Troy – Assyria – Cavalry – Horses – War

INTRODUCTION

The current Dissertation in Military History has the intent to achieve a specialized graduation in Ancient Near Eastern History, from the Late Bronze Age to Early Iron Age from the 14th century to the 8th century BC. The study aims to reflect geohistorical location from the warlike context of Troy to recent rising Ancient Near Eastern superpower of Aššur, focusing on the creation of first cavalry corps and its development in an Ancient World Warfare.

The paradoxical historical-philosophical comprehension of this theme contrasts with the linguistic-rhetorical narratives and various typologies of sources about the *limes* of the Ancient Near Eastern and Warfare.

So, the "Great Power Club" as it was called, of which the Assyrian king made part, as well as all the kings from Ḫattuša and the Mycenaean kingdom, and from Aššur to Egypt. The diplomatic importance of this recognition never seen before ended with the Hittite expansionist ambitions, which rivalled with Assyrian militarization policy. The creation of cavalry corps made possible to balance the Assyrian odds after the devastation of all the Oriental Mediterranean coastline and the fall of the Hittite Empire. The "Sea Peoples" had the main role in this fall of the Mediterranean economy, that is certain.

Then, the Homeric period occurred approximately between the 9th to the 8th century, provoking a problematic paradigm about Homer and the content of the Homeric Texts differs from them chronologically. The Mycenaeans and Asian Minor people had to be part of the incursion in the Oriental Mediterranean coastline, including the battle of Delta in Egypt.

But the creation of the cavalry corps in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I's (ca.1115/4-1076 BC) and its development till the reign of Sennacherib (ca.704–681 BC) had been complex and meticulous search who needs deep historical, religious, anthropological, philosophical, and linguistic analysis. These Dissertation had not only to analyse but trying to respond to some questions about the development of the cavalry till achieved his autonomy. Had the medicinal and religious context in war to horses and cavalrymen a special attention? When the *status militaris* appear in Assyria? Had the Assyrian military rituals and sacrifices? How did they acquire the horses to the cavalry corps? How did they train the horses? Who was Kikkuli?

To respond to these questions and others that certainly will come up during this investigation, the transversality of readings is the most important factor for the better understanding of any the proposed topics. The hermeneutical and heuristic analysis fortified this historical study. Yet, the most circumstantial and complexes contexts – like the Hittite international commercial blocked – was a decisive and huge factor for the fall of the Hittite empire and the raids of the so called "Sea Peoples" in the Levant.

Many battles and warlike realities during the Late Bronze Age we probably never get to fully know and comprehend, like the fall of city of Ugarit. A Bronze Age city like Ugarit it's the best example of an historical and archaeological complex analysis as its insufficient results to deeply know what happen. Even with all the factors about the warlike circumstances the historical comprehension may had to look to tiny details, the improvable ones, or trying to see with the knowledge at the time. Therefore, a question remains: What was happening in Assyria when the "Sea Peoples" raid in the Levant? Who was commanding it? How was their *modus operandi*? Did they attack by land or by sea? Was the horse an important piece in the Bronze Age warlike theatre?

Many questions, new questions, and the horse could be a key to a better understanding of these troubling circumstances and warlike theatre of the Late Bronze Age and Initial Iron Age. The Assyrians and their empire pillars reshaped the Ancient Near Eastern cities and kingdoms as well as with creation of the first cavalry corps. Since then, the historians and archaeologist assume that cavalry appeared only in the Iron Age, but new questions required new proofs and theories; so, the present Dissertation tries to give a new and better understanding about the Ancient Near Eastern Warfare.

Although, the horse is the central part of this Dissertation and all that concerns and evolves the horse and the relation with Men, primarily the warlike matters. Finally, is the Assyrian war and their particular historical circumstance of the Late Bronze Age that gave the to the binomial their special characteristics. The certainly without the Incursions of the "Sea Peoples" or the Fall of the Hittite Empire, or even the singular Assyrian military *modus operandi* wouldn't be possible or probably to reform the army through the centuries and create the first cavalry corps.

The achievements of these Assyrian actions were absent within the today's Military discussion, the historians and archaeologist in general don't pay attention to the Ancient Near Eastern Warfare or Culture, but *ex oriente lux*. The Assyrians represent the militarization of an entire civilization, maybe the first mass militarized civilization with a professional army and a legal *status militaris* of the Ancient World.

Talking about Assyria is talking about war. The most brutal and terrifying way of making war. The biblical texts referred how afraid and respect the Assyrian army were. Mostly the Assyrian references are about war and conquer, the Assyrians valued the warlike deeds because were a way to venerate the god Aššur too. But these complex and tiny line between Religion and History it found the Assyriological studies in abundance because the tendency is to generalize by seeing everything as religion.

So, the horse could had been the crucial point or the tiny line that reunite all these major points creating an image about war, innovation, speed, and terror. The Assyrians look carefully for the horse, as a valuable object a profitable one and the major weapon of war. In this sense the horse represents a great deal to ancient Assyrians and for the Near Eastern culture in general.

State of Art

The present Dissertation has its main objective to substantiate a fact that who was almost completely absent of the academic discussion, primarily between the Military historians. The complexity of this theme report for a transversal academic formation, as far as I can tell, and my Dissertation could necessarily demonstrate. The journey from the warlike circumstance of the Trojan War to the emerging militarized kingdom of Aššur, had as his primarily objective to divide the Dissertation into two big moments.

First the warlike, economic, literarily, philosophical, archaeological, religious, anthropological and ethological context of the Late Bronze Age, after the creation of cavalry corps. Second the warlike, economic, literarily, philosophical, archaeological, religious, anthropological, medicinal, hippological, psychologically, juridically, and ethnological context of Assyria into the Early Iron Age. During and before the creation of the cavalry corps. The various dimensions apply in this Dissertation were extremely necessary, and the academic development of each one is also imperious.

The dimensions of the historical knowledge about what it means to investigate horses, war, cavalry, the Trojan War, the "Sea Peoples" incursions, the devastation of the Oriental Mediterranean coastline, etc, and his historical impact is absolutely a challenge. This last three years working on these Dissertation permitted to refine my analytical thinking to read beyond the countless pages of books and articles, to cross different sources of information and even to specialized in some topics.

The capacity of understanding that the act to write History is one of the most complexes work, because the historian had to look beyond and at same time closer to project in hands but not to fantasize the matter. The historian must carefully choose his words because it can change the *facts* – the ones that he produces and the truth in it – the perspectives, the reality already known and the reality unknown. The implied meaning it might never disappear but to echo for eternity through mistakes, imperfections, misunderstandings, and lack of reading and thinking of the historian.

Nevertheless, the archaeological analysis it's essential for the work and more prefund perspective of the historian analysis. To say that the historian that studies the

Antiquity must be an archaeologist, and know about archaeology, anthropology, linguistics, ethnology, philosophy, religion, and Military History.

The historian must be mentally open to really comprehend the picture of History and their transversal dimensions. Many times, the historian must think like he was dead, and sense the voids and the noises of the minds of the ones who are historically alive and the silence of the ones who were there.

So, the perspectives, the hypothesis, the theories, the sources, the detailed scientific DNA articles, anthropological, veterinary, and literary analysis all deserved a closer look from the historian. But the people that who the historian must be more attentive are the other historians, not only to learn from them but also to critically seek to listen to what is beyond their work; yes, to analyse the work of other historians. However, to me mentally the historian is philosophically a cynic, a stoic and an epicurean altogether. The historian must be in constantly look to himself criticizing and analysing his decisions.

Studying History is to study beyond memory and tradition it's an investigation; although, an investigation without trail or guilt a pure search for the truth because it is in the historian's job to discover what happened and why what happened. History it isn't an *apokalyptô*. Yet, History is more than the experience of the historian is the constant seeking for the understanding of the multi realities of Men. Still, the truth is an objective that the historian will never really know but he gets the chance to simply understand the realities, and not only the realty. History is a plurilingualism of the others, primary from the wisdom of the dead and secondly from the ignorance of the living.

Consequently, the premisses that I used, and the historic-philosophical thinking impregnated in this Dissertation I had a need to explain my little hard and particularly complex perspective about History. The initial core idea for the structurization for this theme was to recover the basic Indo-European mental structure dividing it in three parts, the number three is the essence of the structure too of this Dissertation. The three chapters composed the three stages of progression in historical argumentation. The basic perspective of the general and more contextualized view of the theme in a particular chronological timeline, in this case the Late Bronze Age, referring it to the first chapter.

The first chapter allowed to profoundly analyse the contextualization of the warlike problematic of the Trojan War and the intrinsic relation with the "Sea Peoples" incursion. The literary sources like the Homeric Texts were fundamental for this study. But writing this Dissertation without knowing the Mycenae history or the *Aḫḫiyawa* Texts, the Hittite Texts, the Egyptian Inscriptions and Texts, and the many historic and archaeological studies, etc., it would have been unrealistic written about it.

In this sense, to clarify that a source in History could be understand as a glimpse from the past, this means any text – in my perspective a source is a written document in all supports: in stone, wood, papyrus, clay, iron, bronze, etc – and any archaeological artifact and iconography from the period that the historian pretends to study. Without exception the contact with the past its imperious, is precisely what makes a source a source; although, the historian had to have the instruments to interpreter his object. As Lucien Febvre once affirmed: "[…] É que pôr um problema é precisamente o começar e o fim de toda a história"[2]. So, becomes licit to comprehend that the historian is a researcher and not a mere writer.

It's important to refer that any monography, essay or article that have a translation from a written document/text and an intrinsic study add to it, it's a source. Principally if the study object focus is a relief, a document/text or an archaeological artifact; then, in my perspective, any analytic and thorough study about a source published in a monography, essay or article, the historian must take into account as a source. However, some monographies could have a fundamental pertinence to study at hand and for that reason the historian may considered it as a source, for example: a work of Friedrich Nietzsche. For me some philosophical works are crucial to amplify the understanding of some themes and to explore the deep meaning about certain characteristics, senses, that could lead to an entire new perspective, and in some matters is unavoidable to read them.

So, the product of the historian research its divulgated in the two major forms: the monography and the article. The monography had the objective to compelling unique and several perspectives, essays, studies, or lectures made by the historian in a narrative, normally available to the public or restrict/targeted one like the academic

[2] "It's just that posing a problem is precisely the beginning and the end of the whole History" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see FEBVRE 1985: 31).

public. The monography could simply result from the experience of historian in trying to divulgate his little studies, thoughts, or/and the class lectures. The article it's an academic way to divulgate a more detailed study written for a public that search for a higher level of discussion, where the object its scrutinized to a higher level, and it isn't written in a narrative way.

For example, a difference between a monography and a source it's like the John Chadwick's and Michael Ventris *Documents of Mycenaean Greek* and a simple monography like John Chadwick's *The Mycenaean World*. Although, the same situation repeats itself about *The Correspondence of Sargon II, Part I: Letters from Assyria and the West* published by the States Archives of Assyria – it's a source in Assyriology – and a simple monography like Josette Elayi's book *Sargon II, King of Assyria*, and so on. The public focus is different for the same theme, but reading a direct translation from a source isn't the same as reading a narrative about it, one thing its reading about history other completely different is making history.

Consequently, making history represents the use of a method i.e. the Heuristic and the Hermeneutic. Isn't understandable that the develop thinking about the method use in history its more worked by philosophers than by historians, so, it's clear to me that reading about philosophy is imperative. As Rosaria Vignolo Munson emphasized: "The *histōr* is an expert *hermēneus* "interpreter" in the linguistic, as in the religious, area. […]"[3].

The *Hermeneutic* work of Hans-Greorg Gadamer it's a fundamental source to the historian development thinking about History and isn't appear in the university subjects. But the philosophical works are neglected in the Portuguese university student's formation, primordial in the History graduation. I could mention a several knowledge areas that disappear from the History programs of graduation. This is a reality, and it's a big failure and a disappointment from the Portuguese Universities.

Hans-Greorg Gadamer defends that: "[…] Para proceder a uma hermenêutica histórica é necessário, por consequência, começar por suspender a opinião abstracta

[3] MUNSON 2005: 40.

entre tradição e investigação histórica, entre história e saber"[4]. Therefore, the Hans-Greorg Gadamer hermeneutical study could also be complemented with the premise emphasized by Paul Ricouer: "[…] The first declaration of hermeneutics is to say that the problematic of objectivity presupposes a prior relation of inclusion which encompasses the allegedly autonomous subject and the allegedly adverse object. This inclusive or encompassing relation is what I call belonging […]"[5].

Thus, to complete the initial idea about the Hermeneutical method it's just one part of the historiographical method, the second part is the Heuristic. Etymologically the word *Heuristic* comes et from Greek word "*eureka*", used by Archimedes when he was taking a bath and then realises a trivial truth that is "the heavier the mass, the less water overflows" as it was written by Vitruvius.

Yet, Archimedes invented the *Method* which appeared integrated in his major work *Palimpsest*. The Archimede's Method it's precisely connected to the idea of scientific, logical thinking, even with Physics and Mathematical thinking. In this way, going back to the main idea of Archimedes' science which can be expressed through Calculus, that is, the mathematics of infinity, that is, the application of Mathematics to Physics.

The main Heuristic idea is, as Reviel Netz and William Noel emphasized: "[…] A primeira demonstração da aplicação da matemática ao mundo físico é a descoberta, […]"[6]; which in my perspective this premise is correlated with the Plato's[7] *Theaetetus* philosophical expression of "astonishment"[8], where is begot Philosophy. Consequently, the use of Heuristic method brings the scientific methodological way of work to History making it the most scientific subject in the Faculties of Human Sciences.

[4] "To carry out historical hermeneutics, it is therefore necessary to begin by suspending abstract opinion between tradition and historical research, between history and knowledge" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see GADAMER 1998: 53).
[5] RICOUER 1981: 105.
[6] "[…] The first demonstration of the application of mathematics to the physical world is discovery […]" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see NETZ, NOEL (ed.) 2007: 155).
[7] "[Archimedes] […] however, as an example of how he calculated—again, a more down-to-Earth procedure than the Platonic model of mathematics would suggest" (see HODGKIN 2005: 62).
[8] Pl. *Tht.*155d.

Then, History through Heuristic and Hermeneutic methods have by affinity a proximity to the Philosophical thinking, as it possible to go back to ancient Greek Pythagorism movement, when the Pythagorean mathematical thinking was a philosophical/religious[9] cult in Ancient Greek. So, the integration of the scientific method of analyses (the Heuristic) mixed with a remarkable sense of interpretation (the Hermeneutic) make the historian a researcher, which Men is his study object.

As Arnold Toynbee once said in his chapter about the roman historian Diodorus of Agyrium on the book *Greek Historical Thought* could conclude that: "[…] History is also a mistress of eloquence, the gift of gifts"[10]. In my opinion, is a perspective that attracted History to Reason, making History become a source that sustain Reason. In this sense, History became an elevated knowledge and a distinct form of analysing because it's focused on Men's Space and Time connection. This means exactly that all about Men could be a historical study object, this means a deep analyses of everything that was created by him, for him, and which make him who He is.

This distinguishing form of looking into the problematic question: Who made Men who He is? The historian as thinker and researcher could searching during a lifetime to try find an answer, as well as to many other questions and less philosophical. But who, what and how it was made that period? That person? That thing? That object or even that word? All the questions have many answers in History as in life itself, its Men's actions that make possible to estimate, evaluate, analyse, and produce facts. The Men's actions are materialized in many forms, even in the most trivial things that the historian could collect information. The sources are many and various, and sometimes the research is in the archaeological site or in the translated error.

Thus, I aspire to be an Assyriologist, and the present Dissertation is in Military History which means that I use the historiographical method to analyse the Horse itself, as the relation with Men till development into the binomial, in any aspect. Specially, focused on the use of the binomial between Men and Horse into warfare in the Ancient Near Eastern and Aegen period, dated between 14th and the 8th BC. The sources from the Sumerian-Akkadian, Assyrian-Babylonic, Hittite, Egyptian and Mycenaean Texts were complemented by a consistent look to hermeneutically comprehend the period

[9] Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23.1398b; NYE (ed.), GREGORY 2002: 52; MOJSIK 2016: 275-293.
[10] TOYNBEE 1959: 49.

itself and the trace left in the documents as in the iconography connecting them with the archaeological artifacts.

The topics follow a path in one only direction towards a chronological timeline that permitted to introduce a new perspective with two *casus belli*; i.e. the first *casus belli* is the story of the Trojan War and the historical knowledge behind the story – the Minoan/Mycenaean period and the Incursion of the "Sea Peoples" – as a context. Accordingly, the major connection of the horse and the link between the Aegean and Ancient Near East during that period.

And the second *casus belli,* is the creation of the first cavalry corps. I tried in this Dissertation to analyse the context, facts, marks, traces and evidence from the 12th and 11th centuries BC which appointed to the reign of Assyrian monarch Tiglath-pileser I. Always focusing on the references about the horse, and everything that was for the horse, with horse, iconographically represent the horse, used for Men and the Horse, as well as it value.

The path was made towards the cavalry origin in the Tiglath-pileser I's reign to reach his peak in the reign of Sennacherib. These thematic and temporal markers permitted to complement the problematic of Assyrian cavalry with various subtopics, with the intent to solidify the transversal and depth of the cavalry theme during the Assyrian period. Although, the theorical image that became primordial to corroborate the scientific method was to first right the actual historical knowledge and perspective context about the early period, as the general questions to form the base for the thesis.

In a triangular form from the general (the context, new and old perspectives about the earlier period of the primordial study object) to the core, the vertex, the principal study focus object (which is the creation of the cavalry in the Tiglath-pileser I's reign). Like Newton's colours spectrum[11] the historical methodology permitted to look further to see the results, consequences, repercussions, and development that can change the actual or previous perspective about the study object at hand. So, the subtopic permitted to branch the study object seed that was sown into the fertilized soil that is the lack of knowledge and avid need to comprehend ourselves as Man.

[11] NEWTON 1846: 525.

Then, the dynamic structure impregnated in this Dissertation – if could have a form – had elliptical form. Hence, with a continuous and slow rhythm but embracing a transversal variety of subtopics that permitted to have global and, at sometimes, specific perspective about the topic in analysis. So, was imperious to respond to the chosen title of the topic and the chapter, and even to reanalysing some topics, criticizing them, and bring some new perspectives into the present discussion. This need brings a coherency to argumentation and redefines the multiple dimensions explored in each topic, which means that structural form applied permitted this level of profound and diverse analysis.

In this sense, what it is the main enemy of Historiography? The academic response is the anachronism. But many historians and archaeologists have this problem, so the selected bibliography used in this Dissertation was chosen with this main problematic idea always in mind. One proof doesn't mean much without context, problematic and circumstance i.e. Men's Space and Time; and all what involves the reality known and unknown. Yet, arguing that the creation of cavalry corps was constitute in the Tiglath-pileser I's reign was really a challenge. I had found zooarchaeological, textual, linguistic, archaeological, historically circumstantial, theoretically, and anthropological proofs that make a puzzle less puzzling.

So, what does proof means in History? It is a chance that a historian must be closer to the truth and better understand it. The imperious need to explain and had a practical case for an analysis like the horsemanship, or even the *modus operandi* of the Assyrian cavalry in the Late Middle Assyrian period and in the Imperial Assyrian period. The battling case and the role of the Assyrian cavalry in each period had different dynamics, as well as the large number of reforms. Each reign and Assyrian kings progressively give more and more importance to the cavalry corps since the Assyrian cavalry constituted an autonomous and overwhelming arm in battle.

Therefore, this need corresponds to read various books, articles, studies recent and old. The initial problematic of the context it's imperative to read Eric H. Cline, Trevor Bryce, Gary Beckmann that are crucial, which the perspectives crossed each other. The historian and archaeologist Eric H. Cline, the Hittitologists Gary Beckmann and Trevor Bryce crossed these realities and with theirs's profound linguistic knowledge culminated in *Aḫḫiyawa Texts*. This source its extremely important to

understand all the Late Bronze Age, in which permitted to confront narrative from the Egyptian Inscriptions, not only about the "Sea Peoples" incursions, but the academic narrative monopolization of the Egyptologists.

It's difficult to write honestly without profoundly know and read transversely the sources from the Early, Middle and Late Bronze Age, as the Bettany Hughes book about *Helen of Troy* brilliantly demonstrates. And it's crucial to emphasised that about the Trojan War the abundance of studies is mentally overwhelming, and the orientation in this matter is imperious. The idiosyncrasies about the Mycenaeans and the reality known about that period are completely disconnected from content of the Homeric literary texts and contexts. Again, it's important to analyse and carefully used the History of Literature and even the literary sources.

As it appeared in the studies of Denis L. Page, G. S. Kirk, M. I. Finley, J. L. Caskey, Jorrit M. Kelder, Albin Lesky and others about the Trojan War, the Homeric Texts and Mycenaean History, the theories and hypothesis complete itself by reading them all. However, one of the most impacting books that I read was the *From Mycenae to Homer: A Study in Early Greek Literature and Art* from T. B. L. Webster. The parallelisms made by T. B. L. Webster from the Mycenae material culture and *a posteriori* with the Homeric culture with the Near Eastern culture opened my mind to another level of knowledge.

In fact, I had to highlight the contribution of the French scholars to these profound and diverse perspective about the Mycenaean and Homeric themes like Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Pierre Lévêque, Jean-Pierre Vernant, André Varagnac and others cited. Even though, all the works from John Chadwick, Mary R. Bachvarova, and Billie Jean Collins were tremendous important for this study.

Thus, the American and British scholars had an enormous publication about this subject which facilitates the search and the abundance of high-level discussions. John Chadwick books and articles are imperious in this matter, primary his two books *The Mycenaean World* and the *The Decipherment of Linear B*, as well as the studies with the Michael Ventris. The decipherment and documents from the Linear B by Michael Ventris were the piece that permitted a reinterpretation of the Mycenaean World and the warlike and commercial reality.

Then, the reading of old publications helped to a better understanding of the complex work in progress and the reality picked up of some old ideas and putting them in analysis, reanalysing it. To have a complete and better picture with new studies and perspectives. The chronological timeline used for this Dissertation could reached some publication from the late 19th century till today. Although, I only used them because they were – in my perspective – pertinent for the present analysis and theme in discussion. Some old ideas still are valid, and the new studies had already confirmed some of them, as I tried to put some emphasis in it.

The Assyrians – as these Dissertation tried to carefully expose – create the first cavalry corps which redefine the Warfare in the end Late Bronze Age period to initial of the Iron Age period. And was a military upgrade that spread very fast through the Assyrian neighborship. Most of the times for many Military Historians it's a problem to understand who made who? And who influenced who? It is the main reason about the pertinence of this Dissertation in Military History. Even the military equipment used by the first cavalry corps and its evolution need a cautiously attention, for example the stirrup, the helmets, the armoured, or even the cavalry boots. All that composed the military binomial of the cavalry, and the cavalrymen was watchfully considered.

Consequently, in this Dissertation I used a social-economical perspective that permeates, facilitate and unlock a better comprehension of Military History. Because my path in Assyriology was guide initially – in my graduation and the first steps of this project – with the Professor Doctor António Ramos dos Santos. The Professor António Ramos dos Santos was my former advisor that had a very diverse and deep understanding about the effects of Ancient Near Eastern Warfare in the social-economical life.

Yet, I tried in this Dissertation to comprehend the social-economic impacts of the "international" and internal economy of the kingdoms, cities and thalassocratic political systems in the Ancient Near East and Aegean, focused on the Horse as product and a weapon. It's for me unrealistic to write about Military History without knowing and explain the *cost of war*.

Therefore, the readings about the cavalry during the Tiglath-pileser I's reign was highly difficult to obtain and to analysed; the linguistic problematic was the first

obstacle that was overpast by reading profoundly about it. The second discussing translations and analysing each detail. The translations of Albert K. Grayson and the outstanding perspective and amazing works of Shiego Yamada. These two works placed in confrontation allowed to raise the discussion about horses, cavalry, cavalrymen, war and linguistics. The Ph.D of Maria de Lurdes Palma really showed the importance of the Tiglath-pileser I's reign and demonstrate a high level of Portuguese academic material which should be better divulgated.

The *Annals* sources are highly important, but they don't tell everything, the archaeological artifacts, the micro studies, the anthropological works, and the linguistic works were essential. The reading of Luckenbill, Che Fei, Mario Liverani, Marc van de Mieroop, Irvin Finkel, Samuel Noah Kramer, Wolfram von Soden, A. Leo Oppenheim, etc represent the best readings and academic works. However, the Ancient Near Eastern Studies became a little more complex when the need to comprehend the difference relations between the Assyriology, and Hittitology, and the archeologically and linguistic approach in each other.

The State Archives of Assyria are the proof of a high-level academic work that incorporate an outstanding works of translations – that are sources in Assyriology – and are crucial for this type of investigation. The better and the most recognised Assyriologist participate in these volumes which means that aren't just historical investigations but a full and dense studies about any theme that involves Assyrians. As well as the Society of Biblical Literature.

The studies about the militarization and Military History in Assyria are few but the most important Military Historians in this matter – the Assyrian Amry – is without a doubt the Professor Tamás Dezső. It's pressing to introduce the problematic question of actual situation of the Portuguese Assyriology, which is poor and practically non-existent. The last book that could be related to Assyriology that I read in Portuguese and by Portuguese authors it's a chapter about Mesopotamic religion in the Professor Doctor and Military historian João Gouveia Monteiro's book: *História das Religões: Da origem dos deuses às religiões do futuro*.

These approaches, in my opinion, explain little about the Mesopotamic religion because it's essentially a general explanation about the myths and hymns which became an inadequate and unrealistic idea that is transmitted of a very diverse forms

of religion. On the other hand, the distinctive lines and periods of the mythological narratives, stories, and philosophical repercussions of the Mesopotamic religion was omitted, not clear and in some cases non-existent or explained. The Mesopotamic religion its diverse, highly complex, and in each period had a different comprehension of the myths, stories, hymns and narratives which weren't expresses in the book. Clearly, the book was direct for the public with a narrative writing.

However, the last volume of *Cadmo* journal – is an academic Journal for Ancient History from the School of Arts and Humanities of the University of Lisbon – had only one article about Assyriology. Exists a clearly, progressive and severe decrease of publications of articles, essays, and thesis with themes in Assyriology. Although, the few Assyriologist that are graduated in the Portuguese Universities it's a tremendous problem for the future and presence of the Assyriology within the Portuguese History Academy.

As well as the awarding of FCT's scholarships for master's degrees and Doctoral degrees in History and themes related to Assyriology simply doesn't exist. Hence, the stimulation and knowledge about Ancient Near Eastern History within the Portuguese University is getting lesser and lesser, and the History Professors know very little about it, as in Portuguese University or in the High Schools.

The Portuguese Universities, the Academy as in the History graduation are very few Professors Doctors or Assistants Assyriologists – even some students with a master's degree that would love to pursue a career as an Assyriologist are completely removed from the possibility of trying – as well as the ones that already have a career. In the entire Portuguese History Academy is possible count the Assyriologists with the fingers of one hand.

The History graduation programs have Professors Doctors that haven't any knowledge and formation in Assyriological or in the Ancient Mediterranean studies to teach subjects on Ancient Near East History, Philosophy, Art and Archaeology. This *status quo* is a catastrophic problem for the formation in History and the knowledge that are transmitted in whole Portuguese Education System.

To conclude, for now, this unpleasant point of view I think it's pressing to refer the splendid work of José Nunes Carreira, António Ramos dos Santos and Maria de

Lurdes Palma that represent the best works in the Portuguese Assyriological Studies. And the present Dissertation its new in the Assyriological Studies, it's the first work in Military History about the Assyrian Cavalry and Army.

This Dissertation have a chronological timeline that permitted to cross and introduced the Pre-Greek world in more large discussion within the Portuguese Ancient History program that wasn't connected – until now – with the Ancient Near Eastern History. So, the connection between the Ancient Near Eastern History – having the Ancient Near East History as a primordial source – and the Ancient Mediterranean Studies permitted a better understanding of the Ancient World. These Dissertation bring a high level of discussion in present matter with a theme that is completely new in the Portuguese History Academy.

The diverse perspectives become necessary towards the whole writing process of present Dissertation to introduce the medicinal and wealth/disease discussion of Horses and Men to the Ancient Near Eastern Military History. Then, the micro historical studies in the Assyrian war, military equipment and medicinal studies are the themes of Fabrice De Backer and JoAnn Scurlock, for example the brilliant Ph.D of Troels Pank Arboll.

Even though, the case studies of J. N. Postgate and Hayim Tadmor. The medicinal topic its pertinent because of the *Crisis* situation in the end of the Tiglath-pileser I's reign, the policy of a war economy shaped and influence the Levant and the expansionist mentally and action of the Assyrians towards its neighborship. The horse was a product too, not only a luxurious or practical one, but a useful medicinal and high valuable one.

Nevertheless, the geo-strategic and expansionist policies of the Assyrian Empire and its enemies, like the Neo-Hittite kingdoms and cities, permitted the rising of the Phoenicians culture and cities. These circumstances proportionate the increasing of the trade of horses and all usefully products that came with it, it's more than a simple animal, had its weight in the international market.

So, war for and because of horses, horses as a spoil of war, and horses as religious animal and higher gift to the gods from Troy to Aššur. The culture of war that existed in Assyria has its tremendous and horrific ways to mark the History of

Mankind forever, as it was eternalized in its sources the *Annals* of the Assyrian Monarchs or even the Bible. The Assyrian horses and cavalry received a fame for their roles in battle by fighting everyone that stood in their way as the many works of Frederick Mario Fales, Eckart Frahm, Paul-Alain Beaulieu, H. W. F. Saggs, and others demonstrate.

The case studies present in this Dissertation of some battles in which the Assyrian cavalry corps participate tried to explore – in an analytically hermeneutical point of view – evaluation the strategic and structural Assyrian military thinking. Each case study represents a small military conflict that are mentioned in Hittite, Assyrian, Babylonic, Biblical sources towards the Assyrians reigns till the 8th century BC. In this last and specific topic, I tried to explore the minor Assyrian military conflicts and the cavalry role and the evolutive process of development of the military equipment. As well as the scientific improvement of the engineering and political policies to increase the expansion of the Assyrian Empire.

Finally, this typology of analysis is recent within the Assyriological studies, because of the high-level specialization that is needed to write and analysed these warlike circumstances and archaeological excavations to proof some of hypothesis. But historically it's possible to understand the mental process of the Assyrian strategic actions as the Assyrian art demonstrate the evolutive process in each Assyrian reign.

Any Assyriologist must talk about the military aspect of the expansion of the Assyrian Empire like in works of Malbran-Labat did and others; because the Assyrian History is a Military History and the horse, and the cavalry was the motor to conquer the world.

1

AGAMEMNON'S WAR:
PRIAM, THE HITTITE ENEMY

"A guerra também fazia heróis que, em última instância, reproduziam os combates divinos havidos *in illo tempore* de que nos falam os grandes mitos".

SANTOS, António Ramos dos, "A Guerra no Próximo-Oriente Antigo", *Revista da Faculdade de Letras*, 27, 2003, pp. 15.

1.1 Myths and Realities: Chronologies, War, and Horses

Was through the chant of the Muses that war irrupted into Troy, leading the land and its people to a period of unsteadiness which Eric H. Cline designates as "The First Dark Ages"[12]. Hence, the conflicts with the "Great Powers Club"[13] and the invasions perpetrated by the Sea Peoples (or *Uadj-Uer*)[14] drove the Levant into chaos. Those people that came from the sea, whose chronology and problematic questions oscillate between myths and realities. Nevertheless, they ended up being the main cause of the desegregation of the Hittite Empire.

The Egyptian terminology emphasized the importance of those "people". In the Egyptian sense of the matter, the "Sea Peoples" were not considered a unified entity. On the contrary to what the Academy and some historians argue till this day. We know the origins of the "Sea Peoples", the shareholder organization, and the intelligibility of the common objective: to liberate the commerce the Levant. It's certain that they travelled by land and the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, all might have started in Troy.

The "Era of Heroes" is the epithet assigned to describe the Trojan War. This clashes with the proportions of the destruction of Troy and, at the same time, contrasts with the devastation of the Levant region. The War that was paradigmatically connected to Troy was beneath the *aegis* of the Gods. Consequently, this divine

[12] CLINE 2014: iv.
[13] KELDER 2010: 2.
[14] In the reign of Ramesses III ca.1184-1153 BC occurred the Battle of the Delta ca.1177 BC when the Egyptians challenged the coalition of many people from Anatolia and the Aegean regions, known as Sea Peoples. The Egyptian sources referred to *Uadj-Uer* as "the people that are on islands in the middle of the Great Green". "The Great Green" is, according to the Egyptian, the terminology of the Mediterranean Sea. Then, these people were also referred to in 13th BC as "People from the North", while the Aegean islands were described as *iuu her-ib Uadj-Uer* "the islands that are in the middle of the Sea" (see SANTOS, VARANDAS (coord.), ARAÚJO 2010: 99).

relation to one the most famous human conflicts in History must be understood by considering the Late Bronze Age's idiosyncrasies. From that moment, the two gods Poseidon and Apollo that participated in the war – according to the Homeric Poems – had a connection to horses.

Thus, for a better understanding and development of the theme[15], it's necessary to chronologically locate the Second Invasion of the Sea Peoples. This event occurred between the reigns of Ramesses III (ca.1184-1153 BC) and Šuppiluliuma II (ca.1207/1190-? BC). However, the result of the first and massive confront in Levant was the destruction of Ugarit ca.1184 BC that initiated the invasions of the Sea Peoples.

Ergo, the destruction of Ugarit is considered as an aftermath of the Trojan War. In a way, it's possible to explain the tremendous impact that Ugarit's downfall had on the destructions in the Levant region. The result from this event generated the creation of the first war cavalry of the Ancient World, which occurred in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I[16] ca.1115/4-1076 BC[17].

The impending dilemma that consubstantiates the study of this problematic theme involves the chronologies and numerous terminologies awarded to the "Sea Peoples". Thus, the geographic provenience of the "Sea Peoples" was referred to by the Hittites, Ugaritic, Canaanites, Syrians, and Egyptians in many documents of this period. One of the most important documents was the list of the "Great Kings" that belonged to the "Great Powers Club", mentioned by the Hittite monarchs. Therefore, between the chronological timeline of the 13th and 12th BC the kings of Ugarit, the kings of the Mycenaeans/*Aḫḫiyawa*, Babylon, Assyria and the Pharaohs of Egypt related to the "Great Kings" List. In the eyes of Hittite monarchs, most of the kings were recognised as equals.

The *Aḫḫiyawa's*[18] participation in the Second Incursion of the "Sea Peoples" is the most notorious and controversial. However, Emil Forrer, in 1924, made a

[15] MELLINK (ed.), MELLINK 1986: 93-101.
[16] ROTH 1997: 183; SAGONA, ZIMANSKY 2009: 296.
[17] PALMA 2009: 155-169.
[18] PEREIRA 2012: 57.

publication in Berlin that correlate the name *Aḫḫiyawa*[19] to the *Achaean*[20] (or *AχαιFoí*[21]) – the Homeric epithet assign to the Mycenaean – which demonstrated that they were the same people. The linguistic and phonetic similarities between both names are unmistakable[22]. Hence, the Egyptian hieroglyphs terminologies to assign the *Aḫḫiyawa*/Mycenaean were *Ekweš*[23] or *Tanaja*. The references that are mentioned in the Homeric Poems – with the epithet Achaeans – attribute the geographic location of Mycenaeans[24] people that were in the Peloponnesian/Aegean[25] region.

The numerous epithets attributed to the *Aḫḫiyawa* and mentioned in the Homeric Poems and the Hittite Texts correlate with each other, even though it's possible to associate the "Sea Peoples" to the Mycenaeans and Anatolians. The reason for that resides in the imputation of certain epithets to the "Sea Peoples" alluding to many lands in the Peloponnese and Asia Minor region.

The Hittite royal correspondence that mentions numerously the *Aḫḫiyawa* people exhibit some contiguity of the relations between both kingdoms. To this level of proximity, the correspondence between the realms was so close that the king of the *Aḫḫiyawa* – as correspondent of letters – was assigned as "Brother". As his equal, the Hittite king Ḫattušilli III (ca.1267-1237 BC) returned generously the affinity qualifying him as "Great King"[26]. Also, this epithet is referred to in the *Iliad* and some classic tragedies attributed to king Agamemnon.

In this sense, the *Aḫḫiyawa* domain is known to have an enormous extension from the Peloponnese region to the island of Crete and the coast of Asia Minor.

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[19] The Hittite designation for the people from the Peloponnese region were *Aḫḫiyawa*. Then the Egyptians referred to *Aḫḫiyawa*/Mycenaeans as *Ekweš* or *Tanaja* and the Ugaritics as *Hiyawa*. According to Eric H. Cline "… those toponyms fit nobody but the Mycenaeans". The *Aḫḫiyawa* are seen by many academics like the ones who are considered as a military superpower. Those academics argued based on many documents, for example, the letter KUB XXVI 91 (see CASANOVA 1997: 52-63; CLINE 2014: 40; KELDER 2020: 44-45).

[20] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 1; AMARAL 2011: 36-48.

[21] STUBBINGS 1975: 339; PALMER 1980: 67.

[22] MELLINK (ed.), WATKINS 1986: 45-62; PAGE 1992: 18.

[23] *Ekweš* or *ʴIḳwš* is the Egyptian name that is phonetically vocalized in Hittite by many forms as *Akawasha* or *Akaiwasha*. Also, in the Hittite Texts is commonly identified as *Aḫḫiyawa* (see BRYCE 2005: 336).

[24] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 3.

[25] BRYCE 2003: 74-88; CLINE 2014: 12.

[26] CLINE 2014: 122.

Excluding *Taruiša* and *Wilušiya*[27], which corresponded to the region where Troy was located (or Ilion)[28]. Thus, Troy would be a commercial and military rival of the *Aḫḫiyawa* and known in the 13th BC[29] Hittite letters as *Wilušiya*.

Hence, Troy was a centre of commercial convergence and where the cultures of Anatolia and Aegean intermingled. The intense influence of *Aḫḫiyawa*[30] culture propitiated the veneration of Mycenaean and Hittite's Gods. Numerous artefacts were found in archaeological sites that prove the cultural *Aḫḫiyawa* influence at Hissarlik or Troy (Troy VII)[31].

In a certain way, what marked the singularity of the trojan culture was war and trade. It was through the commerce surrounding cultural sharing that the Near East and the Mycenaean West have met. However, it was in these circumstances of unstable peace that Troy was born. Troy was favoured by its geographic positioning and affluent trade, making war an unavoidability.

The *Aḫḫiyawa's* political and military influence on the region of Troy was already known by the Hittites. For this reason, the *Aḫḫiyawa* had a military impulse on occupying the Asia Minor region, specifically the cities of Miletus, Lesbos, Rhodes, Ephesus, and other cities. And so, in the final decades of the 13th BC, the *Aḫḫiyawa* tried to take control of those regions and cities to the borders to *Arzawa* and *Lukka* lands. The territory of the *Aḫḫiyawa* was vast, not only on land and sea, but also in the region of Asia Minor, where their presence became an opposing force of the Hittite rule.

Troy was undoubtedly a threat, as Jorrit M. Kelder had referred "…suggested that "the military capacity of Ahhiyawa as indicated in the Hittite texts, as well as certain political and geographical characteristics, point towards a larger entity in the Aegean than anything that is attested in Linear B texts" (vide Kelder 2005a: 159; see

[27] MELLINK (ed.), GÜTERBOCK 1986: 33-44.
[28] STUBBINGS 1975: 362; ASLAN 2012: 201-217.
[29] CLINE 1996: 137-141; YOUNG, CHAVALAS, AVERBECK, DANTI (ed.), CLINE 1997: 189-210.
[30] The Hittite name "*Aḫḫiyawa*" that means "the man of *Ahhiyā*" or *Attarshiyash*. Howbeit exists evident a phonetic similarity with the Homeric terminology as Mycenaean names "Atreus" or "Achaeans" (see PAGE 1992: 17).
[31] JAMES 1958: 270-273; LOURENÇO 2005: 9-10; REDFORD, ERGIN (ed.), ASLAN, ROSE 2013: 7-38.

also now comments in Kelder 2010b: 34)"[32]. On the other hand, the citadel of Troy was subject to suffer several destructions, mainly during the 14th and 13th BC, whereas the most famous destruction had taken place in the 12th BC.

However, when occurred the siege of Troy[33], Hector calls their allies because Troy wasn´t alone. Its natural allies were the Thracians, the Phrygians, the Pelasgians[34], and others[35]. The Homeric Poems referred to Troy´s allies by personifying them as active characters in the story[36], as much as Albin Lesky defends that "O mundo cavalheiresco micénico é quase inimaginável sem um cantor"[37]. When the siege of Troy had taken place, it's known that the *Aḫḫiyawa* or the Achaeans clashed with the Trojans and their allies since 14th BC.

Thus, I introduce a problem concerning the relation between the Hittite and Mycenaean sources about the Trojan War. The Linear B and the Homeric Poems are the main sources to comprehend this theme, as well as the Hittite diplomatic texts of the 13th-12th BC. I emphasize that the events of the reign of Ḫattušilli III, who belonged to the "Great Powers Club"[38] and the "Great Kings", is crucial to understand the inscriptions and Egyptian art from the reigns of Merenptah to Ramesses III.

The relations between the chronologies, the documental sources, and the archaeological artefacts and sites allowed a new interpretation of about the role of the Trojan War. The destruction and war of Troy are considered the catalyst of the desegregation of the Hittite Empire. It should be noted that the second wave of the incursions of the "Sea Peoples" coincides chronologically with the most recent archaeological data, that is, that the Trojan War took place at the beginning of the second great incursion of the "Sea Peoples"[39].

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[32] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 5.
[33] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 5-6.
[34] SEENEY 2009: 111-115.
[35] BRYCE 2006: 127-150.
[36] VIDAL-NAQUET 2000: 40-41.
[37] "The knightly world of Mycenae is almost unimaginable without a singer" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see LESKY 1995: 33).
[38] KELDER 2010: 3.
[39] The timelines diverge about the precise date of the Trojan War. As is known, the written record of the *Iliad* dated from the 9th/8th BC, dealing with an event that took place in the Mycenaean period. This period was related to what Heinrich Schliemann had excavated in several levels of destruction in the citadel of Troy. C. W. Blegen dates it to 13th BC, ca.1260/50 BC, in his book *Troy and the Trojans* (see

In this sense, the size of the "Sea Peoples" fleet comes close to a possible conclusion. The size of the *Aḫḫiyawa's* fleet gathered in a "confederation" of 175 cities (large, medium, and small) of the region of Peloponnese and Crete[40] (except Thessaly) is the same as the first. This is not to say that it was a united and centralized kingdom, although a set of coalitions and political alliances is a result of the hegemonic power of a force in the Attica region. However, it's important to note that there was an aggregation by arms that formed a confederation[41].

The confederation was headed by a monarch[42], Agamemnon, who was neither elected nor proclaimed by his peers, although who would undoubtedly be the most powerful. This would not make him king of the entire region, but, as the Homeric Poems note, the "Shepherd of the People"[43] or "King of Kings"[44].

The military dynamics that come to light in the *Iliad*, namely the question of an eventual thalassocratic political congregation found by many cities in the Aegean, under the command of a king like Agamemnon, is still discussed by scholars today. However, in the letters exchanged between monarchs that belonged to the so-called "Great Powers Club", it´s possible to find some references that characterized Agamemnon as king of the Achaeans. As Gary Beckman, Trevor Bryce, and Eric H.

BLEGEN 1971: 168-169). The data referred to what Herodotus said, in his second book of *Histories* (*Hdt.* 2.145), also point to that period.

In this way, Barry Strauss sensibly approximates to ca.1200-1190 BC But these are the most recent excavations in which Penelope Mountjoy (see CHAMOUX 2003: 18; CLINE 2014: 127-128) has demonstrated that the archaeological level corresponds to Troy VII A and B. These levels dating it to the 12th BC, in ca.1190-1180 BC, as being the Troy of Priam and Agamemnon, due to various discoveries such as arrowheads and siege marks. Finally, Eratosthenes, in his book *Geography*, proposes a date for Homeric Troy in ca.1184 BC, what we now know to have occurred on that date was the destruction of the citadel of Ugarit, not Troy (see BRYCE 2006: 129; KOKKINOS 2009: 37-56).

It came to the agreement to these archaeological data, Homeric Troy was part of the invasions of the "Sea Peoples" (see CLINE 2014: 40-42), which ended in the Battle of the Delta, in ca.1177 BC or ca.1175 BC according to José Varandas (see VARANDAS 2020: 97). This theme will be discussed in more detail later.

[40] DAWSON 2012:134.

[41] Jorrit M. Kelder departs from the proposal of an idea of confederation, emphasizing the fact that he considers it unlikely that the *Aḫḫiyawa* constituted a "League" or a "Confederation". Although in Hittite Letters the "Kingdom of the *Aḫḫiyawa*", is something that would not be unreasonable if we consider the possibility that there was a unified Mycenaean kingdom, years before the Trojan War. However, since 13th BC, the king of the *Aḫḫiyawa* has been recognized by the Hittite court as one of the "Great Kings", meaning that this should be a factor to be considered (see KELDER 2010: 2).

[42] FINLEY 2002: 20.

[43] *Il.* 2,243; RODRIGUES 2016: 13-35.

[44] VIDAL-NAQUET 2000: 28.

Cline[45] clarify, Agamemnon was the king of the *Aḫḫiyawa*[46] – and one of the most enigmatic and charismatic characters in the Homeric Poems.

Therefore, Agamemnon was the king and commander of the greatest and most organized fleet that ever crossed the Aegean Sea. He also had the greatest and best warriors of his time and a large naval power that, on closer observation – the *Aḫḫiyawa* were similarly referenced – as narrated in the descriptions of Medinet Habu[47]. Nonetheless, the *Aḫḫiyawa* would have a level of tactical knowledge and a significant aggressive mode plus a very, organized *modus operandi*. Thus, the *Aḫḫiyawa* aggressiveness was reflected in the form of raids and destructions would have been conducted.

The signs and intentions confirm the sense of a common goal to be achieved. Hence, before arriving in Egypt, the expedition will have joined a land force across the Canaanite Syria region, with the support of other people that have revolted, such as the Phrygians and the *Lukka*[48], against the Hittite domination. The scale of the attack on Troy was a premonition of what might be expected regarding the Hittite´s blockade by the *Aḫḫiyawa*[49].

Meanwhile, the war between the Achaeans/*Aḫḫiyawa* and the Trojans was known as the "Era of Heroes"[50], which is narrated both in the Homeric Poems and in the Hittite sources. This gives us a possible way to understand the reason behind the citadel of Troy's trade connected the Miletus[51] region. Although there are various

[45] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 6.
[46] PAGE 1992: 129.
[47] The most recent radiocarbon dating ca.1192-1190 BC, referring to the incursions of the "Sea Peoples", in the *Ḫati*, Levant and Egypt region (Level 7A) was possible to pin a date due to the levels of destruction. This data is important because of the chronological interval of 13 to 15 years, which is approximately the same between the Trojan War and the reign of Ramesses III, when he faced in battle the incursion of the "Sea Peoples" in ca.1177 BC The destruction of other regions is dated to ca.1185 BC, yet it´s eight years that had passed after the Trojan War (see CLINE 2014: 113).
[48] The names related to this people are several, for example, *Lycians*, *Lydians*, *Lyconians*, *Lulahhi*, *Luwians* and, finally, *Lukka* (this being the Egyptian name). Ergo, *Lukka* was one of the intervening peoples in several battles from the reigns of Ramesses II (ca.1279-1213 BC) to Ramesses III (ca.1184-1153 BC), in Egypt, coming from Anatolia, essentially, from the region of Phrygia (see GÜTERBOCK 1983: 134; BRYCE 1986: 1-115, 216-253; CASANOVA 1997: 63-73; MELCHERT (ed.) 2003: 175-179; SINGER 2005: 430-452; YAKUBOVICH 2015: 36-37).
[49] YASUR-LANDAU 2010: 83-84.
[50] BLEGEN 1971: 153-184.
[51] Miletus is referred in the 14th to 12th BC, especially in the *Annals* of Muršili II, as *Milawata* or *Millawanda* (see BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 45).

references in the Hittite sources and in the Homeric Poems, there is little archaeological evidence. Trade blockades carried out by the Hittites were frequent, especially in trade between the *Aḫḫiyawa* and Assyria, where they used the Aššuwa region as a blockade[52].

In the reign of King Tudḫaliya IV[53] (ca.1237-1228 BC) – a contemporary of Shaushga-muwa (ca.1225-? BC), king of Amurru – a treaty that concluded in declaring that all kingdoms deserved the friendship of the King Hittite and of Amurru. Among those kingdoms were the *Aḫḫiyawa*, the Babylonia and Egypt, excluding the kingdom of Assyria. In this sense – a prohibition on trading with Assyria – under the threat of the kingdoms going to war with the Hittites, it was decreed that should any nominated break the oath:

> "§13' (A iv 1–18) And the Kings who are my equals in rank are the King of Egypt, the King of Babylonia, the King of Assyria, and the King of Ahhiyawa. If the King of Egypt is the friend of My Majesty, he shall be your friend. But if he is the enemy of My Majesty, he shall be your enemy. And if the King of Babylonia is the friend of My Majesty, he shall be your friend. But if he is the enemy of My Majesty, he shall be your enemy. Since the King of Assyria is the enemy of My Majesty, he shall likewise be your enemy. your merchant shall not go to Assyria, and you shall not allow his merchant into your land. he shall not pass through your land. But if he should come into your land, seize him and send him off to My Majesty. [Let] this matter [be placed] under [oath] (for you)"[54].

The Assyrian blockade of Tukultī-Ninurta I (ca.1243-1207 BC), referred to in the Anatolic texts, expresses some fear on the part of the Hittites regarding Assyrian expansion policies. In such a way, there was a need for the monarchs of *Ḫattuša* to create alliances with some kingdoms, especially those that could surround Assyria.

[52] STUBBINGS 1975: 341-342.
[53] KOROŠEC 1963: 159-166.
[54] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 61.

Due to this cunning strategy of diplomatic policy, aimed to block the trade between the *Aḫḫiyawa* and Assyria. This led to the drafting of a treaty, with the following clauses: §13 military matters related to possession of territory; §14 commercial prohibition and, finally, §15 effective military and mercantile blockade, and the closure of ports. It was a way of stabilizing the Hittite court and diplomatic relations with their allies, enabling the Hittite expansion to the south and west, in this period, to *URU*^{KI} *a-la-ši-ia*/*Alašiya*[55] or *Yadnana*[56] (Cyprus).

In a commercial context, one of the most significant and considered luxury products was the purchase of horses, which served to be used in chariots[57] and for court use. However, it wasn't the only luxury product being traded. The acquisition of bronze weapons to equip the army allowed Assyria to gain stronger ties, particularly with the *Aḫḫiyawa*. It was a necessity to equip the Assyrian forces with better equipment, better horses, and better weapons, so that they could continue to defend themselves from the Babylonian threat.

It was the alliances formed through marriages between the Assyrian and *Aḫḫiyawa*'s dynasties that established alliances that were both political and diplomatic. These alliances gave room to a stronger and closer bond than with any other realm. Nonetheless, in certain Hittite texts one can find the idea of a deep uneasiness in these links between two great enemies of the Empire, who played a decisive role in its disruption. It could be considered a strategy of these two kingdoms, with the aim of forcing the Hittites to fight on two fronts simultaneously. As described in the *Aḫḫiyawa* Texts:

> "§14' (A iv 19–22) Because I, My Majesty, have begun hostilities with the King of Assyria, and as I, My Majesty, am forming(?) an army and a unit of chariotry for myself—just as it is (a matter of) urgency and … for My Majesty, let it likewise be (a matter of) urgency and … for you. With alacrity form(?) an army and a unit of chariotry for yourself. Let this matter be placed under oath for you.

[55] KELDER, WAAL (ed.), MANTZOURANI, KOPANIAS, VOSKOS 2019: 95-131.
[56] LIVERANI 2014: 490.
[57] KELDER 2004-2005: 151-160.

> §15’ (A iv 23–26) [you shall not allow(?)] any ship [of] Ahhiyawa to go to him (that is, the King of Assyria) […] When he dispatches(?) […] the deity of your land […] the palace […]”[58].

According to Trevor Bryce, the existing free trade between Assyria and the *Aḫḫiyawa*[59], carried out through Canaanite Syria, made it possible to hire Mycenaean mercenaries. These commercial circumstances that allowed the hiring of mercenaries led Tudḫaliya IV[60] to do everything to prevent it from continuing. Thus, Assyria proved to be a much greater threat than it appeared to be. Assyria armed itself with better equipment and stronger[61] horses, creating an entrance for the chariot teams. This was one of the aspects that led to revolutionary progress in the context of war[62], perpetrated by Assyria[63].

The trade took place through the city of Sidon, according to the Urtenu archive, passing through the city of *Alašiya*, being the latter the closest warehouse for the distribution of heavy goods, and horses. Let’s see as we look in detail to what is referred to in the Hittite correspondence, we see that: “May my brother know this…Say to the king: ‘If they have received the horses which the king gave to the messenger of the land of Alashiya, then a colleague of the messenger will come to you. May they give those horses into his hand’.”[64]. Horses could be transported by sea, in a short distance, like crossing a strait, but we have no reference to how this transition would take place. This topic will be discussed in depth below.

[58] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 63.
[59] Idem *ibidem*: 68.
[60] BRYCE 2005: 339.
[61] The issue of horse trade between Mycenaeans and Assyrians leads to the question of horse domestication and its geographical origin. We do know, however, that there is a treatise on the domestication of the horse, written by Kikkuli dated ca.1360 BC, found in *Ḫattuša*. Subsequently, with the decipherment of Hittite script and language and Indo-Aryan script and language, the treatise was translated for the first time into English by the hipologist Johannes A. Potratz, in his doctoral thesis (see DREWS 2004: 2; SAGONA 2018: 363).
[62] BRYCE 2019: 237.
[63] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 97.
[64] CLINE 2014: 108.

However, in a letter contemporary that matches with the ones of the king of Sidon, the Hittite king Tudḫaliya IV, writes to the king of Ugarit[65] – Ammistamru II – ordering the export of horses to Egypt. The Hittite messengers and merchants and the Egyptians were prohibited to make trade with Assyria. In this sense, the island of *Alašiya* operated as a geostrategic trading post and, as it was a connection between the Aegean regions Asia Minor and Ugarit, it suffered from the consequences the most. Although even if it were from Ugarit, that all trade flowed from the Syrian Levant to the kingdom of Assyria and from Canaan to Egypt, Ugarit would be equally harmed.

The Hittite prohibition on the island of *Alašiya* – led to the economic weakening of Ugarit, as described in the Hittite letters sent to the Cypriot king: "My father, now the ships of the enemy have come. They have been setting fire to my cities and have done harm to the land"[66].

Nevertheless, it was not only the Hittite bans on these regions that caused the weakening and destruction of ports and cities, but also the invasions of the Sea People from the Aegean. Tudḫaliya IV, as well as Šuppiluliuma II, tried to protect their domains[67] by strengthening the naval fleet near the coastline of *Alašiya* and Ugarit.

The king Šuppiluliuma II wrote to the king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, expressing some concern about the attempted landing of the *Aḫḫiyawa* naval force. The *Aḫḫiyawa* launched an attack on *Lukka* lands, hoping that there would be a reinforcement of the fleet to resist the offensive, as described:

> "§7 (rev. 30–41) Concerning those owing a service obligation about whom you have appealed to My Majesty—on this occasion have I not sent Satalli to you? Now it has been told that the (Ah)hiyawan is tarrying in [the land] of Lukka, but that there are no (copper) ingots for him. in this matter don't tell me that there is no appropriate action. Give ships to Satalli, so that he

[65] According to Eric H. Cline the citadel of Ugarit was destroyed with some violence during the reign of Ammurapi (ca.1215-1190/85 BC) between ca.1190-1185 BC Billie Jean Collins argues that the destruction of the city of Emar happened at a date very close to the fall of Ugarit, that is, in ca.1185 BC (see COLLNS 2007: 79; CLINE 2014: 108).
[66] CLINE 2014: 109.
[67] BRYCE 2019: 261.

may take the ingots to the (Ah)hiyawans. On a second occasion My Majesty will not again send to you persons owing a service obligation"[68].

The letter emphasizes the existence of a commercial and diplomatic relationship between the *Lukka* and the *Aḫḫiyawa*, who needed help to face the forces of Šuppiluliuma II. The attack was initially directed at the Lycian region, with the objective of reaching *Alašiya*, but with Ugarit as its destination.

Therefore, some private groups of *Hiyawa*[69] men (or *Aḫḫiyawa*) were bribed by Šuppiluliuma II to fight on his side or simply not attack him. This was one of the stratagems that the monarch of *Ḫattuša* used to protect his potentates, creating small alliances. The objective would be to delineate a "buffer zone" or *limes*, between the lands of *Lukka* and *Alašiya*, against a possible invasion of the *Aḫḫiyawa*, as described by Eric H. Cline.

Finally, given all these issues, the important thing to highlight is the connection of the *Aḫḫiyawa* to Assyria in their trade and diplomatic policies. These circumstances may offer a possible explanation for the fact that Assyria came out unscathed from the Incursion of the "Sea Peoples". After all, the arguments regarding the distance separating Assyria from the coast are unfounded, as the Assyrian borders were shared with Syria, as it can be seen from the Assyrian occupation of *Ḫanigalbat*.

It was then the *Aḫḫiyawa* who after the Trojan War (Troy VII), plundered the coastal area of Asia Minor (specifically *Milawata*/*Millawanda* (Miletus), *Lazpa* (Lesbos) and *Apasa* (Ephesus)[70]), and the ones who crossed the Lycia to the lands of the *Lukka*. During their crossing, the *Aḫḫiyawa* incited rebellions against the Hittite power and decimated throughout the various Anatolic regions towards the Levant. It was not long before they reached one of the greatest problems they would have to face: the island of *Alašiya*, which was under the Hittite's grasp, just like Ugarit.

[68] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 257.
[69] BRYCE 2016: 67-79.
[70] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 274.

The island of *Alašiya*, Ugarit and the port of Ura[71] formed a blocking triangle that constrained any trade – both in the sea and land – intending to isolate Assyria from its allies, surrounding it. This strategy was aimed at preventing Assyria from trading with the Mediterranean and being trapped between Babylon and Syria (which was under Hittite rule and influence).

In turn, Babylon was under the Kassite[72] rule and had cut ties with Assyria. Whereas, at the end of the reign of Tukultī-Ninurta I[73], and with the murder of his son Enlil-kudurri-uṣur (ca.1186-1182 BC), who reigned for four years, later triggered the rise of Aššur-reša-iši I (ca.1132-1115 BC). Aššur-reša-iši I, who assumes the reins of power, was a monarch who did not bow to Babylonian influence. Even though existed an uncertain amount of subsequent Assyrian kings that during their reigns were in turn supported by Babylonian kings – with Babylonian controlling Assyria from the outside.

This situation led to a conflict between Assyria's king Aššur-reša-iši I and Nebuchadnezzar I (ca.1124-1103 BC), king of Babylon, who took place on the southern border of Assyria. The battle ended with a victory for Aššur-reša-iši I, who called himself "the avenger of Assyria"[74] for having prevented a Babylonian invasion. Had it been defeated; it could have been fatal to Assyria's survival as a kingdom. This event took place in the same timeline as the destruction of the cities of Ugarit, Karkemiš, Aleppo, Lachiš, among others, by the Assyrian allies, the *Aḫḫiyawa* (that is, by the incursions of the "Sea Peoples").

Aššur-dan I (ca.1179-1134 BC)[75] played an important role in maintaining stability in the Assyrian kingdom. After the death of Ninurta-apli-Ekur (ca.1192-1180 BC), his father assumes the reins of power, solving a long-standing conflict by expelling the Elamite tribes from the Assyrian borders. Therefore, following the Battle of Delta, in ca.1177 BC in Egypt, the region that previously belonged to the ancient

[71] BRYCE 2005: 331.
[72] Kassite Babylon in this period ended with the two kings Zababa-šum-iddina (ca.1158-? BC) and Enlil-nādin-aḫe (ca.1157-1155 BC) and then began the Babylonian period of the Chaldeans (see SANTOS 2003: 16-17, 2011: 51-59).
[73] CARAMELO 2011: 33-50; FRAHM (ed.), JAKOB 2017: 132.
[74] Idem *ibidem*: 134.
[75] LÉVÊQUE (dir.) 2014: 299.

kingdom of Amurru (a region that was part Syria and part of Canaan), was the chosen place for the Aramaic tribes to settle down.

Though it was the veracity of the attacks of the *Peleset*[76] (and other fractions of the "Sea Peoples") that, later, when agglutinated with the Canaanites, gave rise to the Philistines, a people known through the biblical texts, this topic will be further discussed. The Aramaic tribes were forced to move to the North, as far as the Euphrates River, after the passage of the "Sea Peoples"[77].

Yet, in the *Ḫatti* of Šuppiluliuma II, it is attacked from the North and the city of *Ḫattuša* is destroyed by the tribes of *Kaška*[78]. Hittite ships that, according to Trevor Bryce, were Ugaritic ships that, tried to fight the *Aḫḫiyawa*'s ships[79] in the south, off the coastline of the island of *Alašiya*, where, at the same time, land battles[80] were taking place, close to the coast. It was even though – without success – the Hittite forces in *Alašiya* tried to protect the coastline[81] against the numerous *Aḫḫiyawa* fleet, which inevitably managed to cross and defeat the Hittites. Proving that the naval force was, in fact, numerous and well-disciplined, added to an "army" with characteristics that could only be found in the Mycenaean Aegean.

Each Mycenaean king would have its own army, composed of contingents from various citadels, which were under its domain, thus providing a significant aggregation capacity, associated with a naval power, which the main citadels would have.

Thus, Assyria closed itself off to protect itself from the destruction left by the "Sea Peoples". It took advantage of the disruption of the Hittite Empire which exacerbated by the wanton left by the Thracian-Phrygian peoples, therefore allowed

[76] According to Trevor Bryce, "The most notable group, the Peleset, can be confidently identified with the Philistines who eventually settled in Palestine" (see BRYCE 2005: 337).
[77] LÉVÊQUE (dir.) 2014: 300.
[78] BRYCE 2005: 345.
[79] This Hittite fleet would be made up of Ugaritic ships, as Trevor Bryce argues: "Their success could only have been achieved by having at their disposal a war Xeet from an allied state, probably Ugarit" (see BRYCE 2005: 332). As Mary Aiken Littauer and Joost Crouwel referred "Actual naval engagements are first recorded in a text of the last Hittite king Šuppiluliuma II: "The ships of Alashiya met me in the sea three times for battle, and I smote them; and I seized the ships and set fire to them in the sea". No information is provided on details of these engagements, which were followed by one on hand in Alašiya itself – a kingdom most probably to be identify with Cyprus or part it" (see RAULWING, LITTAUER, CROUWEL (ed.), CROUWEL 2002: 103).
[80] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 262.
[81] BRYCE 2005: 332.

for a commercial unblocking. Consequently, Ugaritic Syria was in great difficulty[82], due to the destruction of the citadel and its fleet. This led to a drop in the circulation of goods and products, as well as a commercial and economic[83] crisis that hit several Mediterranean regions, such as the Aegean and Egypt.

In this sense, the destruction throughout the various regions of Canaanite Syria and Anatolia certainly had the goal of reaching Egypt. And given the above, the existence of a classic tragedy such as *Helen*[84] from Euripides, which narrates an episode of Troy's post-destruction, the one in which Helen would have reached Egypt[85]. This is an alternative version referred to in the Homeric Poems, the hallmark of a possibility of understanding both literary and historical knowledge, to substantiate the reasons for the Delta's battle against the "Sea Peoples"[86], which are still unclear today.

[82] In a letter from king *Alašiya* to the king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, a request for help is urged in the face of the commercial crisis in the Levant and the imminent attack of the "Sea Peoples": "My father, behold, the enemy's ships came (here); my cities(?) were burned, and they did evil things in my country. Does not my father know that all my troops and chariots(?) are in the Land of Hatti, and all my ships are in the Land of Lukka?...Thus, the country is abandoned to itself. May my father know it: the seven ships of the enemy that came here inflicted much damage upon us" (see BRYCE 2005: 333).

[83] BRYCE 2005: 341.

[84] BESPALOFF 2005: 25-33.

[85] *Hdt.* 2.111-123.

[86] The documentation cited below was chosen in English for the excellent translation by Trevor Bryce. The inscriptions by Medinet Habu of the reign of Ramesses III (ca.1184-1153 BC) describe the battle with great enthusiasm: "I equipped my frontier in Zahi (Djahi) prepared before them. The chiefs, the captains of infantry, the nobles, I caused to equip the harbour-mouths, like a strong wall, with warships, galleys, and barges. They were manned completely from bow to stern with valiant warriors, soldiers of all the choicest of Egypt, being like lions roaring on the mountain tops. The charioteers were warriors, and all good officers, ready of hand. Their horses were quivering in their every limb, ready to crush the countries under their feet...Those who reached my boundary, their seed is not; their heart and their soul are finished forever and ever. As for those who had assembled before them on the sea, the full flame was their front, before the harbour-mouths, and a wall of metal upon the shore surrounded them. They were dragged, overturned, and laid low upon the beach; slain and made heaps from stern to bow of their galleys, while all their things were cast upon the water" (see BRYCE 2005: 337).

1.2 From the Troy of the Hittites to the Troy of the Achaeans

The reading of Ibyco's poem revealed to me a conspicuous and rhetorical epic interrogation. It presented me coherently to the coercion on this theme, as follows: "[…] how many ships of Aulis have been crossing the Aegean Sea since Argos came to Troy "herdsman of horses""[87]. This already epic need to try to understand what led the Mycenaeans to aggregate such a significant set of regions under a single purpose, such as navigating towards Troy.

Such reasons are likely to be explained, given the understanding of why Troy – despite being the enemy of the Achaeans – have been, at the same time, a reason for a union. With that said and written, what was the reason for the formation of various coalitions of Aegean citadels and thalassocracies in an offensive organization of epic proportions?

In response, the first glimpse in the mid-13th BC recorded by the Hittites describing the military movements that troubled the monarchs in *Ḫattuša*, between ca.1400-1220 BC[88]; however, which parallels other descriptions such as the Egyptian and Ugaritic. These were probably the first movements that led to the first invasions of the "Sea Peoples" in Egypt, during the fifth year of Merenptah's reign (ca.1224-1204 BC, 19th dynasty)[89]. Even so, the most important and largest coalition of cities and thalassocracies in the Aegean was without doubtlessly the one that Agamemnon[90] must have assembled against Troy.

Therefore, a set of 175 different cities and 29 contingents[91], came together, commanded by 46 leaders from the Peloponnese region and the various adjacent

[87] *Ibyc*. 27-30.
[88] KELDER 2010: 1.
[89] ARAÚJO (dir.) 2001: 562.
[90] Agamemnon is considered *a primus inter pares*, as well as an ἄναξ (*wanax*) term that in Mycenaean means "king", corresponding to the functions of economic, religious, and military tutelage. According to Barry Strauss "The wanax controlled a corps of charioteers and bow man and possibly one of the infantrymen too" (see FINLEY 1972: 109; STRAUSS 2006: 33). It would, therefore, be a figure of authority, that is, "the one who owns and governs over others". However, there are other titles that would correspond in Mycenaean society to more specific functions such as *lawagetas*, which could be a "local lord", a "nobleman" or a "grand vizier". According to Pierre Lévêque, the *wanax* and the *lawagetas* are the most important figures in the city as they hold large properties (*teménaí*) (see WEBSTER 1964: 105-109, 143; PAGE 1992: 184-189; MOSSÉ 1994: 90- 91; STRAUSS 2006: 32-33, 36; WALL 2019: 11-14).
[91] LATACZ 2005: 222.

islands. Barry Strauss points to a total of one hundred thousand Mycenaean soldiers[92], spread over 1186 ships[93]. These are characterized in the Homeric Poems as "sea horses", used to cross the Aegean Sea towards the Strait of Dardanelles. According to Dictis of Crete[94], the leaders and the cities would make a total of 32, bringing together a set of 1236 ships[95], without making, any reference to the number of contingents. Thus, it would be even if there's no mention of the contingent's numbers, at least a thousand ships that would have sailed to Troy, from the Theban port of Aulis[96] towards the bay of Beşik – in present-day Turkey.

What is important to highlight is the conflict that led to the Trojan War, that is, from the Troy of Priam to the Troy of Agamemnon. This being a problematic of essentially military contours, as reflected by the cynicism of Herodotus[97] and the perspicacity of Bettany Hughes, when she expressed: "Clearly for Herodotus, love does not conquer all"[98]. And it is transversal in the composition and structure of the Homeric Poems, Epic Cycles, Tragedies, and Comedies that connect, in a symbiotic way in their content with the Hittite letters. Then the relation to the Hittite kingdom and its domain over Troy, whether this political-cultural or economic and social. It is at the military level that the Hittite letters reveal a very important connection: Achilles/*Ἀχιλλεύς* – "a name that is not Greek"[99] – to a certain Piyama-radu.

According to Barry Strauss, Piyama-radu is a general of *Luwian*[100] or "prince" (DUMU.LUGAL), but noble, perhaps royal, birth is presumed by his request for

[92] Yet, M. I. Finley and Denys L. Page points to a minimum estimate of fifty thousand Mycenaean soldiers, arguing that the number is exaggerated, as is "the 400,000 Saracens of the Song of Roland" (see FINLEY 1972: 69; PAGE 1992: 316-323).
[93] BEYE 1964: 345-373; BRYCE 2006: 2; STRAUSS 2006: 3.
[94] Dictis of Crete claims to be a companion of Idomeneus, king of Crete, and would thus have participated in the Trojan War and written his memoirs of the war on his return home. The work will have been written in Phoenician. Therefore, it addresses several emblematic episodes reported in the *Iliad*, corroborating some episodes described by Homer. Finally, before he died, he ordered the work to be buried with him, which have indeed happened. Although the tomb was uncovered due to an earthquake, as well as the work that later ended up in the hands of Emperor Nero – who immediately had it translated into Greek. According to Reina Marisol Troca Pereira, the text was proven to be controversial regarding the Trojan War, in turn, it contains relevant elements for understanding the conflict (see DICTIS OF CRETE 2016: 14-17).
[95] DICTIS OF CRETE 2016: 68-69.
[96] HUGHES 2006: 191-197; LOURENÇO 2008: 100-112.
[97] *Hdt.* 2.113-120.
[98] SIMPSON, BASKIN 1976: 249; HUGHES 2006: 161.
[99] TAYLOR 1970: 41; PALMER 1980: 97-98; NAGY 1998: 99-130.
[100] MELCHERT 2003: 67-85; STRAUSS 2006: 35.

recognition by the Hittite sovereign as a vassal king"[101]. Piyama-radu is referred to in the Hittite correspondence as a Hittite renegade subject during the reign of Ḫattušilli III (ca.1267-1237 BC) in mid and late 13th BC. It is connoted with a destabilizing effect from the entire region of the east coast of Anatolia and mainly, from the regions of *Wilušiya* and *Milawata*[102].

Eric Cline proposes two possibilities about Piyama-radu's actions and role: that is, either he acted under the protection of the *Aḫḫiyawa* or in confrontation with others. These actions resemble the attitudes, comparing the Homeric Poems, Achilles towards Agamemnon. Similarly, in Dictis of Crete's lessons, there´s a reference that Achilles made inroads into *Lazpa*[103]; thus, did Piyama-radu. Both fought in *Wilušiya* under the command of the king of the Achaeans/*Aḫḫiyawa* and both took refuge in *Milawata*.

If the Hittite figure does not coincide with the Homeric Achilles, then the hypothesis is raised that the point where the story of Piyama-radu served as an inspiration to "Homer". In a way, it substantiates the idea that the episodes narrated in the Homeric Poems have a substratum of historical factuality. This led to the construction of the image of an irreverent Mycenaean hero, which is, par excellence, a representation of Mycenaean military cunning.

Konstaninos Kopanias[104] writes, in what he calls "*Achilles' deconstruction*", and where he compares the story of Achilles with the one of Piyama-radu. The similarities between both stories are so evident that they should not be ignored. The linguistic proximity of the names that may have undergone an adaptation in the Hellenistic period is not an unusual hypothesis.

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[101] HOFFNER JR. 2009: 300.

[102] *Milawata*/*Millawanda* was one of the most fortified citadels in this period, which would be close to the citadel of (W)Ilios. *Milawata* was a geostrategic point of strong *Aḫḫiyawa* influence during the reign of Muwattalli II (ca.1295-1272 BC), as it was the region of *Wilušiya*. Piyama-radu "a notable villain" made his daughter marry Atpā, governor of *Milawata*, to consolidate the relations he had and thus receive the support of the *Aḫḫiyawa*. The Hittites end up having to negotiate with the governor of *Milawata* to face the advance of coalitions in certain regions with the *Aḫḫiyawa* (see BRYCE 2005: 224-225).

[103] The incursions that Achilles in *Lazpa* referred to in the *Iliad* stand out as follows: "But Achilles went to lie down in the inner recess of the well-built tent; beside him slept a woman, whom he had brought from Lesbos, daughter of Forbant" (see *Il.* 9.663-665; SMITH 1918: 670-681; SHIELDS 1918: 670-681; GRIMAL 2008: 138).

[104] KOPANIAS 2018: 63.

This historian propose is that Hector, Priam, and Patroclus are characters invented by the Hellenic Epic poets. Therefore, it is due to a paucity of documentary and archaeological material that coherently corresponds to the inherent characteristics of these characters and the role they played in the Trojan War. There is, then, the prerogative, as defended by Bettany Hughes[105] – if Hector, Priam, Patroclus, or even Helen[106], really existed.

Approaching the perspective of Joachim Latacz, who analyses the narrative structure of Homer, the author presents some specificities that are known from a Sumerian-Akkadian and Babylonian works, such as *Enūma Eliš* or the *Epic of Gilgameš*[107]. Suggesting that, in a way, the Hellenic poets adopted some traits of characters from Near Eastern literature, emphasized the fact that Homer didn't create something new: "So this form of poetry must have a long history. It must have been practised long before Homer and passed on from generation to generation of poets. Homer is not its inventor, but its highest peak"[108].

It is in the *Letter of Tawagalawa*[109] that much of the history of Piyama-radu[110] is told, highlighting the incursions in *Lazpa* and the refuge in *Milawata*. Therefore, *Alaksandu*[111] – the king of *Wilušiya* – a name that philologists associate with "Alexander / Paris"[112], is mentioned in the letters, as he asked the Hittite king for military assistance to fight the invaders. These circumstances provided the elaboration of a treaty between *Wilušiya* and the monarchs of *Ḫattuša*. However, some philologists and historians infer the linguistic proximity that the name *Tawagalawa* seems to have with the name *Etewoklewes*/Eteocles[113]. As a result, this would be the brother of the

[105] HUGHES 2006: 342.
[106] Idem *ibidem* 20202: 83-90.
[107] PEREIRA 2012: 158-161; CAIRNS, SCODEL 2014: 29-54.
[108] LATACZ 2005: 257.
[109] GÜTERBOCK 1983: 136-137; BRYCE 1999: 257-264; GEORGE 2003: 138-144; SINGER (ed.), MILLER 2010: 159-169; BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 101-125.
[110] Piyama-radu assumes the government or guardianship of the citadel of (W)Ilios for 35 years and was a contemporary of three Hittite kings: Muwattali II (ca.1295-1272 BC), Muršili III or Urbi-Teššub (ca.1272-1267 BC) and Ḫattušilli III (ca.1267-1237 BC) (see BECKMAN 1999: 59-87, 87-96, 96-103, 169-179).
[111] GARELLI 2003: 178-179; BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 2, 123, 144, 279.
[112] LUCKENBILL 1911: 85-86.
[113] SEENEY 2009: 88.

king of the *Aḫḫiyawa*, as Euripides refers, in his tragedies *The Seven Against Thebes*[114] and *The Phoenicians*[115].

In addition to the similarities with the story of Piyama-radu, the story of Achilles becomes even more intertwined with the *Epic of Gilgameš*, namely about the stories of *Gilgameš and Ḫuwawa* and *Gilgameš and Enkidu*[116]. It is most likely then that the poetic construction of the *Iliad* itself presents structural contours that paradoxically evidence this consistency, from the poetic and literary tradition of *Gilgameš's Epic*.

In a way, the hypothesis put forward by Konstantinos Kopanias about the very existence of the Trojan War has a reason of being, and Eric H. Cline does not rule out such a possibility. The archaeological evidence proves that Troy VII[117] dates to the beginning of 12th BC, demonstrating that there is chronological proximity between these remains and the Invasions of the "Sea Peoples".

The contours of this level of destruction showed similarities with the levels of destruction of other cities, such as Tiryns, Midea, Pylos, Thebes, and Mycenae, in the late 13th BC until the beginning of the 12th BC. The archaeologist Guy Middleton[118] proposes a date for the occurrence of these events, which is ca.1200-1190 BC. The same author also mentions that some cities and sites do not have any traces of destruction, proposing that they have only been abandoned.

The Anatolian Islands, now Greek and located on the east coast of Anatolia, such as Tenedos, Imbros, *Lazpa* and Rhodes, had commercial and diplomatic activity. This activity was stimulated by the military intentions of the *Aḫḫiyawa*, which intensified in the late 13th BC and early 12th BC. Similarly, it is possible to go deeper into this issue of commercial and military stimuli on horses[119]. Because, in this period, the Troy[120] of Homer, or the *Wilušiya* of the Hittites[121], was known for breeding

[114] WEST 2003: 6-9.
[115] ALVES 1975: 29-34; HUGHES 2006: 77-80.
[116] CAIRNS, SCODEL 2014: 13-28; CLARKE 2019: 330-334.
[117] FERREIRA 2002: 41-61.
[118] MIDDLETON 2019: 135; 2020: 9-18
[119] CHADWICK 1977: 202-226; 1955: 1-3.
[120] DAWSON 2012: 136.
[121] GALHANO 2012: 3-7.

excellent horses. It's necessary to return to the founding myth of the citadel of Troy[122], and Zeus' loves, in this case, that of Electra.

According to the Homeric Poems and Pierre Grimal, Zeus and Electra had two children, Dardanus[123] and Iasion, in Samothrace. It tells the myth that there was a flood and that Iasion would have drowned, while his brother Dardanus was taken to the shores of Anatolia. Teucer[124], who was the king of that realm at the time, had received Dardanus hospitably. Over the years, Teucer died, leaving Dardanus part of the kingdom along with his daughter Batieia. And Dardanus, having assumed his responsibilities, assigned his name to the region he ruled.

This entire region is known to the Hittites as *Wilušiya*, and known to the Mycenaeans as Dardania, from which the name of the Trojan strait of Dardanelles[125] is derived "ways of the roiling sea". However, it was Tros, Dardanus's grandson, who created the royal house of Troy[126], which had the epithet "Rich in Horses", and its inhabitants known as the Trojans – also called "The Horse Tamers". This is the old version of the myth. In a more recent version, Tros receives from Zeus the fastest warhorses[127], which appear in various epithets in the *Iliad*, as well as in the myth of the founding of Troy.

Jean-Pierre Vernant argues that Troy assumed a significant role in the acquisition and breeding of horses, expressing the following, "Tal como os Mínias da Tróade, os Grécia conheciam o cavalo; deviam ter feito criação de cavalos nas estepes onde haviam permanecido antes da sua vinda para a Grécia"[128]. After all, Homer describes the horses of Tros as the best and the fastest, as they appear in the *Iliad*, "Pois eles são da raça dos que a Trós deu Zeus que vê ao longe, como recompensa pelo filho,

[122] ARUZ, WALLENFELS (ed.), DRAKAKI 2003: 262-270.
[123] *Il*. 20.215-229.
[124] There is, however, another Teucer that appears represented as a Mycenaean king, defender of Ajax, the same as in the tragedy of Sophocles, in the *Iliad* of Homer and the *Ephemeris of the Trojan War* of Dictis of Crete (see KITTO 1990: 226-229).
[125] GRIMAL 2004: 111.
[126] In the myth of Atlas, it is said that he would have reigned in Arcadia until Dimas, the founder of the royal house of Troy, succeeded him (see CALDWELL 1989: 83, 161; PINHEIRO 2011: 133).
[127] PINHEIRO 2011: 212-213.
[128] "Just like the Minya of the Troas, those of Greece knew the horse; they must have reared horses in the steppes where they had stayed before their arrival in Greece" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see VERNANT 1987: 13).

Ganimedes, porquanto eram eles os melhores de todos os cavalos debaixo da Aurora e do Sol"[129].

Consequently, the Trojan predicate the horse as a totem, presupposing symbolic-magical imagery that was also a religious and military one. The narrative and ritual referencing, mirrored by the mythological symbolism of the sea and the sun, namely Poseidon[130] and Apollo[131]. The Trojans worshipped their gods, such as *Ap(p)aliunas*[132] or *Iyarri*[133], who was the Trojan god of the sun and war.

The totemic and liturgical[134] attributes of Poseidon's mythological narrative show that the stable where the god kept his horses. Made of white shooting, with bronze hooves and golden manes, were paired with a golden chariot. This was the sea god's means of transport. The construction of the myth denotes the deep and intimate form of the horse's connection to the Sea and to the God who commanded all maritime activity was known as "Lord Earthshaker/Earth-holder/*κρείων ΄Ενοσίχθων*"[135]. This correlation is very significant for understanding the provenance of the horse in these regions and its veneration.

To better understand this matter, it´s necessary to refer to the affective connection that Poseidon maintained, according to the myth, one of his Nereids[136] – namely Thetis, mother of Achilles[137]. The mythological link between Poseidon and

[129] "For they are of the race of those given to Tros by Zeus who sees in the distance, as a reward for his son, Ganymede, for they were they the best of all horses under the dawn of the sun" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see *Il*. 5.265-267).
[130] BURKERT 1992: 90.
[131] CITATI 2005: 13-25.
[132] OLIVEIRA 1982: 287-340; BRYCE 2006:119; PETROPOULUS 2018: 500.
[133] STRAUSS 2006: 103.
[134] HALL 2015: 55.
[135] BREMMER 1994: 17-18; MAITLAND 1999: 1; CLINE, NUR 2000: 43-63; VIDAL-NAQUET 2002: 24-25.
[136] The Nereids are daughters of Nereus, an ancient god of the Seas. Among them Thetis stood out due to her seductive characteristics, becoming a favourite of Poseidon (see GUTHRIE 1962: 94-99; BURKERT 1992: 90-96; LESKY 1995: 44-45; SLATKIN 1995: 17-107).
[137] There was a prophecy of a woman from Themis (allegorically representative of the idea of "Moral Law", it´s the one that generates the Seasons), who said that the son Poseidon had with Thetis (not to be confused with a pre-Homeric version of Thetis and Ocean, that were the first parents of the gods). Poseidon´s son would be greater than his father. Therefore, Poseidon left Nereid to Peleus – Achille's father – a mortal that happened to be the king of Phtia – Peleus – that has the Homeric epithet of "[…] the old knight Peleus". This being a region of Thessaly, land of the famous warriors of Achilles, the Myrmidons. However, Plato in his work *Criton* refers to this region and 9th Chapter of the *Iliad* when Achilles threatens to leave the battlefield to return home (see *Il.* 2.681-685, 9.421-429; *Od.* 11.254; Pl.

Achilles is also expressed through the Corinthian cult of Poseidon *Hippios*[138]/ *Hippos*[139] or *Damaios*. According to Jean-Pierre Vernant the cult of Poseidon was associated intrinsically with horses, "[…] associava, tanto no espírito dos primeiros Helenos como no de outros povos, […] a importância e o prestígio do cavalo numa sociedade dependem em grande medida da sua utilização para fins militares"[140].

However, the region of Thessaly[141], the mythological birthplace of Achilles, was traditionally known as a region of horses. Hence, it´s pertinent to state that Poseidon is intrinsically linked to it, through its own mythological, symbolic, and religious narrative construction, which was, paradoxically, present in the culture of Troy. The great Achaean hero, Achilles[142], and horses are common denominators, in the sense that Troy[143] and Thrace[144] come together, as both are horse breeder regions.

This proximity between animal, man and earth is embodied in a symbol or totem[145]. As Claude Lévi-Strauss writes: "[…] o totemismo aproxima o homem do animal"[146]. Even then, this is demonstrated through iconography and aesthetics, consolidating a long tradition. Which would not be completely mythological-literary, but a set of known characteristics that distinguish Troy from other regions.

This fact, which was perpetuated until the century of Homer, in which Troy uses the horse as its totem, gathering a set of characteristics related to the creation of

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Cri. 44b; WEBSTER 1964: 119-124; CORNFORD 1975: 362; BURKERT 1992: 91-93; FERREIRA 1992: 267-293; BESPALOFF 2005: 19-23; CITATI 2005: 71-83; GRIMAL 2008: 139; PINHEIRO 2011: 206-208, 212-213, 258; CAIRNS, SCODEL 2014: 222-329; GONZÁLEZ 2018: 56-57).

[138] SIMPSON, BASKIN 1976: 234; JANKO, KIRK 1992: 43-45; PINHEIRO 2011: 261; KINT 2021: 67,108-109, 114.

[139] CHADWICK, VENTRIS (ed.) 1973: 131.

[140] "[…] associated, both in the spirit of the first Helens and in that of other people, […] the importance and prestige of the horse in a society depend to a great extent on its use for military purposes" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see VERNANT 1987: 14).

[141] MELLAART 1965: 115-119; HOOD 1968: 18-29.

[142] A great reference to Achilles' connection to horses is the mythological attributes relating to his development as a warrior. As he was taught by Chiron, the first physician and the "wisest of the Centaurs", which is a very significant reference. This correlates to the qualities and actions inherent in the Homeric hero during the war with Troy (see *Il*. 11,831-832, 16,141-143, 19,388-390; Pind.*Pyth*.3, 1-8; CALDWELL 1989: 122; MICHELAKIS 2002: 1-22; BUXTON 2013: 21, 93; HALL 2015: 65; KINT 2021: 240, 252-253).

[143] PAGE 1992: 57.

[144] WIESNER 1968: 115; FOL, MARAZOV 1977: 18, 30-31, 60.

[145] FREUD 2001: 13.

[146] "[…] totemism brings man closer to the animal" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see LÉVI-STRAUSS 1986: 13).

a military culture that is assumed and stands out from the other. There are several characteristics, and geographical positioning was predominant, in which the citadel of Troy is situated, but, as Barry Strauss emphasizes, "But a horse symbolized war, privilege, piety, popularity, and Troy itself"[147].

Thus, two regions with the epithet of the creation of "good horses" stand out in this period: Troy and Mitanni. Both were contemporary cities of the disaggregation of the kingdom of Mitanni, which took place ca.1300 BC, with the occupation of the region of *Ḫanigalbat* (Assyrian designation for Mitanni). More than half of the region was occupied by the Assyrians, which consequently led king Šattuara II (ca.1295–1264 BC)[148] to become a vassal of the Assyrian king Adad-nirāri I[149] (ca.1307-1275 BC).

Faced with this complex conjuncture, in ca.1270 BC[150] there was a failed attempt to recover independence. The king Šattuara II led an uprising by some groups of Mitannians, who gained Hittite support and died, with the aim to challenge the Assyrian occupation of the region, which was still recent. The revolt, in turn, was completely obliterated by the Assyrian army. And finally, Mitanni disaggregates, never to have any historically significant expression again.

Troy's connection to Ugaritic Syria (controlled in this period by the Hittites) made trade possible with Assyria – which quickly emerged as a military power, began as commercial and diplomatic. It passed through regions that were mandatory stops such as *Lazpa*, *Milawata*, Rhodes and *Lukka*, until reaching *Alašiya* and, finally, Ugarit. The latter is being the gateway to the transaction of products between the Syrian-Canaanite world and the Mycenaean world. Yet, Emmet Seeney referred to that "Archaeology proves that during the Mycenaean epoch Greece was in close contact with the nations of the Near East"[151].

As can be seen, the three shipwrecks found along the Anatolic coast, that of the *Uluburum*[152], dating from ca.1300 BC The *Sinaranu* of Ugarit sank on the coasts of

[147] STRAUSS 2006: 176.
[148] GARELLI 2003: 158-159; COLLINS 2007: 60-61; BRYCE 2012: 183.
[149] BECKMAN 1999: 146-149.
[150] LÉVÊQUE (dir.) 2014: 294.
[151] SEENEY 2009: 85.
[152] CLINE 2009: 24-27.

this city, with a route defined for the island of Crete. As described in the letter written in Akkadian that was found on the ship, which dates from ca.1260 BC (during the Ugaritic reign of Ammistamru II, ca.1260-1237 BC)[153]. Also, the shipwreck of Cape *Gelidonya* dated from ca.1200 BC[154], the latter being Canaanite/Ugaritic, with a well-defined route towards the Aegean. They took a variety of products[155], but they did not carry live or dead animals.

It was through this route that political and military relationships and affinities were established between Mycenae and Assyrians. Many of these links lasted until the occupation of Ugaritic Syria by the Hittite king Tudḫaliya IV. However, the Hittites reconnected with the kingdom of Amurru, using this region as a form of the blockade, allowing a total cut off communication between the Assyrians and Mycenae. In this sense, it should be noted that the Assyria of Tukultī-Ninurta I (ca.1233-1197 BC), which was at the beginning of an expansionist[156] policy, with several military victories. Tukultī-Ninurta I marked especially the Babylon Kassite, when he defeats the Babylonian king, Kaštiliaš IV (ca.1242-1235 BC), and captures the city of Babylon.

Tukultī-Ninurta I thus became the first Assyrian king to rule Babylon and Assyria simultaneously, calling himself the "king of Karduniaš", "king of Sumer and Akkad"[157] and "king of Ṣippar and Babylon". To the North, he secured control of the border with the kingdom of Urarṭu, which allowed him to organize and secure the region that was once outside Mitanni, while pressing the monarch of *Ḫattuša* and the coalition with Amurru[158].

For this coalition was, in a way, crucial and decisive for the meeting of a large *Aḫḫiyawa* army[159], which aimed to put an end to the Hittite power installed. If this

[153] CULICAN 1966: 52-54.
[154] BUCHET (ed.), SOUZA, ARNAUD (ed.), SAUVAGE 2017: 156.
[155] CLINE 2014: 73-80.
[156] SINGER 1985: 100-123.
[157] FRAHM (ed.), JAKOB 2017: 122-123.
[158] This coalition will last until the reign of Šuppiluliuma II (ca.1207/1190-? BC), when King Igarit of Amurru became a vassal of the monarch of *Ḫattuša*.
[159] The word "army" comes from the Latin "*exercitus*", which encompasses a set of characteristics to which we can attribute the Roman notion of the imperial period of a "public army". Therefore, the "armies" of the Late Bronze Age would not have these characteristics. The notion developed by the Romans of what an "army" is problematized another possible conception about the organization and hierarchical structure of an army. Hence, this brings to the placement of a set of characteristics such as the uniformity of military forces as a group and team, as well as the military individual himself. The

were to happen, the trade route between the Aegean and the Levant would be unblocked, as well as products arriving in Assyria and Babylon through the Syrian-Canaanite region. In turn, the commercialized products would reach Egypt, eventually re-establish trade, diplomatic and military links between Assyria and the Aegean.

M. I. Finley opens the assumption about the reasons that led to the war in Troy, arguing that, literally, this fits well in the narrative, that it be the love or abduction of Helen, the causal factor for the war. Nevertheless, love isn´t sufficiently strong enough evidence for the military organization of colossal dimension, which would have been perpetrated by Agamemnon[160]. Not even a purely commercial factor seems to have been. As a result, Finley alludes to the following:

> "As for a commercial war, I frankly refuse to take the idea seriously until one of its proponents offers a reasonable explanation why mainland Achaeans should have organised and mobilised themselves on a great scale in order to destroy a centre to which they had long been sending a continuous supply of pottery and from which, we are told, they received horses, which they needed, wool, which in fact they may not have needed, and perhaps gold"[161].

Consider also that it could even be a diplomatic issue and yet these three factors combined continued to not be a plausible reason that could lead to the complete destruction of Troy. Having said the present, is it possible to understand that when we think about the Trojan War as an isolated object, let us ask ourselves about the complete destruction of the Trojan people?

creation of a *status militaris*, and professionalization of a set of military training and operational training capabilities, which we could not find until the Imperial Assyrian period. On the other hand, there is a military organization and construction of a model and military practices, but not in a unified and uniform way as we can observe in the Assyrian army, and later Persian, Hellenic or Roman periods.

[160] OLSEN 2014: 63-64, 114-115, 242-243.

[161] FINLEY, CASKEY, KIRK, PAGE 1964: 6.

Though the Trojan problem is international[162] and, consequently, it is not Trojan. This is an issue that has its logic. That is a strategic objective of geopolitical and commercial reorganization. Having been the destruction of Troy a necessary evil that was caused by the Hittite trade blockade, while the Trojan responded practically for itself as an independent kingdom. This independence become dangerous when international issues changed, adding to the strong diplomatic links with the Hittites, which sharpened the Trojan situation.

It is to be understood through the treatment of this period, such as the Treaty of *Alaksandu*, whether it negotiates a non-aggression relation about the number of military interventions by the *Aḫḫiyawa* in Troy and adjacent regions. Troy always tried to remain a discreet but unreliable opponent.

The likelihood of the Trojans attacking the land of *Aḫḫiyawa*, while they sailed to face the great Hittite problem, was substantially fastidious. And it especially is due to the historical-military past of permanent conflicts, for the dominance and commercial control of the Aegean.

According to D. L. Page[163], who corroborates the importance of Mycenaean influence in the Eastern Mediterranean – this being commercially intense in some regions such as Colophon, *Milawata*, Rhodes and *Alašiya*. These were central trading warehouses linking Troy and consequently the Mycenaean to Egypt[164]. Therefore, were founded some evidence of trading between the Aegean and the Tell al-Amarna city recorded in the Letters[165]. The evidence is clear about the origin of some references like the Aegean mercenaries/mšʿ/*miši*[166], the pottery[167] and the Danuna's[168] people from the "Sea Peoples" which consubstantiate the proof of this relation.

In this sense, many historical and archaeological circumstances demonstrate that commercial activity was significant, and of great affluence, with transactions of

[162] BRYCE 2006: 18.
[163] PAGE 1992: 16.
[164] DAVIES, SCHOFIELD (eds.), CLINE 1995: 91-119.
[165] EA 154, 126: 58-66, 110: 50-52; 108: 34-41, 104–105; FINLEY, CASKEY, KIRK, PAGE 1964: 18; HANKEY 1981: 38-43; WACHSMANN 1998: 130; COTTERELL 2005: 223.
[166] EMANUEL 2020: 34-47.
[167] CLINE 2009: 31.
[168] MYNÁŘOVÁ, ONDERKA, PAVÚK (ed.), SIMON 2015: 391-408.

large quantities of products[169]. The shipwrecks of which we have statements, and the descriptions of the letters are clear evidence of this fact. Moreover, the transactions took place between the coastal coast area of Asia Minor (Mycenaean) and the Syrian coast (Ugaritic/Canaanite)[170] finally reaching Egypt.

After this reflection on the contours of the war against Troy, which led to contexts that need to be delimited, such as what is literature in the face of historical circumstance, where the likelihood between the Homeric epithets and Hittite culture. They are too much to ignore. The Trojans[171] are closer to a Hittite reality than a Mycenaean one, in its form and constitution and the various episodes referring to *Wilušiya* in the Hittite charts present it always connected in some way to the monarchs of *Ḫattuša*. As Joachim Latacz argues "Homer's (W)Ilios is Wilusa, the city associated with the empire of the Hittites"[172].

Except for the Piyama-radu episode and the great similarities with epic stories, which denote an influence of Near-Eastern realities and knowledge. The sharing that Troy receives from the Hittites and a strong Hurrite, Mitannian, Amoritic, Babylonian and Assyrian influence, in which the horse was considered symbolically and commercially, an animal and a totem of power. The horse was often associated with the chariot, an unmistakable symbol of military power in the Ancient Near East.

The Final Bronze war car uses two horses in Egypt and four in Assyria. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, in which the use of the horse as the driving force of the war car symbolically expresses Man's connection to nature, the domestication of the horse, its militarization, and the use of nature in the service of men. In this way, the horse is created and assigned a status, which has a symbolic-imagery, totemic, divine, and royal charge, elevating the animal to the stage of indispensable for man.

Resuming, resuming, the problem of the siege of Troy[173] is the time, in which Homer narrates about the last days of the ninth year of the war in Troy, and as Joachim Latacz points out, "The Achilles story is presented as a 51-day episode from the ninth

[169] HORN, KRISTIANSEN 2018: 24-28.
[170] CULICAN 1966: 46-50; KRAMER-HAJOS 2016: 56-69.
[171] MELLINK (ed.), ANGEL 1986: 63-76.
[172] LATACZ 2005: 167-168.
[173] MELLINK (ed.), VERMEALE 1986: 77-92.

or tenth year of the ten-year Trojan War and centres around one of the Achaian besiegers"[174].

This reference indicates that the war had lasted for nine years, which is not strange or unreasonable, because we know wars that lasted longer, such as the Hundred Years War, the Thirty Years, the Fifty Years, or the Seventy Years. The heart of the problem is the existence of a paradox between a "War" and a "Siege". A "War" organically expresses a more time-consuming timeline or circumstances that involve several organized conflicts and which, in turn, require a significant military capacity of logistics to maintain the conflict.

If there is, in this sense, a clear dichotomy, both for the scale of the problem and its durability, then talking about the Trojan War is more complex than simply refer the Homeric Epic Poems as the principal source about this theme. As Oswald Spengler reflected:

> "E, suplantando os combates entre os predadores isolados, então, a guerra como empreendimento organizado de tribo contra tribo, com chefes e seguidores, com incursões, emboscadas e batalhas organizadas"[175].

Even then, it must be understood that the duration of a siege to a citadel would not take as long as that what Homer refers to, because the practice of sieges became a very frequent tactic during the Assyrian reigns, especially in the imperial period.

I recall that, in the reign of Sennacherib, ca.701 BC[176], the siege was set to the citadel of Lachiš, which would have characteristics that were like the citadel of Troy[177]. For the simple reason of following a model of fortification of Hittite style. But this siege took only a few months since the military campaign will have lasted roughly a

[174] LATACZ 2005: 204.
[175] "And, supplanting the fighting between isolated predators, then the war arose as an organized enterprise of tribe against tribe, with chiefs and followers, with incursions, ambushes and organized battles" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see SPENGLER 1980: 89-90).
[176] ELAYI 2018: 52-88.
[177] SCODEL 1982: 33-50.

year[178]. Hence, would the citadel of Troy have the capacity to withstand nine years of siege? Bettany Hughes understands the difficulty of the actual existence of a nine-year siege, arguing that, "In reality it would have been impossible for the trojans (or for any Late Bronze Age city) to endure a ten-year siege"[179]. Thus, even if there are significant numerous armies, it would not be easy logistically speaking to prolong a siege for nine years.

At most, any citadel could hold out its walls while being surrounded for a period of this duration only because the siege´s tactic implied the constant permanence and the total cutting of the block supplies and contact of the besieged with the outside. Consequently, even with traits of the specific Troy´s siege, the citadel had in its aid, a forest to the south and the Scamander[180] River to the north, which protected it from that side. The two most fragile areas (the flanks) were protected, forcing the enemy to face the only possible path, the west gate, which is the main route to the citadel. The Mycenae couldn´t surround the citadel, even though they had numerical superiority[181]. Then they built palisades and moats[182], to isolate Troy but could only do so in the west area.

On the issue of the "Trojan Horse", as George Dumézil, Vasilij J. Abaev and Vasilij Ivanovitch Abaev analyse, "En tant que ruse de guerre, le cheval de Troie est absurd"[183]. Based on this principle, military historians advanced to the possibility of expressing a metaphor for an assault tower. The hypothesis presented seems to answer the question but simultaneously it doesn't. Francesco Tiboni, a submarine archaeologist that proposed a theory to explain what it was the "Trojan Horse". And it wasn´t a "horse"/"*hippos*" but a "ship horse".

However, as Homer once referred to the Achaeans ships[184], calling them "Horse of the Sea". Tiboni defends that "[…] the closest one to the correct interpretation of what Homer said. The bard, in fact, never described the use of any

[178] LUCKENBILL 2005: 85-89.
[179] HUGHES 2006: 208.
[180] Soph. *Aj.* 418-426.
[181] STRAUSS 2006: 129.
[182] LATACZ 2005: 25-27, 34-35.
[183] "As a ruse of war, the Trojan horse is nonsense" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see DUMÉZIL, ABAEV, ABAEV 1963: 1056; BURROWS 1969: 133).
[184] STRAUSS 2006: 45-46, 59.

war machine, any gigantic wooden horse, and never referred to a sacred or to a ritual boat. He has only spoken of a *hippos ship*, a merchant-ship, used in its standard way, that is according to maritime rules and the customs of the Mediterranean of the Late Bronze Age/Early Iron Age"[185]. Consequently, Thomas G. Chondros, Kypros Milidonis, Stefanos Paipetis, Cesare Rossi tried to reconstruct the "Trojan Horse"[186]/ *Doureios Hippos* based on the Homeric and Ancient Antiquity texts. This theoretical hypothesis of reconstruction[187] of the Wooden Trojan Horse, had as the main idea of the structure with the chassis model of a ship from the Late Bronze Age, which was pushed by 28 horses to the gates of Troy.

How much is worth a literary metaphor to make a problem bigger, soluble; for the simple reason, that there is no record – in text or archaeological artifacts – of more advance siege machinery until the reign of Aššurnarṣipal II[188] , as Fabrice De Backer referred. The most famous iconography of an assault machinery is depicted in the North-eastern relief of what would be the Palace of Nimrud[189] (Room B, Panel XVIII), the well-known Assyrian battering-ram[190] that was a more sophisticated siege weapon at the time. As Stefan G. Chrissanthos referred "[…] The Assyrians also had one other military advantage: their siege craft. […] The Assyrians perfected the art of breaking into fortified cities. They employed battering rams, siege towers, and sappers to tunnel under walls"[191].

To further consideration about the discussion on possibility of an Egyptian battering-ram evidence had no sense, as Nicolas E. Wernick defends: "Despite the claim of Yadin and Schulman that the use of the battering-ram was known to the Egyptian in the Middle Kingdom, there is no evidence in textual, artistic or archaeological material for its use during the New Kingdom"[192]. In line with the early affirmation what really Yigael Yadin said was "[…] *in his opinion* […] *could be*

[185] TIBONI 2021: 8.
[186] *Od*. 8.489-494; PAGE 1992: 296; SINGER (ed.), EASTSON 2010: 50-63.
[187] CHONDROS, MILIDONIS, PAIPETIS, ROSSI 2015: 261-282.
[188] FERRIL 1994: 74-75; RADNER, ROBSON 2011: 396-397.
[189] WIESNER 1968: 128-129.
[190] CAMPBELL 2006: 7-26; FAGAN, TRUNDLE (ed.), FAGAN 2010: 94; LIVERANI 2014: 504; BACKER 2016: 142-153; COTTERELL 2022: 233-246.
[191] CHRISSANTHOS 2008: 19.
[192] WERNICK 2014: 329.

interpreted as […]*"*, so, this is an interpretation and not a fact[193]. Yigael Yadin did had a proof of the existence of an Egyptian battering-ram during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom period. Despite, the Egyptian iconography only show three soldiers with a large stick under the protection of some structure, which it possible represent that they were maybe *trying* to open a hole on the wall, it would have been very insufficient, complicated and primitive. There is no evidence that sustains this interpretation that could be corroborated by any military historian. Yigael Yadin said the following affirmation:

> "[…] In these drawings we have, in my opinion, the earliest documents depicting the battering-ram and the sloping glacis *together*, or in fact, at all. The sloping glacis is very clearly depicted in all three figures. As for the primitive construction, sheltering two or three soldiers who are pushing a very long shaft against the walls (Fig. 3) or the battlements (Figs. 1-2) with their hands-they should be interpreted in my opinion, as a primitive type of *battering-ram* […]"[194].

Hence, there is no evidence of a battering-ram in Egypt *a contrario sensu* to the Assyrian reliefs period where it's possible to find many mentions in the texts about the siege warfare. The reason for this is a logical one, the siege warfare was an Ancient Near Eastern tactical weapon of war that goes back to the early times of the Sumerian-Akkadian period. It appeared in the later Old Babylonian texts (ca.1800-1600 BC) describe as a two major types of siege engines, i.e. the *yaššabum* or *ašubum* (battering-ram)[195] and *dimtum* (siege tower).

Although, the existence of an ancient cylinder-seal dated back to the mid-3rd millennium found in southern Mesopotamia, portraying a Mesopotamian siege tower and ram assaulting a city[196]. Also, it's possible to observe an Akkadian[197] siege tower

[193] SHAW 1991: 39.
[194] YADIN 1955: 31.
[195] YADIN 1955: 30; HAMBLIN 2006: 216.
[196] HAMBLIN 2006: 219; SASSON 2015: 199, 208, 284.
[197] LEVINE, RENFREW, BOYLE (ed.), OATES 2003: 115; HAMBLIN 2006: 219.

and ram in a cylinder-seal from Nabada/Tell Beydar (in Syria), which revelled that the chronology goes back to the core of the Ancient Near Eastern siege engineer warfare, even before Assyria.

Nevertheless, its imperious to mention the constant reference to a Hittite battering-ram and its use in siege warfare, but so far, the earliest references to this engine, siege machine, or even to sieges towers were from Near Eastern kingdoms. The Mari Letters[198], the Sumerian-Akkadian and the Assyrian-Babylonic Annals[199], Texts, Chronicles, etc., exists a constant reference to siege warfare which constitute substantial evidence in this matter. Culturally the Near East was so powerful that the Mari Letters were written in Sumerian-Akkadian, as Jack M. Sasson[200] refer.

Even when some academics referred the Hittite Uršu text the dimension of a siege battle tactics applied by the Hittites were clearly influenced by the Mesopotamian engineer warfare. As it was recognized by Jürgen Lorenz – Ingo Schrakamp in which referred the following affirmation: "According to the Mesopotamian cuneiform tradition, such methods may have constituted the common repertoire of siege warfare in the Near East. The undermining of fortified structures and the use of storm-ladders were surely techniques in common use as well"[201].

Therefore, with a careful analysis it's easy to realise that the *praxis militaris* of a siege craft was in the Near East a normal tactic, as well the use of a mobile structures like a siege tower or a battering-ram that had its presence in primordial times of war, of course starting in the Sumerian-Akkadian period. Even thought, the argument about the use of a battering-ram in Egypt its absurd, because as further as the excavation in Egypt develop, the fortresses[202] were built exclusively in the Upper Egypt colliding with the Nubian frontier.

This Egyptians fortresses function as an Upper Egypt protector block clearly due to the fact about the possibility of a Nubian incursion. The idea was to have a back protector, as well as a political campaign to maintain a stability in a Lower Nubia

[198] HEIMPEL 2003: 66, 104.
[199] E2.3/231, 2.3.2/232, 2.3.3/233.
[200] SASSON 2015: 2-3.
[201] GENZ, MIELKE (ed.), SCHRAKAMP 2011: 145.
[202] FERREIRA 2016: 23-279, 2019: 31-52.

territory, exactly to keep the Nubians away, controlled, watched and blocked to the Egyptian territory. As Ellen Morris clearly explained about the Nubian problematic: "From Egypt's point of view, then, the trade missions that passed through Lower Nubia to Kerma—or even to lands beyond—required safe passage, and it was thus imperative that the population of Lower Nubia refrain from raiding Egyptian caravans or from extorting exorbitant customs fees. […]"[203].

On the other hand, the Egyptian political expansion campaign in the Levantine region was no more than an administrative ruling, as it will be explained in more detail in the next topics. So, the Egyptians had no need the develop siege tactics, because internally their cities weren't walled, and the major military concerned of the Egyptians was with the Nubian frontier, as it's known so far. As Ludwig D. Morenz and Lutz Popko mentioned: "In the New Kingdom, Levantine city states were under Egyptian sovereignty but were not organized as an Egyptian province. In fact, a special form of administration with Egyptian suzerainty was devised"[204].

Thus, the main siege *praxis militaris* in the Ancient Near East Military History goes back exactly to the famous cities' sieges during the reign of Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III in its expansionist campaigns towards the Mediterranean. Finally, it was Vegetius who best synthesized in his work *Epitoma rei militaris* the two most effective ways of fencing, deprecating the following:

> "Multa defensionum oppugnationumque sunt genera, quae locis competentibus inseremus. Nunc sciendum est obsidendi duas species esse, unam cum adversarius oportunis locis praesidiis ordinatis vela qua prohibet inclusos vel deditionem sperat a fame, quando omnes prohibuerit commeatus; hoc enim consilio ipse otiosus ac tutus fatigat inimicum".
>
> "Por agora, é sabido existirem duas maneiras de cerco, uma das quais quando o adversário instala um posto num lugar propício e, ou corta a água aos sitiados, ou – impedida a circulação de todas as provisões – espera a sua

[203] MORRIS 2018: 69.
[204] LLOYD (ed.), MORENZ, POPKO 2010: 101.

> rendição pela fome; na verdade, com este procedimento, conserva-se ele próprio tranquilo e seguro, e desgasta o inimigo"[205].

Therefore, setting up a siege aims to tire the enemy out in the fastest way possible, so that there is a surrender from the besieged part. This tactic usually only applies when there is a disproportionality of forces because there is some difficulty and inability to react to the external threat. Hence, the duration of a siege[206] could not be perpetuated for nine years, and the "war"[207] itself against the Trojans would not handle a reality of nine years, but of many more, as well as and before the siege that Homer narrates.

[205] "For now, it is known that there are two ways to siege, one of which when the adversary installs a post in a propitious place and, either cuts off the water to the besieged or – prevented the circulation of all provisions – awaits its surrender by hunger; in fact, with this procedure, he himself is quiet and safe and wears out the enemy" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see Veg. *Mil*. 4.7).
[206] FOSTER 1914: 294-308; LESKY 1995: 46.
[207] DAWSON 1996: 13-14; CITATI 2005: 63-70.

1.3 The warhorses of Poseidon and Aššur: Horse trade from Anatolia to Assyria

Assuming that the Late Bronze Age trade is understood as an international reality, which was more active between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean space since the beginning of the 2nd millennium BC. Yet, the issue of the horse trade is much older. The cultural sharing inherent one is due to commercial activity and the need to wage war. Paradoxically evidenced a development of new technologies like the chariot, and the enginery process to develop a moveable vehicle pulled by horses trained engaged in battle, was by far the first technologic machine of war[208]. As Arthur Cotterell defends: "[…] the rise of Mitanni was connected with the invention of the chariot, the world's first war machine"[209]; and the horse was the "engine".

Much of this trade took place "between the banks of the two rivers", the Euphrates and the Tigris, with a strong relationship, initially to the Asian steppes. As Stuart Piggott refers, "the steppe is the homeland of wild horses"[210], in which domestication[211] must have taken place before ca.4200 BC. Not only in these Central Asian steppes, but also the crossing from the Carpathian Basin to Central Europe, because the horse essentially spread through the Lower Danube Valley in ca.4200-4000 BC. Therefore, during the Proto-Indo-European[212] expansion, it had special importance in the pre-dynastic societies of Anatolia, due to the proximity of the Caucasus Mountains.

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[208] WEST 2007: 42-43.

[209] YADIN 1963: 36; COTTERELL 2022: 71.

[210] PIGGOTT 1981: 176.

[211] The domestication of the horse took a few centuries to master due to the characteristics of the *Equus caballus* large size. Known for having a remarkable strength, being more aggressive, and, at the same time, more scared or ready for a confrontation depending on the animal itself. Consequently, the task of capturing an animal with these behavioural characteristics turned out to be harder than expected. However, David W. Anthony proposes that the development of domestication and of the assembly itself, should have happened through the capture and creation in an environment of a familiar nucleus, in a way, that it could be controlled and properly tamed (see DOWNS 1961: 1193-1203; KELEKNA 2009: 1-31; ANTHONY 2010: 278; GUIMARAES, ARBUCKLE, PETERS, ADCOCKS, BUITENHUIS, CHAZIN, MANASERYAN, UERPAMANN, GRANGE, GEIGL 2020: 1-10).

[212] This Proto-Indo-European expansion that had reached the north of the Peloponnese continued south until reaching the Cycladic islands, with the history of Minos attesting to this anatomical heritage. Somehow in their writing, they reveal some similarities with the Indo-European linguistic family. Thus, they would be a kind of "distant cousins" of the Achaeans, the "Pelagians" (see WEBSTER 1964: 178-186; LÉVÊQUE 1967: 46; BURROWS 1969: 196-197; HOOD 1973: 13, 34-40; KITTO 1990: 25-27; MUNSON 2005: 7-13; MUNRO 2013: 109-115).

The cities of Uruk and Ur were the first two cities in History, which had the first commercial and cultural contact with the Asian and Anatolian steppes in ca.3700-3100 BC[213] alluding to the species *Equus caballus*. The Sumerians designated the "horse" first by *ANŠE.ZI.ZI* translated as domestic horse and, later, by *ANŠE.KUR.RA* "the mountain donkey"[214], and in Akkadian called *sīsûm*[215]. Therefore, in the 2nd millennium the Sumerian logogram *ANŠE.EDIN.NA* the "equid of the steppe" translated as *onager*/*hemione*[216] which in Akkadian is called *serrēmu*.

The Sumerian-Akkadians of the III Dynasty of Ur at the end of the 3rd millennium already knew the *Equus caballus* and domestication, which influenced Sumerian language and phonetic value from the Sumerian logogram *ANŠE* to the phonemes *kunga*$_2$, *dusu*$_2$[217] and as in Akkadian the word *sīsûm* related to Horse. So as time went by, this species ended up replacing the native horse[218].

The steppes are the natural habitat of wild horses due to their spatial amplitude of the steppes of Asia and Central Europe/Eurasia, during the Pleistocene. They also provide natural protection to the horse from predators such as wolves. It is the biological and genetic constitution of the horse – the elongated neck, per example – which provides a biological defence mechanism, which allows a large range and depth of sight.

These biological characteristics must have been improved due to the climate and habitat, such as the plain. It´s in front of a vast horizon that the horse acquires a defensive biological trait – an elongated neck. The habitat gave the horse a bigger dimension and a new diet. Though, the migrations of families of wild horses were

[213] However, during the expansion of Uruk, mainly in the Late Uruk period (ca.3350-3100 BC) trade relations intensified both to the North of the Euphrates and Tigris, but also to the East with the creation of colonies, like Susa. In this way, it allowed a greater circulation of goods and people, which enabled the creation of *Writing*. As well as the East with the creation of colonies, like Susa. However, it allowed a greater flow of people and goods, which enabled the creation of *Writing*. The creation of *Writing* was not solely deemed a commercial need, it was also an instrument that regulates trades and identifies what was observed (see OPPENHEIM 1964: 12-22; MALLOWAN 1971: 59-71; AMIET 1974: 44-66; KRAMER 1977: 195-196; DIRINGER 1985: 15-37; HERDER 1987: 168; LIVERANI 2017: 77-83).
[214] GADD 1940: 31; AZZAROLI 1997: 23-24; HYLAND 2003: 9-10; ANTHONY 2010: 382; MATTILA, ITO, FINK (ed.), SELZ 2019: 39-41.
[215] BOYLE, LEVINE, RENFREW (ed.), OATES 2003: 117; LIVERANI 2014: 273.
[216] MEADOW, UERPMANN (eds), GILBERT 1991: 75-122.
[217] RECHT 2022: 9.
[218] PORTER, SCHWARTZ 2012: 165-170; NOBLE 2015: 35.

extremely important for this improvement. During the 4th millennium BC, changes in the fauna and flora and climate allowed some equine subspecies to settle in the Caspian[219] steppe, in the Ponto region. As Laerke Recht defends:

> "The morphological characteristics are primarily based on the enamel patterns of teeth, general size (especially for horses), and postcranial remains, particularly the 'slenderness' of metapodials. Various other factors have been suggested for the skull and the postcranial skeleton. […] General body size is perhaps the characteristic most commonly used in practice and can with some confidence distinguish between horses (larger) and donkeys (smaller), at least in later periods when they were both clearly domesticated"[220].

The ancient *Tartans*[221] or *Equus ferus ferus*[222] were probably the first wild horses to be domesticated[223]. Subsequently, in the same period, at the end of the 3rd millennium BC[224], *Equus caballus* would arrive in the Near East[225]; that is, a horse with the same characteristics as a modern horse[226]. Just as the definition of the

[219] DREWS 2004: 9.
[220] RECHT 2022: 17.
[221] BOYLE, LEVINE, RENFREW (ed.), LEVINE 2003: 4.
[222] COLLIS 2002: 17; GEPTS, FAMULA, BETTINGER, BRUSH, DAMANIA, MCGUIRE, QUALSET 2012: 246.
[223] The *Tartan* species was possibly the first wild equine species (it isn't a modern horse/ *Equus caballus*) to be domesticated, however, the DNA tests to the earliest horses indicate some evidence of domestication that could go back to the ca.9400 BC. This evidence may bring some problems to the actual and future historical narrative about this topic. Nevertheless, the first modern horses to be domesticated belong to the region of Anatolia and the Ponte-Caspian steppe region in ca.5000/4800 BC the Middle Holocene (see JANSEN, FORSTER, LEVINE, OELKE, HURLES, RENFREW, WEBER, OLEK (ed.) 2002: 10905–10910; BARKER 2006: 31; ANTHONY 2010: 275-278).
[224] According to Duncan Noble, M. A. Littauer and J. H. Crouwel the *Equus caballus* was already known by the Sumerians-Akkadians of the III Dynasty of Ur, at the end of the 3rd millennium BC. However, the iconographic representations were found in Tel Aya from the Akkadian period. Still the early Babylonic riders form Kiš that appear in the terracotta tablets and cylinder seals proves that the Horse riding was known by the Sumerian-Babylonic (dated from the end of the 3rd millennium and 2nd millennium). According to Augusto Azzaroli "The riders are not warriors, nor are they hunters or predators. They are unarmed, either summarily dressed or naked, with a simple belt at their waist" (see LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1979: 23-28; AZZA ROLI 1997: 25-26; NOBLE 2015: 35).
[225] WILLEKES 2016: 64-72.
[226] The arrival of the *Equus caballus* (or the modern horse) in the Near East allowed its development, domestication, and breeding to constitute a determining factor, both in transport and in war. One of the

dimensions of the Ancient Near Eastern[227] horse is crucial for the creation of the first cavalry, on which the historian specialist in horsemanship Ann Hyland defends:

> "Too diminutive a horse (pony) would not have been much use in war, especially in the later cavalry phase"[228].

In Thessaly[229] – a region north of the Peloponnese – there was a species of half-ass known as *Equus hemionus*/onager, which in Greek is called *ἡμίονος*, has settled. However, it lasted until crossing with other species. Paradoxically, at the end of the 3rd millennium, around ca.2000 BC, there was a migration of peoples from the Indo-European linguistic family (the Ionians, Aeolians, Achaeans, and Dorians)[230]. This migration from Northern Europe through the Carpathian-Danubian regions allowed the settlement of the pre-Hellenic territory.

It is understood that these people[231] crossed the entire Balkan region and settled in Northern Anatolia[232], some in the region of the Strait of Dardanelles. With these people came along the *Equus caballus*, which was already known in the Near East, which allowed a different development. As Laerke Recht defends:

> "The straight back and comparatively short, low-rise steps of donkeys make for a much more comfortable ride over long distances. […] The difference in physical build of horses and donkeys also result in the same tack not fitting equally well on both: ideally, it should be specifically developed and adapted for each species. As we will see, this can be detected in the ancient material,

most paradigmatic examples was the introduction of the horse and chariot into Egypt during the 16th dynasty (ca.1650-1550 BC), at the time of the Hyksos invasions (possibly a coalition of Syrians and Bedouins). As Stuart Piggott refers, "The first known horse in Egypt was buried with all honours, around ca.1750 BC" (see CULICAN 1966: 33-34; PIGGOTT 1981: 177; WEST 2007: 417-418).

[227] RECHT 2022: 23-26.

[228] HYLAND 2003: 11.

[229] HALL 2016: 62.

[230] LÉVÊQUE 1967: 26.

[231] DREWS 1994: 127.

[232] PIGGOTT 1981: 145-156; HUGHES 2006: 75-76.

where there was both experimentation with types of tack and adaptation to species"[233].

Through breeding, the cross between *Equus caballus* and other species (possibly from the Levant) provided more robust characteristics. Caused both by the horse trade between the Aegean[234] and the Near East, the need to breed horses[235] over donkeys permitted a more "manageable" (the *Equus caballus*) and a more valuable product. For this reason, it is hypothesized that around the 2nd millennium BC, during the migration of the Ionians[236], they may have deviated and settled in the *Wilušiya*[237] region, and only after that migrated to the Attica region. In this sense, they assumed characteristics that differentiated the Trojans from the others, even though they were entirely linked to the region of Thessaly, as can be seen in the myths – for example, the myth of the centaur[238].

This scenario was conducive to the development of distinct societal capabilities and characteristics, which distinguished them from both the Hittites and the Mycenaeans[239]. This explains, the predisposition and investment of a culture directed and focused on the breeding and domestication of the horse, which consequently led to the improvement of the species. Hence, we can see those three regions – Thessaly, Troy, and Mitanni – had the morphological, geographic, and cultural capacity, which enabled the perpetuation of the tradition of breeding (*hippobotai*)[240] and taming of the horse. This was metamorphosed, ritualized, mythologized, and was used as a totem.

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[233] RECHT 2022: 29.
[234] ANDERSON 1961: 2-3.
[235] STRAUSS 2006: 60; WILLEKES 2016: 127.
[236] This migration is related to the myth of Ion, who was a River God that's, paradigmatically at a philological level, the eponym of "Ion" will lead to the name "Ionian" which means "Ardent". As Euripides and Plato referred in theirs plays by the name *Ion* (see ROEBUCK 1959: 1-166; ALTY 1982: 1-14; FERREIRA 1992: 15-21; LESKY 1995: 115-116; LEÃO 2010: 75-83; FERENTINOS, GKIONI, GERAGA, PAPATHEODOROU, 2012: 2167-2176). Frederico Lourenço, nonetheless, emphasised that "Íon dará o nome aos Jónios, seus descendentes; e de Xuto e Creúsa nascerão Doro e Aqueu, ascendentes dos Dórios e dos Aqueus, respectivamente"/ "Ion will name the Ionians his descendants, and from Xuto and Creusa were born Doro and Achaea, ascendants of the Dorians and the Achaeans, respectively" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see LOURENÇO 2005: 25)
[237] DREWS 1994: 81-82.
[238] WEBSTER 1964: 124-129; VEYNE 1987: 72-74.
[239] CULICAN 1966: 102.
[240] *Hippobotai* means in ancient Greek "horse breeders" (see GRAS 1998: 47).

Not to be confused with the ass or the onager, which were more common in Ancient Egypt, Nubia, and the Syrian-Canaanite Corridor. Species such as *Equus africanus* that inhabited one of the most inhospitable regions of the Sahara. The *Equus africanus africanus* in Nubia, which inhabited the east of the Sahara and the Red Sea Coast. The *Equus asinus* that was common in Egypt, especially during the 4th and 3rd millennium BC, spread throughout the regions of Palestine, Arabia, and the entire Near East. Hence, not forgetting the *Equus africanus somaliensis*[241], as its name indicates its origin from the Somali region, it lived between the said Horn of Africa and the coast of Eritrea. The Greeks and Romans defined these species as *όνάγροϛ* (or "wild donkeys").

The subspecies in the Syrian-Canaanite region were dispersed over an area that extended to the Indus Valley. While in the Northwest of the Indus Valley, in a desert region where the *Thar* or *Equus hemionus khur* known today as the "Indian wild donkey" lived. Yet, it´s in the region of present-day Iran, which inhabited the *Ghor-khar* or *Equus hemionus onager*. And this shared border with Syria where inhabited the *Achdari* or *Equus hemionus hemippus*[242] (it was this species of *onager* that was used by the Sumerians in their war vehicles)[243].

The donkeys and the onagers[244] were extremely territorial, a characteristic that distinguished them from the wild horse[245] and, consequently, from the *Equus caballus* (the modern horse) by their size. The characteristic size of the *Equus caballus* was

[241] COLLINS 2002: 17.
[242] VILA, GOURICHON, CHOYKE, BUITENHUIS (ed.), HELMER, GOURICHON 2008: 124.
[243] COLLINS 2002: 18.
[244] DREWS 1994: 78.
[245] Apart from the *Equus hydruntinus* that was common in southern Europe and the Levant that became extinct. However, being part of the diet of a large part of the prehistoric "communities" / "clusters" where horses are found, according to André Leroi-Gourhan the wild horse "[…] foi a caça *por excelência* em todos os períodos da Pré-história"/ "[…] was the hunt *par excellence* in all periods of Prehistory" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see LEROI-GOURHAN 1987: 41). Mainly after the Ice Age, the same species existed and adapted to that colder climate, being spread throughout Asia and Europe, including the Iberian Peninsula. The hunting figures of the horse and bison would have a symbolic component which, in turn, suggests that there was the construction of a mythological idea. A theme that is often repeated as the object of a symbiosis between the perception of the hunting scene and a zoomorphic construction. To represent a duality of man *versus* nature, in their differences and similarities. The Bellerophon myth is a reference to these symbioses between the Neolithic art and the archaeological artifacts of the Mycenae period. And influences of the Anatolic Hittite and Assyrian-Babylonic mythologies (see *Il*. 6,152-164; *Jer* 2,24; WEBSTER 1964: 178-180; VIDAL-NAQUET 2002: 15-16).

important to horse breeding cultures. It was possible to domesticate, commercialize and conduct horse breeding to improve the species for military training, gaining preponderance over the use of the Sumerian logogram *ANŠE.GÚ* and in Akkadian *imēru* (donkey/*ass*)[246] – the *Equus asinus*[247] could be related to the Akkadian *agālum* which represent the domesticated or ridding donkey/ass, the more common equid type in the Bronze Age – and the *onager* (or *haradan* in Arabic).

It was during the 2nd millennium BC that commercial activity and contacts between the Near East, Anatolia and the Peloponnese intensified and brought these regions closer together. These circumstances reflect a commercial complexity, which at the international level went beyond the *limes*, that is, the commercial dynamics provided an extra-wall cultural conjecture. The cities came to understand the level of importance and attraction of land and sea´s trade routes. The city could hold a set of other small and medium cities (satellite cities) that mirrored the influence of a larger and more important city.

In this sense, the means of transport developed both with the creation of the wheel, approximately in the 5th millennium BC, and with the domestication of the horse. Consequently, earlier to the development of these technological mechanisms, transportation was done by men and the use of donkeys to carry heavier loads. As a result, the trade was much slower and more expensive between cities. The importance of developing agricultural complexes – the wheel, the boat, and the domestication of the horse – catapulted the development of commercial capacity in the cities.

The use of the horse/*Equus caballus* in Near Eastern societies was as important as the invention of the wheel, as both served the same purpose, complementing each other in two really determining factors: transport, and war[248]. But to these factors, I must add another one, the boat, which allowed the development of all societies in the Near and Middle East, firstly in the river crossing and later in the Mediterranean Sea. Not forgetting, in this way, the importance of small rudimentary vessels that are

[246] MITCHELL 2018: 72-108.
[247] RECHT 2022: 14.
[248] HOOD 1973: 156-159; PIGGOTT 1981: 114; TAVARES 1987: 23.

extremely useful for crossing rivers[249] such as the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, used in First Dynasty Egypt and Sumer.

The Sumerian vessels – in addition to being fluvial – were more developed than the Egyptian ones. There are even traces and records of the presence of Sumerian vessels in the Persian Gulf. This means that there was commercial contact with the Indus Valley during the Sumerian-Akkadian period, that is, they already had the ability to navigate by sea[250].

The boat, as well as the horses and the wheel, provided the development of societies, not only in their autonomy. The creation of a commercial link with war as a defining factor in the acquisition of wealth and technological development. In this way, it is possible to understand that it was in the service of the war in Sumer that the wheel decisively assumed its role as a technological invention. This technology is put to the test both in the symbiosis in vehicle construction and the introduction of the fit and enjoyment of the dynamic element. Nevertheless, the first traction element – the donkey, and later the horse – was a decisive factor in the development of these societies.

Thus, it was the horse that catapulted the war chariot capacity to a level of military development, which lasted until the 8th/7th BC in the reign of Sennacherib, with the autonomy and structuring of the cavalry unit. In this way, understanding that during the 2nd millennium commerce already had more developed systems provided an idea that it was no longer useful for a subsistence economy. During the Late Bronze Age emergence, surged an idea to obtain through international relations power and political-military influence over a particular region, society, or city (as was the case of Troy or Mitanni).

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[249] The vessels such as the coracle, used to cross small rivers, which are still used for this purpose today, for example, in Iran and the Netherlands. The coracle is also primarily related to the myth of the Flood, in its Babylonian version it is explicitly described in terms of its size. Nevertheless, it would be much larger than a normal coracle. In the story of Atra(m)-ḫasīs / Utanapištim, he would have to save all animal species known to Babylonian Man. These species would essentially be domestic animals – animals that were closer to man, such as goats, chickens, dogs, cats, donkeys, horses, among others. It´s not a literal reference to *all* animals (see KRAMER [s.d.]: 177-183; BOTTÉRO 2006: 53-57; DALLEY 2009: 1-39; FINKEL 2014: 146-167).

[250] TOYNBEE 1964: 25; WHEELER 1966: 11-14; CULICAN 1966: 14-27; KARMER 1977: 325-326; CRAWFORD 2013: 454.


In this sense, it is imperative to mention that commerce was done through cities, and from cities to cities, as well as, war and religion belong to the city, as Duncan Noble says "War is as old as civilization"[251].

The trade was intensified, and the distances and time were shortened. Symbolic and mythological conceptions changed due to the war factor, which provided a circumstance for adapting behaviour, as we can understand with the prosperity of the citadel of Troy[252]. Troy was a cultural and commercial hub, a place of unavoidable interconnection between Asia Minor and the Aegean.

It was known for having a highly complex fortification system, which sought in its construction to take advantage of and adapt the structure of walls and towers to the geographic morphology that was inherent to it. In a way, Troy was known to be impassable. Paradoxically, Troy acquired an opening in its defensive complexity that allowed it to maintain a very active commercial activity, inside and outside the walls.

Paradigmatically, the Mitanni region developed more economically through military processes, approaching the Syrian region, mainly the city of Alalaḫ[253], Ugarit, Al-Mina[254]/Posidion[255] (this name come from the 8th BC) or Byblos. Already during the reign of Sauštatar that resolved an old conflict between Kizzuwatna and Alalaḫ, which allowed political and economic stability in the region. This region had been under Hittite occupation, which nevertheless reflected the great influence and authority of the king of Mitanni. Even near the Oronte River and consequently, the eastern Mediterranean coast. Nevertheless, confronted in Syria by expansionist campaigns of Thutmose III.

[251] NOBLE 2015: 15.
[252] KIRK 1962: 4-5.
[253] The city of Alalaḫ, which was located near the mouth of the Orontes River, was a large trading post, with a great Achaean influence. This geographic location allowed the flow of products directly with the Euphrates River and, in turn, had easy access to the routes that converged on the Jordan River in Jericho (see WEBSTER 1964: 144).
[254] HELM 1980: 86-89.
[255] COOK 1971: 64.



Map 1: The map represents the kingdom of Mitanni and the reality of the civilization in the 14th century BC https://wildhunt.org/2022/06/mitanni-city-emerges-from-the-mosul-reservoir.html

The interest and need for proximity to the Mediterranean and also to the island of *Alašiya*, which is an important trading post, made it possible to establish a bridge with the coast of Asia Minor, even with Crete. As explained by Marc Van De Mieroop:

> "Cyprus and the Aegean became regular trading partners, while trade contacts with Egypt intensified. A maritime trading system developed by which the countries along the eastern Mediterranean shores were tied together, visited by ships that circled the sea picking up items at all stops and exchanging them for others"[256].

The purpose of this relationship was to maintain Mitanni as a commercial hub. This allowed the transaction of products that came from the Aegean and the Syrian-Canaanite Corridor to the East; from Ḫatti to the North, from the region of present-day Afghanistan to the West; and from Babylon to the Southwest.

Hence, Mitanni was a pivot city, where everything converged – both land and river trade routes and the sea routes of the Mediterranean. Luxury goods were also a part of this mass trading – premium items such as animal products, pottery and

[256] MIEROOP 2015: 263.

amphorae that carried a wide variety of cereals and seeds, fish, salt meat, bitumen, wine, wheat, dates, reeds (for building houses), grain[257], bronze plates[258], textiles, pigments of lapis lazuli, wood, gold (which came from Egypt), etc. All this was transported by land, river, or sea, from the East (Assyria) to the West (Mycenae) and *vice versa*.

The products were traded by Mycenaean boats or by Ugaritic ships, however, the Mycenaeans built a fleet that made it possible to control trade and the seas. These Mycenaean vessels had few characteristics that distinguished them from those of Ugarit or Egypt. As Pierre Lévêque briefly describes:

> "The most common type is the rowing ship (generally 5 pairs, but much larger boats have 15 pairs of oars: it was in a triacontor of this kind that Theseus undertook his voyage to Crete); but this ship also has a mast and can therefore combine the force of the wind with the effort of the oarsmen"[259].

This type of boat could correspond to various activities, such as trade, piracy, and war. However, it is necessary to highlight the two important outposts, Miletus, and Colophon. These ports were strategically located close to the route that came from Syria and *Alašiya*, being an obligatory stop before reaching Troy. It's important to remember that these regions were under the Achaean influence. Products were traded in Troy[260] where you could buy a little of everything. From weapons (specifically daggers and arrowheads), marble, ivory to ostrich eggs (as far as we know these products came from far away, it is not clear where, but were marketed by the Mycenaeans), vases (cups, which were not used as containers, but more in an

[257] BRAUDEL 2001: 96.
[258] The technique of joining the two metallic alloys, tin, and copper, was perfected in the Near East consisting of, as described by Stuart Piggott "[…] in the periodic reheating of the metal, in order to make it capable of being beaten into a plate, thus facilitating the manufacture of vases, helmets, breastplates, shields, etc…" (see PIGGOTT 1981: 189).
[259] LÉVÊQUE 1967: 73.
[260] CLINE 1991: 1-9.

exhibition sense, due to their aesthetic value). The Mycenaeans usually bought two products that the Trojans[261] excelled at producing, cloth and horses[262].

The Mycenaeans not only occupied the great islands of the Aegean (Crete and Rhodes), but they also created entrepots (similar to the *emporia*[263] or *bīt-kāri*[264] or *kāru*[265] of the Archaic Period)[266] throughout the eastern Mediterranean. As a result, it provided the construction of a commercial web in which the products that were traded connected Troy to Egypt – with the exception of Anatolia. Only the coastal area of Anatolia was able to take advantage of this commercial surplus, perpetrated by the Mycenaean hegemony and monopoly[267].

This situation became a dangerous factor for the Hittites, as they did not have a navy or ports that allowed them to purchase products cheaper. The Hittite´s expansionist policy towards the South (towards Syria), which allowed for the capture of the land and sea commercial pole, as was Ugarit[268]. In addition to the Hittite´s interest in the Mitanni region, if it were indeed occupied, it would create a natural boundary that would alienate the Babylonians and the Assyrians. And, at the same time, the Hittites would have control of all trade routes North of the Euphrates.

In this context paradigmatically the Hittite kingdom and after confrontations with the Egyptians of Ramesses II, the Hittite influence was noticed until Kadeš (the battle took place in ca.1274 BC). Well, what was at stake was an extremely important region for both regional and international trade. Because whoever controlled this region would have the ability to enjoy large tax revenues, most of which came from customs duties.

The products would enter the Syrian coast and head south, to the region of Canaan, specifically to Jericho and, consequently, would reach Egypt. However, they would also head west towards the Euphrates and there converged between Anatolia and Babylon, where was the kingdom of Mitanni. The awakening of Assyria was not

[261] PAGE 1992: 58, 70.
[262] LÉVÊQUE 1967: 72.
[263] GRAS 1998: 200.
[264] NAKATA, NISHIAKI, ODAKA, YAMADA, YAMADA (ed.), YAMADA 2019: 222-235.
[265] PARPAS 2018: 63-64.
[266] KELDER 2006: 52; VERNANT (dir.) 1994: 40-41.
[267] CLINE 2014: 87-89.
[268] CULICAN 1966: 52-54.

unusual, for an expansionist period directed towards the East, as mentioned by Marc Van De Mieroop[269].

An essential question arises then, as to how to proceed in the transactions of products to logistics and the transport of horses. Archaeological and textual data from this period are scarce, so the meaning of the question is divided into two other questions: Was there a way to transport horses by sea? Or were they only moved the animals overland? What is known is that horse transactions during the Late Bronze Age certainly took place by land. Though by sea there is no documentary, ichnographic or archaeological data, with only references from the Hellenistic period and later periods.

It is not possible to develop this subject in a deeper way, for the simple reason that boats from the Hellenistic period are much more developed and larger than those used in the Late Bronze Age. It is known, however that ships from the Hellenistic period were prepared for commercial activity and others specifically designed for war. Yet, something that was not distinguishable in the Mycenaean[270], Ugaritic or Egyptian galleys – at least we can refer to the Greek term used in the transport of horses is *ἱππαγωγά* "*hippagoga*"[271].

Therefore, it is important to point out the characteristics and natural difficulties of what it is like to transport a horse[272]. There are some facts still to be questioned, such as the rocking of the boat due to the movement of the sea swell. Would it be necessary for the horses to be blindfolded so they wouldn't stress out? How much space was needed to carry a horse? What would be the necessary amount of food onboard? How would this space be cleaned?

[269] MIEROOP 2015: 277.

[270] The typology of the Mycenaean galleys, as in all others, contained a system of oars arranged in pairs, with a single level of oars, normally totally, were 10 oars or more, that is, 5 to port and 5 to starboard (in some Egyptian iconographies appear 4 oars on each side), had a large rudder on the stern, as can be seen in Egyptian iconography. Thus, they had a low draft, which allowed them to be put dry on the dock in sandy harbours, making it easier for them to be transported ashore, in order to shelter them from the wind and storms (see TAYLOR 1970: 160-161).

[271] IOANNIDOU 2019: 9-18.

[272] MOSSÉ 1984: 58.

Regarding the safety of the animal itself and the durability and quality of the trip was a decisive factor. How many stops would have to be made, for example, from Troy as departure point to *Alašiya* as destination?

How many horses could a galley from the Late Bronze Age (or even the Hellenistic period) carry on board? And in which part of the boat where they kept? In turn, how would they get into the boat itself? Would it be on deck, or would there have a specific part for them to enter, like on medieval landing ships? Consequently, the boat would have to be larger than the one found, for example, in *Uluburum*.

These constraints and difficulties do not apply entirely to land routes, though only one of the crucial issues that were repeated were the resting points. Also, where and under what conditions would these stops take place, since the land routes during the Late Bronze Age did not belong to a network of roads, as those that existed in the Roman Empire. That is, they would be (at best) unpaved roads, crossing sometimes mountains and plateaus of the most varied.

If we think of Troy as a natural starting point, we must bear in mind that it was a citadel that traded horses. To trade, they would have to cross the entire region of the ancient kingdom of *Arzawa* (the land of *Lukka*), *Tarḫuntašša*, to the northern banks of the Euphrates. The transactions passed through various cities as Alalaḫ, Karkemiš[273], Aleppo, Emar[274] (these four cities belong to a region called *Kizzuwatna*, later known as Cilicia)[275], Ugarit, Qatna, Kadeš, Sumur, Byblos (these cities belong to the ancient region and kingdom of Amurru that disintegrated in the late 13th BC).

The climatic conditions are also an extremely relevant factor, especially in trade, both land and sea, which should not be neglected. Like Fernand Braudel[276] wrote in the title of his work *Memories of Mediterranean* summarizing this subject in his first chapter "Seeing the Sea". So, Braudel describes passionately, highlighting the climatic processes and their characteristics. It is the paradigms between the Mediterranean Sea[277] and the regions that describe it as natural frontiers, delimiting it in its dimensions. That makes this sea unique in having a decisive commercial role. As

[273] WASTON, WYATT 1999: 655.
[274] Idem *ibidem*: 656.
[275] MYNÁŘOVÁ, ONDERKA, PAVÚK (ed.), SIMON 2015: 391-394.
[276] BRAUDEL 2001: 17-31.
[277] GRAS 1998: 8, 18-29.

a former volcanic crater, with the depth of its waters close to Cape of Mattapan (as it is known today) that circumscribes a 4600m deep trench. This is to say that it is in this *Mare Internum*[278] that three continents meet, and the first societal people are catalysed towards a common memory.

Finally, if it were possible to synthesize this relationship between the terrestrial and maritime processes that the Mediterranean is the stage from the Neolithic to the Iron Age, and from the West (Aegean) to the Near East. As Cicero once said, "*haec fere accepinus*"[279]. The most attractive proposal would be that of André Varagnac:

> "[…] cada período da nossa Proto-história corresponde um tipo novo de circulação: no *Neolítico, é o calcorrear a pé*; no *Calcolítico, é o navio*; no *Bronze, é a atrelagem*; no *Ferro, é a cavalaria*"[280].

The horse was, doubtlessly, commercially profitable, and valuable, to the point of being both a luxury and a war product, as Barry Strauss references: "Horses are expensive, and in the Bronze Age they were usually used in military context, rarely as farm animals"[281]. This reality can be seen during the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, while he created the first cavalry corps.

[278] GRAS 1998: 30.
[279] FINLEY 1986: 54.
[280] "[…] each period of our Protohistory corresponds to a new type of circulation: in the *Neolithic ones, it is walking on foot*; in the *Chalcolithic it is the ship*; in *Bronze, it's the harness*; in *Iron, it's cavalry*" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see VARAGNAC 1963: 401).
[281] STRAUSS 2006: 176.




Figure 1: Part of a rock relief portraying the image of the king Tiglath-pileser I. This inscription was discovered *in situ* of a natural cave called Birkleyn (The Tigris Tunnel) in 1862. Source British Museum.

However, decades later, this premise is corroborated by a letter that king of the *Aḫḫiyawa* Warika (or Awariku) writes to Tiglath-pileser III, in which he extols the following "§4 I added horse to horse; §5 I added army to army. §6 Indeed, the Assyrian king and all the Assyrian dynasty became (like) a father and mother to me, §7 and (Ah)hiyawa and Assyria became a single house"[282], with the aim to remember the inter dynastic ties that both shared.

The reference to horses and their armies denotes the existence of an ancient bond of mutual respect and recognition, a link that was not exclusive to the second half of the 8th BC. But would certainly come from the 12th BC and the Assyrian monarchs who faced the Hittite's trade blockade between Assyria and Mycenae.

[282] BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 263-265.



Frontispiece. Map of the Late Bronze Age civilizations in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.

Map 2: Map of the Late Bronze Age representing the Aegean, Near East, and the Eastern Mediterranean civilization between the 1200-1177 BC (See CLINE 2014: iv).

1.4 The Invasion of the Near East and Assyria: The Sea People

There are several elaborations of conceptions, hypotheses and theories discussed by historians and archaeologists about the genesis of these "people" who crossed the Mediterranean Sea to invade the Syrian-Canaanite Corridor (or the Levant). Some proposals are similar to the perspective of the Christian monks of Lindisfarne during the first incursions of the Nordic people. The monks made the people of this region believe that these were as if they were the "Devil", the "Punishment of God", the "Apocalypse" or "The insoluble problem of the Sea People"[283].

Perspectives differ, from rather far-fetched to unsubstantiated theories, to the data we have. Some say that they came from Northern Europe and, from there, they extrapolated to a wave of mass destruction that could be felt from Mycenae, Sparta, Rhodes, Miletus, Lesbos, Troy, *Lukka*, *Alašiya* – until they finally arrived at Ugarit, in ca.1190-1185/4 BC. And, without respite, they headed South, where there was no Canaanite city (for example, Minet el-Beida) that did not suffer from this annihilation of the Levantine world, culminating in Egypt, in ca.1177 BC.

As if that wasn't enough, several archaeologists[284] enter the discussion with certain prerogatives, about some cities that have suffered from the so-called "Poseidon's horses"/Earthquakes. That in some way, would have previously weakened the structures of the cities. As for the empirical fact of this event, there is no discussion. What is discussed instead is, firstly, the prevailing conjectures, the repercussions, and the macro-scale effects that these earthquakes had on the disruption and destruction of other cities, such as Mycenae. And consequently, whether it opens or not, a precedent to the hypothesis of consubstantiation with the Invasions of the "Sea Peoples"[285]. It is an analogy, in a way, hasty and exaggerated, even condensing a cascade of events, which seem to fit together very well, naming them as the "Perfect Storm", as satirizes Eric H. Cline.

The conjectures of these incursions derive from the understanding of some factors, which are not *a priori*. In turn, some archaeologists and historians depart for

[283] BRAUDEL 2001: 180.
[284] CLINE 2014: 140-147.
[285] These invasions refer, essentially, to the late 13th BC and early 12th BC.

unclear and less objective explanations. In an argumentative attempt to attribute reasons that, consequently, allow them to connect certain data to a theory that the "Sea Peoples" were a "people", or a "collusion of people". That by self-determination wanted to end the commercial structure and corporate from the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this way, one enters a cloud of explanatory conjectures regarding the destruction of Mycenae and the cities of the Aegean, except for Troy. This is because there, the contours change – since it wrongly dealt with this issue in isolation. Then, they move to circumstances such as internal rebellions within Mycenaean and Canaanite cities, due to climate changes that, in turn, would lead to poor harvests, followed by widespread famine; earthquakes that would seldom culminate in the war between cities. And, in the end, to level the matter comes the invasions of the "Sea Peoples".

This type of reasoning and argumentation attributed to the precedents of the various destructions of the late 13th BC and early 12th BC should not be correlated with this perspective. As a result, the complexity of this period is not reduced to internal rebellions, complicated annual climatic contexts, hunger, political, social, and diplomatic instability and, to solve everything, use the argument of war.

These "Sea Peoples", as already discussed, are certainly those from the various Mycenaean cities, and some cities still do not know very well. In turn, all the complications related to the names of Hittite Letters and those we know from the Homeric Texts are the same, that is, they are Mycenaeans. Ann E. Killebrew and Gunnar Lehmann refer to the Late Bronze Age as the "Age of Internationalism"[286] precisely because of the various factors already discussed. As well as the diplomatic and commercial importance that they ended up developing more intensely, enabling this way the growth of societies.

With that said, another question arises, why is it that Assyria, (which during the reign of Adad-nirāri I occupies more than half of the region of *Ḫanigalbat*[287]. As a result, which was occupied in perpetuity until the reign of Tiglath-pileser I), does not suffer any damage with the Invasions of the "Sea Peoples"?

[286] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 5.
[287] GALIL, GILBOA, MAEIR, KAHN (ed.), FALES 2012: 99-121.

Well, this question can be clarified through the marriage and inter dynastic relationships of the Assyrian monarchs to the Mycenaean monarchs, as already discussed. However, the conjecture of the commercial blockade perpetrated by the Hittite monarchs, which was the *casus belli* for the invasive initiative of the "Sea Peoples", allowed Assyria to remain untouched but not quiet.

Let us go back to the period of the Middle Helladic until the Doric[288] Invasions (which already belongs to the Recent Helladic), to better understand and contextualize the proportions of these events that deserve a more careful reflection. Not only, delimiting these factors with the chronology, but also by the logic of the events. It is known that, before the first invasions of the Heled region, these places were already occupied, as far as is known, by more primitive people.

The Ionians were the first to direct their attention to the south, reaching Heled between ca.1950-1580 BC[289]. Once there, they intermingled with the natives of the Peloponnese region, as well as those of the *Wilušiya*[290] region, which, have already been occupied by the *Hattites*[291] roughly since the 3rd millennium[292]. Therefore, between ca.1580-1200 BC[293], it was the Achaeans who invaded and occupy Heled, the same ones referred to by Homer. These began the Mycenaean period, comprising two of the greatest events in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean – the Trojan War and the Invasions of the "Sea People". It is possible to infer that in addition to the Eastern Mediterranean, they also occupied the coastal regions of the Italian Peninsula.

[288] WEBSTER 1964: 40-41; BURROWS 1969: 139-141; FERREIRA 1992: 67-90; LIPIŃSKI 2004: 40.
[289] CLINE 2010: 148.
[290] The Ionians who settled in the Heled region introduced the horse, as well as their "cousins" who founded Troy VI, who took the horse (*Equus caballus*) from Northern Europe (see LÉVÊQUE 1967: 22-29; GRIMAL 2015: 47-49).
[291] To elucidate about this terminology and the ethnonym that the historians, the ethnologists, and the archaeologist used – on purpose – the term "Hattites" to differentiate the Hittites form the autochthonous people from the *Ḫatti*. The name "Hittite" comes from the Hebrew name *ḥittīm*, therefore, the toponym *Ḫatti* was given by the Assyrians to the region where was the kingdom of Ḫattuša, and subsequently noun as the Hittite Empire (see BRYCE 2012: 52, 67–75; YAKUBOVICH 2015: 35-36).
[292] GALHANO 2012: 8.
[293] The dates used to follow the chronological line of Pierre Lévêque, however, they vary according to specialists such as Dietz 1991, Dickinson 1994, Rutter 2001, Voutsaki Nijboer and Zerner (see CLINE 2010: 148).

Consequently, several fragments of Mycenaean vessels found in Panareia and Lipari Islands were discovered, as well as tombs in Syracuse and Tarentum[294].

The Mycenaean expansion was the most important event in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean. It shaped all the societal, commercial, and military dynamics of this period – both in the Aegean and Asia Minor as well as in the Canaanite-Syrian Corridor. Thus, contributing to the construction of another paradigm in Levant after the Invasions of the "Sea People". Territories in this region were occupied by some of the "people" involved in the incursions, such as the *Peleset* (certainly the *Philistinians*, who are recorded in the Bible, as emphasized by the anthropologist Ann E. Killebrew)[295]. These occupied the surrounding region from the shores of the Dead Sea to the Sinai Peninsula.

Returning to the Peloponnese and the destruction of Mycenae from Iolkos, Lefkandi, Thebes, Teichos Dymaion, Tiryns, Nichoria, Pilos, Midea, Troy, Miletus, Kydonia and Knossos in ca.1200-1100 BC. There are also chronologically associated with the Doric Invasions. It is, in this way, chronologically relatable with the Achaean[296] expansionist period, which had as its first act to the East; the siege of Troy[297] in ca.1200-1190 BC[298]. It's important to remark that this is a delimiting date and not the real one. As already analysed, the siege of Troy did not last that long. In turn, Agamemnon knew the fact that the Argolid citadels were the first to suffer from the Doric hordes, coming from the North.

After Troy, the fleet heads south, adding reinforcements from the remaining Mycenaean potentates along the way to wage war on the Hittites. While the northern

[294] LÉVÊQUE 1967: 72; BREA 1972: 45-50, 60-92, 102, 132-156; MOSSÉ 1993: 14.
[295] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 77.
[296] The Achaeans expansionist period began significantly with the conquest of Crete in ca.1400 BC, which it extrapolated to other territories, such as the Italian Peninsula, followed by North (Troy) and the South Coast of Asia Minor. However, they tried to create a vast commercial network, which could sustain the citadels of the Peloponnese. Due to the geographic morphology that was not conducive to agriculture, the search for other lands was imperative. Consequently, the expansion extended to Egypt, so it is possible to say that the first incursion of the "Sea Peoples" is during the Achaean expansionist period and the so-called "people" from the sea that Merenptah confronts in ca.1213-1203 BC. In this sense, some already known from the reign of Ramesses II (ca.1279-1213 BC), such as the *Ekweš*, *Tereš*, *Šekeleš*, *Lukka* and *Šardana* (*šrdn*), are Achaeans and Anatolians (see TOYNBEE 1964: 92-93; BURROWS 1969: 152-159).
[297] MOSSÉ 1984: 31.
[298] LIVERANI 2014: 384.

citadels are attacked by Doric hordes[299], in a process of successive raids that perhaps can explain the reason why; Thessaly did not enter the military company against Troy. It was already suffering attacks from people of the North, who pressed the entrance and which, in some way, was felt throughout the 12th BC. Hence, we can only affirm that the Mycenaean domain ends with the destruction of Mycenae, which took place between ca.1150-1100/1050[300] BC. Extending probably as Maria Helena da Rocha Pereira[301] says, until ca.800 BC.

Gradually the Doric hordes penetrated the Mycenaean territory, known for the characteristic of not having any writing system, contrary to the Mycenaeans. What provided a period of "Darkness" was similarly portrayed in the myth of the Return of the Heraclids[302]. Consequently, the paradigm of this myth that narrates the return of the descendants of Heracles – which contradicts the Thucydides version – would have happened eighty years after the Trojan War. The archaeological data corroborate the idea that Thucydides was not very rigorous. Being, consequently, a *sine qua non* condition to understand, possibly, the permanent reason for Agamemnon's return[303] home. The outcome of this return was tragic, as Aeschylus[304] tells us.

In this sense, it is before the conjecture of a war fought on two fronts. Firstly, to the North due to the Doric incursions and, secondly, the Hittite commercial blockade in the Levant[305]. In consequence, aggravated by the situation of loss of territories in the region of Miletus and Rhodes[306]. This comprises the version of Euripides – in which Menelaus sailed south to wage war on the Hittites, while Agamemnon returned

[299] Pl. *Leg*. 3.682d-e; LÉVÊQUE 1967: 91-99; BURKERT 1985: 23; LESKY 1995: 19-21; FERREIRA 2001: 26-27.
[300] FINKELBERG 2009: 144-145.
[301] PEREIRA 2012: 43.
[302] *Hdt* 9.26; WEST *GEF*, Fr. 2; LÉVÊQUE 1967: 87.
[303] *Il*. 2.113; 2.288; 5.716; 9.20.
[304] LEATY 1974: 13-14.
[305] In this situation, post-Trojan War reigned Tudḫaliya IV (ca.1237-1209 BC) which in a letter (AhT 11) justifies the reason why he replaces the vassal king of the lands of *Lukka* (*Seḫa River Land*). Consequently, this one elaborated a military offensive against that *Aḫḫiyawa* potentate, in *Milawata*. This offensive brought the *Aḫḫiyawa*'s military and political influence to an end, triggering a warlike reaction by the *Aḫḫiyawa*, who had just surrounded Troy. Hence, the creation of a military company that aimed to militarily retaliate against the Hittites for their successive attacks. While diplomatically, the king of the *Aḫḫiyawa* will have been removed from the list and treated as the "Club of the Great Powers", thus failing to be recognized internationally as a "Great King" (see GARELLI 2003: 185- 187; BECKMAN, BRYCE, CLINE 2011: 157).
[306] CLINE 2011: 99; BURROWS 1969: 160-161.

home to face the Dorians[307]. Certainly, according to Aeschylus, when Agamemnon arrives at home, he is faced with a generalized hatred of a vengeful and adulterous wife.

The objective and the reason are clear: to avenge the sacrifice of his firstborn, Iphigenia, for the sacrifice committed by order of Agamemnon – which the "*nomos* declares unlawful"[308]. In this way, Euripides attributed character defects to Agamemnon, as being "weak and ambitious", as narrated in the tragedy *Iphigenia in Aulis*. And it is in this bellicose circumstance that the murder of Agamemnon was unleashed[309].

Even the goddess Athena, who had protected and defended the Achaeans in their company against Troy, has asked Poseidon to destroy the Achaeans' ships on their return – or to be more specific, Agamemnon's. It might not have been able to get home, having *in extenso* the premise and judgment of the gods before the acts performed in Troy[310], connoted of *hybris*[311]. In this way, it is possible to understand that there is an attempt to condemn certain and certain acts, even in times of war. This paradigm introduces to the question, the prerogative of a "Justice in War", being, certainly, a

[307] STOBART 1960: 40-71.

[308] BURKERT 1985: 95-96, 273-274, 312-313, 318, 329, 333; FERREIRA 1992: 387.

[309] The murder of Agamemnon in the eyes of the 5th BC Helens was not only a heinous crime, for the reason that the king of Mycenae was murdered by his wife. This, in turn, is a blood crime, which Aeschylus explores in his work *Oresteia*. It was also expressly repudiated by the scars of the Trojan War, where the numerous of Achaeans/Mycenae that died. It has been marked by intense criticism, which runs from Homer to Aeschylus and from Sophocles to Euripides, and in these works, there are numerous references condemn the echoes of the Trojan War. The episode of Polyphemus in the *Odyssey* is a reference, which did not let Poseidon's son repair (see Aesch. *Ag*. 1-1672; ROMILLY 1970: 23-25; FERREIRA 1992: 378-380).

[310] LATACZ 2005: 200-201.

[311] As Nuno Simões Rodrigues emphasizes that "A guerra faz parte da sua bolsa de recursos poéticos, por dar forma à *hybris* que a ambição desmedida por norma traduz. O autor chega mesmo a refletir sobre as causas da guerra através das suas personagens"/ "The war is part of its poetic resources, for it gives shape to the *hybris* that the excessive ambition usually translates. The author even reflects on the causes of war through his characters" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see RODRIGUES 2012: 72).
The issue of *hybris* and "war" as a paradigm of Homeric Texts, and that in Euripides Trojan Cycle, the military scenario is often used as a circumstance for the unfolding of the theme, and of a reflective approach on the Trojan War. It was through the psychological inquiry of its interveners and their actions that it ended up being conditioned by the inherent military circumstance. Plus, there was an attempt to condemn the excesses and injustices committed during wartime (see BURKERT 1985: 272; KITTO 1990: 146-147; FERREIRA 1990: 261, 263; VERNANT 1994: 49-50; LESKY 1995: 89-93; LANCELIN, LEMONNIER 2010: 45).

hyperbole that embellishes the whole epic, regarding the return of Agamemnon to Mycenae (*nostos*)[312].

Then, it is in the face of the brutality of the act and the death of innocents, as well as that of numerous Achaeans, that the 8th and 5th BC Hellenes[313] were concerned to portray. As João Gouveia Monteiro and Miguel Gomes Martins wrote the "Scars of War"[314] when approaching the Trojan War. Besides, they extrapolate to continuous philosophical conceptions about Justice issues, as presented in Platonic texts, mainly the *Republic* and *Socrates' Apology*, where *Justice* is discussed in depth. It should be noted that the Mycenaeans who went to Troy had more reasons, as already discussed.

In illo tempore, Agamemnon was not able to make war on the invaders from the North[315], as he did not live long enough to do so. The Thessalian resistance allowed time for some cities and populations to engage in self-defence, as happened with Mycenae. Other cities, however, were left to abandonment. As soon as Agamemnon leaves Troy, victorious, back to Mycenae – as well as several kings who intervened in Troy, at least four of them returned to their kingdoms, according to Homer. As Idomeneus (Crete), Odysseus (Ithaca), Achilles (?) (representing Thessaly, despite of not being king), Rhesus[316] (Thrace), Agamemnon (Mycenae/Argos?[317]) and Nestor[318] (Pylos), among others. While Menelaus and the remaining kings headed east with a well-defined goal.

It is necessary to bear in mind that "War costs a lot, so do long-distance calls"[319], as exalts Fernand Braudel. War efforts for Menelaus to sail from Troy, via the Cycladic Islands, bypassing the Cape of Gelidonya, to the island of *Alašiya*. And,

[312] BURKERT 1985: 95-96, 312-313; WERNER 2018: 63.
[313] TOYNBEE 1959: xxi.
[314] MONTEIRO, MARTINS 2010: 13-135.
[315] It is not insignificant to mention that, as far as the archaeological discoveries can convey, the Linear B disappears at the end of the 12th BC, as a disastrous consequence of the Doric invasions. As stated by Joachim Latacz: "In the course of the twelfth century, Greece vanishes from the light of Mediterranean history, to return into the light after about 350 years of darkness, from about 800 BC onwards, with changed structures re-emerging and then developing with great rapidity" (see TOYNBEE 1964: 167-168; WEBSTER 1964: 272-273; DIRINGER 1985: 60-63; CHADWICK 1996: 22-23; LATACZ 2005: 232; HALL 2013: 50-52).
[316] *Il.* 10. 435, 517-519; FOL, MARAZOV 1977: 48.
[317] PAGE 1992: 127; VIDAL-NAQUET 2002: 38.
[318] ACHTERBERG, BEST, ENZLER, RIETVELD, WOUDHUIZEN (ed.) 2021: 7-165.
[319] BRAUDEL 2001: 183.

finally, in other to reach Ugarit, it was necessary to secure a set of logistic lines for the maintenance of the fleet, which sailed to wage war on the Hittites.

Is Menelaus' fleet the same as that of the "Sea Peoples"? Give all the evidence already discussed, they lead to possible affirmation. And it is in this sense that the alternative version of the Menelaus[320] story gains preponderance due to its connection to Egypt. This story is likely to be found in Homer, Herodotus, Euripides, and Thucydides. They refer to some characteristics that resemble some members of the "Sea Peoples" since the 14th BC. These are referred to by military activities (*raids*) and, also, as mercenaries[321], and in some texts, they are referred to as merchants. As Trevor Bryce says: "Seaborne attacks were by no means a new phenomenon"[322].

Chronologically, according to Thucydides[323], who attributes these military movements to the thalassocracy of Minos, due to the increase in the size of the raids during the reign of Pharaoh Ramesses II[324]. In this period, however, there are some of the sayings, the most prominent names of the "Sea Peoples", who became known for their pursuit. Some even ended up being part of the Egyptian royal guard after the Battle of Kadeš, such as – the *Lukka* (in Egyptian *Lk, Lukki,* or, *Lu-uk-ka* as referred to in the Kadeš Inscriptions, as they were allies of the Hittites)[325], the *Šardana*[326] (*šrdn*, referred to in the Kadeš Inscriptions, in the Stele of Tanis and the Papyrus of Anastasi I)[327] and the *Karkiša* (*Kar-ki-cha*, participated in the battle of Kadeš as allies of the Hittites, did not form part of the royal guard)[328], but also, as allies of the Hittites were

[320] *Od.* 3.141-42.

[321] As Mario Liverani referred to the *Šardana* people as mercenaries and empathized the principal route that comes from Thebes, Troy to the Battle of the Delta, "[…] thus they started conquering and destroying kingdom after kingdom, palace after palace – starting from Thebes and Troy VI *ca*. 1220 BC and arriving at the Nile delta *ca*. 1180 BC. No real "invasion" took place; a few thousand skilled mercenaries, already active on the spot, were able to overthrow the most powerful kingdoms of their time" (see LIVERANI 1994: 242).

[322] BRYCE 2006: 335.

[323] *Thuc*. 1.5-1.

[324] Already in the reign of Amenhotep III, at least two "people" of the "Sea Peoples" were known, the *Lukka* and the *Šardana*, who once again made their presence known in the reign of Ramesses II.

[325] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 646-647.

[326] During the reign of Ramses II (reigned ca.1279-1213 BC), there is a reference to a naval battle between the Egyptians and the *Šardanu*, which phonetically resembles the name of one group of the "Sea Peoples", the *Šardana* (see SANTOS, VARANDAS (coord.), ARAÚJO 2010: 97).

[327] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 648-650.

[328] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 656-657.

the *Ekweš*, *Tereš* (*Ta-ru-i-cha*), *Šekeleš*[329], *Danuna*[330] (*DNNYM*, *Denyen*, *Danaoi*, *Yad(a)nana*, *Daniya-wana*).

During 13th BC the expansion was Mycenaean. Therefore, is in the reign of Merenptah, where some of the members of the "Sea Peoples" were already known to the Egyptians. Some of these people had participated in the military campaign against Egypt while others were left unknown. However, the members of the "Sea Peoples" who continued with the initiative of military and trade policies were – the *Lukka* (present in the Karnak Temple Inscriptions); such as the *Šardana* (listed in the Karnak Temple Inscriptions, Stele of Athribis, Papyrus Anastasi II and the Stele of Setemhebu); the *Ekweš*/*Achaeans* (in the Temple Inscriptions of Karnak and Stele of Athribis); and last but not least the *Tereš* (in the Time Inscriptions of Karnak and Stele of Athrisbis).

While in the 12th BC[331], Ramesses III – after the Battle of the Delta – highlights other "people" who did not participate in the raiding campaigns of Merenptah's reign. He refers, however, to other "peoples" who have been constant since the reign of Ramesses II, such as: the *Šardana* (referred to in the Medinet Habu Inscriptions, Harris Papyrus, Amiens Papyrus, Wilbour Papyrus, Adoption Papyrus, Moscow Papyrus, BM Papyrus 10326, Turin Papyrus 2026, BM Papyrus 10375, in the Onomasticon of Amenope, the Stele of Donation of Osorkon II and the Stele of Padjesef); the *Tereš* (in the Inscriptions of Medinet Habu and the Rhetorical Stele of Deir el-Medina); the *Šekeleš* (*Si-ka-la-yu*, "Sikilayu who live in ships", were thus known by the Hittites and Ugaritic and also referred to in the Inscriptions of Medinet Habu); the *Peleset*/*Pelasgoi*[332], *Tjekker*[333]/*Sikila* (?)[334], *Denyen* (in Egyptian *d3-ỉn-ỉw-n3*,

[329] SANTOS, VARANDAS (coord.), ARAÚJO 2010: 98.
[330] MYNÁŘOVÁ, ONDERKA, PAVÚK (ed.), SIMON 2015: 391, 398-402; NIESIOŁOWSKI-SPANÒ, WĘCOWSKI (ed.), PFOH 2018: 23-57.
[331] OREN 2000: 233-253.
[332] *Jz* 13-16; PALMER 1980: 73, 87.
[333] The Egyptian name *Tjekker*, which vocalizes itself *Tjikar*, resembling *Teukr-*; cf. in Hebrew *s[u]ran*, which comes close to the *tju-ra-n* of New Kingdom Egyptian period, as well as its later equivalent which in Greek is spelt *turann-*. Existing in this way, a strong possibility of the Teucer, described of the Homeric Texts being the *Tjekker*. This means that there is a connection between the Teucer and the Trojans (see STUBBINGS 1975: 509). While G. A. Wainwright defends a relationship of the Hittite names to the region in which the Troy citadel of *Wilušiya*/*Walmu* or *Troad*/*Tauiša* was located, in which it is physiologically related to the name *Turša* to the *Tereš*. Consequently, is phonetically close to the name of the founders of Troy, the Teucer (see WAINWRIGHT 1961: 73).
[334] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 660.

dnỉn)[335]; and *Wešeš* (are present in the Inscriptions of Medinet Habu. in the Papyrus of Harris, in the Onomasticon of Amenenope, in the Report of Wenamun, in the Inscription of Pedeset and in the Rhetoric Stele of Deir el-Medina).

Given the present, the Hittite, Ugaritic and, even later, the correspondence of the reign of Tiglath-pileser III appear referred to in Assyrian, still the name of some of these "people". Meaning then that they were known by the three great forces of this period, while some no longer appear in the Egyptian inscriptions. Hence, in the inscriptions (Hittite and Ugaritic), remained several reports that ended up culminating in the Inscriptions of Medinet Habu. Where many other members of the "Sea Peoples" that correspond with the remaining Hittite and Ugaritic inscriptions, present the trajectory that always came from the same region. It is possible to make the relation, due to the constant presence of certain "people". The iconographic presentation of the boats in which they would come – the region of the Aegean and Anatolia – as it is the only region north of Egypt.

The Mycenaeans made war and trade horses with Ugarit/Ras Šamra[336], for in correspondence with the monarchs of Karkemiš and Emar[337], they reveal that there was a search for better-trained horses that would certainly come from Troy. This issue still needs further study. In turn, fragments of Mycenaean pottery[338] were found with representations of some individuals armed and mounted on horseback. However, it does not prove that there was a cavalry corp. Instead, there were groups of scouts, border patrols, in a clear reference to military "chiefs" or "officials" who stood out for the use of horses. Thus, opposing the perspective of Jorrit Kelder on the Mycenaean cavalry (LHIII B2, found in Minet el-Beida)[339].

There were, nevertheless, contemporaneously to this period patrols on horseback in Assyria, as represented in the seal of the vizier Ili-pada of *Ḫanigalbat*. Therefore, before the ships used by the *Akhaians*/*Aḫḫiyawa* could wipe out the Ugaritic-Hittite coalition. Decades earlier, the Hittites had to face Cypriot galleys in a

[335] BRYCE 2009: 5-6; KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 658.
[336] WATSON, WYATT 1999: 656.
[337] Idem *ibidem*: 655-657.
[338] YASUR-LANDAU 2010: 84-91; VLACHOPOULOS (ed.), THALER, VETTERS 2018: 465-495, 569-605.
[339] KELDER 2012: 5.

naval battle coordinated by Šuppiluliuma II[340]. The Hittite kingdom was already weakened on its land borders to the West and North, under pressure from the *Lukka* and *Kaška* tribes.

Still, the death of his father Tudḫaliya IV, led to many internal revolts, including at Court, significantly weakening the entire Hittite kingdom, which was reflected and contributed to the destructuring of the Hittite Empire. While near the waters of *Alašiya*, the Achaean galleys – which had a set of characteristics that were common to all the galleys – were they Cypriot and Ugaritic of this period[341], such as describes Michal Artzy[342]. They needed to defeat the Hittites in a naval battle in the waters of *Alašiya*. Ugarit was a few nautical miles from a landing, this being the last line of defence of the Hittite tutelage, as referred to in the Ugaritic texts (RS 20.238, RS 20.18, KTU 2.47)[343]. The destruction of Ugarit in ca.1190-1185/4 BC was inevitable.

In the Letter of Ammurapi to the King of Assyria, in a dramatic attempt to ask for support against the invader, he also appealed to the Viceroy of Karkemiš Talmi-Tešub[344] to intervene, but no response had been received. However, it was relatively predictable that Assyria would ignore it, for obvious reasons. Mario Liverani clarifies

[340] Šuppiluliuma II in ca.1210 BC coordinated a fleet of ships that, according to some specialists, such as Claude Schaeffer and Trevor Bryce, argue that they would have used Ugaritic galleys since there was already a suzerainty of the Hittites to Ugarit. When the battle for the control of the Cypriot sea takes place, intending to conquer the island of *Alašiya*, the Cypriots are defeated. The victory is attributed to the Hittites. But in agreement with the documentary records, through a treatise written in *Luvian* hieroglyphics, which narrate this feat, being one of the first records of a naval battle in History (see BRYCE 2006: 332-333; SINGER 2011: 173-174).

[341] Analysing the iconography of Medinet Habu, the Tomb of Kenamun (from the reign of Amenhotep III, XVIII dynasty) and the galleys represented in the fragments of Vasos form Kynos (LH IIIC Middle karter by Pyrgos Livanaton), are similar in their form and aesthetics to the galleys, represented in Medinet Habu. However, these were narrower, and longer, in addition to being visible the symbols and totems on the prows of the galleys, as they are represented in a battle scene. Thus, the Syrian ships represented in the Tomb of Kenamun are a little shorter but more robust and without any totemic symbol (see EMANUEL 2014: 25).

That said, it is also necessary to reference a significant amount of Mycenaean pottery, belonging to the XIV-XII BC, throughout the island of *Alašiya* and in the Canaanite-Syrian Corridor, in cities and citadels such as – Ajia Irini, Enkomi, Kourior, Kition, Hala Sultan Tekke, Alalaḫ, Ugarit, Tell Sukas, Tell Hazel, Kadeš, Sidon, Biblos, Ekron, Kamid el-Loz, Sarepta, Hazor, Tell Abu-Hawam, Beth-Šan, Amman, Gezer, Ašdod, Laquiš and Tell Ajul (see LIVERANI 2014: 288).

[342] ARTZY 1987: 77.

[343] BARAKO 2001: 6.

[344] Talmi-Tešub was a great-grandson of Šuppiluliuma I, Viceroy of Karkemiš, and the last Viceroy of the Hittite empire during the reign of Šuppiluliuma II (see WEEDEN 2013: 6-10).

that the only effective measure to resist an invasion, such as that of Ugarit, was the retreat of the populations inside the walls of the citadels in the hope that the invader would come closer. When the invader was faced with the impossibility of crossing the defensive system of the citadels, the tactic used was the same one tested in the siege of Troy. Which led to the destruction of Ugarit, as well as of many other citadels along the coast of the Syrian-Canaanite Corridor.

As a result, the process of fragmentation of the Hittite empire suffered successive attacks and internal revolts throughout the late 13th and early 12th BC, but its end can only be affirmed with the destruction of *Ḫattuša*. Still, the dating varies according to the perspectives of hittitologists and archaeological artefacts between ca.1200-1185/4 BC highlighting. Harry Hoffner Jr. proposes the date of ca.1190-1180 BC[345] for the destruction of *Ḫattuša*.

However, the perspectives of who would have been the actors of the Hittite Empire's destructuring vary between the Thracian-Phrygian peoples who attacked from the West. There also had already established themselves during the Trojan War in the region of Asia Minor, as mentioned in the Homeric Poems[346]. Yet, invasions by the *Kaška*/*u* tribes, who were north of the *Ḫattuša* citadel, were the main reason for the citadel's abandonment, according to Trevor Bryce[347] and Mario Liverani[348].

Both perspectives are plausible. But the crux of the matter lies in the whereabouts of King Šuppiluliuma II, of which there are no records. Soon, if there was no king to manage the situation, the state of calamity and the ruin of the Hittite Empire worsened. In this way, the various fronts of defensive instability caused both by the pressure of the Thracian-Phrygian/*Muški*[349] (is the Assyrian name), the *Kaška* and the Mycenaeans who attacked Ugarit, and even the Assyrians in *Ḫanigalbat* that surrounded the citadel of Karkemiš, were united. This circumstances of great wear and tear and loss of control over the management of resources, that is, the destruction of the Hittite Empire was inevitable.

[345] CLINE 2014: 126.
[346] *Il.* 2,862-863; 3,184-185; 10,430-431.
[347] BRYCE 2006: 354-355.
[348] LIVERANI 2014: 384-386.
[349] LLOYD 1967: 128; WEST 2007: 412-414.

1.5 For Helen: The Trojan War's last clash – the battle of the Delta (ca.1177 BC)

J. M. Cook understands the dimension of war and the relevance of horses to its outcome, warning that "A criação de cavalos é considerado um assunto muito sério e pode até ser motivo de guerra"[350]. Mycenaean tactics provided, in agreement with the version of Euripides and Herodotus, that Menelaus[351] was inevitably one of the commanders of this great fleet that landed at Ugarit. After a very brief siege, it was destroyed, as they had done in Troy years before, with Anna R. Stelow characterizing Menelaus as "Not Quiet the Best of the Achaeans"[352].

As Bettany Hughes[353] refers to the episode of Helen's escape and Menelaus' persecution, Euripides narrative gives a deceptive context of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean region, conveying the idea that the only existing war was that of Troy. As already discussed, the context was much more complex, the escape of Helen and Paris from Troy. They allowed the Achaeans to organize themselves and were led by Menelaus to sail towards Egypt[354]. As mentioned by Herodotus:

> "This was the account I had from the priest about the arrival of Helen at Proteus` court. I think Homer was familiar with the story; […] I asked the priests if the Greek story of what happened at Troy had any truth in it, and they gave me in reply some information which they claimed to have had direct from Menelaus himself"[355].

Corroborating this way that Menelaus' fleet is that of the "Sea Peoples" that attacks Egypt[356]. This episode is described in a romantic and epic way, nevertheless,

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[350] "Horse breeding is considered a very serious matter and may even be a cause of war" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see COOK 1971: 39).
[351] SEENEY 2009: 89-90; LUSH 2017: 59-61.
[352] STELOW 2020: 25.
[353] HUGHES 2006: 156; 160; 229-234.
[354] *Anth. Lyr. Graec* frg.11; PULQUÉRIO 1974: 265-273; BESPALOFF 2005: 30-33; SOARES, SECALL, FIALHO (coord.) 2008: 11.
[355] *Hdt.* 2.116-121.
[356] PRITCHARD 1992: 262-263; RODRIGUES 2004: 487-489.

the entire process and phases of the Delta battle, and the intentions would be geoeconomics and military.

Faced with the circumstances imposed by Hittite and Egyptian pressures that divided the Syrian-Canaanite Corridor, since the expansionist policy of Thutmose III[357]. A fact that led to the Mycenaeans after the destruction of Ugarit, and the destruction of the Hittite empire, the routes and commercial hubs were unblocked.

The destruction was in great number, due to the unpreparedness of these societies to face an enemy that accepted on two fronts, by land and by sea. The narrow number of galleys[358] and soldiers in the citadels – both on the coast and in some further inland, somehow made it impossible to establish an auxiliary force. The refuge for the citadels was the only alternative, due to the lack and impossibility of reinforcements.

One of the best known and most studied groups of the "Sea Peoples" are the *Pelasgoi*/*Peleset*/*Philistinians*[359]. Accordingly, this group of the "Sea Peoples" at an archaeological[360] and documental level is a significant proof to substantiate that the "Sea Peoples" are Mycenaeans. It is through stratigraphy, pottery[361], iconography, and the texts found that has been being possible to affirm that this group had come from Crete (referred to in the Bible as *Kaphto*, in Akkadian *Kaptara* and, known by the Egyptians as *Keftiu*)[362]. In this period Crete was already part of the Mycenaean domain[363].

As Denys L. Page[364] demonstrates, Ajax and his brother Teucer[365] lived long before the siege and destruction of Troy. Well, Ajax like Danao, uses a shield with characteristics of the 16th BC. Therefore, the chronological proximity to the *Tjekker*/*Teucer* who occupied Cilicia, as well as the *Pelasgoi*/*Peleset*/*Philistinians* and the *Denyen*/*Danaos*. These groups settled, in this chronology, in citadels such as Enkomi and *Alašiya*, between the 16th and 14th BC.

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[357] GABRIEL 2009: 27-48.
[358] LIVERANI 2014: 384.
[359] HERZOG, GICHON 2008: 91-92; GUTHRIE 1962: 204-205.
[360] GREENBERG 2019: 272-354.
[361] CLINE 2009: 31-47.
[362] *Dt* 2,23; *Jer* 47,4; STROOTMAN, EIJINDE, WIJK (ed.) KELDER 2019: 42-45.
[363] *Od.* 14.233-301.
[364] WAINWRIGHT 1961: 77.
[365] FAGAN, TRUNDLE (ed.), FAGAN 2010: 96-97.

Expressing, in this way, that these "people" already occupied several islands[366] of the Eastern Mediterranean that extended from the Cycladic islands to the island of Crete, having as main reference the island of *Alašiya*. connecting this way with the coast of the region of Cilicia. The connection between islands turned out to be one of the reasons why the Hittites of Šuppililiuma II occupied this region in a desperate attempt to gain control of the sea and the sea trade routes. The support of the Menelaus' fleet allowed [the Sea Peoples] the capacity to react against the Hittite occupation. Hence, the "people" from these regions attacked Karkemiš[367] overland and later destroyed Ugarit.

The *Peleset*/*Philistinians*[368] were one of these "people" who attacked by land, but they certainly benefited from the naval support that had come from Troy, explaining the mass destruction of the coastal citadels and many of the Syrian-Canaanite interior. Some military features are common to the *Peleset*/*Philistinians*, the *Tjekker* and the *Danuna*, which are manifested in the iconography of Medinet Habu, the Disc of Festus (found in Crete) and pottery (LM IIIC1 later referenced in the Bible). The use of helmets with feathers or plumes is one of the most frequent characteristics in the identification of the *Peleset*/*Philistines* as identified by Nancy Sandars[369].

These references indicate that firstly, the *Peleset*/*Philistinians*[370] are not autochthonous from Canaan, but from Crete and Cilicia/*Kizzuwatna*, as demonstrated by the linguist Itamar Singer. This group occupied the territory, forming a corporate nucleus, before the Battle of the Delta, of five citadels (the Pentapolis)[371]. The kingdom

[366] The *Tjekker* and *Peleset* are not referred to as "coming from the sea". This clarifies the reference to civil elements, such as women and children in ox carts, portrayed on the walls of Medinet Habu. Consequently, this group that was attacked by the Egyptians does not necessarily want to indicate a migration. Perhaps it was a ground support line for the Delta incursion. The *Tereš*, *Ekewš*, *Wešeš* and the *Šardana* are at least once referred to as "coming from the sea". The *Denyen* were part of the *Peleset*/*Philistinians* group and are referred to as "coming from the islands". Thus, Eric H. Cline stresses the following hypothesis: "If this is correct, we could hypothesize an origin on Sicily and a final settlement in coastal Canaanite for the Tjekru/Tjekel/Shekelesh/Sikels" (see CASANOVA 1997: 49-52, 73-87, 92-95, 95-98; CLINE, O´CONNER 2012: 189-190.).

[367] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 5.

[368] EMMANUEL 2017: 1-21.

[369] SANDERS 1987: 132.

[370] KILLEBREW 2005: 230.

[371] The Pentapolis are coastal citadels in the southern region of Canaan (commercially they were similar to the citadels that later constituted the Phoenician kingdom). These citadels played a decisive role in trade in southern Canaan, which formed a blockade against Egyptian incursions, citadels such as Gaza, Aškelon, Ašdod, Ekron and Gath. In this way they coexisted with deeply Egyptianized cities such as

of Israel did not yet exist. The *Peleset* being Cretans[372], demarcated their position by encouraging trade in the Levant, as a military power, which enjoyed diplomatic and cultural links with the Aegean[373].

In this sense, it is urgent to understand and understand the circumstances of the Delta battle, emphasizing the paradigms, dimensions, dynamics, and *mementum* in which the Delta incursions occur. For Ramesses III ascends the throne as pharaoh in ca.1184 BC, approximately, when Ugarit is destroyed. It is, however, two years after the accession to the throne, that the Delta would start to suffer *raids* from some groups of "Sea Peoples"[374].

Due to military dynamics and constant destruction in Canaan, it allowed Ramesses III to foresee a possible invasion. The land movements in Canaan were supported by the Mycenaean fleet, being the same that landed in Ugarit. In the Sinai Peninsula, specifically, in the Horus Corridor, forts were built by the Egyptians, which functioned as blockades[375], to protect the ports and land routes with Canaan[376].

Grosso modo, the Mycenaean galleys that accompanied land movements, at first, did not come into direct confrontation with the Egyptians, as they had learned

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Tell el-Far'ah (S), Tel Sera, Lachiš, Tel Mor and Gezer. However, it is also necessary to understand the perspectives of the Egyptian occupation. Horvath defines another conception, about what is the "colonization" or "imperialism" in Egypt during the New Kingdom over Canaan. Horvath defined it as a "formal" or "administrative" occupation, practically institutional, not ceasing to have a significant military weight and present in the daily life of the Canaanite city (see 1*Sm* 6,17; KILLEBREW 2005: 55, 198; KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 38; HALL 2016: 416-417; LEÃO, RAMOS, RODRIGUES (coords.), SALES 2018: 39).

[372] HALL 2016: 399-400.

[373] *Am* 9,7; CLINE 2009: 191–198.

[374] One of the significant characteristics of the armament of these "people" are the helmets that included the use of feathers in the form of horse manes, or with horns. These elements have a religious meaning, in which the use of totemic references of two animals sweetened to military armament, which were related to the god Poseidon, that is, the Taurus and the Horse, allowed the god(s) to be protected in battle. The physical characteristics inherent to the Egyptian iconographic representation correlated with the pottery found in the Cyclades, Attica, and Anatolia islands. See Luís Manuel de Araújo who best describes this correlation in detail (see 1*Sm* 17,5; SANTOS, VARANDAS (coord.), ARAÚJO 2010: 123-126).

[375] CLINE, O´CONNOR 2012: 163; O'CONNOR, QUIRKE (ed.) CLINE 2016: 107-138.

[376] The Egyptians collected cereals in Canaan, which were used to feed the military contingents and the administration, however, offerings were made to the Temple of Ammon, by Canaanites as described in the Papyrus of Harris (I.9.1-3.). Thus, demonstrating that the Egyptian occupation was mediated by taxes and the inculcation of religion, as a way to maintain the Egyptian presence, not only administratively or militarily, but with the introduction of Egyptian cultural elements in the Canaanite culture.

during the Libyan[377] Wars from Merenptah (ca.1213-1203 BC). They ended up attacking in sync. The groups of "Sea Peoples" coming from the Northwest, were repelled as soon as they disembarked, due to a tactical error. The clash of a network of small and medium-sized Egyptian forts was the main catalyst for the defeat.

This error weakened the entire offensive operation in the face of solid Egyptian defence, as the Egyptians used their military forces, in which the war chariot was significant in the theatre of operations. Although some authors claim that there would be an Egyptian cavalry, there is no certainty that it participated, or even existed[378].

Anthony J. Spalinger is clear in his approach to the participation of the "Egyptian cavalry"/*seneni*, which in his analysis reveals that in the Medinet Habu representation "Horses are not present, […]"[379].

Yet, the discipline and coordination of military efforts were essential to face the infantry of *Tjehenu*, who attacked in the Northwest, and in the Northeast, the fortifications successfully blocked the land attack of the "Sea Peoples". That is, the Egyptians were tactically on the defence at all levels, as Anthony J. Spalinger points out "From a military viewpoint this war reveals the static defence posture of Egypt"[380].

Therefore, thirty years after the reign of Merenptah, and two years before the reign of Ramesses III (ca.1184-1153 BC). In ca.1186 BC[381], there were *raids* perpetrated by the *Šekeleš* and *Šardana* on the banks of the Delta, from Biblos, Tyre, Sîdon, Ašdod, Gaza, Šaruhen, Tell el Ajjul and Tell Mor[382], as highlighted by Nancy Sanders.

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[377] Libya was known as *Tjemeh* and the Libyans as *Tjehenu*. During the reign of Merenptah, they had a characteristic that could be decisive in the theatre of operations, in conjunction with the infantry, such as the use of the war chariot, which they did not use. Well, they only acquired it during the reign of Ramesses III, after realizing its effectiveness on the battlefield.

[378] CLINE, O´CONNOR 2012: 269.

[379] SPALINGER 2005: 253.

[380] Idem *ibidem*: 235.

[381] The XX dynasty began with the short reign of Setnakht (ca.1186-1184 BC). In other words, it was not during the reign of Ramses III, his son, that these *raids* took place. According to Jacobus Van Dijk, who refers to the brevity of this reign because of the state in which Egypt was, "The papyrus describes how a state of lawlessness and chaos had broken out in Egypt because offerees from 'outside'; after several years in which there was no one who ruled" (see SHAW (ed.), DIJK 2004: 296).

[382] The various levels of destruction of these cities, both pottery on stratigraphic levels consistent with an earthquake of LH IIIB and grey levels. However, is not transversal to all citadels, for example, Ašdod

The remaining groups of the "Sea Peoples" such as the *Tjekker*, *Denyen*, *Peleset*, *Tereš* and the *Ekweš*, settled in the outskirts of Dor, near the Carmel Mountains. Probably looting, destroying, and occupying some in towns on the coast of Canaan and from the interior, settling in some citadels such as the *Pentapolis*. The raids had their impact, but with the tactical aim of testing the Egyptian defences, despite being defeated, as Mario Liverani elucidates "These symptoms show that, at the beginning of the twelfth century BC, the invasion was not entirely unexpected"[383].



Map 3: The map represents the *Pentapolis* and the Levantine cities and kingdoms in the end of the Late Bronze Age to initial of the Iron Age period, called by his biblical name "Philistines *Pentapolis*" https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=534049406605690&set=pb.100067785999682.-2207520000.&locale=ar_AR

level XIIIb and XIV, Beth-Šan who was violently destroyed (level VI) and Deir Alla who was destroyed by an earthquake (see SANDERS 1987: 202-204).

[383] LIVERANI 2014: 384.

Starting from this premise, it is necessary to remember that the raids have not ceased since ca.1186 BC Therefore, in the 5th year of the reign of Ramesses III, in ca.1180 BC, some of these small incursions of the *Tjehenu* are mentioned in the Papyrus Harris I. In the most famous, that of the 8th year, in ca.1177 BC, in which the long-awaited incursion of the "Sea Peoples" took place, which was immortalized in the famous Egyptian hieroglyphic narratives inlaid on the walls of Medinet Habu's temple.

It is one of the most relevant sources on the dynamics of a naval battle, which is a rare military circumstance in the history of Ancient Egypt. In the 11th year of the reign of Ramesses III, ca.1174 BC [384], it was an aftermath of the Delta battle, with an attack by the *Tjehenu* and the "Sea Peoples". Consequently, these attacks are usually mistaken as part of the naval battle episode, which did happen, but only two years later. It is, in this way, imminently different due to the consonance of the coalition of the attack of the *Tjehenu*[385] and the "Sea Peoples", having this conflict been fought on land and at sea.

This is the last battle of the Trojan War[386], and Helen[387], an epic Homeric and Euripidian[388] pretext to turn a military campaign and one of the greatest and most grandiose episodes of Mycenaean culture. A timeless reference, in which Alessandra Cristina Jonas Neves Oliveira enunciates, from enlightening a way where:

> "Tróia representaria ainda, no imaginário grego, um espaço fundacional, um monumento de valores ancestrais, resistente ao tempo e ao devir. A guerra ali travada, palco de celebração dos heróis e das virtudes guerreiras a que eles encarnam, conheceria também apenas uma perspectiva: a da Grécia triunfante sobre a barbárie"[389].

[384] MIEROOP 2010: 356-360.
[385] CLINE, O´CONNOR 2012: 7.
[386] RODRIGUES 2007: 319-331.
[387] Eur. *Hel.*1-1692; MELTZER 2009: 188-222; LUSH 2017: 29-35, 57-59.
[388] SOARES 1999: 24-26.
[389] "Troy would still represent, in the Greek imagination, a foundational space, a monument of ancestral values, resistant to time and becoming. The war waged there, stage of celebration of heroes and the warrior virtues to which they embody, would also know only one perspective: that of Greece triumphant over barbarism" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see OLIVEIRA 2015: 11).

This story reveals a strategy[390], which is not explicit in the epic and tragic narratives but involves a complexity of realities. Hence, they elaborate a bold strategy, in which the ability to bring together all available means of the land of the *Aḫḫiyawa* to wage war on the Hittites and coalitions with the aim of unlocking trade. The establishment of *emporia* at the main strategic points of the Syrian-Canaanite Corridor created a commercial network with a clear objective: the monopoly of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To achieve this goal, they would have to face the Egyptians, knowing that the Assyrians were expanding and fighting the Neo-Hittite resistance in Syria and with the *Mušku* and *Papḫu* tribes pressing the borders of *Ḫanigalbat*[391]. The battle was essentially a naval one, near the banks of the Nile delta (ca.1177 BC). Yet, the Mycenaean galleys would have characteristics that provided navigation with some dexterity at sea, as highlighted by Jeffrey P. Emanuel "This force would certainly have been simultaneously large enough to carry out a raid on a coastal settlement, and small enough to be highly vulnerable to encounters with organized military units"[392].

One of the features of Mycenaean and Minoan material culture and iconography found[393], as Shelley Wachsmann accurately scrutinized, it´s possible to highlight in the Mycenaean galleys/"Sea Peoples" marine totemic symbols from the Aegean. Therefore, possibly of Minoan influence (LM IIIB/C)[394]. They assumed a protective function, placed on the prows a "bird's head"[395] as we can find in Skyros (LH IIIC)[396].

Meanwhile, the Egyptians who used galleys with a lion's[397] head on the bow, known as *meneš*, included an interesting detail, in which the head of a Syrian would

[390] VARANDAS 2020: 107-109.
[391] FRAHM (ed.), FUCHS 2017: 249.
[392] EMANUEL 2018: 7.
[393] WACHSMANN 1998: 83-155.
[394] IMMERWAHR 1945: 540.
[395] WACHSMANN [s.d.]: 349-354.
[396] SANDERS 1987: 130.
[397] This Egyptian reference was not unusual. It is a specific invocation of an ancient deity of War, which is not often referred to, called Mahés, that is, the lion god, whose name means "Angry Lion". This was considered the son of the goddess Bastet, who was worshipped in the region of the eastern part of the

be inside the lion's mouth. This was clearly an Egyptian message that the gods of war and the Delta would protect the Egyptians in the face of attack from Canaan. Consequently, centuries later, they would use in the prows of the Assyrian galleys of Tiglat-pileser I[398], horse heads (*hippios*), as a totem, as it is possible to observe through the Assyrian and Phoenician iconography.

Mycenaean galleys are depicted as being without oars or oarsmen, unlike the Egyptians. This is not to say that they didn't have them and that their square sail was just the only means of propulsion. It was a complementary means of propulsion, as the ability to sail only with this type of sail was reduced, as shown in the Egyptian iconography.

José Varandas'[399] position and proposal are sensible when the author exposes the possibility of Mycenaean rowers assuming a double function. That is, when the conflict occurs, they participate and take up arms like the rest of the crew, something that we do not see represented concerning to the Egyptians.

The significant use of archers by the Egyptians (the composite bow) was also a determining factor in the face of the Mycenaean infantry, which essentially used spearmen. The battle took place on the east side, along the coastline on the beaches of the Delta. Following a strategy of geographic use, enabling the placement of archers in the highest places, which gave them protection against the possibility of a landing.

The movements of the Egyptian troops, who were waiting on the beaches for the Mycenaean landing (as portrayed in the Egyptian iconography) were commanded by the Crown Prince[400], who appears to be in charge of the distribution of armaments by the troops. This phase is what in military language is known as “the call to arms”, that is, the preparation of troops for combat.

Ramesses III ventures into a daring strategy, which succeeds in various phases to different dynamics. The first phase was, waiting for the enemy, in which the Egyptians prepare for the approach of the Mycenaean galleys, hiding their ground

Delta, being from Tell el-Muqdam. By the Greeks, he was known as Miysis and often called Mihos (see SALES 1999: 255).

[398] PARPAS 2018: 95.

[399] VARANDAS 2020: 113.

[400] SPALINGER 2005: 253.

forces and waiting for the right *momentum*. The second stage was, of course, when the Mycenaeans tried to disembark, the gathering of sails and oars was the signal. The third phase was the presentation of ground forces, where it would be possible to see a large group of archers dispersed along the beach. The revelation of the element of surprise, made possible the immediate launch of an attack of arrows on the enemy, in order to making the disembarkation impossible.

One of the relevant details represented, which highlights this eventuality, are the collected Mycenaean sails and the galleys without oarsmen, presented as static, as suggested by Jeffrey P. Emanuel[401]. This allows us to hypothesize that the Mycenaeans had been ambushed by the Egyptians when attempting to disembark. And simultaneously they were surprised by a fierce attack by archers[402].

Finally, there is the fourth phase of Ramesses III's[403] strategy, in which the Mycenaeans faced with these circumstances could have tried to withdraw, but in the end to no avail. The Egyptians had prepared a coordinated attack with galleys[404], to block the riverbanks and the beaches, with an attack from the flanks, clearly to surround the Mycenaean galleys, engulfing them in chaos. As it is fabulously represented in Medinet Habu's panel, which led to a great massacre that could be seen along the beaches of the Delta.

In this plane, the Egyptian galleys had a significant role in *stricto sensu* by the tactical skill of Ramesses III. A battle of galleys against galleys, with the detail that

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[401] EMMANUEL 2014: 27.

[402] SANTOS, VARANDAS (coord.), ARAÚJO 2010: 116.

[403] KNAPP, DEMESTICHAPP 2017: 161.

[404] José Varandas points to the characteristics of the Egyptian galleys that are important for a more rigorous analysis of the dynamics of the battle, such as - an angular hull, with a length of about 25 meters, a width of around 4.5 meters, they feature a mast simple, a crow's nest, they had long, high prows and sterns, a rudder and, roughly, seventeen oarsmen (on Port and Starboard). Since fore, and aft platforms were mounted higher concerning the deck, where the archers would be (see VARANDAS 2020: 120-121).

The Egyptians, according to Jeffrey P. Emanuel and other researchers, were the first to designate the galleys used in battle as warships, *aHaw aHA* (*m–Hry–ib pA ym*), in other words, "boats of sea warriors" (see EMMANUEL 2014: 37-38.).

These Egyptian shipbuilding innovations were due to an appropriation of the characteristics of the Syrian and Mycenaean galleys, as it is possible to observe, this same elevation of platforms for the archers, or even the length and width of the galleys, which were very approximated. They were hybrids in their activity, as they could either be transport galleys or for a military function (see WACHSMANN [s.d.]: 341-345).

the Mycenaean warriors[405] were more prepared for land combat than naval, which led to imminent defeat and chaos. After the massacre, the survivors were taken prisoners of war. The Harris Papyrus[406] states that the *Šardana* and *Wašoš* were taken to Egypt as prisoners, putting them in captivity and taxing them on grain and clothing every year.

Some details allow us to question an *ad hoc* alliance between the Egyptians and the Mycenaean "chiefs" to perpetuate the peace. This alliance allowed them to enjoy trade, through some citadels that were still under Egyptian influence, near the Sinai's Peninsula. The war could have ended against the "Sea Peoples" but not against the *Tjehenu*. Egypt faced two wars against the Libyans, during the reign of Ramesses III[407], simultaneously with the various incursions of the "Sea Peoples". The Egyptians'[408] ability to prolong two wars in parallel led to a need to seek better relations with one side, and the *Tjehenu* continued to press with various attacks until the reign of Ramesses IV (ca.1153-1146 BC).

[405] REDFORD 1993: 246-256.
[406] CLINE, O´CONNOR 2012: 186.
[407] ARAÚJO 2011: 184-188.
[408] *ANET*, 262-63.

2

THE ASSYRIAN CAVALRY OF TIGLATH-PILESER I

"A guerra era vista pelos Assírios como um imperativo divino que sancionava toda a acção violenta, o seu império foi estabelecido e mantido através do belicismo".

SANTOS, António Ramos dos, "E a «Espada de Aššur» abateu-se sobre a Fenícia…", SANTOS, António Ramos dos, VARANDAS, José (coord.), *A Guerra na Antiguidade III*, Lisboa, Caleidoscópio, 2010, p.87.

2.1 The Horses of Aššur: The Creation of the Assyrian Calvary

After the Battle of Delta war did not end in the Near East. The devastation left by the raids of the "Sea Peoples" provided the various regions of Canaan with a geopolitical and economic reorganization. The Philistine *Pentapolis* are an excellent example, not the only one. Since the constitution of Neo-Hittite kingdoms in the North and West of Syria, along the border with the Assyrian *Ḫanigalbat*, are a consequence of this new geopolitical and military situation.

The thalassocratic citadels of the ancient kingdom of Amurru – such as Byblos, Tyre, Sîdon, Beirut, among other citadels were very important for this period. Since the great Ugarit was destroyed, played a very important role in the recovery of commercial and economic activity in Canaan. The pottery has changed, the Mycenaean or Aegean style has been significantly manufactured. If before the trade was focused on land routes and markets in the Near East, after the incursions of the "Sea Peoples", there was a new market.

The importance of studying pottery in this period made it possible to obtain information about a transition from the commercial and productive focus, from the Canaanite citadels to the Aegean. Elizabeth French[409] explains the evidence present in pottery produced in Cilicia and Philistia that it had adopted the Mycenaean style, with a clear Cretan influence. These regions were occupied by the Mycenaeans/"Sea Peoples", from Crete, Attica, and Anatolia.

[409] KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 345-347.

In this way, there is a visible relationship with the city of Tiryns, due to the simple and basic style, as well as the material and even the techniques used. This pottery contains characteristics that go back to an "early" and "middle" phase of Mycenaean pottery (LH IIIC).

Robin Rollinger highlights the Assyrian references to Aegean societies in cuneiform texts from the 8th BC[410]. They called them "*Yamnāya*" (pronounced *Yawnāya*), as well as, in Babylonian designation, "*Yamanāya*" (pronounced *Yawanaya*)[411]. It is due to these references and the production of pottery that it is possible to understand the Mycenaean presence and the structural impact on the societal dynamics, which it had in Canaan and a military influx in Assyria. At an economic level, the horse trade, among other products, suffered a significant drop, when the citadel of Troy was destroyed. Followed by and the inevitable destruction of the Hittite empire and, finally, the citadel of Ugarit as well.

There is a date of the Battle of the Delta, the Assyria of Ninurta-apil-Ekur (ca.1181–1169 BC) closed on itself, as previously it was only focused on the conflicts to the south with Babylon. For after the death of Tukultī-Ninurta I[412] and his son Enlil-kudurri-uṣur (ca.1186–1182 BC), he was defeated in the battle for the throne against Adad-šuma-uṣur, who died shortly after conquering Babylon. Stefan Jakob[413], points out that Ninurta-apil-Ekur was a king of Assyria who was under the Babylonian

[410] Rarely does a placename as *Yaman* (pronounced *Yawan*) correspond to the region of origin. In this case, "*Yam(a)nāya*" is etymologically related to the "Ionians", in a clear reference to the "Greeks". As it appears in other Near Eastern languages as *yunan-* in Turkish, *yūnān-* in Arabic and Persian, *yawān-* in Hebrew, that precisely meaning the Greek people, language and land. These etymological references date back to the Late Bronze Age, that is, to the period of Mycenaean expansion. These terms are analogous to the Egyptian, Ugaritic and Linear B toponyms and the first interpolation appear in the Homeric Texts related to "Ionians/Ionians"/*Ἰάονες* six centuries later in the *Iliad* as in a hymn to Apollo. As referred by Robin Rollinger "A few additional cuneiform documents testify to the presence of "Greeks" within the Assyrian empire" (see *Il*. 13.638; *Hymn*. *Hom*. *Ap*. 3.147; COOK 1971: 65; HELM 1980: 162-166; ANTHONY, BROWN 2011: 143-144; FRAHM (ed.), ROLLINGER 2017: 275, 277; PARPAS 2018: 102-112; KHAN 2019: 4-24; NAKATA, NISHIAKI, ODAKA, YAMADA, YAMADA (ed.), YAMADA 2019: 221-222; HAYWOOD 2022: 10-13).

[411] KINZL 2006: 202.

[412] During the reign of Tukultī-Ninurta I, there was a battle between the Hittites and the Assyrians, known as the Battle of Niḫriya. This battle was very important to the Assyrian occupation of the territories and trade post between the *Ḫanigalbat* and Hittite border. And yet, it was a catastrophic defeat from the Hittites and, at the same time, a significant blow from the Assyrians that was reprocured in the collapse of the Hittite Empire (see SINGER 1985: 100-123; 2011: 353-373; RUTHERFORD 2020: 21).

[413] FRAHM (ed.), JAKOB 2017: 132.

influence. This state of political instability led Assyria to a period of stagnation, as he was a king who was not concerned with foreign policy.

After the death of Ninurta-apil-Ekur and twelve years of reign, Aššur-dan I ascends (ca.1169-1133 BC). Therefore, relations with Babylon ended and military campaigns allowed the conquests of important cities such as Zaban, Irrija and Ugar-Sallu. Assyria sought to expand and strengthen its borders. However, it was after the death of Aššur-dan I that it provoked power struggles for his two sons, thus leading to another period of instability.

Aššur-reša-iši (ca.1132–1115 BC) took the reins of power and did not allow Babylon to submit to Assyria. Consequently, this conjecture led to one of the most important conflicts, in which he faced King Nebuchadnezzar I in battle at the citadel of Zanqi, known as "The Fortress of Assyria", from which he was defeated[414].

Assyria was somehow secure and stable on its southern border with Babylon, owing to the victories of Aššur-reša-iši who immortalized him as the title "Avenger of Assyria". Aššur-reša-iši transmitted this form of rule and military commander to his son Tiglath-pileser I[415] (ca.1115/4-1076 BC). Assyria suffered, even in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I. With the aftermath of the destruction of the Hittite Empire, the movements still had a deep impact on the kingdom. Tribes that participated in the collapse of the Hittite Empire, such as the *Kaška*/*Gasga* and the Thracian-Phrygian[416]/*Muški* who descended to the Assyrian border of *Ḫanigalbat*.

These hostile Thracian-Phrygian/*Muški* tribes crossed the Taurus and marched through the Tigris River valley towards Nineveh. To the east, in the Zagros mountains, there tribes were attacking the trade routes, known to the Assyrians as *papḫû* (is the

[414] In this battle there is a reference to the use of "siege devices" by the Babylonians. There are no archaeological or iconographic elements that can describe what they were, or what their function was. Nebuchadnezzar I, at the time of his defeat at Zanqi, and moments before withdrawing, had the "siege devices" burned so that they would not be captured by the Assyrians (see LÉVÊQUE (dir.) 2014: 300-301; FRAHM (ed.), JAKOB 2017: 133; BÁCS, BOLLÓK, VIDA, (ed.), DEZSŐ 2018: 79-108.

[415] Note that Tiglath-pileser I is the Hebrew name, attributed to the Assyrian king Tukultī-apli-Ešarra that is his Assyrian name, meaning "My trust is in the son of Ešarra". Ešarra is connected to the temple complex of Aššur, where the Ten Judges of E-šarra or the "Divine Decade" would be located. Ešarra is the Assyrian name, whereas is known in Akkadian as Ešertu(m) meaning "The Group of Ten People" (see FRAYNE, STUCKEY 2021: 103).

[416] *Hdt*. 4.87,91,92; VALEVA, NANKOV, GRANINGER (ed.), VASSILEVA 2015: 327.

Hurrite word for "mountains", and it was this "people" that later constituted the kingdom of Urarṭu, in the region of Šubartu)[417].

Meanwhile, the *Aḫlamû*-Arameans (*aramāyya*) tribes to the West, settled in the Syrian desert, in cities like Palmyra and Jebel Bišri, as well as, along the Euphrates River, crossing it. The Babylon of Marduk-nadin-aḫḫe reinforced the military presence by pressing the southern border of Assyria, essentially in cities like Bit Adini, Laqe and Suhu a Rapiqum.

Tiglath-pileser I inherited this geopolitical and military situation. This situation allowed the adoption of more regulated measures that were necessary to keep Assyria strengthened while facing the constant external threats that surrounded it. As António Augusto Tavares says, "Lá, tudo é voltado para a guerra"[418].

The militarism that Arnold Toynbee is very critical about the militarization in general terms as it was used in the Assyrian History and yet, he ends up understanding its importance when it talks about to Assyria. The need for disputes to be resolved in these periods *a manu militari* depended on the ability to militarized society as did Tiglath-pileser I. Thus, Arnold Toynbee points out that:

> "O valor militar que uma sociedade eleva entre os habitantes de seus confins para a defesa contra inimigos externos torna-se a terrível efemeridade moral chamada militarismo [...]"[419].

This militarism was essential for the structural reforms of Tiglath-pileser I, when in his Palatial Decrees[420] he instilled the concept of responsibility – firstly, to all those around him, and then to society in general. The Middle Assyrian Law, essentially

[417] PALMA 2003: 98.
[418] "There, everything is geared towards war" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see TAVARES 1987: 43).
[419] "The military value that a society raises among the inhabitants of its confines for the defence against external enemies becomes the terrible moral ephemerality called militarism […]" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see TOYNBEE 1963: 129).
[420] ROTH 1997: 206-207.

the codes of the Assyrian Criminal Law, is clear in this respect. As Mario Liverani expresses regarding the Assyrian social and military structure:

> "The Middle Assyrian family was still based on a unity of brothers, who, if divided, still gave double the inheritance to the eldest son. […] These laws also emphasise the influence of military activities, with soldiers who never returned from war, or were lost"[421].

Tiglath-pileser I's preoccupation with defending the northern borders was linked to the need to militarize the society. Because for half a century, the *Muški*[422] or *Mešeše*[423] pressed the borders to such an extent that they ended up occupying the Alzi and Purukuzi regions that extended to *Kutmuhi*. Then, the aggressive retaliations of Tiglath-pileser I in ca.1100 BC, he led the army across the Kašiari Mountains. Ergo, Tiglath-pileser I to confront the five *Muški* kings with twenty thousand men, as described in his *Annals*. Therefore, what proved to be an extremely important factor was disciplined, rigorous training and the new weapon of the Assyrian army, the cavalry corps.

The outcome of the battle in the lands of *Kutmuhi* was inevitable[424], the Assyrians repelled for once and for all the threat of the *Muški*. Tiglath-pileser I[425] massacred more than half of the invading force, with a particularly graphic passage, which explains the scale of the outcome of the battle, been following "Their blood I caused to flow in the valleys and on the high places of the mountains. I cut off their

[421] LIVERANI 2014: 362.

[422] These Thracian-Phrygian tribes, known to the Assyrians as *Muški* or *Mešeše*, as referred to in the Bible, in addition to having contributed to the destruction of the Hittite empire, organized to attack the Northern border of Assyria. But according to Herodotus and Strabo, these tribes had a "military aristocracy of cavalry", contrary to *Phrygians*/*Brygians* where there is no reference to a "Phrygian cavalry" in the *Annals* of Tiglath-pileser I. There is, however, reference to a numerous army commanded by five kings. These *Muški* tribes, and the *Kaška* and *Luwian*, are the ones who developed the Neo-Hittite kingdoms on the Northern border of Assyria (see *Ez* 38,2; 39,1; Joseph. *AJ*. 125; PALMA 2003: 67).

[423] *Gen* 10.2.

[424] SMITH 2014: 29-30

[425] OLMSTEAD 1920: 150-151; OPPENHEIM 1964: 167-168; HUROWITZ, WESTENHOLZ 1990: 1-49; FRAHM (ed.), JAKOB 2017: 134-135.

heads and outside their cities, like heaps of grain, I piled them up. Their spoils, their goods, and their possessions, in countless numbers, I brought out. I carried off six thousand (men), their remainder of their troops, who fled before my weapons and had embraced my feet, and I counted them as inhabitants of my land"[426].

Assyria was rigidly demarcating its position, *vis-à-vis* all its neighbours and enemies. The *Aḫlamû*-Arameans[427] tribes were really a challenge, as the inscriptions narrate the crossing of these tribes a total of 28 times, which means 28 conflicts won by the Assyrians in 14 years[428]. This military capacity of the Assyrian army to perpetuate campaigns in *continuum*, denotes a preparation of the Assyrian military and a very tough training. These campaigns provided, as described in the *Annals* of Tiglath-pileser I, an adaptation of the army that was certainly trained for the most varied war scenarios.

About this particularity of the Assyrian army, Maria de Lurdes Palma clearly addresses the capacity and the Assyrian military training, highlighting:

> "As dificuldades inerentes aos terrenos da montanha obrigavam a disciplina dura, treino sistemático, conhecimento apurado do próprio quadrado geográfico e morfológico. Escalar montanhas fazia, com certeza, parte do treino dos homens de Tiglat-pileser I, pois era para lá que o inimigo fugia para reorganizar a sua defesa e porque aquelas constituíam o ambiente geográfico que a norte (incluindo nordeste e noroeste) limitava a Assíria"[429].

It's important, however, to refer to the sharpness of the Assyrian military discipline[430], as an attribute of respect for the law. On the contrary to what some

[426] *ARAB* 1.221.
[427] NIEHR 2014: 38-39.
[428] LIVERANI 2014: 435; KEREKES 2017: 39-41.
[429] "The inherent difficulties of mountain terrain required hard discipline, systematic training, accurate knowledge of the geographic and morphological square itself. Climbing mountains was, of course, part of the training of the men of Tiglath-pileser I. Because that was where the enemy fled to reorganize their defence and because those constituted the geographical environment that to the north (including northeast and northwest) limited Assyria" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see PALMA 2003: 217).
[430] RIMA 2, p. 16, ii 63-70.

historiographic literature alludes to, the Assyrian military were not allowed to loot indiscriminately.

Assyria, in addition to militarizing society and introducing more rigid military training, also needed the horse trade to be re-established. The purchase of horses from Troy was known for its quality of training and for being good examples, both in terms of height and physical strength, characteristic of Trojan horses. These horses were substantially different from the Anatolian, or, Babylonian-Elamite horses, which were much smaller. Tiglath-pileser I, when he defeats the *Muški*, forces them to pay taxes and tributes, which are normally paid with horses, among other luxury products[431].

It is, in this way, that the Assyrian military of the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, provided the creation and structure of the first cavalry corps of the Ancient World. As it was explained by Robert Drews: "It appears, then, that the use of cavalry began in the twelfth century, that by the tenth century some kings employed thousands of cavalrymen, and that the ninth-century Assyrian kings had at least as many horses in their cavalry as in their chariotry"[432].

The introduction of a more robust horse, which would come from the regions of Asia Minor through trade, was decisive for the creation of this new military element. The chronological timeline between the 11th/10th BC which match with the final years of the Tiglath-pileser I's reign that could be a mark and an evidence that go back to that period, as J. K. Anderson emphasized: "[…] The Assyrian horses are larger and coarser in build than those of the Egyptian reliefs. "The mountains" continued to be an important source of supply to Mesopotamia, and the Assyrian kings repeatedly led their armies into Media, largely with the object of recruiting their studs of horses"[433].

The Assyrians were not the first to domesticate the horse[434], but they were the first people to use the mounted warrior as a military corps, which acquired, from this reign, a militaristic status. As Arthur Ferrill clarifies:

[431] OLMSTEAD 1917: 176.
[432] DREWS 1996: 166.
[433] ANDERSON 1961: 12.
[434] ANTHONY 2007: 200.

> "Perhaps a word is in order about one of the great mysteries of Assyrian military history, the fact that Assyrians were the first to deploy cavalry forces, yet they retained chariotry as a more important arm"[435].

Mounted warriors were a defining element within the Assyrian army, and in this period the *ša pētḫalle*[436]/cavalry unit or more accurate *pītḫallu*[437] (war-chariot/cavalry) was inherently linked to a higher military rank. Stefan Jakob points out the existence of a cavalry corps in the Assyrian army of Tiglath-pileser I and Maria de Lurdes Palma explains:

> "Do equipamento militar pouco sabemos; as inscrições reais mencionam carros de guerra, exército e guerreiros (entenda-se cavalaria e infantaria). […] Porém, três terão sido as principais divisões do exército: carros de guerra, cavalaria e infantaria, embora não se faça referência explícita à cavalaria e infantaria"[438].

References in the *Annals* of Tiglath-pileser I to *ANŠE.KUR.RA.MEŠ GIŠ.LAL GIŠ.ni-ri-šú*[439]/"teams of horses", or bodies of cavalry are referred to as horses

[435] FERRILL 1997: 73.

[436] This term was only used in the end of reign of Sargon II and after the reforms in the reign of his son Sennacherib, as it will be discussed in detail on the Third Chapter of this Dissertation in the topic of "The Sennacherib´s Iron Knights: Cavalry *versus* the War Chariot".

[437] The first time that the term *pītḫallu*/*pit-ḫal-li* appeared was to refer the ambiguous sense between cavalry and the war chariot in the Inscription of Tukultī-Ninurta II as it was translated by Albert Kirk Grayson, "*i-sa-ab-tu ina 2-e u₄-me ina KUR-e KUR iš-ru-un la-a ina GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ-a la-a pit-ḫal-li it-<ta>-bal-ʾkiʾ-t[u ...]*/On the second day, (since) in the hills of Mount Išrun one could cross neither with my chariots nor with cavalry [...]" (see RIMA 2, p. 173, 37). Albert Kirk Grayson opted for an distinguish terminology and sense of the term *pītḫallu* to designate the "cavalry" and *GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ-a* to referred the "war chariot". On the other hand, the Assyriologist like Shigeo Yamada and others appoint to the ambiguous semantic sense of the term *pītḫallu* that connected to the "war chariot or/and cavalry" (see YAMADA 2000: 262). The terminology it isn´t literal or even clear, and this translation choice made by Albert Kirk Grayson wasn't helpful at all for the better understanding in precision of this problematic theme.

[438] "We know little about military equipment; royal inscriptions mention chariots of war, army, and warriors (understand cavalry and infantry). […] However, three would have been the main divisions of the army: chariots, cavalry, and infantry, although there is no explicit reference to cavalry and infantry" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see PALMA 2003: 219).

[439] DEZSŐ 2012: 63.

equipped with harnesses and harnesses[440]. However, this feature allows the interpretation that there would be horses as war booty and for use in chariots. As described in the *Annals* of Tiglath-pileser I: "I had in harness for the forces of my land more chariots and teams of horses"[441]. This meaning that there would certainly be references to cavalry in battle.




Figure 2: Representing the Terracotta octagon known as the *Annals* of the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser I, from the Anu-Adad Temple at Aššur, Iraq, found today in the British Museum.

[440] Consequently, "horses in harness" is variously mentioned in the *Annals* of Tiglath-pileser I in more detail appearing as *aṣ-ʾban ANŠEʾ.KUR.RA.MEŠ* (team of horses in harness) (see RIMA 2, p. 37, 13), so, that could possibly admit the existence of a cavalry that fought as a team. Because in the early Assyrian military conjuncture – especially in the reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II – relative to the cavalry corps *modus operandi* that fought in pairs, a lancer and the shield bearer, as team. But, throughout the reading of the *Annals* of Tiglath-pileser I there is a constant necessity to distinguish between the references to the war chariot and the team of horses. Perhaps Tiglath-pileser I tried to reference for the better comprehension of the role in battle of this "team of horses in harness" that needed or were worthy of being differentiated as it appears in the *Annals*, "[…] *GIŠ.GIGIR-šú ra-ki-su ANŠE.KUR.RA.MEŠ GIŠ.LAL GIŠ ni-ri-šú ḫal-lu-up-ti ANŠE.KUR.RA.MEŠ ḫal-lu-up-ti ÉRIN.MEŠ*/[…] his harness chariot, his team of horses, the equipment of the horses" (see RIMA 2, p. 199, I 86). As was clearly and objective referred by M. A Littauer and J. H. Crouwel as the "Directional control is more difficult to exert on the driven than on the ridden horse" (LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1988: 171).

[441] RIMA 2, p. 27, vii 28-35.

It is urgent to highlight the unique ideology of Tiglath-pileser I. In addition to creating the first cavalry corps, it also provided for the institution of an ideal of what the Assyrian monarch is, as well as a distinct historical literary gender, the *Annals*[442]. As José Nunes Carreira highlights:

> "Mas o texto de Anitta não tem percursores. Mesmo na velha Mesopotâmia, só com Tiglat-pileser I (1115-1077) se atinge nível historiográfico que se lhe possa comparar"[443].

This is important for the fact that it related to the predecessor Tukultī-Ninurta I, who used the epic as a narrative.

The relevance of the reforms of Tiglath-pileser I is that they allowed an abrupt break with its predecessors, mainly with Tukultī-Ninurta I. These reforms redefined all the imagery, symbolism, law, literature and, essentially, the military part. The determining factors of a chariot force and a cavalry unit must be thoroughly defined.

A chariot or cavalry force is not just a group of soldiers on a horse-drawn chariot or, in the case of cavalry, an armed group riding on horseback. For the task to

[442] Tiglath-pileser I introduced a new literary gender, the *Annals*, which is based on the description of events year by year, in the first person, as if the monarch were the narrator, using metaphorical language, poetic comparisons, epic hyperbole and *topoi*. The *Annals* are primarily historical sources, not historiographic, according to José Nunes Carreira, "[…] pouco avançam na ideia de história"/ "[…] make little progress in the idea of history" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see CARREIRA 1993: 84). However, it was from these sources that it was possible to develop a narrative of linked events, with a chronology and emphasizing military victories so much those of the king, who is a narrator, like those of his ancestors. In addition, the King's Lists which are the beginnings of the creation of an idea of History and a historiographical narrative, as defended by Victor Hurowitz, Joan Goodnick Westenholz and José Nunes Carreira, *a contrario sensu* of Collingwood's premise (see COLLINGWOOD 1978: 23-27; HUROWITZ, WESTENHOLZ 1990: 1; CARREIRA 1982: 333-358).

[443] "But Anitta's text has no precursors. Even in old Mesopotamia, it was only with Tiglath-pileser I (1115-1077) that a historiographical level could be reached that could be compared to it" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see CARREIRA 1993: 142).

be a chariot or cavalry unit must respect certain military[444] characteristics as organization, discipline, corporation, training, and *status militaris*.

The war in Assyria is a very important event, in addition to being ideologically and religiously justified. The ideological appropriation of religion in the service of war and the justice for which war is waged was not invented in Assyria, but in Sumer. As it is possible to find in the ancestral conflict between the Uš king of the city of Umma who invades the territory of the *ensi* Entemena of Lagaš. Thus, Entemena invokes the protective and war gods, in the sense that the gods such as Ningirsu (the warrior of Enlil and patron god of the city of Lagaš) protected from invasion. For Tiglath-pileser I, war was more than a form of protection for Assyria, it was also an order that came from the god Aššur and other gods.

Tiglath-pileser I skilfully explored the Assyrian capacity to mobilize for war, and the ideologization of the Aššur cult was fundamental. Therefore, he introduced this conception in the narratives of his Annals, in which the premise is, that there is a need for war and for justice. This need led to the addition of the god Šamaš (the God of Justice and Protector of Law) as a moral and ethical justifier of the need for domination and for brutal punishment of those who oppose him.

The role of the gods in the Near Eastern world is pivotal. Religion and war are two determining pillars in Assyria. This union of Šamaš and Aššur, allowed more than a justification of the war in narrative and religious imagery, but also had the value of law and legally argued. As highlighted by Wolfram von Soden "With this, the Assyrian ideology of war gained a juridical character which in this way was not verbalized in other peoples of that time"[445].

However, the great work of Tiglath-pileser I was the constitution of the first cavalry corps, as evidenced by Sarva Daman Singh "The Assyrians had cavalry from an early date. In the period between the middle of the second millennium BC"[446]. This new weapon of war operated *pari passu* with the chariots, having been implemented

[444] NOBLE 2015: 18.
[445] CARREIRA 2008: 81.
[446] SINGH 1962: 105.

an equivalent hierarchical structure. And that is why Robert Drews highlights the following "But in other respects the cavalry teams were surely superior"[447].

In other words, the preponderance that the cavalry gained over the war chariot provided more investment, which accelerated the development of many qualities. For example, it was much cheaper, had greater attack and defence abilities and adaptation to geography that the chariot did not possess. They had a greater versatility of equipment and weaponry than the chariot. Therefore, in the *modus operandi* of the battlefield, it was more mobile and initially light.

The war chariot[448] (in Akkadian *narkabtu*/*mugirru*) was limited in its range of action in the theatre of operations, essentially concerning about geography. As noted by Mary A. Littauer[449] and Georges Contenau "The car, whose front part was not articulated, had no possibility of suddenly changing its direction near an obstacle"[450].

Therefore, it is noticeable the capacity and dexterity of the cavalry, to move in different geographies, was a clear tactical advantage, mainly, from the reign of Tiglath-pileser I. Then, the Assyrian tactics became more aggressive[451], both influenced by the military training that became part of the structure and composition of the army, as well as the special use of cavalry in battle. The use of cavalry provided the filling of certain tactical gaps on the battlefield, given the use of the war chariot and its limitations and range of action in battle.

For Tiglath-pileser I, military force was an imperative necessity to "avenge Assyria". Yet, the structural reforms within the *limes* of the Assyrian kingdom were fundamental for the maintenance of order and peace of the various ethnoculturally and ethnolinguistically heterogeneous population potentates. The foundations were finally laid for what was the larger project, namely *māt Aššur*.

When Tiglath-pileser I[452] unites the concepts of "War" and "Justice" and the gods, in an ideology of militarization and expansion of the "Great Assyria", it creates

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[447] DREWS 1996: 165.
[448] RAULWING, LITTAUER, CROUWEL (ed.), LITTAUER, CROUWEL 2002: 68-72, 98-103; CASTLEDEN 2005: 34; COTTERELL 2005: 219-257,
[449] LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1997: 92-96.
[450] CONTENAU [s.d.]: 157.
[451] PALMA 2003: 216-217.
[452] GARELLI 1982: 201-202.

the first cavalry corps. These changes in posture brought about a difference in the Assyrian stance towards enemies, to something more aggressive, more robust, pragmatic, versatile, quick, and powerful in its impact, as Aššur had ordered.

It is necessary to emphasize the importance and uniqueness of this Assyrian cavalry corps, not only for being a pioneer but also for being documented, corresponding to the characteristics of what cavalry is. Hence, the use of binomial (horse plus man, which is military), means that until the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, there was no type of team, corps, or cavalry unit.

Hence, the domestication of the horse was known long before Assyria existed, and even the horse was marketed and used in chariots, the typology of training and use in warfare. It is, however, completely paradoxical regarding the use of the binomial and, of a structure and professionalization of the cavalry corps, as well as the specific training that was inherent to it.

Therefore, until the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, the mounted warrior used in warfare, was just a messenger, as Sarva Daman Singh refers "The Hittites made use of messengers on horseback in war"[453] – known as *PITḪALLU*[454].

Although, as Shigeo Yamada clearly and objectively referred, "The term *pītḫallu* can be interpreted as either cavalry man, cavalry horse or cavalry unit[455] (trained horse with equipment and a rider). See A. Salonen, *Hippologica Accadica*, pp. 42f. and 222; AHw 858b (*pētḫallu*). In the evidence considered here, the term, attested without the determinative LÚ or ANŠE, seems to mean a cavalry unit, but costly trained horses and their equipment, rather than their riders, must have been of special interest to the Assyrians"[456]. So, Tiglath-pileser I puts war in Aššur's name, with characteristics that were not known until then, the transition from the bronze to the iron weaponry allowed the cavalry to change the Late Bronze warfare.

[453] SINGH 1962: 104.
[454] GOETZE 1957: 124; YADIN 1963: 113; LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1979: 98; BEAL 1992: 190-91; BRYCE 2002: 111; GENZ, MIELKE (ed.), LORENZ, SCHRAKAMP 2011: 141.
[455] BRADFORD 2001: 43.
[456] YAMADA 2000: 262.

2.2 Religion and War: The Sacrifice of Horses

The religious, symbolic, and magical premise that underlies the first population agglomerates or societal clusters is *Death*. Wolfgang Palaver explains that the stability of the community – whether primitive or a *URU*/*alūm*/*polis* – is affected by the natural fatality and mortality inherent to the human condition. Therefore "Death throws a community into crisis"[457]. And in line with René Girard, who goes further advocating that "There is no culture without a tomb and no tomb without a culture; in the end the tomb is the first and only cultural symbol"[458].

Consequently, the stability of the community is directly related to the control of violence, whether internal or external, and it is necessary to define the dimension of violence and war. This need for *pax* often manifests itself through a process of sacralization, the *sacrifice*. According to the anthropologist Mark R. Anspach[459] exposition, the etymological root of the word "sacrifice" means "to make sacred".

This process of sacralization establishes a bridge between the individual and the collective, through the reinforcement of values in the face of rivalries and violence between oneself and others. One of the most interesting concepts about violence was the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas as "La violence est originellement justifiée comme la défense de l'autre, du produchain (fût-il mon parent ou mon people!), mais est violence pour quelqu'un"[460].

Ergo, it´s not possible to speak of sacrifices, religion, and war without mentioning the magical[461], symbolic, totemic, ritualistic, and mythological narratives[462]. Bernardo Bernardi synthesized that the context of a magic-religious *etnema* puts man in the purpose of his existence, what "[…] representa o conunto das

[457] LÉVÊQUE 1996: 64-66; HODDER (ed.), PALAVER 2019: 48.
[458] HODDER (ed.), PALAVER 2019: 49.
[459] HODDER (ed.), ANSPACH 2019: 135.
[460] "Violence is originally justified as the defence of the other, the neighbour (whether my relative or my people!), but it is violence for someone" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see MARCOS, CANTINHO, BARCELOS (orgs.), BOJANIC 2011: 248-249).
[461] LEROI-GOURHAN 1983: 129; MALINOWSKI 1988: 22, 30, 41; BRONOWSKI 1989: 20-21.
[462] ELIADE [s.d.]: 107; JESI 1977: 76-77.

interpertações encontradas pelo homem nas suas relações quer individuais quer colectivas, com o *mistério do cosmos*"[463].

One of the main ideas of using the sacrifice is to maintain order within the community. Its principle is to face the chaos from the outside, keeping the inside orderly, pure, and strengthened. The sacrifice, whether of animals or humans[464], is clearly a form of *katharsis*[465]. Then, it´s in the ritual that gathers the community to adopts a behaviour of "communing"[466], through which the myths[467] are explained and corroborated, and the gods are exalted. As Walter Burkert synthesise that "O ritual reflecte-se num conto sobre a morte por sacrifício"[468].

However, the horse sacrifice is a primitive and ancient approach of sacralization. This type of sacrifice was a form of *expiation* and complemented by a ritual. In the Hittite military tradition, it was a *Between in Pieces* ritual, that "After a military defeat, Hittite ritual prescribed the cutting in two of a man, a he-goat, a dog, and a pig, upon which the troops were marched between the parts"[469]. Nonetheless, the process of *takpirtu* (is the Akkadian term for purification)[470] and sacralization were essential to the stability of the numerous groups of people, both in society and in war as to human or mythical enemy.

War keeps the community cohesive and alive, religion through magical processes purifies and legitimizes the violence/aggression[471], as René Giard defends

[463] "[…] represents the set of interpretations found by man, in his relationships, whether individual or collective, with the *mystery of the cosmos*" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see BERNARDI 1978: 386).
[464] For example, the royal tombs of Ur, ca.2900-2700 BC, are known by the grand scale of human's sacrifices (see JAMES 1958: 221).
[465] Arist. *Poet*.1449b.
[466] As Malinowski referred "Sacrifício e comunhão, as duas principais formas de distribuição ritual dos alimentos, podem ser agora vistos à luz dos antecedents da attitude primária de reverência religiosa do home mem relação à abundância providencial de alimentos"/ "Sacrifice and communion, the two main forms of ritual food distribution, can now be seen in light of the antecedents of man's primary attitude of religious reverence towards the providential abundance of food" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see MALINOWSKI 1988: 46).
[467] CHÂTELET (dir.), AUBENQUE, BERNHARDT 1974: 22; VERNANT 1991: 20; BURKERT 1991: 28; LEROI-GOURHAN 1983: 13; JABOUILLE 1994: 35-40; LACERDA 1998: 28.
[468] "The ritual is reflected in a tale of sacrificial death" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see BURKERT 2001: 104).
[469] PUHVEL 1978: 355; RUTHERFORD 2020: 211.
[470] WRIGTH 2009: 200.
[471] CLASTRES, GAUCHET, ADLER, LIZOT 1980: 16.

"[…] A vítima é um bode expiatório"[472]. Thus, the most expressive episode of this reality is the Homeric Trojan Horse metaphor or *atê*[473]. Faced with this problem, there are three determining factors: Gods, Animals and Man. The Homeric metaphor fits these three factors – Poseidon is the god, the animal is the Horse[474], and the Trojans are the men – who worshiped the god Poseidon, and the offering was a *Hippos* (a ship).

On the other hand, in the Ural-Altaic populations the sacrifice of horses is the main shamanic religious ceremony to a celestial god (for example, the god Bai-Ulgen). Since the sacrifice[475] of the horse for these cultures was intended to offer the "soul" of the sacrificed horse, as a way to ascend to the heavenly world (the abode of the gods) and also as a magical cure for a sick person. As Mircea Eliade explained:

> "A fixação e a consagração do lugar de sacrifício equivale a uma espécie de sublimação do espaço profano; "na verdade, o oficiante constrói para si uma escada e uma ponte para alcançar o mundo celeste", […]"[476].

Therefore, the aggression is intrinsic part of the religious process – the blood, the offering, the entrails, the magic/craft, the gods that need meat and the man that want divine power. The philosophic sense of the sacrifice isn't about the *truth*[477] of a

[472] GIRARD 2020: 59.
[473] DODDS 1988: 48.
[474] In fact, it is permissible to infantize that during these periods the animals were the first entities to be venerated at the first sedentary communities/agglomerations. Thus, as divine remained even with the humanization of mythology, initially the zoomorphization and then the anthropomorphization of divine and semi-divine entities. The Animal symbolism – according to some archaeologists in several Palaeolithic representations on the caves and the Neolithic cults – were also attributed as sexual symbols (male and/or female). However, Laming-Emperaire tried to reverse this tendency to categorize certain animals, such as the Bison/Bull as a male symbol and the Horse as a female symbol. Yet, the god Poseidon is a male god and was offered to him sacrifices of Horses and Bulls (see LEROI-GOURHAN 1983: 87, 102; ANTHONY, BROWN 2011: 138). As Pierre Lévêque referred "[…] – os animais mais representados, bisontes e cavalos, não se confundem, mas encarnam uns o sexo femenino, outros o sexo masculine"/ "[…] – the most represented animals, bison and horses, are not confused, but some embody the female sex, others the male sex" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see LÉVÊQUE 1996: 20).
[475] PIGGOTT 1981: 217, 233; GILHUS 2006: 22-26, 28.
[476] "The fixation and consecration of the place of sacrifice amounts to a kind of sublimation of the profane space; "in fact, the officiant builds for himself a ladder and a bridge to reach the heavenly world", […]" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see ELIADE 1990: 138).
[477] VEYNE 1987: 108-109; SCHAEFFLER 2002: 20.

religion or cult but to achieve a proximity to the divine world (the place of the gods) through a ceremony and a symbolic[478] act with a specific language. As Jean-Pierre Vernant referred to that "Neste sentido, a simbólica religiosa, mais do que linguagem humana, quer-se linguagem divina"[479].

Consequently, this language has been used in various ways to express the position and extent of mythological stories[480], rite ceremonies, magical/craft healings, and illusions that was synthesized in the totems that transpired ancient historical reality. The knowledge is passed through a symbol, known as writing – for example, the hieroglyphic writing, the cuneiform writing, syllabic writing, all have historical and religious charge[481]. Still, it is the philosophical message that connects the individual and community with nature and the gods.

The rituals of death and funeral ceremonies, mainly those of Umm el-Marra[482], have as a symbolic language[483] a reference of high status – possibly royalty/*kunga* or *anše.BAR.AN*[484] – to an equid, as described by Jill A. Weber and the research by Glenn M. Schwartz. This type of complex burials[485] had one main purpose make "visible" to the society. Yet, the representation of the lineage/heritage and the transference of power, that was legitimized by the symbols of high status, as the pottery and the animals (horses). Hence, the magic-ritualistic ceremonies invoke the protection of gods and ancestors by a blood sacrifice, even in some cases groups of animals (horses or donkeys[486]).

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[478] As Mircea Eliade referred "[…]; é, graças aos símbolos, que o Mundo se torna "transparente", susceptível de "mostrar" a transcandência"/ "[…] it is, thanks to symbols, that the world becomes "transparent", capable of "showing" transcendence" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see ELIADE [s.d.]: 140; WHITEHEAD 1987: 14, 20).

[479] "In this sense, the religious symbolic, more than human language, wants divine language" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see VERNANT 1991: 18).

[480] BURKERT 1983: 26-34.

[481] WOODHEAD 1967: 12-23; DIRINGER 1985: 16-27; GOODY 2000: 38-41.

[482] PORTER, SCHWARTZ 2012: 170; WYGNAŃSKA 2017: 142.

[483] BERNARDI 1978: 390-391; SILVA 1992: 49-57; SANTOS 1993: 66; ECO 2006: 52.

[484] SCHWARTZ, CURVERS, DUNHAM, WEBER 2012: 164-167.

[485] BIEHL, ROSENSTOCK (ed.), BIEHL, ROSENSTOCK 2022: 8.

[486] For example, the asses that were buried with the king Ur-Nammu/a as gifts to the gods. In fact, was found various equid burials (of Horses and Donkeys) were found in the EBI-II and MBII period within the Hurrian, Mitannian, Ugaritic, and Canaanitic territories like – Tell es-Sakan, Tell es-Safi/Gath, Tell Brak, Tell Halawa, Tell Banat, Umm el-Marra, Tell Banat, Tell Brak, Tell el-Ajjūl, Tel Haror, Tell Abu Hureyra, Tell Jemmeh, Lod, Lachiš, Tell Far'ah (N), Azor, Acco, Tell Miqne-Ekron, Jaffa (the modern

In the cult of Helios[487] horses were sacrificed by fire[488] on Mount Taigeto; while on Rhodes, during the festivities dedicated to him, had offered a chariot (with four horses attached to the chariot), which was thrown into the sea. Serpents and horses are symbolically chthonic animals, but it's with this dichotomy of the elements of fire and water that they brought meaning to what connects the two polos in one moment, the sacrifice. However, the horse is more than a symbol that was present as in Uranian and Chthonic myths. Nonetheless the horse was a representation of high status, strength, aggressiveness, courage, and a high level of social and military development.

In fact, the horse was at the same time a Near Eastern icon, and an animal who were the most representative of the symbiosis between the Chthonic and Uranian myths, that cross-paths in turn of the theme of death. As Mario Liverani explained referent to the Middle Bronze Age in Levant, that "Tombs, including burials for horses, and temples in particular were Near Eastern in style"[489].

Thus, in the Near East the greatest and more powerful gods were those who were connected to the Moon. The Moon is an astronomic satellite that have a death, a rebirth, and a reappearing as a "New Moon". The Moon is a symbol of the rhythms of life for the reason that the three phases of the Moon – birth, death, and the rebirth – were shown as the initial concept of the *eternal return*[490]. The decrepitude of the Moon is the main factor in the vivid and observable process of decay, obscurity, and magic in the rebirth of a star and a divine entity. This similarity to the reality of human existence brings the Man closer to his fateful and decadent reality, with sacrifice being a way of reconnecting and being reborn from Chthonic to Uranian entities.

Tel-Aviv) and Jericho (see WOOLLEY 1928: 7-17, 1950: 13-48; DREWS 1994: 91; SAGGS 2000: 115; PORTER, SCHWARTZ 2012: 172; SILVER 2014: 343-344; 346-347).

[487] The god Helios or *Halieia*, from the Doric dialect Halios (see ELIADE 1990: 182).

[488] As Gaston Bachelard once referred "No seio do fogo, a morte não é morte/ within fire, death isn't death" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see BACHELARD 1972: 40). However, T. B. L. Webster, Walter Burkert, Jean-Pierre Vernant, Michael B. Cosmopoulos, and Deborah Ruscillo referred that in the cult of the Poseidon at Isthmia, as well as Edith Hall clearly expresses "The cremated remains, bronzes, and immolated horses are reminiscent of the culture depicted in the *Iliad*" (see WEBSTER 1964: 226; WALTER 1983: 38-39; VERNANT 1991: 66-67, 85; COSMOPOULOS, RUSCILLO 2014: 257-273; HALL 2015: 63). It is possible to find this same reference of sacrifice in the story of Helen in Egypt, at was told in the tragedy of Euripides, the sacrifice of bulls and horses were common in the Greek ritualistic and sacrificial tradition (see RODRIGUES 2004: 490).

[489] LIVERANI 2014: 237.

[490] ELIADE 1990: 195; [s.d.]: 164-165.

Ergo, this conception puts on the altar the neolithic primitive beliefs and the new collective/social beliefs that they substantiate and legitimize this conversation between existence and death. Hence, the extrapolation that the greater understanding of magic and the stars, with fate being "written in the stars" is also in the liver omens[491] and entrails of animals and that were Chthonic entities.

Highlighting that the animal sacrifice as an offering (the Akkadian term is *qīštu* or *kadru*)[492] is a moment when men create a dependence of the divine entities[493]. The revelation offering that thinking was like *do ut des* (I give it so that you give), and Pierre Lévêque[494] adds in his opinion the *do quia dedisti* (I give it because you gave it to me). Sacrifice through an offering is based on the exchange system whose axis is gift and counter-gift, as is apanage in Hesiod and Aristophanes with the myth that led to the "death of the gods"[495].

In the Arzawa rituals as Ian Rutherford named it, the horse was part as an offering. The rituals were specific and directed when an epidemic comes, as coming from a closer enemy or caused by someone's death, like an augur for example – the Maddunani's *muranza* ritual or the Uhhamuwa's ritual[496]. The Hittites[497] had a fruitful number of Rituals of Purification or War Rituals, essentially the post-campaign epidemic as was the Pulisa's ritual.

One of the most important rituals was the so-called "Ritual of the Sea"[498]. In the Assyrian texts the king performed the ritual by washing his weapon and hands on

[491] Yet, in a semiotic perspective one way of transmitting knowledge called Hepatoscopy in the Near Eastern cultures was by the liver omens, referred in the Sumerian texts by the ideogram *ḪAR* – that is the etymological origin of the Latin term *harupex* – or by the Akkadian *amutu* and in Hittite *IŠTU* ^{UZU}*NIG.GIG* (see KANG 1989: 43, 59, 109, 139; BURKERT 1992: 50; NEMET-NEJAT 1998: 251).
[492] SCURLOCK 2006: 242.
[493] BERNARDI 1978: 412.
[494] LÉVÊQUE 1996: 60.
[495] Hes. *Op*.542-557; Ar. *Plut*.1113-1116, *Av*. 481-564; WEST 1988: xii.
[496] RUTHERFORD 2020: 123-124.
[497] BALENTINE (ed.), BECKMAN 2020: 36-52.
[498] The Water in the archaic and civilized societies of the Ancient Near East, is represented in their mythologies and religion as an element of death and renaissance. The function of the Water, in the anthropological and historian of religion point of view, is to disintegrate, abolish forms, purify and, simultaneously, regenerate. So, everything that is form manifests itself above the water, which transforms it into an idea of creation. The main cosmic hierophanies in the Near Eastern mythologies were correlated to the god Enki. Enki/Ea was a creator god, a god of underground waters and of the watery "abyss" as a fertility figure as well, and Wisdom. As John Maier especially synthesized "[…] He is the king of the Abzu, the decreer of fates; the controller and distributor of the precious *me*

the seashore when returns form a military campaign, involved a model of chariot and horses[499]. This ritual was performed in ancient times, by the kings of Sumerian-Akkadian empire like Sargon and Narām-Sîn, so the Assyrian kings maintained the military tradition but practiced on the Mediterranean Sea[500].

Tiglath-pileser I realized an old Assyrian dream – to achieve and conquer the Mediterranean Sea. When Tiglath-pileser I conquered the cities of Arwad, Byblos, Sîdon and received tributed from them, he performed a ritual and heroic acts in *the midst of the sea* (*ša MURUB A.AB.BA*) by killing a *nāḫiru* (sea-horse)[501]. This kind of rituals were connected with the "Ritual of the Sea" and performed to establish boundaries not only as in the magical-symbolic way, but also as to introduce a new authority and the Assyrian values. So, when the Assyrians assume control of a recent conquered territory, they perform this type of ritual to purify and regained strength and to thank and praise the gods through water and blood[502].

This ancient ritualistic tradition perdured for a long time, particularly in the reign of Šalmaneser III (ca.858-824 BC). Andreas P. Parpas referred that

(irrevocable, authoritative, universal laws); the joy and terror of the seas and rivers; the lord of *the* land and father of all the lands; the older brother of the gods" (see KRAMER, MAIER 1989: 2, 38-56; ELIADE [s.d.]: 141). When the Sumerian and Assyrian kings performed the "Ritual of the Sea", they were purifying their weapons to gain magical powers by washing them into the sea or rivers. By doing so, it reconnects them with the god Enki and subsequently with the cosmic and catalytic myths – like the Flood. Thus, the rituals and the myths were a semiotic language that represent the connection of fertility, water, rain, vegetation cycles with the phases of the Moon, the celebration of *akītu* (Assyrian-Babylonic New Year) – even the menstruation cycles. However, the Thales of Miletus archetype was based on the Near Eastern mythologies and the knowledge from Babylonic astronomers to establish an explanation that Water, was the permanent subtract that sustain Earth and Life. Thales of Miletus referred in his own philosophical and cosmic perspective to explain the creation of Life and Man by writing that "everything is *made* by water" (see OPPENHEIM 1966: 259; LAMBERT, MILLARD 1969: 25-40, 42-146; KRAMER 1972: 62-63; HEGEL 1974: 88-89; CORNFORD 1975: 367-386; KIRK, RAVEN 1982: 86-89; ELIADE 1979: 125-126, 130-131; 1990: 200-223, 250-252, 256-257; PRITCHARD 1992: 277-278; BURKERT 1992: 89-91; BAUMGARTEN 2002: 41-42; MIEROOP 2003: 9-11; SCURLOCK 2006: 256; SANTOS 1993: 70-74; MEVILLE 2016: 225; PARPAS 2018: 97; NIETZSCHE 2018: 25-31).

[499] RUTHERFORD 2020: 211.

[500] KANG 1989: 48; ROLLINGER 2012: 726, 730.

[501] This ritual, which is religious and military, was transmitted and practiced since the 3rd millennium, until the Šāh of Sasanian Persia. However, with some changes in their practice since the Assyrian-Babylonian period, consequently, the Šāh of Persia like 'Uqba already worshipped to a single god, due to the adoption of a monotheistic religion (see RIMA 2, p. 37, 21-25; MULLO-WEIR 1931: 259-264; CIVIL 1998: 11-14; YAMADA 2005: 34, 45; ROLLINGER 2012: 738-739; BRYCE 2014: 116-117; ELAYI 2018: 106; PARPAS 2018: 97-98).

[502] BECKMAN 2011: 95-102.

"Shalmaneser III (858-824 BC) continued his predecessors' association with the sea within the same limits of this concept"[503]. Then, Šalmaneser III conquered more territories closed to the Mediterranean Sea than other former Assyrian monarchs. Still, when Šalmaneser III waged war upon the Aramean coalition saying that "I marched [to the Great] Sea, washed my weapons in the Great Sea; I offered sacrifices (there) to my gods. I received the tribute from all the kings of the seacoast"[504]. This procedure was a religious and military one from the Babylonic and Assyrian tradition, provided for by law. Yet, for the Assyrian kings like Tiglath-pileser I the wars were fought for justice[505].

Hence, the sacrifice in Babylonia and Assyria was practiced as punishment after a trial at court of law. In the eyes of a Babylonian and Assyrian judges – and essentially in perspective of the Assyrian Penal Code[506] – the sacrifice could be human or animal. The sacrifice had a dichotomic function in these circumstances; firstly, as an offering to the god Šamaš and Adad, to thank for the verdict of the sentence and that justice was done; secondly, the sacrifice of a horse or human had to be by fire.

C. T. H. Johns elucidates that "The forfeit sometimes took the form of white horses, or foals (?), which were dedicated to a divinity. […] This is worded as if the dedication was to be by fire. The additional mention of incense or cedarwood, as accompanying the offering, renders it probable that it was really meant that the litigant should be punished by the sacrifice of his child as a "burnt offering" to the god"[507].

Thus, the Hittite Law Code[508] had also some explicit sacrificial punishments as an offering to the gods after the judge's verdict of the sentence. The king Tudḫaliya IV as well as the Assyrian monarch Tukultī-Ninurta I had laws to guarantee the purification of spaces and the individual through a sacrificial offering. In fact, the king of the Hittites was concerned about the violation of boundaries, which were regarded as sacred. So, the king, (for example) decrees in the Hittite Law Code 168 and 169 that "[…] whether intentional or negligent. In either case, the land has been made impure,

[503] ROLLINGER, RUFFING 2013: 101-103; PARPAS 2018: 98.
[504] PRITCHARD 1992: 277.
[505] CARREIRA 2008: 78.
[506] AMIET 2004: 101.
[507] JOHNS 1904: 95; SCURLOCK 2006: 254.
[508] LIVERANI, MORA (ed.), ARCHI 2008: 261–280.

and ritual purification is therefore necessary. The violator must make a sacrifice to the Sun God, who is the god of justice"[509], just like in Assyria.

As Sophie Démare-Lafont referred that in the Middle Assyrian Laws and the *riksū* (Decrees) of Tiglath-pileser I, "[…] the judges demanded supra-rational evidence (an oath or ordeal)"[510]. So, after the verdict of the judges, these sacrifices were offered to the gods through a ritual and the animal sacrificed was used to eat. Regarding this matter, the human beings were never used in the food offerings to the gods, as explained Joann Scurlock. The ritual was led by a *sângû*[511] or *bārū*[512] (or priest), and not by the judges.

Still, the judges in Babylon and Assyria were professional – named in Sumerian by *di-ku*$_5$ and in Akkadian by *dayyānum*[513] – they were men of high rank and great importance, mainly to eyes of the king and in the society. There is some evidence that they were royally appointed and named as "the king's judges"[514], especially in the Ḫammurabi's Code, as well as in Assyria most of the high officials acted like judges.

As Karen Rhea Nemet-Nejat[515] explained that the prisoners of war were offered in sacrifice to the gods. Yet, in the Homeric Trojan War the death of Patroclus[516] was so important that even ritualistic ceremonies and sacrificial deaths deserved the greatest luxuries, with the sacrifice of horses and war chariots. This feature is deeply embedded in the sacrificial traditions of the Near East.

Nonetheless, in the Hellenistic period their practices of animal sacrifices before the battles, as it happens in the Achaemenian Persia. The Magi sacrifice at the river Strymon was practiced by sacrificing white horses, as Herodotus[517] and Xenophon[518] had written. This type of sacrificial ritual had the conspicuous purpose of allowing or preventing armies from crossing rivers or the sea. In a normal sacrifice the blood would

[509] WESTBROOK 2003: 648.
[510] RADNER, ROBSON 2011: 337; FRAHM 2011: 316.
[511] OPPENHEIM 1966: 252.
[512] KANG 1989: 139; ARBOLL 2020: 7, 90-91.
[513] RADNER, ROBSON 2011: 336.
[514] JOHNS 1904: 83; SAGGS 1989: 156-169; NEMET-NEJAT 1998: 178; SNELL 2001: 85; MIEROOP 2005: 108; CHARPIN 2012: 156; LIVERANI 2014: 242.
[515] NEMET-NEJAT 1998: 236.
[516] *Il.* 23,7-11, 12-17; BURKERT 1992: 103-104; PAGE 1992: 253, 256; KINT 2021: 86.
[517] *Hdt.* 7.113–14.
[518] Xen. *An*, 4.3,17.

flow into a vessel, but in this context the liquid (blood) flows into another liquid (water) as a way of creating a harmony between the wills. This procedure respecting the divine entities (gods, muses, nymphs, etc.) that protect the courses of rivers or sea, called *Sphagia*[519].

The sacrifices in Hellenistic period, however, were a reflexion of the symbioses of many religious and traditions that were inherited of the Near Eastern military rituals. The timing before and after a battle marked the *momentum* of Life and Death, and everything in between. The waters of the Babylonic Moon god NANNA/Sîn, who annihilate the known world (the Flood)[520], were a semiotic preterit of regeneration and represent the three days of death and obscurity, and at same the three days of absent of the Moon. The waters that received the sacrificial deaths of horses before a battle were decisive to regenerate the values, the strength of the Moon and Sea gods that determine who were the victorious.

Then, was the blood on the water and – in some cases – the fire that were the means of sacralisation. And again, it's the violence, the blood spilled, the duty of the armies that marched, the ambition that moves through rivers and the Mediterranean Sea that was worth to conquer. As Walter Burkert explained "War is ritual […]"[521]. This victorious language in the ritualistic ceremonies was the representation of some specific ancient myths that were all gathered in the sacrifice. The horse was that semiotic symbol and language that was used to express this type of analogies, as Michel Foucault defended:

> "As línguas estabelecem com o mundo uma relação mais de analogia do que de significação; […]"[522].

This type of analogies or bridges between the extremes were main creators of meaning. Creation and Death were represented by divine entities who received in

[519] HANSON 1991: 197-228; VAN STRATEN 1995: 145.
[520] WOOLLEY 1950: 3-13; KRAMER 1972: 99-103; ELIADE 1979: 151-159.
[521] BURKERT 1983: 47; MELVILLE 2016: 226.
[522] "The languages establish a relationship with the world, one of analogy rather than meaning; […]" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see FOUCAULT 1988: 92).

sacrifice[523] what was primarily theirs *ab origine*, as have been already told by the myths. The most unmistakable episode is the Sumerian eschatological myth of Atra(m)-ḫasīs – the *renovatio mundi*[524]; that was the first step of individual awareness as a *homo religiosus* or the conception of the end of everything and everyone, and the void. As Albert Baumgarten referred to: "Certainly, the family god, a god represented by blood, was important for the Western Semites; it is they who created and cemented alliances by means of the bloody splitting of animals and to whom we owe the image of divine blood in the Atrahasis epic"[525].

Death is the beginning of a divine life, the purest way of making sacred the prophane space reclaiming it continuously and repetitiously the first birth. Philippe Ariés paraphrased Manlius by saying: "Ao nascer, começamos a morrer e ao fim começa na origem"[526]. Yet, António Ramos dos Santos replies by explaining that: "A origem da religião é a procura na revelação interior do divino graças à descoberta do sagrado"[527].

So, the sacrifice is a bloody and violent way of sacralising the space through death and offering in sacrifice a horse – one of the purest and most divine creatures of the Ancient Near Eastern mythologies, religion, and military cultures. This ritualistic sacrifice was made to give the gods the more precious possession of a civilized society – the horse[528]. These practices make way to develop a relation between man and the gods, the sacred and prophane space, to expand the social connection, to purify and sacralised military campaigns, and mostly to break with Man's mortal and historical place.

[523] To Mircea Eliade the sacrifice it's a way to complete the eternal returning cycle of Life and Death explaining that "Todos os sacrifícios são feitos no mesmo instante mítico do princípio; o tempo profane e a duração são suspensos pelo paradoxo do rito"/ "All sacrifices are made at the same mythical instant of the beginning; profane time and duration are suspended by the paradox of the rite" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see ELIADE 1981: 50).
[524] SANTOS 1993: 67-68.
[525] BAUMGARTEN 2002: 46.
[526] "At birth we begin to die, and the end begins at the origin" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see ARIÉS 1977: 117).
[527] "The origin of religion is the search for the inner revelation of the divine, thanks to the discovery of the sacred" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see SANTOS 1993: 65; CALLOIS 1988: 16, 20).
[528] WILKINSON, SHERRATT, BENNET 2011: 250.

Men find religion when the ritual and the sacrifice justified war and death. The Assyrian-Babylonian annual festivities[529] and the eschatological myths were the social and royal ways to satisfy the city gods to maintain peace and order. Ergo, war was the replication of the ultimate fight, the pinnacle of the sacrificial and divine signification. Consequently, the historical awareness of Man – in these periods – allowed him to stablish a cyclical timeline that continuously repeats itself.

This repetition of the sacrificial rituals – as for religion purposes as for war – the horse was used, and the ceremonies derived into ways of *expiation*; form the self and the social objective of attain justice from the gods and from the historical time itself. The memory and the written memory as main factor of strongest connection from the military-religious perspective as a constant dialog with the transcendent and the divine entities. As Mircea Eliade highlighted that "[…] qualquer sacrifício é, por sua vez, a repetição do ato da Criação, […]"[530].

[529] SODEN 1985: 182.

[530] "[…] any sacrifice is, in turn, the repetition of the act of Creation, […]" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see ELIADE 1981: 25).

2.3 Transferring Horses from Anatolia to Elam

The International Crises provoked by "Sea Peoples" invasions led to a period of instability and war in the Near East[531], that provided, at the same time, to a unique reorganization of the international trade network in the beginning of the 12th BC. After the fall of Ugarit and the Hittite Empire, the trade was reformed to a new geo-economic and political centre in the Anatolian and Assyrian regions. The Assyrian Empire on was rise and in expansion, but with the fall of the Hittite Empire some cities had reclaimed their independence as a new Neo-Hittite kingdom.

Just as it had happened in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I (ca.1115/4-1076 BC) that smashed some of the invaders like the *Aḫlamû*-Arameans, the Thracian-Phrygian/*Muški*, the *Kaška* and the *Luwian*[532] tribes, had a collateral effect. Consequently, most of these tribes had become sedentary, for example – the tribal groups like the Nairi[533] that formed later the kingdom of Urarṭu. They established themselves around the peripheries[534] of the Assyrian kingdom borders. While others had developed as independent cities and kingdoms, recovering the Hittite culture[535],

[531] *ARE* IV, 65–6; *ANET*, 262.

[532] MELCHERT (ed.), BRYCE 2003: 28; MOUTON (dir.), YAKUBOVICH 2017: 39-51.

[533] The tribal group Nairi provoked hostile movements in the Northern border of the Assyrian kingdom, in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, who had faced them in battle where the Nairi initially gathered twenty-three "kings" or "tribal leaders". However, they increased to sixty by the end of the battle, regardless of the numerical advantage, the god Aššur was besides the Assyrians, given them a victory. The Assyrian monarch inflicted an extreme defeat on the core of the Nairi tribes who, after the conflict, imposed heavy taxation on the newly conquered region. The taxation was so heavy that when Tiglath-pileser I returned to Assyria, he brought 1200 horses, and 2000 head of cattle. Yet, the conflicts never stopped until the Assyrians reached the Mediterranean Sea and became an empire (see RIMA 2, p. 20-22, iv 43-v 21; LÉVÊQUE (dir.) 2014: 300; MIEROOP 2015: 357-358).

[534] TYSON, HERRMANN 2018: 67-68.

[535] The Neo-Hittite culture was highly influenced by the Luwian people, art, costumes, even in writing (the Luwian Hieroglyphs) and in the Southwest Writing in Portugal (see AMARAL 2011: 11-464). Therefore, the Neo-Hittites cities and kingdom over the centuries since the 12th BC that were scattered across the Anatolia and Western Syrian-Canaanite regions like: Karkemiš (was so important and powerful, that was noun by Neo-Hittites as *Ḫatti*); Malatya or the classic Melitene (in Assyrian appears as Milidia, Melid, Meliteia); Kummuḫ (the Urartian Qumaha); Masuwari or Til Barṣip. However, in the Anti-Taurus and Western Syrian region was some powerful kingdoms as: Gurgum; Taita (maybe a Philistine kingdom (?)); Pat(t)in (in Assyrian appears as Unqi); Ḫamath. And in the South-Eastern Anatolia kingdoms as: the Tabal Kingdoms; Atuna; Ištu(a)nda, Šinuhtu; Tuwana; Hupis(h)na; Que (or in the Assyrian Texts appears as Adanawa, and sometimes as Hiyawa); Hilakku. The Arameans cities were also influenced, and some were Neo-Hittites cities like: Bit-Agusi; Bit-Adini; Sam'al (which means "North"); Damascus or Aram-Damascus the biblical name (2*Rs* 8,28-9); Ktk and Soba (see SINGER 2005: 438; BRYCE 2012: 83-179; HALL 2016: 402-403).

military traditions, trade networks, political influence with their neighbours, and strong opponents of the Assyrian military expansion.

The war had continued with a greater Assyrian force that extended their frontiers with the objective to reach the Mediterranean Sea. The several military campaigns of the Assyrian monarchs had as their primary enemies the Neo-Hittites cities and kingdoms. This Neo-Hittites enemies were located in the Southwestern Anatolia and Northern Syria[536]. Nonetheless, in the Northern region of the Assyrian territory where was located the kingdom of Urarṭu/Van/Ararat (as was known by the Assyrians)[537]. They reorganized geo-economically the trades routes that came of the Mediterranean Sea and the terrestrial routes form Asia Minor.

Yet, the emergence of the *Phoinikes*[538] people – as the Greeks called them – and the thalassocratic cities and the trade network that inherent of those independent

[536] YAKUBOVICH 2015: 35.

[537] The Urartians called themselves as Khaldian related to their main god Khaldis. On the other hand, the toponym Van to designate the region and kingdom of Urarṭu was related to the proximity of the Lake Van, as Henry R. Hall explained that "Later on the cuneiform script was adapted for writing the language of Urartu itself, Vannic as we call it from the fact that its chief monuments, and those first deciphered, were erected on the shores of Lake Van, where was situated Turušpa, the later capital of the kingdom" (see MIEROOP 1999: 35; HALL 2016: 458; ELAYI 2017: 136). But the Vannic language was not part of the Aryan linguistic family, so Henry R. Hall defends that was part of the Caucasic linguistic family. However, Seton Lloyd referred to the Urartian's kingdom as a "tribal federation of Hurrian origin", nonetheless, the region of Urarṭu appear for the first time – as far as is known – in the Assyrian inscriptions form the 13th BC, and later, in the inscriptions of the Gates of Imgur-Enlil/Balawat Gates form the reign of Šalmaneser III in the 9th BC (see LLOYD 1971: 110).
Finally, Mario Liverani clarifies that "The Lake Van area, the political centre of the people of Nairi, which by now had a 'king' (a certain Arame) and a name (Urarṭu), was more difficult to access" (see LIVERANI 2014: 481). The toponym Arame for this region of Urarṭu give name to the Aramean people (see *SAA* XXIII: 188, 261).

[538] Yet, as Trevor Bryce and Michel Gras referred to the entogenesis and entolinguistic formation of the Phoenician people, as Trevor Bryce referred that "The name's most commonly accepted derivation is from the Greek word *phoinix*, meaning 'crimson-red' or 'purple'. This derivation may have been inspired by the copper colour of the hair and skin of the peoples so called, or by the famous purple dye extracted from the murex shellfish found in the region's coastal waters. But other explanations have been proposed" (see HARDEN 1968: 17-55, 115-123; GRAS 1998: 37-38; BRYCE 2009: 555).
Hence, the Phoenicians were a people who speaks a North-Western Semitic language. As Maria Eugenia Aubet explained that "Some linguists claim that the Greek *phoinix* is no more than a simple translation of the Akkadian *kinaḫḫu*, a word which appears in texts of the fifteenth to fourteenth centuries BC found at Nuzi. In these documents the term alludes indiscriminately to the country of Canaan and to its most important export, red-coloured wool or *kinaḫḫu*. According to that, the Hurrian texts of Nuzi seem to show not only the semantic parallel existing between 'canaanite' and 'purple', but also a direct association between the name of the country and the colour purplish red, both in Akkadian and in Greek" (see AUBET 1993: 8). Although, they were not Ugaritic, Canaanites or even Sidonians, as the historians could tell, the Phoenicians did not have an official or specific name for themselves. This isn´t surprising

cities and kingdom. This trade network made them the most fruitful and desirable for the application of tributes, taxes[539] and commercial surpluses. This was a very important change, despite of that every route and trade ships continue to make a stopover in the *Alašiya*[540] island.

Then, the main Phoenician coastal cities[541] by the sea like Arwad, Byblos, Sîdon[542] and Tyre[543] occupied the major coastal line of the region. These cities had a determinant influence into many minor cities of their peripheries. As Mario Liverani explained that the "Siyannu and Usnu in the North, Sumura and Arqa between Arwad and Byblos, Beirut between Byblos and Sidon, Sarepta between Sid and Tyre, and Ušu and Acre to the south of Tyre"[544]. These cities harbours or the *bīt karrāni* (trading posts) were an entrance of every product from the Mediterranean Sea, specially from the Aegean Sea.

Josette Elayi highlighted the expansion[545] of sea routes around the Mediterranean Sea where, however, the Phoenician merchants had a greater influence, for example in the Iberian Peninsula[546], and even that:

> "[…] during the Late Bronze Age by their precursors, the proto-Phoenicians, and the Mycenaeans who dominated sea-borne trade at that time. Long-

due to the fact that the multiplicity of political systems in that region. These cities were never only political or military unified – except culturally. However, the thalassocratic Phoenician's cities and kingdoms had a very strong trade network connection allied to their independence (see TAVARES 1987: 53-57; SANTOS, RODRIGUES, KUZNETSOVA-RESENDE, GUERRA; RODRIGUES 2003: 54-55; HAYWOOD 2022: 19).

[539] In the 11th BC Tiglath-pileser I's described in his Annals that "I received tribute from the lands Byblos, Sidon, (and) Arvad. I rode in boats of people of Arvad (and) successfully travelled a distance of 3 double hours from the city Arvad, an island, to the city Ṣamuru which is in the land Amurru. I killed at sea a nāḫiru, which is called a sea-horse" (see RIMA 2, p. 37, 20-25; *SAA* XXIII: 218; BIKAI (ed.), PORADA 1978: 77-78; LIVERANI 2014: 422).

[540] CULICAN 1970: 50.

[541] COGAN, EPH´AL (eds.), ELAT 1991: 23-29; MIEROOP 2015: 390.

[542] DOUMET-SERHAL 2013: 45.

[543] MARRINER, MORHANGE, BOUDAGHER-FADEL, BOURCIER, CARBONEL 2005: 1302-1327.

[544] LIVERANI 2014: 420.

[545] ROMILLY 2001: 23.

[546] ARRUDA 1993: 193-214, 2020: 317-326; BRYCE 2009: 557; DIETLER, LÓPEZ-RUIZ (ed.), BELARTE 2009: 91-112; GOMES 2019: 85-107; SOUSA 2018: 23-35, 2020: 1603-1613.

> distance trade focused on the search for metals, such as copper, silver, and tin, as far as Sardinia, Spain, and Portugal"[547].

For example, the pottery of Tell Kazel[548] proved that – in the transitional period of Late Bronze Age/Iron Age – was occupied by people from the Aegean region because the production of pottery in Tell Kazel decayed in quality and quantity. As Hélène Sader referred that "In the transitional Late Bronze/Iron Age levels, the pottery is characterized by the emergence of the so-called barbarian or handmade burnished ware and by the presence of Trojan vessels […]"[549]. The Trojan and Mycenaeans' (LHIIIC 1B) pottery and many other products mostly passed through in *Alašiya* before entering the Phoenician ports – excepting the trade of horses. Therefore, the horses were imported by all the Near Eastern super-potencies for war and economy.

Thus, in the end of the Late Bronze Age was the loss of power, prestige, and influence of the Egyptians[550] that opened a door to the Assyrian monarchs like Tiglath-pileser I to the conquest of Amurru region (or the former Phoenicia). Therefore, the Phoenician coast did not suffer from "Sea Peoples" invasions during the 12th BC, since there is no archaeological evidence[551] of destruction in this region from that period. On the other hand, as Ayelet Gilboa explained that exists strong evidence from *Alašiya* that:

> "[…] presence in the region, especially along the Carmel coast.… Some of this population probably arrived in northern Canaan following the LCIIIA /IIIB disruptions on the island. Some newcomers from Syria are attested by designs on ceramics"[552].

[547] ELAYI 2018: 122.
[548] BIETAK, CZERNY (ed.), JUNG 2007: 551-570.
[549] CARPENTER 1958: 35-36; ANDERSON 1988: 390; BADRE 2006: 92; HARRISON (ed.), CAPET 2008: 198; SADER 2019: 37.
[550] AUBET 1993: 25-27; ACQUARO (ed.), HELCK 1994: 110; SASS 2002: 247-255; WOOLMER 2017: 33.
[551] ELAYI 2018: 91-92; SADER 2019: 49.
[552] KILLBREW, STEINER (ed.), GILBOA 2013: 635.

The archaeological and ethnological evidence like the inscriptions of the Cypriot syllabic script of Palaepaphos had tremendous importance because it proves that the Mycenaeans'/Minoic[553] dialect was spoked in the *Alašiya* island in the 11th BC.

Ergo, the clear influence of the Mycenaeans' in the Syrian-Canaanite Corridor, the Phoenician and, even in some Anatolic cities and kingdoms had changed the people ethnic-philologically and culturally during this instable period. And the military technology developed in this period with the creation of the first cavalry corps in the reign of the Assyrian monarch Tiglath-pileser I.

The transformation of this new international geo-political scenario in Anatolia and Asia Minor was with the Assyrian expansionist war in the North of the Euphrates. More specifically the Neo-Hittite kingdoms and cities that reconnected the trade network with the Asia Minor region. Yet, the Peloponnesian region was under Doric domain and, consequently without an active trading activity. As J. M. Cook described:

> "[...] os Dórios eram cultivadores obstinados de vastas extensões de terra"[554]. Nonetheless, the Dorians from the region of Rhodes implemented the colony of Phaselis. This Dorian colony had an important trade network with Egypt.

Therefore, in the Karkemiš[555] kingdom – the most important Neo-Hittite realm – couldn't resist the Tiglath-pileser I's military expansion and fall to the Assyrian control, so it began to pay tribute to the Assyrian monarch. This means that the primary trading routes from Anatolia and Asia Minor were in the 11th BC controlled by the Assyrians. As was described in the Annals of Tiglath-pileser I:

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[553] COOK 1971: 63; HELM 1980: 94-98; KARAGEORGHIS (ed.), MASSON 1983: 411-415; LIPIŃSKI 2004: 41.

[554] "[…] the Dorians were obstinate cultivators of vast expanses of land" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see COOK 1971: 30).

[555] WEEDEN 2013: 8-9; KILLEBREW, LEHMANN 2013: 328; BRYCE 2014: 84-98.

> "I plundered from the edge of the land Suḫu to the city Carchemish of the land Hatti in a single day. I massacred them (and) carried back their booty, possessions, and goods without number"[556].

The horse was one of the most desired trading items by the Assyrian-Babylonian monarchies. In reality, it was deemed a *necessity* due to the fact that all the payments, tributes, taxations, and spoils of war had a percentage that was paid with horses. However, all the maritime trade from the Aegean and Asia Minor regions[557] essentially culminated in a major Phoenician[558] city of Tyre. And the Assyrians applied a heavy taxation in the silver, iron, tin, and lead[559] was the primary products that were commercialized by the city of Tyre.

The Assyrian policy over the trade market was what is called "war economy", the controlling of the agricultural production and the international trade network through a non-economic coercion based on booty and tribute.

This *status quo* inside of the emerging Assyrian Empire in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I changed between the end of the 11th till the middle of the 10th BC. The instability of many Assyrian monarchs, the constant war campaigns to the Babylonian frontiers, the Neo-Hittites and Arameans coalitions of cities and kingdoms rebellions, the continuous loss of Assyrian territories and influence, and more important the loss of tributes, booty, taxes, and spoils of war[560]. This was the Assyrian "Dark Age"[561], and the first in the Assyrian Empire that was initiated by the reforms of Tiglath-pileser I. Clearly, was a Crisis (ca.1050-935 BC) that gradually came to change *mutatis mutandis* with the rise of Aššurnaṣirpal II (ca.883-859 BC)[562].

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[556] RIMA 2: p. 23, v 50-55.

[557] Maria Eugenia Aubet referred to the various metallic products that were traded between Anatolia, *Alašiya*, and the Sinai Peninsula "In the period in which we are interested, the great mineral reserves were located in Anatolia (silver, copper, lead, tin and iron), in Sinai and Cyprus (copper), in Etruria and the island of Elba (tin, copper and iron) and in Tartessos (silver, gold and tin)" (see AUBET 1993: 60).

[558] GRAS 1998: 194-196; FRAHM (ed.), ROLLINGER 2017: 277.

[559] *Ez* 27,1-26; *Zc* 9,2-3; COGAN, EPH´AL (eds.), LIVERANI 1991: 65-79.

[560] ÁLVAREZ-MON, BASELLO, WICKS (ed.), DUBOVSKÝ 2021: 323.

[561] FRAHM (ed.), FRAHM 2017: 161.

[562] The cavalry as a military corps – in this period – was already a warfare reality that were manifested across the Near East, Aegean, and Asia Minor regions.

The reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II (the Assyrian name is Aššur-nāṣir-apli) recovered the notion of "war economy"[563] since the territorial expansion to Karkemiš and Lebanon, proved to be economically and military profitable. As Aššurnaṣirpal II described how significant was his military campaign, referred to as:

> "[…] I advanced towards Carchemish. (There) I received from him (self) the tribute of Sangara, the king of the Hittites (amounting to): 20 talents of silver, a *sa'aru* object of gold, a ring of gold, golden daggers, 100 talents of copper, 250 talents of iron, (furthermore) bull images of copper, copper basin-and-ewer sets for washing, a copper brazier—(all) his own furniture, the weights of which were not taken (separately),—(furthermore) beds of boxwood, *ašti*-chairs of boxwood, tables of boxwood, (all) inlaid with ivory, also 200 young females (clad in) linen garments with multi-coloured trimmings made of dark and reddish purple-(dyed) wool, (also) alabaster, elephants' tusks (and even) a shining chariot (and) a golden *nimattu*-chair with panels—his (own) royal insignia"[564].

The Aššurnaṣirpal II's expansion campaign had a purpose to end the rebellions and hostilities to the West, therefore, the capture of a city form Bīt-Adini's kingdom permitted the enforcement of heavy tributes. The aggressiveness of this economic strategy and victorious news spread till the Phoenician coast in the way that Aššurnaṣirpal II marched straight to Karkemiš unopposed.

The wrath of the Assyrian army spread so fast to the kingdom of Karkemiš, and to the Phoenician cities of Tyre, Sîdon and Gubal that they voluntary surrendered and paid that tribute[565]. Hence, as Josette Elayi referred to the campaigns of Aššurnaṣirpal II as the following statement:

> "He listed the Phoenician cities that rushed to send him their tributes as a sign of submission in his annals. From south to north they were Tyre, Sidon,

[563] SANTOS, VARANDAS (coord.), SANTOS 2006: 43-44.
[564] *ANET* 275, iii 64-90.
[565] GRAS 1998: 43-46; STIEBING JR., HELFT 2017: 269.

> Byblos, Mahallata, Mayza, Kayza (possibly in the region of Tripoli), Amurru and Arwad, "which is an island." It was probably in the vicinity of Arwad that he reached the Mediterranean, and he then went up as far as the Amanus to cut down trees and erect a commemorative stele"[566].

On the other hand, this international circumstance in which the regularity of the Assyrian military campaigns was so aggressive that marked the new attitude of this reign. Consequently, the trade of horses was affected by this new paradox, the rebellions and coalitions of the Neo-Hittite and Aramean cities and kingdoms. In fact, the importance of this trade was not only about the military, the royal court[567] or even as spoil of war use, but for a medicinal use too.

The medicinal remedies[568] against the ghosts that attacked the ears, the noses, the eyes, and mouth, was in these terms how were the diseases addressed. The Assyrian physicians – and almost every physician[569] of Near East – apply many compositions of parts of plants, animal, and mineral substances with the right quantities that were known by experience. During a ritual, the cure for many of the afflictions could contained small portions of substances withdrawn of horses like: "horse bristle", "horsehair", "horse sweet", and "horse urine"[570].

To obtain these kinds of substances for medicinal healings was necessary that the horse trade could flow without barriers. The Asia Minor was reorganizing its geopolitical and economic states with Peloponnesian regions and with the recent Anatolic kingdoms and cities like Que, Tabal, Hillaku, Gurgum, etc. Most of the trade was slow and expensive, what could possibly had affected the quality of products and their diversity. So, the emergence of the Phoenician cities and kingdoms was important, and the new *bīt karrāni* (trading posts) like Babylonia and the Israelite kingdoms and cities came to reconnect the Near Eastern trading network.

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[566] ELAYI 2018: 130.

[567] Ergo, only the *LUGAL*/*šarrum*/"king" and the high-ranking officials and high dignitaries of the Temple or *EN* were the only that could possess a horse (see OPPENHEIM 1964: 98-99; LÉVÊQUE 2014: 310).

[568] GÜTERBOCK, JACOBSEN (eds.), RITTER 1965: 299-321; ATTIA, BUISSON (eds.), FINCKE 2009: 79-105.

[569] ANDRÉ-SALVINI 2003: 59.

[570] SCURLOCK 2014: 380, 412, 548.

Consequently, and as the need for horses started to turn into a priority, Babylonia became a horse breeding region, and the Kikkuli *Manual*/treaty was one of the essential elements for this knowledge about the domestication of the horse, essentially to use in war chariots – as will be approached in the next topic.

Babylonia and Assyria import a large number of horses in this period. The Babylonic monarchs bet on luxury trade permitting that the *tamkāru*/*DAM.GÀR*[571] (was a royal trade agent and a military commander) to redirect the trade[572] network. Although, in Assyria existed a professionalized merchant namely *tamkār sisē*[573] "the royal agent for procuring horses". And this trade network was part of a geostrategic pole of trade that came from the Elamite regions and from the North of the Euphrates which came to merge into Babylon later in History.

The Babylonic landowner aristocracy and high officials were intrinsically connected with the horse ownership and war chariots. On the other hand, the laborious mass that possessed a horse was obliged to pay an impost known as *nuškēnu*[574] (similar to the medieval *corvee* impost), known in Assyria, Alalaḫ, Ugarit, and Nuzi as *hupšu*. For example, in the annals of Aššurnaṣirpal II the application of the *hupšu*/*corvee* impost after a military campaign the acknowledgment of a tribute was mentioned:

> "I received the tribute of Mounts Kirruru and Simesu, the land Simerra, the land Ulmania, the land Adaus, the land Hargaia, the land Harmasaia — horses, mules, oxen, sheep, wine, (and) bronze casseroles. I imposed upon them corvée"[575].

Still, these economic policies allowed the creation of specific taxes for horses, with at least three types of taxation, namely: *iškāru*, *nāmurtu* and *nakkamtu*[576]. The *iškāru* was a local and military tax on horses, which could also be paid in silver, with

[571] OPPENHEIM 1964: 90-91; DERCKSEN (ed.), RADNER 1999: 101-104.
[572] MIEROOP 1999: 105-122.
[573] YOUNGER JR 2015: 185.
[574] GARELLI 1982: 204-205.
[575] RIMA 2, p. 197, i 55b-56a.
[576] COGAN, EPH´AL (eds.), ELAT 1991: 21-23; DEZSŐ 2016: 178.

the main objective of acquiring horses to join the cavalry corps. There is a letter from the king Sargon II in which a total of 464 horses were listed – with another tax also applied to 100 of those horses, the impost of *nakkamtu* (reserve). In that letter only 60 horses and 30 mules would have the tax of the category of *iškāru*, while 20 horses would obtain the tax of *nāmurtu*[577]. Therefore, these inventories show that the horses arrived from all regions of the empire.

It was through this tax that soldiers were paid, in order to give them the possibility to buy horses, receiving a value of 20 *manû* (*mina*). They could buy a horse for 1 *mina* each, because of the military campaigns spoils that allowed the abundance of the equine trade, leading to prices being relatively affordable for a soldier's salary[578]. However, there would eventually be an investment on the part of the king, to boost the equine trade, thus resulting in a greater profit for the army that was able to buy more horses for a relatively low price.

The *nāmurtu* was possibly an audience in the presence of the monarch, not being a taxon of the same weight as the *iškāru*, but it was one that included horses – sometimes in a volume so large proportion that it could acquire military importance. In this way, *nakkamtu* was a type of wage on horses, known as *nakkamtu* horses[579], which served as a "reserve". Regardless of their origin, ships transporting animals arrived with the respective lace in the centre of Calaḫ, Nineveh, Arbela and Dūr-Šarrukīn, royal cities and administrative centres, which served as storehouses for these horse reserves.

For example, Sargon II in his 8th campaign, ca.714 BC, mentions that in the regions of Mannai/Manna/Mana[580] and Urarṭu there were fortified cities, where the "reserves" of the *na-kam-ti* horses were kept in the stables[581]. Consequently, this

[577] DEZSŐ 2016: 179.
[578] Idem *ibidem*: 179-180.
[579] FRAHM (ed.), JAKOB 2017: 155.
[580] Mannai was a kingdom located in the North-Western Iran and to South of Lake Urmia. This kingdom was surrounded by their major kingdoms like Assyria, Urarṭu and Media. The Mannai and the Mannaeans were first recorded in the Annals of Šalmaneser III (reigned ca.858–824 BC) and are last mentioned in Urarṭu by Rusa II (reigned ca.685–645 BC), however, it still appeared in the recordings of Esarhaddon (reigned ca.680–669 BC). With the intrusion of the Scythians and the rise of the Medes in the 7th century, the Manneans lost their identity and were subsumed under the term Medes (see LIVERANI 2014: 454, 487, 490-491, 493).
[581] DEZSŐ 2016: 182-183.

taxation come with an idea of "war economy" provided by oriental centrality of economic policy the Temple.

The Temple was the engine of this "war economy" that perdure as a pole of religious and political administration and trade management in the various kingdoms, citadels, or cities in Babylonia or Assyria[582]. This economic system managed by the Temple is the perfect image and adaptability of the Sumerian-Akkadian system. Consequently, this realty was an unaltered notion of the economic management and production over the centuries in the Babylonia and Assyria. On the other hand, the trade routes and the war were two fundamental realties that go *a pari passu*.

With this economic, political, and military scenario the Assyrians and the Babylonians, tried to increase their armies through many reforms, although, the Kikkuli Horsemanship Treaty was the main manual for military training and performance. The supply of horses permitted the expanding numbers of military effectives in the Assyrian-Babylonic horsemanship trainings.

This commercial routes between Anatolia and the Elam provided the continuous supply of horses into the principal military potencies of the Ancient Near East. The ancient Trojan-Thessalian practice of the horsemanship had a great impact in the Mitannian-Anatolic's method of horse training or *LÚ.aššuššani*[583]. In this period, the various methods of horse domestication were essentially to a military use – for war chariot use[584].

On the other hand, the kingdoms of Thessaly and Troy produced the best trained horses of all Ancient Near Eastern world, and the kingdoms of Mitanni and Babylon had a constant need of the best horses on the market. War was a constant and a way to obtain more and more horses. The Thessalian, Trojan and specially the Assyrian method of military Horsemanship had differences from each other. The

[582] However, in the Old Assyrian period the commercial relation, as well as the trade network and the economy in the Assyrian citadels and cities worked differently. The finance and the investments were dynamic and based with the idea of profit achievement, creation of health, richness, and quality of life that were possible through the economic system, trade network and their merchants. As Klaas R. Veenhof explained: "We have to assume that investments, commercial credit, and short-term loans of some size - apart from what moved between close relatives and business partners - were granted by persons grown rich from the trade" (see DERCKSEN (ed.), VEENHOF 1999: 65).
[583] DREWS 1994: 90.
[584] WILKINSON, SHERRATT, BENNET 2011: 255.

Assyrian-Babylonic military cultural were different form the Asian Minor and the Aegean military culture, each one had their own idiosyncrasies. This subject will be developed in more detail in the next topic.

Most of these cultures had a strong trade network and policies that were extremely important for their own development as society and military culture. The Assyrian-Babylonic monarchies had a preference from the Trojan method of military Horsemanship. These Assyrian-Babylonic monarchies invested on their own method of Horsemanship based on the Kikkuli's method, exchanging the principal object of the training horses instead of applying to war chariots, they create the professional cavalry.

3

THE IMPERIAL ASSYRIAN CAVALRY

"A reunião de equídeos para as campanhas de Sargão
tinha por base todo o império. Existem dezassete
«Textos dos Cavalos»".

SANTOS, António Ramos dos, "Um Orçamento da Guerra na Antiga Mesopotâmia", SANTOS, António Ramos dos, VARANDAS, José (coord.), *A Guerra na Antiguidade II*, Lisboa, Caleidoscópio, 2008, p.50.

3.1 Treatises and the Art of Riding of Kikkuli

Primarily, to better understand the full-scale war and the importance of the first Horsemanship *Manual* and Texts of the Ancient World, it's necessary to comprehend the boundaries to the extensive use of the war-chariot. In the 2nd millennium the primary semiotic ideology had a complexity hierarchy of importance, which was known in the Near East – and also in Mycenaean/*Aḫḫiyawa* world – as "Horse-Chariot-Warrior-Ruler"[585]. In fact, Robert Drews establishes a plausible hypothesis to determine a chronologic timeline for the massive war-chariot's use in warfare, and subsequently the arrival of the cavalry. According to Robert Drews "The age of chariot warfare – ca.1700 to ca.1200 BC – coincides with the Late Bronze Age"[586].

This hypothesis makes way to corroborates that the cavalry for a military use occur after the Trojan War and the "Sea Peoples" Invasion[587], as it was elucidated in the previous chapters. Also, this theory equally substantiates the principal purpose of the Kikkuli's Horsemanship *Manual* and Texts. The Kikkuli's text was written during the reign of Hittite king Šuppilulimas I, method that was also used in all Hittite Empire. Yet, the Assyrians applied this method to the cavalry, improving it, as Vittore Pisani defends, "Indeed cavalry has been introduced at first in Assyria in the XII century B.C.; […]"[588].

Therefore, the warfare and commercial circumstances in the Ancient Near East provide a recovery of some Horsemanship methods like the Ḫurrian-Mitannian[589]

[585] KRISTIANSEN, LARSSON 2005: 325.
[586] DREWS 2004: 43.
[587] WERNER 1987: 504.
[588] PISANI 1958: 133.
[589] As it was written in the Kikkuli's Treaty, KUB I 13 I 1f: *UM.MA Ki-ik-ku-li* ^{LÚ}*A-AŠ-ŠU-UŠ-ŠA-AN-NI ŠA KUR* ^{URU}*MI-IT-TA-AN-NI* / "Thus speaks Kikkuli, master horse trainer of the land of Mitanni"

Kikkuli's method. As Deborah O'Daniel Cantrell emphasized that "The master horse trainer, Kikkuli, recommends a six-month regimen that includes stabling, exercise, grooming, swimming, and special diets. Much of the Kikkuli protocol, which includes interval training, is still valid today, especially for the sport of endurance riding"[590].

To the better understand of the problematic references of the Hurro-Indic, Vedic, Aryan and Ḫurrian-Mitannian ethnolinguistic dynamic is to comprehend the weight that had in the provenience of the certain terms. The influence of the Hurro-Indic language in the Ḫurrian-Mitannian culture had a directly impact. For example Kikkuli called himself *LÚ.aššušanni*[591] – horse trainer[592] – which is a term clearly based on *aśva-* the Indian word for "horse"[593] and *śam-* for "to tame"[594]. Although the Ḫurrain word for chariot driver is *kusi*, and the word for the third man who makes up the crew three members that belongs to the war chariot is probably *šananu*. This nomenclature is directly related to the war chariot driving and training.

The Kikkuli's method was developed to train a horse during a period of 214 days, approximately six to seven months. In the Mitannian period this method was applied to the training with a war chariot, mostly with two horses. As Annelies Koolen defended:

> "Horse riding is based on the nature of the horse, and good training should never go against the nature of the horse. Most horses by nature have a high level of trainability"[595].

The trainability of the horse was directly connected with his nature, the speed, and the human use for it – despite of the Kikkuli's *Manual* and Texts, it was never

(see RAULWING 2009: 3; CLINE 2014: 31). The Assyrian term to designate the "horse trainer" was *LÚ. GIŠ.GIGIR*, as it could mean "groom", "charioteer" and like "chariot fighter" (see DEZSŐ 2012: 69).

[590] CANTRELL 2011: 3.

[591] ROUMAN, HELD 1972: 328; POSTGATE 2000: 92.

[592] AMIET 1974: 115; LAROCHE 1978: 739-753; HAMP 1979: 189-190.

[593] THIEME 1960: 301-302; GOETZE 1963: 125.

[594] DANDEKAR 1969: 62.

[595] KOOLEN 1975: 20.

specifically mentioned that the training was for war or other activity. And, in this sense, the Mitannian way of training horses was one of preparing the horse, both mentally and physically, for war.

The fragmentated Kikkuli's text being as the oldest Horsemanship *Manual* presents an approach about the training of horses was based on four paces of speed instead of three like it is practiced today. The Kikkuli's perspective of speed was based on the slow(er) speed as trot (*penna*-) and the fast(er) speed as gallop (*parḫ*-); however, the four speed paces are the normal, that is, walk, trot, the three-beat gait, and the gallop is four-beat. And, on the other hand, the crucial factor for the studying the speed in the Mitannian way of Horsemanship is to comprehend how to they measure the length[596] of each step on the diary training. So, the two main measurements used in the Kikkuli's *Manual* were the *iku*[597] and *danna*[598], and the value of a one hundred *iku* is the equivalent of one *danna*. As Ann Hyland explained:

> "The interpretation of the length of the *iku* is crucial to estimating the actual distances travelled by Kikkuli's horses in training"[599].

In this sense, the most interesting demand was to put the horses on day and night[600] drives, occasional 'on foot' i.e., 'without the chariot'. The usual length of the training performance was approximated of 75km in a slower gait/*penna*- and 21km in the faster gait/*parḫ*-. Thus, as an example the first four days of the introductory training translated by Annelies Kammenhuber express the idea that training was a progressive performance.

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[596] There has been a broad of divergency among the specialists about the measure of the length in the Kikkuli's text. The measurement was discussed with the purpose to apply as the Mesopotamian mile – defended by Kammenhuber, that correspond 10.7km to one *danna* and 107m to one *iku*, or the Neo-Assyrian/Babylonian mile, defended by Hrozný, that 6km corresponds to one *danna* and 60m for one *iku*. Yet, Potratz uses 5km for one *danna* and 50m to one *iku* (see HYLAND 2003: 38).

[597] The Sumerian sign *IKU* is equal to the Akkadian *ikû* and is represented by cuneiform sign *GÁN* (see MELCHERT 1980: 50, 53-54).

[598] The Sumerian sign *DANNA* is equivalent to the Akkadian *bī*/*ēru* (see MELCHERT 1980: 50, 55-56).

[599] HYLAND 2003: 38.

[600] HOLLAND 1989: 173.

The training plan started at the first day, which consisted in making the horse perform three sessions of exercises. The first one of three *danna* in a moderated speed and a total of seventeen *iku* in a faster speed; the second one of one *danna* in a moderated speed and seven *iku* in a faster speed; and the last of one *danna* in a moderated speed and seventeen *iku* in a faster speed.

At the second day the horse had to perform two sessions: firstly, two and half *danna* in a moderate speed – and leading back three *danna* –, and a total of seventeen *iku* in the faster speed. And the secund one of one *danna*. On the third day, the plan of the second day is repeated, without the process of leading back three *danna*. On the fourth day the horse had to perform one severe session, one *danna* in a restrained speed and the return of one *danna*, with a total of twenty *iku* in a faster speed.

However, after four days of intensive training, there was three-weeks period of rest, where the horse could graze[601], had good stable care, multiple baths, anointings, and careful feeding. In the end of each training period, the horse would be washed in the river and a final dunking in the cold water and once with warm water, known as *arra- katkattinu-*. On some training days feed and water were denied and often the water was denied, in particular after a heavy training day.

Consequently, on the fourth day of resting, the horse would receive a treatment of crushed malt, the necessary salts replaced *via* a drink of saltwater, and the horse must stay in warm stables and blanketed. These periods of rest and treatment must be respected and taken very seriously, because that was time when the horse master observed the horse's physical and mental aspects of the horse were cautiously observed, hence the importance of the resting periods.

On the twenty-fourth day, the horse was led ten *iku*, and the put out on the grass in the next day. Nonetheless, for each of ten days the horse was led 2 *danna* at a moderate pace. On the thirty-six day the horse was led 2 *danna* and by the evening period hitched up and ridden moderate speed approximated 30 *iku*. And on the thirteen-seven day the was led to a moderate speed of half *danna* with no galloping, then it was turned out to grass. Still, the thirty-seven to the forty-sixth day, the horse was driven 2 *danna* a day at a moderate pace.

[601] TYLER 1956: 98.

The training after the forty-sixth day had to slowly escalate intentionally untill the one hundred-twentieth day, where the progressive work would become more intense. After that day the horse was put to a moderated speed of 7 *danna*, finishing with a sprint of 8 *iku*. After a very intensive training, special on the nights 131, 132 and 133 of 7,3 and 7 moderate *danna*, ending each night training with a sprint of 10 *iku*. Nonetheless, at 145 day the moderate work of training decrease and proportionally the faster work increased, and on some days the training varied between over half *danna* and almost half *danna*.

But the one hundred seventy-eightieth day of training was the toughest, composed by five sessions that correspond to a total of seventy-five and half km. Yet not the longest distance covered in a complete day of training, was the arduous training. The distance was approximately 46.759 km that were covered at the fastest speed. Only the toughest horses would resist to this methodology of training, in fact, this was a form of selection so to say. The reason for this was because the method was effective with untrained horses[602], since the introductory training plan would be inappropriate for horses that were taken from pastures. This routine would apply to horses that were meant to be trained and used for warfare.

The Kikkuli's training plan had an objective that was to make the horse to able to fit in a team that pushes a war chariot[603] and be used in warfare. On the other hand, the method could be intensively applied to domesticate a horse in a short period of time. The horse care was fundamental in the Kikkuli's methodology of training, as the need to push the limits and test in the various forms of exercises. So, one most interesting question is: how profound was the knowledge of the Hippiatric medicine?

The Akkadian, Hittite, Ugaritic and Assyrian Hippological texts that survived until our time, allow us for the better understanding the problematic variety of knowledge in the veterinary medicine *praxis* processes that were practiced the Ancient Near East.

The Kikkuli's method was meticulous with a deep knowledge to about the functionality of the horse anatomy, and how to heal a horse from fatigue after a heavy

[602] WILEKES 2016: 214.
[603] BOYCE 1987: 508-509.

training session. A crucial point of this complex theme is that most of the veterinary medicinal knowledge and *praxis* were transmitted through orality and by empirical and case experience. Consequently, the healing process was in part written so that the *āšipu*[604] or the *asû*[605] could guide more carefully and precisely to cure infirmities, as well as a study source.

The horse taming training process follows a set of precautions that require close attention and an experienced trainer. For that reason, horse diseases could appear, and the horse master (called in Assyrian *susānu*) had to know how to proceed. The knowledge in the Ancient Near East about the *corpus* Hippiatric texts[606] was shared and actualized. For example, the Hippological texts knowledge from the Neo-Assyrian period were known from the Ugaritc manuscripts like the *RA* 15 pl.76, *BAM* 159, *BAM* 309 and some plants list[607].

A case of study was related to the horse illness in the stomach, that affects the gastro-intestinal system like the *kīs libbi* – "binding of the 'heart" or specifically the "abdomen/belly" – commonly known as horse colic, which was a common horse infirmity. The process of healing was accompanied by an incantation spell and ritual of purification, with a praise to the gods in order to complete the process.

Yet in many situations of infirmities[608] the healing process of horses – like a *kīs libbi* – could pass with fumigation[609] techniques and/or with the *DUG ziriqi*/"tube" that was similar to a "feeding tube" that was put through its nose and down to the oesophagus. The physician administrates solutions through the "tube" specifically

[604] NEUSNER, FERISCHS, FLESHER (ed.), ABUSCH 1989: 27-31; SCURLOCK, STEPHENS 2008: 4-15.

[605] In the Ancient Babylonian period there were two types of medicinal professionals the *asû* = "Physician" and *āšipu* or *mašmaššu* = "Magical-expert", "Exorcist" or "Conjurer" (see OPPENHEIM 1964: 294; ABUSCH, TOORN (ed.); SCURLOCK 1999: 69). On the other hand, there were mentions other important intervenient in the Medical Texts like the *bārû* = "diviner", *šā'ilu* = "dream interpreter", and the *ummânu* = "scholar" (see WEE 2021: 1-8).

[606] GORDON 1942: 406-408.

[607] ARBOLL 2020: 58.

[608] COOK 2002: 7-14.

[609] In the INANNA/Ištar Descent to the Netherworld myth was a line that give meaning to this fumigation healing process that reveals in the line 139 as: *BA.ÚŠ.MEŠ li-lu-nim-ma qut-ri-in li-iṣ-ṣi-nu*/"Let the dead come up and smell the incense" (see JAMES 1976: 82-84; KRAMER, WOLKSTEIN 1983: 51-91; GELLER 1985: 85-139; FOSTER 1996: 504; KATZ 2003: 251-287; LAPINKIVI 2010: 22, 28, 33; HOLLAND 2010: 154-160).

onto the left nostril[610]. However, the fluids were prepared and administrated through the nose to induce vomiting. The principal breathing orifice – the nose – was considered a marker for a healthy state not only for humans, but it was also applied to horses. Plus, the process was a mythological philosophical metaphorical explanation for this particularity; that link to the Mesopotamic concept relating between breath and life. Consequently, I cannot explore in depth to preserve the focus of topic under discussion.

It was a magical-ritualistic way to achieve the wellbeing of humans and animals. In the Neo-Assyrian period, for example, there was a ritual called NAM.BÚR.BI[611] – "Ritual of Nineveh" – and it was practiced for the king's horses in the presence of the latter. This ritual was performed in a camp with the presence of an exorcist would make amulets[612] for the horses. An important point that had to be emphasized is that the illness affects such as much the animals as the human conditions provoked by life itself like snake bites, scorpions' bites or even some food that may cause disturbances.

However, to this highly technical and experimental work for this period, the physician Kiṣir-Aššur also contributed with some religious explanations, as was usual, for a more complete diagnosis. As Troels Pank Arboll emphasized:

> "Gods or demons could inflict illness upon animals as well as humans. Similarly, an evil afflicting an animal could likely be transferred to the owner"[613].

The *āšipu*, consequently, had an obligation after to deliver the *ušāpi*/"made clear the nature of the illness"/ diagnosis to say how long it would be before the patient could expect to get well. Similar to the European pharmacist or herbalist – the *asû* –

[610] COHEN 1983: 9-10; ARBOLL 2020: 95-96.
[611] SCURLOCK 2005: 46-47.
[612] Idem *ibidem*: 59-62.
[613] ARBOLL 2020: 88.

that compounded drugs for complex diseases, where the medicinal plants had a crucial role.

Hence, the *asû* wasn't qualified to diagnose patients, so he worked in cooperation and consent his colleague *āšipu*. Only the *āšipu* could deliver a diagnosis. As Karel van der Toorn defends:

> "The former of the two [the *asû*] specialized in the 'empirical' treatment, using herbs and bandages and occasionally the scalpel, while the second [the *āšipu*] sought to exorcise the primary causes of the disorder [...]"[614].

This kind of knowledge was passed through orality and empirical experience, although, the specializations between a physician and an exorcist were quite different. Still, the Ancient Mesopotamians comprehended that both experiences could work together, even more in cases of complex diseases. There's a need to describe in detail all the process in all the cases weren't necessary. That's because in most of cases the cure for illness was, in some sort, a combat against demons, especially in the human cases. The animal illness was treated with more resource of an *asû*, even if the diagnosis were prescribed by the *āšipu*.

So, could had this issue been a cause for a lack of veterinary texts? Not necessarily, the explanation for the lack of veterinary medicinal texts might have been that most of the times the medicine applied to humans was also applied to animals. On the other hand, the risk of some zoonotic diseases probably had existed, not intentionally provoked, like for example the rabies[615] or perhaps the *maškadu*[616].

The Ancient Mesopotamians were aware that existed a separation between the human condition and the animal condition. For example, they believed that animals didn't have *eṭemmu*[617]/ghosts. Nevertheless, some animals present an anatomical and

[614] TOORN 1985: 69.
[615] WU 2001: 1-32.
[616] WASSERMAN 2012: 426-436.
[617] JASTROW JR. 1898: 262; SCURLOCK 1997: 77-96; FINKEL, GELLER (ed.), WILSON, REYNOLDS 2007: 84-99; HOLLAND 2010: 74; KONSTANTOPOULOS 2020: 1-14; ARBOLL 2020: 204; FINKEL 2021: 14-16.

physiologically similarities to humans. Also, some of them were used as totems and magical symbols too – even the gods would appear as animals and be represented by them. Everything was connected. The horse was a resource as well as a weapon, and knowing the physiology is having the first instrument to train it.

3.2 The Sennacherib´s Iron Knights: Cavalry versus the War Chariot

After comprehending how to train a horse in the Ancient Near Eastern's way as knowing its anatomical-physiological state and health process of cure as was known by veterinary medicine professionals, it's set clear the relation between horse and man/*binomial*. The constitution of the first cavalry corps is known, so, another question remains: when did the autonomy of the cavalry corps from war chariot's corps actually happen?

The great potencies of the early Ancient Near Eastern armies had generally and primarily the war chariot as a machinery of war, logically knowing the domestication of horse first. However, it was in the kingdom of Assyria that it was possible for the constitution of the first cavalry corps to happen.

Even though this first cavalry corps from Tiglath-pileser I's reign wasn't fully autonomous, he worked in symbiosis with the war chariot corps, which had tremendous impact in warfare at the time. From that moment on, the cavalry began to work its way towards becoming fully autonomous. The various processes of professionalization in the cavalry corps became a necessity. That included the training, the hierarchy, the *status militaris*, the war economy, the healing knowledge, etc. These topics will be discussed in more detail below and in the next topic.

Hence, these reflexions are important because the warfare in the Ancient Near East world wasn´t just a mere confront of cities or kings with smalls armies, or just bloodshed and steel. It was a clash of cultures, wars of coalitions and parties, from small kingdoms that became the largest empires in the Ancient Near East.

On the other hand, it's important to emphasize that a considerable number of historians make some serious mistakes when referring to the Assyrian Army, especially when they address the subject of the cavalry corps. They consider that the Assyrian cavalry was only created or had its most relevant role in the 9th century BC due to representations.

So far, most of the historians completely neglect the reading of the Assyrian *Annals*, the Assyriological studies, the archaeological data, the archaeozoology, the

philology, the epistemology, the semantics, the ethnozoological and even the ethno-anthropologic studies. Nonetheless, few historians – and even less the Military historians – really take the trouble to research enough to better understanding the issues or to have a more substantiated argument. It's imperative to have a transversal, focused, and constant problematized reading.

The Ancient Near Eastern History permitted to comprehension of the fact that the past it's a constant present, and a rhythmized future that constructs itself by all the intervenient people. As Marc Van De Mieroop emphasized a very pertinent detail that permit to conclude this Assyrian militarized attitude, "This policy actually may not have been Assyria's initial intention but was forced upon it by the resistance of the local population"[618].

The internal and international policies, the warfare and the war's economy, the professionalized medicine and the magicians that fought against disease and chaos, etc. In fact, all these factors and more that could be explored with more detail constitute a high level of complexity from the Ancient Near East world and especially from Assyria.

As a result, it's necessary to understand the foundations of the Assyrian Empire for an in-depth realization of the reformations of Sennacherib's Iron Knights. The bases or the first sign of reformation that could enlighten the Assyrian Empire remount endlessly to Early Assyrian Period or even when Assyria was part of the Mitannian-Hurrian kingdom. But the reign that could better exemplify these structural bases remount to the Assyrian king Tukultī-Ninurta I (ca.1243-1207 BC). Though the most prominent and disruptive reforms were from the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, Assyria ceased to be just a kingdom to allow the creation of the pillars of what would become the Empire.

It was due to the reforms that characterized the reign of Tiglath-pileser I[619] that it was possible to develop and create the first cavalry corps and the pillars for the empire. The Tiglath-pileser I's military campaigns weren't peaceful but made way to

[618] MIEROOP 2015: 248.
[619] RAGOZIN 1905: 64.

a prosperous peace between the conquered realms within the Assyrian domain, in search what was known as *pax assyriaca*.

Still, it contradicts in my perspective, Mario Liverani's[620] pronouncement in part of the description of the military campaigns in the regnal years of Tiglath-pileser I. In fact, as was described in the topic of this Dissertation known as *The Horses of Aššur: The Creation of the Assyrian Calvary*, tried to achieve a better and clear comprehension the importance of Tiglath-pileser I's reign also as a builder of the pillars of Assyrian Empire. And according with the perspective of Wolfram von Soden:

> "The murder of Tukultī-Ninurta I was followed by a period of decline, after which Tiglath-pileser I (Ass. Tukultī-apli-Ešarra; 1116-1077), after many struggles against the Aramaeans, created a great new empire stretching to the region of the Mediterranean"[621].

This long-time strategy was followed by all the late Middle and early Neo-Assyrian kings[622] until the reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II. The Aššurnaṣirpal II's[623] military campaigns serve a major purpose, to secure the Assyrian influence in all the occupied territories against an old enemy (the Arameans). The dynamics changed to a high speed, brutal, terrorized and machinery of siege[624] war tactics that when applied in the

[620] LIVERANI 2014: 422.
[621] SODEN 1994: 54.
[622] From Tiglath-pileser I's reign (ca.1114/5-1077 BC) till the Aššurnaṣirpal II's reign (ca.883-859 BC) Assyria had thirteen kings, which were the following: Ašarēd-api1-Ekur (ca.1075-1074 BC), Aššur-bē1-kala (ca.1073-1056 BC), Erība-Adad II (ca.1055-1054 BC), Šamšī-Adad IV (ca.1053-1050 BC), Aššurnaṣirpal I (ca.1049-1031 BC), Šalmaneser II (ca.1030-1019 BC), Aššur-nārārī IV (ca.1018-1013 BC), Aššur-rabi II (ca.1012-972 BC), Aššur-rêša-iši II (ca.971-967 BC), Tiglath-pileser II (ca.966-935 BC), Aššur-dān II (ca.934-912 BC), Adad-nārārī II (ca.911-891 BC), Tukultī-Ninurta II (ca.890-884 BC) (see RIMA 2; FEI 2020: 199).
[623] ARMSTRONG, TRUNDLE (ed.), SIDDALL 2019: 45.
[624] When Aššurnaṣirpal II marched with his army to besiege the fortified city of Ḫulāiia, a fierce battle happens. The Assyrians captured alive the city ruler and burned three thousand captives and the king ordered to make a pile with their corpses as an example of what could happen to the ones who tried to resist. Aššurnaṣirpal II ordered that the recent captured city ruler would have his skin draped on the wall of the city Damdammusa (see RIMA 2, p. 201, i106-110). The records are succinctly describing the battle itself but, on other hand, explicitly and graphically illustrated the gore process of what would happen to those who resisted the Assyrian advance. This was a message; this was the Assyrian war.

annihilation of the rebellions, became the primary characteristics of this Assyrian monarch[625].

Nevertheless, it was in this reign that the cavalry corps initiate the transitional phase from the war chariot corps to an independent corps, as the palace bas-reliefs show. The shield-bearing horseman beside the mounted archer represented in the palace's bas-reliefs permitted the corroboration of the value and efficiency of the shield-bearer lancer's fighting. Still, an early complex structure between the war chariot and cavalry was determinant detail. Then, as a warfare element that came from the bas-reliefs of Aššurnaṣirpal II's palace[626] indicate an Assyrian advantage in the battlefield. A flexible and faster arm – the cavalry as pre-independent corps was crucial in the previous campaigns against the Arameans.

All the kings between the reigns of Tiglath-pileser I and Aššurnaṣirpal II had dealt with great war against Arameans cities coalitions and rebellions. As were described in the Aššurnaṣirpal II *Annals*:

> "I appointed Azi-ili as my own governor over them. I erected a pile in front of his gate; I flayed as many nobles as had rebelled against me (and) draped their skins over the pile; some I spread out within the pile, some I erected on stakes upon the pile, (and) some I placed on stakes around about the pile. I flayed many rights through my land (and) draped their skins over the walls. I slashed the flesh of the eunuchs (and) of the royal eunuchs who were guilty. I brought Aḫi-iababa to Nineveh, flayed him, (and) draped his skin over the wall of Nineveh. (Thus) have I constantly established my victory and strength over the land Laqû"[627].

However, it was only in the reign of Šalmaneser III (ca.858-823 BC)[628] that the Assyrian attitude changed drastically. The attitude was based in a more warlike

[625] RUSSELL 1985: 64.
[626] TALLIS, CURTIS (ed.) 2008: 26-28.
[627] RIMA 2, p. 199, i89-94.
[628] The son of Aššurnaṣirpal II, Šalmaneser III had an Assyrian name that was related to a theophoric name as occurred to the deity named *Šulmānu*(*m*) that in Assyrian language means "Official Gift" or

approach where the cavalry[629] and war chariot had a decisive role as the exploration of dread as a psychological war tactic. Also, there was the use of the siege as a more effective and profitable way of making war. The expansion to the Mediterranean coast, especially to the Phoenician territory permitted a heavy taxation, tributes, and spoils of war.

Hence, the war damage proposition was substantially higher than wars fought previously. In the Šalmaneser III's *Annals*, the descriptions referred more than a dozen of cities burnt or destroyed, hundreds of spoils of war[630], and huge towers of decapitated soldiers' heads. This war context demonstrates a typology of war that had not been seen before – a total war[631]. The descriptions are clear as the violence and the war dynamics, the battles wouldn´t last much as long as sieges were prepared properly. Šalmaneser III's *Annals* are explicit:

> "By the command of Aššur, my lord, I scattered their assembled forces. I besieged the city, captured (it), (and) carried off valuable [booty] from them, (namely) numerous chariots [(and) teams of horses]. I [felled 700 of their fighting men] with the sword. [In the midst of this battle] I captured [Bur-Anate, the Ias]buqean. [I captured] the great cities of [the Patinean. I overwhelmed the

"Peace Offering", however, some Assyriologists referred to Šalmaneser III in Assyrian as Šulmānu-ašarēd III (see LEICK 1999: 145; FRAYNE, STUCKEY 2021: 334).

[629] During the reign of Šalmaneser III, the terminology used to refer the cavalry was the same used to refer the war chariot, the term was *pītḫallu*. In spite of the fact that it was mentioned in the *Annals* of Tiglath-pileser I that were referred early in the topic "2.2. The Horses of Aššur: The Creation of the Assyrian Calvary". This nomenclature persisted till the end of the reign of Sargon II and the ascension of Sennacherib. As Shigeo Yamada referred, "Chariots and/or cavalry (*pītḫalllu*)" (see YAMADA 2000: 262).

[630] Tamás Dezső described a gigantic number of spoils of war referred to the first campaign of Šalmaneser III in ca.853 BC, when the Assyrians march against a twelfth kings coalition. This campaign culminated in the battle fought near Qarqar. The great amount of cavalry, war chariots and troops that came from the remaining survivors, like the king of Damascus Ḫadad-ezer (Adad-idri) collected 1,200 chariots, 1,200 cavalry and 2,000 troops. On the other hand, the king of Ḫamath Irḫuleni collected a more modest spoil only 700 chariots, 700 cavalry and 10,000 troops (see DEZSŐ 2012: 17; MIEROOP 2015: 227).

Generally, the Texts emphasized a highly improbable number of deaths in the end of a battle, like 10,000 dead enemies' troops, what seems a little unreasonable. In Qarqar had approximately fought 50,000 troops of each side at best. Consequently, Šalmaneser III fought four times against constant insurgence of the twelfth king's coalition, as well as that the chronologic timeline of this battles are ca.853 BC, ca.849 BC, ca.848 BC and ca.845 BC. The difficulty of the Assyrian expansion was essentially the internal rebellions of the recent conquered territories.

[631] LIVERANI 2014: 438.

cities on the shore of the] upper sea [of the land Amur]ru, also called the [western] sea, [(so that they looked) like ruin hills (created by) the deluge. I received tribute from the kings] on the seashore"[632].

The king Šalmaneser III performed a war ritual when his territory reached the Mediterranean Sea, as tradition in the Assyrian culture and army dictated. A ritual that has already been previously discussed, corroborating this Ancient Near Eastern way where religion, politics and war converge in a single act. So, Šalmaneser III washed his weapons on the Mediterranean Sea, and made a sacrifice to the gods before moving to the city Gilzānu[633]. The principal military campaign of Šalmaneser III was the Levant, the region of ancient Amurru, and Phoenicia. However, in approximately 856 BC the Urartians threatened the Assyrian vassals and domains in the North and the focus turned to the Lake Van[634]. The kingdom of Urarṭu was an ancient, well-known and formidable enemy of Assyria.

Yet, the war was a profitable way to acquire tributes on horses, as it was present in the royal inscriptions known as *madattu*, applied in all provinces, cities, citadels, and vassals of the Assyrian kingdom. This imposition allowed the direct financing of the army and military campaigns. The tributes of horses that arrived from the most varied regions, such as: Ḫargu, Ḫarmasa, Sirišu, Ulmānu, (and) Simerra, Ḫubuškia from Kakia, Gilzānu from Asua, Sam'al, Patinu, Bīt-Adini, Gargamiš, Que, Ḫiluku, Iasbuqu, and Iaḫānu of Urarṭu, Arzaškun of Aramu, Zanzinua, Gilzānu (Asāu), Bīt-Adini of Aḫūni and the coalition of the 12 kings of the coast, Ḫ -ezer (or Adad-idri) of Damascus, Irḫulēnu, Ḫamatite from the twelfth kings of the seacoast, and the Nairi and Urarṭu of Asia king of the land of Daiē, Namri from Marduk-mudammiq[635].

[632] RIMA 2, p. 10, 70´-75´.
[633] RIMA 3, p. 9, 1 33b-40a.
[634] FRAHM (ed.), FUCHS 2017: 250-251.
[635] DEZSŐ 2016: 168-169.

Furthering in chronology[636], by the time of the Adad-nīrārī III's son, in the Tiglath-pileser III's reign (ca.745[637]/4-727 BC) occurred another change of attitude and perspective. The Assyrian monarch permitted a renaissance within the empire, a political and military reform. The Tiglath-pileser III's reforms referring to the cavalry corps' role in the Assyrian warfare could been noticed in the royal inscriptions. And the descriptions eternalized the many stories in the Assyrian history characterizing it "the victory and might"[638] of the Assyrian army. Consequently, it must be told a fascinating episode about the role and strength of the cavalry corps in war against the Urartian's.

In the 3rd *palû* (ca.743 BC), the Assyrians march into the territory of Kummuḫ, between Kištan and Ḫalpi to face their old enemies – like Sarduri II[639] – that conspired and gathered some other kings to make a coalition[640] against the Assyrians. These alliances of four rebel kings composed by the king of Matī´-il of Arpad, the king Sarduri II of Urarṭu, the king Sulumal of Meliddu, and the king Tarḫularu of Gurgum. The Assyrian army crushed the rebellion and broke the coalition. But, after the battle the Assyrian cavalry corps chased the remaining Urartians troops that were fleeing to their main city, Ṭurušpâ, that they never got close[641]. The Tiglath-pileser III's cavalry corps – as Davide Nadali referenced, "As usual, Assyrian horseman advance in

[636] From the Šalmaneser III's reign (ca.858-823 BC) till the Tiglath-pileser III reign (ca.744-727 BC) Assyria had five kings, which are the following: Šamši-Adad V (ca.823-811 BC), Adad-nīrārī III (ca.810-783 BC), Šalmaneser IV (ca.783-773 BC), Aššur-dan III (ca.773-755 BC), Aššur-nīrārī V (ca.755-745 BC) (see TYSON, HERRMANN (eds.) 2018: 21; FEI 2020: 199-200).

[637] It's pressing to emphasize the extension of the trade routes in this period – essentially the eastern route – the great trade route of Khorasan to China, by command of the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III that ordered to build *kāru* stations has a measure of defence against the robbers and the Assyrian enemies (see PARPAS 2018: 69). Regardless, as Stephanie Dalley mention that the economy was extended not only towards the tributes, but also in times of war the importation of some luxurious products came from various conners of the known world, referring that "[…] they imported horses from Egypt by trade, […]" (see DALLEY 1985: 31).

[638] RINAP 1, p. 29, 6 4b-5a.

[639] MIEROOP 2015: 217.

[640] Making coalitions between cities and kingdoms – small and large – were a common practice in the Ancient Near East. The necessity for making allegiances to face an expansionist culture was imperative, most of the times even for the surviving of a single and unique culture, language and ethnic group. When the Assyrian expansion took a more expressive size the necessity of introducing in the army, especially in the cavalry corps, other ethnic groups and recent conquered peoples. In the Assyrian heartlands cities had military arsenals, large stables, and military training camps for all people of the Empire. This theme will be explored in depth in the next topic.

[641] DEZSŐ 2012: 19.

pairs"[642] – obliterated them before they could reach the gates of the city. On the other hand, the inscriptions' description expounds the Assyrian political and military attitude, as it were in the Tiglath-pileser III's *Annals*:

> "Sarduri of the land Urarṭu revolted against me and conspired with Matī´-il (against me). In the lands Kištan and Ḫalpi, districts of the city Kummuḫ, I defeated him and took his entire camp away from him. He became frightened of the terrifying radiance of my weapons and fled alone in order to save his life. I confined him to the city Ṭurušpâ, his city, and inflicted a great defeat upon him before his city gates. I erected my royal image in front of the city Ṭurušpâ"[643]

These types of revolts/rebellions occurred throughout all Assyrian history. The reason behind it was the Assyrian policies and military intelligence that maintained the borders of the empire guarded. The Northern regions like the Urartian kingdom proportionated a constant climate of instability, as was described in some letters and mention in the inscriptions, essentially from the reigns of Sargon II and Sennacherib. This topic will be discussed further below.

Tiglath-pileser III's strategy to secure the functionality and *modus operandi* of Assyrian army permitted that conquests extend "from the Great Sea to Rising Sun"[644]. As well as the reforms that allowed the control over some governors and magnates to make an easier task to administrate all the imperial provinces[645]. Still, as Wolfram von Soden clarified: "[…] reducing the size of the provinces in order to limit the power of the governors, which had become excessive"[646].

Thus, the most pertinent and problematic question about the reign of Tiglath-pileser III is that this monarch incorporates a practice and improvement of the siege[647],

[642] VIDAL (ed.), NADALI 2010: 127.
[643] RINAP 1, p. 98, 39 20b-24a.
[644] RINAP 1, p. 86, 35 23´.
[645] The terminology used to designate "provinces" is the sign *NAM* or *pīhatu* in Babylonic or *pāhutu* in Assyrian (see YAMADA 2018: 11).
[646] SODEN 1994: 57.
[647] YADIN 1963: 16-25.

in particularly the Syrian and Levant regions (like the Israel and Judah kingdoms). The siege practice had a heavy weight in the Near Eastern way of making war – when compared to the Tiglath-pileser III's reign. As was known by the terror that came to everyone who dared opposing to the Assyrian's expansionist advance, just like what had happened in Ulluba.

In the 7th *palû* (ca.739 BC), this rebellious land and rebellious people[648] faced the might of the Tiglath-pileser III's Assyrian army. Tiglath-pileser III ordered his troops into march towards the land of Ḫalziatbar, crossing twenty-nine cities and villages. Most of the people took refuge in the land of Ulluba[649]. The Assyrians surrounded them, even though the morphological context wasn't an easy one. The type of difficult terrain of the Mount Ilimeru didn't make that siege a wise choice, but the siege had happened regardless.

The Ulluba people that had fled onto the mountain terrain settled a defensive perimeter. Even so, they had to face a well-trained Assyrian army and the lives of the ones that were taken captive threatened (some would be parents, kids, old people, etc…). A siege[650] put any people, city and kingdom in a terrifying scenario – which in the Assyrian inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III appears some metaphors as "[…] like a ring […]"[651]. Nonetheless, the outcome of the Ulluba's siege was a merciful one.

Tiglath-pileser III recognized the surrender of people from recent occupied territories, the choice to surrender allowed them a benevolent[652] outcome. The

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[648] The inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III characterized the Ulluba people as *KUR.Ullubāya āšib pūt māt Aššur.KI*/ "the people of the land [of] Ulluba, who live opposite Assyria" (see YAMADA 2018: 15). On the other hand, as it appears in the descriptions like: "(As for) the Aḫlamû (that is, the people of the land Ulluba), the ones who do not bring gifts (and) who do recognize [authority, …] they were over-confident, […]" (see RINAP 1, p. 91, 37 19-20).

[649] ELAYI 2022: 105-107.

[650] ARMSTRONG, TRUNDLE (ed.), SIDDALL 2019: 39-40.

[651] RINAP 1, p. 92, 37 37.

[652] It's necessary to comprehend the Assyrian political and diplomatic approach to the recent and non-conquered territories. So, within the Assyrian Empire, the Assyrian king had his subjects as a *urdu*/"servants or slaves" no matter the social status, eminent or humble. His subjects were exclusively in the king's service and had to *maṣṣartu naṣâru*/"to mount guard" for him. They had to be in utter devotion for the *abat šarri*/"royal orders" and finally, had to express an obligation to taking a *adê*/"oath allegiance" to the king (see MONTE 2010: 93-95). Therefore, any act that could break one or all this vows, such as rebellions, conspiracies or assassinations conspiracies or non-denunciations of bad actions were immediately sentenced to death in any part of the Empire. It's also curious to add that these rules also applied to allies, which could mean a declaration of war from their part if these laws were violated (see COLLINS, MANNING (ed.), FRAHM 2016: 89; ELAYI 2017: 33).

Assyrian monarch annexed the land in order to make them an imperial province; however, he instructed that part of the population were deported to stabilize the region.

Subsequently, one of the firsts political measures was the reorganization of the cities and villages and the appointment of a high official, a *ša rēši*/"Eunuch"[653] as a new provincial governor. Thus, the Ulluba region became an Assyrian imperial province. Mario Liverani accentuated that:

> "After the noncompliant local leaders were eliminated, Assyrian governors were appointed, often eunuchs (*šūt rēšīya bēl pīḫāti ana muḫḫīšunu aškun*); after the palace of the local king was destroyed, an Assyrian palace was built in its place; and after the local population was deported, new people were settled in their place"[654].

More than an economic measure, this reorganization of territory was a political way to implement an "indirect rule" and in other contexts a "direct rule". The enemy's ruler was substitute for a pro-Assyrian ruler, even if they weren't ethnically Assyrian. The indirect rule could be a more economically profitable and convenient measure; not only it was a method to avoid the risk of future rebellions, but also as a better internal production which could mean a higher collect taxation and external tributes. On the other hand, the Assyrian monarchs preferred the direct rule instead of economic income that could had been less profitable, even though it was a more politically stabilized measure as a long-term strategy.

A possible reason for a choice like a direct rule was a less diplomatic policy that could result in a stronger political presence. Consequently, it was used as a precaution against a high probability of a rebellion, because the governors were appointed directly by the Assyrian monarch. Yet, the city people mass deportations,

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The Assyrian monarch was the main responsible for the proper functioning of the kingdom and had an extensive bureaucracy and highly qualified administrative officials and structure which were planted in all the provinces of the Empire. As Marc Van De Mieroop referred to the mentality of Assyrian policy and attitude, "Beyond the borders was a world that had to obey but did not need to become part of Assyria" (see MIEROOP 2015: 244).

[653] DELLER 1997: 303-311.

[654] FRAHM (ed.), LIVERANI 2017: 541.

the replacement of local governors and local high officials' holders of public offices were frequently eliminated or *šaglûte*[655] (deportees foreigner's officers). All the political and administrative structures were modified. Also, there was a political and social procedure of "Assyrianizing"[656] these insubordinate territories, as Mario Liverani[657] defined. As appears in the inscriptions the annexation the land of Ulluba and all the cities and villages that became part of the Assyrian territory:

> "I annexed to Assyria the land Ulluba in its entirety, the cities of Bitirru, Parīsu, Tašuḫa, Manṭun, Sardaurriana, Diulla-ana-Nal, Sikibsa, Aššurdāya, Babutta, Lusia, (and) Tapsia, fortresses of the land Urarṭu that (are located) behind Mount Nal"[658]

Therefore, Tiglath-pileser III turned his attention to the Babylonic complex case. A Chaldean dynasty took place within the Babylonian kingdom[659]. The struggle between Babylonians and Assyrians was an ancient one, although, in ca.729 BC Tiglath-pileser III decided to put an end to the conflict.

The Assyrian monarch attacked the city of Karduniaš/Babylon and defeated the Babylonian-Chaldean king Mukin-zeri, which means that Babylonia became part of the Assyrian rule, but not as a province of the Assyrian Empire. The Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III respected the Babylonian legacy and culture as the heirs of the Sumerian-Akkadian culture, same as the Assyrians. The inscriptions showed the gesture, devotion and respect of Tiglath-pileser III by the Babylonian culture, as following reference shown:

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[655] DALLEY 1985: 33.

[656] Tiglath-pileser III's reign was one of the most interesting ones, because the Imperial Assyria had the most prosperous expansion years. The "Assyrianization" and Assyrian political and military influence extent was so large that almost reached the Egyptian borders, but certainly had the entirety of the Arabian desert region. As A. Leo Oppenheim referred about Tiglath-pileser III, "He applied the age-old method of large-scale deportation of vanquished peoples and extended his influence even into Arabia; two queens of the Arabs sent tributes to him. He carried the extension of Assyria rule into Syria and Palestine, which aroused a new enemy of Assyria, Egypt" (see OPPENHEIM 1964: 169).

[657] LIVERANI 2014: 441.

[658] RINAP 1, p. 98, 39 25b-28a.

[659] TYSON, HERRMANN 2018: 7.

"I entre[ed] Babylon (and) offered [pure sacrifices be]fore the god Marduk, my lord."[660]

The Assyrian Empire became not just larger, but the authority and influence of the Assyrian king was extended. Though in a diplomatic level Tiglath-pileser III only exercises a political control despite wearing the Babylonian crown when he received the Babylonian name of *Pulu*. Yet, the defeat of the Chaldean-Babylonic king wasn't enough to consolidate politically and diplomatically the unification of both crowns, in which only took place in the reign of king Sargon II in a more serious way. The Babylonic problem wasn't fully resolved. The Assyrians had a more serious and large rebellion on its way lead by Marduk-apla-iddina II or generally known by his Hebrew name Merodach-Baladan II (ca.721-694 BC) – the archenemy of king Sargon II.

Furthering a little more in the chronological timeline[661] till reaching the reign of Sargon II[662] (ca.721-705 BC). This reign was one of the most important among the many kings in the Assyrian monarchy. The achievements towards the military campaigns of Sargon II had an enormous impact in the Assyrian current context of "mini crisis of succession". After the Tiglath-pileser III's death – father of Šalmaneser V and Sargon II – the Assyrian Empire had an extension that was never had seen before. Then again, the empire wasn't completely as internal as externally cohesive and unified, even though it was a political-administrative pillars that had been laid by previous monarchs.

Hence, in Sargon II's reign, the frontiers' definition of the Empire wasn't firmly stable. The Assyrian enemies were everywhere, almost literally. The Northern

[660] RINAP 1, p. 100, 40 15b-16a.

[661] From the reign of Tiglath-pileser III (ca.745/4-727 BC) till the reign of Sargon II (ca.721-705 BC) only had one king between them which was Šalmaneser V (ca.726-722 BC) (see FEI 2020: 200).

[662] The name of the Assyrian king Sargon II was written, in fact, as *Šarru-ukīn* or *Šarru-kēn*(*u*). The name Sargon appeared written in Hebrew – in the Bible – as *srgwn* (1*Is* 20,1). So, the name Sargon was adopted towards the Academy that was highly influenced by the Biblical Studies at the time in the earlier Orientalists. However, the name had been translated by some scholars as "the faithful king" interpreted as the "rich and just" and defined by the phonetic pronunciation of the name *Šarrukīn*/Sargon that means "the king has obtained/established order" (see CHAMAZA 1992: 32; FRAHM 2005: 46-50; ELAYI 2017: 13).

border was unstable and the Urartian kingdom, which the Assyrians fought many times instigate rebellions in the Neo-Hittites kingdom. In the western border, there were the uprising collations of Neo-Hittites kingdom and the Phoenician cities started to become a priority of the Sargon II's campaigns.

Therefore, in the Southwest border, the Israelite and Judah kingdom a highly necessary Assyrian strike, as well as in the Southeast border, where the Chaldean-Babylonic rebellion had to be smashed. And finally, the Southern border, the Arabian[663] desert kingdom and tribes that began to cause disturbances in the desert trade routes.

Without a doubt, Sargon II had a difficult problem in hands, struggles in all borders and an imminent uprising of recent and old enemies; it seems that all Assyria's enemies gathered some steel to put an end to bloodshed. The problems had to be solved for the sake and stability of the Assyrian Empire. In ca.720 BC[664] Sargon II had his first battle near Dêr, a distinguished Assyrian provincial city, that severed a barrier

[663] The Sargon II's father, Tiglath-pileser III in 13th *palû* (ca.733-732 BC) had a battle against the Arabian queen Samsi, that occurred at the same time when he was defeating the rebellion in Damascus, as well as, in the Aram kingdom. Still, it wasn´t possible to determine the location of the battle or even the morphological geographic characterization, what the Assyriologists could theorize is that the battle took place in the desert or near of the Arabic desert. The Assyrian army more specific the Assyrian bodyguard cavalry and king's war chariot units had a determinant role in the battle, especially when they overwhelmed the Arabians with such aggressiveness that the Arabians escaped on camels (see RINAP 1, p. 59, 20 18´, p. 106, 42 19´, p. 107, 42 25´b- 27´a; RETSÖ 2003: 110; BENNETT 2021: 68-78, 91-105, 161-168, 213-214).
As Tamás Dezső emphasized, "The king is shooting with his bow at an Arab warrior, who is riding on the back of a collapsing camel" (see DEZSŐ 2012: 65). And the more interesting detail of this historical episode is that the battle was a confront in open field, because as Davide Nadali referred, "Since there are no fortified settlements in the desert, the Assyrian army can only engage the Arabs in pitched battles to defeat them, reaching and destroying their camps and tents, as recorded in Tiglath-Pileser's accounts and clearly depicted on Assurbanipal's bas-reliefs" (see RINAP 1, p. 59, 20 18´; VIDAL (ed.), NADALI 2010: 127).

[664] To better comprehend this problematic matter that in ca.720 BC Sargon II moved his army to the border of eastern Babylonia, crossed the Tigris, to confront the rebellion of the Chaldean-Babylonic and Elamite king's allegiances. At the same chronological timeline, in the Levant and Israelite-Judah kingdom, there were preparations happening for a large-scale rebellion encouraged by the ruler of Ḫamath Ilu-bi'di. The power vacuum that succeeds by the death and Sargon II takes the throne, the opportunistic enemies like the Urarṭu, Phrygian and Egypt all revolt at the same time (see LIVERANI 2014: 529).
As Sara C. Melville clearly referred, "At about the same time, Ilu-bi'di, the ruler of Ḫamath in Syria, incited the kingdoms of Arpad, Ṣimirra, Damascus, Hatarikka, and Samaria to rebel against Assyria. After securing Egyptian support, Ḫanunu, the king of Gaza, also claimed independence. These rebellions not only posed a security threat to Assyria but also disrupted their control of vital trade networks in Iran and along the Mediterranean coast" (see MELVILLE 2016: 61).

state between Assyrian territory and the Elam region. The Assyrian-Babylonian crown will not be put in question by a Chaldean tribal chief of Bît-Yakīn[665] like Marduk-apla-iddina/Merodach-Baladan II[666].

The Assyrian army could move fast within the Empire, the provincial military units secure the borders and the hostilities. Almost any of provincial cities within the Empire could feed and host an entire army that travelled by the large roads[667] network in campaign. This means that the Assyrian troops were prepared face the Chaldean-Elamite rebellion. At the time of the confront the Sargon's troops didn't wait to charge, despite the fact that only ones to appear on the battlefield were the Elamites troops. The Babylonic troops delay to aid permitted that Elamite king proved to be a big flaw, since he didn't have backup on time. Thus, the Elamites faced in first instants alone the Assyrians. After waiting for a while, Sargon II ordered the attack upon the Elamite army of Hu[m]ban-nikaš I[668] (ca.743-717 BC).

Apparently, the outcome of the battle – in the perspective of Josette Elayi[669] – was "indecisive". Nevertheless, Paul-Alain Beaulieu[670] affirmed that the outcome of battle ended up with an Assyrian defeat, because the Babylonic's late intervention in aid to the Elamite army. But the Assyrians maintained the province and city of Dêr, what cause some pertinent hypothesis of an Assyrian victory, even if, it was just a little victory.

According to, with the *Annals* of Sargon II[671] claim a victory over the Babylonic-Elamite coalition. As a result, as Duncan Noble emphasized "[…] Sargon claimed to have won a victory in 720 BC against a Babylonian/Elamite coalition. But a Babylonian text gives a different version, that the Elamites defeated the Assyrians"[672]. Thus, within these contexts like the battle near of Dêr, Nabû-dūru-

[665] SANTOS 2013: 9-17.
[666] 1*Is* 39,1; 2*Rs* 20,12; SPEK 1978: 56-66; FRAME 2007: 42-43; DALLEY 2021:185-193.
[667] The Assyrian roads were known as "royal roads", for example permitted the communication by the royal mule express and had *bēt mardēti*/"way-stations" (see PARPOLA, WHITHING (ed.), KESSLER 1997: 129-136).
[668] POTTS 2017: 480.
[669] ELAYI 2017: 200.
[670] BEAULIEU 2018: 198.
[671] *ARAB* 2.10b-23; POTTS 2017: 482.
[672] NOBLE 2015: 51.

uṣur[673] the deputy governor of Dêr offered his own *gudūdu*/"military detachment" of cavalry and war chariots units to support the Assyrian king Sargon II and the *kiṣir šarrūti*/"royal corps".

Still, the cavalry corps wasn't fully autonomous and clearly defined, along with what appears in the inscriptions. The Nimrud Horse Lists and the associated texts from the Sargon II's reign the cavalry corps officers – as it were interpreted by Stephanie Dalley[674] – wasn't objectively named but referred as *rab urâte* "team commander officers"[675].

This reference could mean both cavalry or/and war chariot officer, an ambiguous sense that allowed the Assyriologists to have a very strong and cohesive foundation on the autonomy of the cavalry corps. In some representations of cavalryman appeared in action alone[676], what could suggest the principle of visibility and capacities of the cavalry corps, and his impact on the battlefield as a singular ridder combat, breaking the ancient teams of horses.

The army reforms of Sargon II referent to the military equipment/"[…] *pad-da* […] GIŠ.*til.li*"[677] were revolutionary as much as the Assyrian cavalry was the first in the Military History to be both horse and cavalryman equipped with an armour[678]. This Assyrian armoured cavalry was one of the most relentless in pursuit and open field battles, as Tamás Dezső referred:

> "The Scythian, Median and Persian cavalry was unquestionably descendants of the Assyrian armoured cavalry tradition"[679].

[673] DEZSŐ 2012: 90.
[674] DALLEY 1985: 36.
[675] DEZSŐ 2012: 78; FRAHM (ed.), DALLEY 2017: 527.
[676] RAULWING, LITTAEUR, CROUWEL (ed.) 2002: 135.
[677] RINAP 1, p. 39, 12 2´.
[678] The specific Assyrian designation, in the period of Aššurnaṣirpal II and later reigns, for the armour used to equip the horses is *ḫal-lu-up-ti ANŠE.KUR.RA.MEŠ* (see RIMA 2, p. 214, iii 22; ANDERSON 1961: 73-76; DEZSŐ 2012: 63).
[679] DEZSŐ 2012: 53.

If it wasn't enough, another crucial reform that altered the entire Ancient Near Eastern military paradigm in this period was the creation of a permanent professional *kiṣir šarrūti* (royal corps/contingent/army). Perhaps the idealization remote to the reign of the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III, even though, the concretization of this idea occurs in the reign of Sargon II.

Hence, Arnold Toynbee vastly described and referenced the high-level and importance of this militarization idea as: ""[...], o mais importante, talvez, de todos os avanços não é indicado pelos baixos-relevos, mas pelo texto das inscrições: trata-se da fundação de um exército real, [...]"[680]. A central standing army was a radical, progressive and innovative reform that took place in the reign of Sargon II. This royal army had a commander the *rab ša–rēšē*/"Chief Eunuch"[681] that belonged to the strict circle of the king, and had a high political influence in court.

Yet, a tiny detail of anthropo-historical reference that highlights the complexity of Near Eastern paradoxes imposing a relevant comprehension that the king's royal army was ethnically[682] Assyrian. Even if another important detail of historical and arch-zoological data was about the breed of the horses that also were differentiated[683] by its size, colours, and level of training. As it's already known, most of the horses were obtained towards spoils of war, tributes, and imposts.

Therefore, in the reign of Sargon II, the monarch received several large horses from Egypt during the campaigns of ca.716 BC, contemporary with the reign of the Egyptian Pharaoh Šilkani IV (reigned at ca.730-715 BC) – or more commonly known as Osorkon IV[684]. After Sargon II defeated the Osorkon IV's Egyptian general Rē´ē at the great battle of Raphia[685] – because the Egyptian interference in the rebellions on the Levant region. The Egyptians paid tribute as a gesture to avoid an open and declared war against the Assyrians in horses. Accordingly, as it appears in the Sargon II's inscriptions:

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[680] "[…], the most important, perhaps, of all the advances is not indicated by the bas-reliefs, but by the text of the inscriptions: it is a question of the foundation of a royal army, [...]" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see TOYNBEE 1963: 88).
[681] *SAA* XXI 83; DEZSŐ 2016: 16; ELAYI 2017: 35.
[682] SNELL (ed.), LIMET 2005: 370.
[683] ALBENDA 2004: 325-334.
[684] REDFORD 2004: 82-84; LLOYD (ed.), NAUNTON 2010: 124-125.
[685] MELVILLE 2016: 72.

> "*12 ANŠE.KUR.RA.MEŠ GAL.MEŠ ša KUR Mu-uṣ-ri ša i-na ma-a-ti la ib-šu-ú tam-šil-šu-un iš-šá-a ta-mar-tuš*/12 big horses of Egypt, they're like not to be found in Assyria"[686].

Then, the Assyrian strategy of open field battles allowed the cavalry to had more effective action. Although, there are many moments in the Assyrian History that were worthy of mentioning, and profoundly investigated or even discussed, especially during the reign of Sargon II. The military campaign that had better characterize the complexity of the Assyrian warfare and his politic-military *modus operandi* is the 8th campaign against the Urarṭu kingdom (ca.715-714 BC). After any campaign that took place or put in action, like the battle of Mt. U'auš, Sargon II used an outstanding network of spies and specially a high-level of military intelligence spread for all the Empire and his neighbours. As Josette Elayi accentuated:

> "Sargon had an efficient spy system, and during the campaigns, he had reconnaissance scouts with skills superior to those of the enemies. Surrounded by enemies on all sides of his empire, Sargon had to concentrate in each campaign on just one foe alone. Any attempt to redirect the army to another region once it was on the move would have had disastrous results"[687].

So, it's crucial to understand that the warfare theatre wasn't in the Assyrian period only a performance of a siege warfare or complete annihilation of his enemies, In fact, it was also that but not all of it. In all the levels of military intelligence, the last and lowest one is the catchiest known as the "Level of Spies". This 6th level is the action and more dangerous of levels, i.e., the level of informers, the scouts, and the agents.

[686] TADMOR 1958: 78.
[687] ELAYI 2017: 19.

All these spies lived under cover spread throughout all by all the Assyrian Empire and neighbour kingdoms, citadels, villages, and borders, as Tamás Dezső referred:

> "They monitored the troop movements of enemy armies on the roads, bridges and passes. They kept a close watch on the traffic, primarily the military traffic passing through the gates of enemy towns. They were probably local people with local businesses. There were even spies amongst them who were sent to the enemy country on a special mission"[688].

The inscriptions revealed several types that were possible to reconstructed from the Akkadian terminology to categorize the intelligence personnel. The *dayyālu*/*LÚ.da-a-a-li-ia* (the scouts or spy) had an important and dangerous role that was, plainly speaking, to infiltrate the enemy territory and even into the buffer kingdom and cities. The mission had various quests. For example, chasing fleeing people from the Assyrian territory or a less risky but no less important mission to verify the contractions in the *lišāni* (rumours). The espionage worked both ways, as the Assyrians sources referred with a particular predominance of references to the Urartian[689] kingdom and border.

The *bātiqu* (*ba-ti-qí-tú*)/*LÚ.EME* (informers), for example the *maṣṣarti ša URU.birāte* (guards of the borders fort) the forts garrison's had permanent state of observation of all the passages, ports, and troops movements (Urartian's troops). The network system of *ṭēmu* (information) had its own organization into smaller and larger circles of shared information. The information circulates in several, differentiate, and parallel circuits of many independent sources, what permitted a high level of cross information that was analysed to construct some sort of puzzle image of Empire and his dangers.

This kind of information circuits were vital to elaborate a military strategy and tactical decisions that required a gained knowledge of daily actualized high-level

[688] DEZSŐ 2014: 226.
[689] SAGGS 1958: 202, 206.

reports. Sargon II had a known spymaster called Aššur-rēṣua[690], who was appointed to settle base in Kumme, and he served the Assyrian delegate to the local government where the intelligence operation in Urarṭu were confluent. The spymaster reported directly – at the time – to the *mār šarri* (crown prince)[691] Sennacherib back in the Nineveh citadel, as well as to the king Sargon II.

Thus, it was in the reign of Sennacherib/*Sîn-aḫḫē-eriba*[692] reign (ca.704–681 BC) that one of the greatest and crucial reforms was carried out. It was the first *momentum* that bestowed the cavalry as an autonomous and professional unit, however, it wasn't the only reform that affect structurally the Assyrian army. Firstly, an important data that uncovered the change of focus *mutatis mutantis* in the Assyrian Art was that the sculpture representations of numerous cavalrymen in battling action. In all the Sennacherib's artistic sculpture was a significative percentage where were represented the cavalrymen in 13,3%[693], circa 232 representations.

Subsequently, the war chariot was progressively less represented in the Assyrians sculptures during the Sennacherib's reign. Along with one of the main factors that could explained this late transition was a coherent and plausible hypothesis emphasized by M. A. Littauer and J. H. Crouwel:

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690 MELVILLE 2016: 82.

691 FRAHM (ed.), FRAHM 2017: 182.

692 The name of Sennacherib comes from the Akkadian *Sîn-aḫḫē-eriba* which means "Sîn has replaced the brothers". This reference to "the brothers" – it's at least intrigant – because is the first Assyrian monarch with that name, and what could even that reference mean? Josette Elayi as well as the majority of the Assyriologists propose that reference to *talīmu* (the brothers) it's addressing to some Sennacherib's dead brothers, what could mean that he wasn't the first-born son, but one that survives (see DALLEY 1985: 33; ELAYI 2017: 29). As interpretated Eckart Frahm and clearly referred; "indicates that he had not been Sargon's first child – at least two older brothers of him must have died before his birth –, it seems reasonable to assume that Sennacherib was born around 745" (see FRAHM 2005: 47).
Although, in the Sargon II *Annals* and the Assyriologist Tamás Dezső referred that the Sargon II had a twin brother called Sîn-aḫu-uṣur who was his right hand, a *sukkallu dannu* (Grand Vizir), a high military officer, and also the commander of his *pētḫalli šēpē* (the king personal bodyguard cavalry unit). This reference to "the brothers" that maybe is related to the "twin brothers" – in this case his father and uncle – it´s my proposition to clarify this nomenclature (see *ARAB* 2.154; DEZSŐ 2012: 35, 77; FRAHM (ed.), FRAHM 2017: 181). Out of curiosity, the name *Sîn-aḫḫē-eriba* was forbidden to give a commoner Assyrian inhabitant within borders of the Assyrian Empire, it would been considered offensive, a sacrilege and even a taboo (see FREUD 2001: 37-113). Hence, the Sennacherib name was translated in many languages like in Hebrew as *snḥryb*, in Aramaic as *šnḥˀryb*, in Greek as *Σαναχάριβος*, and in Septuagint as *Σεν(ν)αχηριμ* (see ELAYI 2018: 12).

693 DEZSŐ 2012: 20.

> "Another factor in the long prevalence of chariotry over mounted troops in the ancient Near East may have been that the horseshoe had not yet been invented. […] Speed, however, and the ability to cross rough country when necessary was required of the *war horse*"[694].

Another factor was a late technology that gradually increase the potentiation of the cavalry was the stirrup[695], that is, the horse thigh, knee and adjusted ankle allowed the cavalryman better controlling during the riding and had both hands free to fight. The reference to this invention was subtly found in the Middle Assyrian Seal Impressions from Tell al Rimah, as referred by Barbara Parker:

> "Behind it in the field is the unexplained stirrup-shaped symbol having some detail within it"[696].

A further factor was that the quantity of imported horses maybe had been reduced and vehicles inherently ceased to be used for war. So, the Assyrian cavalry not only increases its importance on the battlefield since the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, but also constitutes the newest form of making war and the war chariot began to play a symbolic role. The war chariot served a propose of a vehicle for a nobleman or even for the king as prestige and wealth status symbol that had by the time of the 7th century, become exclusively a vehicle of prestige[697] for the king.

As the war chariot became bigger and unfunctional for war the cavalry was shown as a better and most versatile arm of the Assyrian army. This dichotomy existed by necessity for adaptation and rupture of ancient models of making war. The cavalry stayed even as a *pētḫalli šēpē* (personal royal guard), which guaranteed the full protection and high flexible that resides only in technical and emotional relation that

[694] LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1997: 12.
[695] YADIN 1963: 4-5.
[696] PARKER 1977: 261.
[697] DREWS 1996: 164; FAGAN, TRUNDLE (ed.), ARCHER 2010: 73.

bond the Sennacherib's iron knights. A clear and intriguing description revelled that the war chariot was incapable of functioning and overcome the inevitabilities of mountain terrain, as it was described in the Sennacherib's *Annals*:

> "In the high mountains, difficult terrain, I rode on horseback and had my personal chariot carried on (men's) necks"[698].

In fact, this little description substantiates the argument about the many qualities of the cavalry and intensified the attitude of the Assyrian monarch that bet a lot into a more dynamic warfare, which was what the cavalry corps bring. The Sennacherib's reforms within the regiment of war chariots and cavalry were very deep in thought, form which the cavalry was clearly beneficiated. The lack[699] of representations of the war chariot in the battle seems to allow a singular possibility to indicate their full autonomy. And like no other Assyrian king, Sennacherib was very calculous, took several years to properly respond to the numerous insurrections that took place after the death of his father Sargon II.

This new structurally, organized, and premeditated attitude was a reflex exhibited, not exclusively in war and politics but essentially in the building of cities, ziggurats, palaces, and tombs. It became a characteristic of Sennacherib's reign and personality, and it appeared objectively described in his *Annals*:

> "[But as for me, Sennacherib, king of Assyria, the performing of this work] came to my [attention by the will of the gods] and I put my mind to it"[700].

Then, the revenge for the death of Sargon II was a ruthless moment. One that left a trace of destruction and mass deportations of insidious people that rebel against the might of the Assyrian domain. This was a flame that illuminated a hypothetical

[698] RINAP 3/1 2.21.
[699] RAULWING, LITTAEUR, CROUWEL (ed.), LITTAUER 2002: 131, 138.
[700] RINAP 3/1 2.41.

idea for an ultimate centralized and ulterior extended "world empire"[701]. On the other hand, one of several characteristics that could had been appointed to Sennacherib, in an explicit or implicit way by some Assyriologists, was that he wasn't categorically "an expansionist"[702]; as it was stated by Hayim Tadmor.

Sennacherib was moved by revenge, what could be seen throughout his reign, as well as the reformed cavalry corps aggressive role showed during in his second campaign ca.702 BC, even though it was a very catchy episode.

During the Sennacherib's 3rd regnal year, the programmatic military campaign policy was to regain the Assyrian influence and territories in the regions around the Zagros Mountain. The Assyrians were relentless when they passed through the Kassite and Yasubigallians[703], which were mercilessly attacked. The Assyrians plundered and captured numerous cities along the way.

Yet, after Sennacherib destroyed the city and fortress of Bīt-Kilamzaḫ and submitted the cities of Bīt-Kubatti and Ḫardišpu to his domain, he also replaced these territories under the authority of his *ša rēši* (Eneuch), the governor of city Arrapḫa[704]. Then, Sennacherib marched to the land Ellipi.

This episode is a case of how important the centralized power, political thrust and devotion was. It must had been imperative to redo the bureaucratic system and espionage network, which were clearly oversighted of the political and military positions. The king of Ellipi Ispabāra[705]/Ašpabara[706] was placed by Sargon II to control the region, but he abandoned the fortified city upon the arrival of Sennacherib. The main cause for the automatically abandonment is logic and clear: the Ellipi's[707]

[701] KALIMI, RICHARDSON (ed.) 2014: 438.
[702] TADMOR 1999: 61.
[703] RINAP 3/1 2.20, 24-25.
[704] LEVINE 1973: 312-317.
[705] *SAA* I 1.16; RINAP 3/1 2.27.
[706] ELAYI 2018: 205.
[707] The kingdom of Ellipi had an influence range that could reach the control what today is called Luristan, and at the time by the Assyrian Zagros provinces, so, Ellipi was located between the regions of Media and Elam. Therefore, Ellipi was a kingdom surrounded in all sides by high mountains and a difficult terrain almost inaccessible, what permitted to manage and staying independent for a short time, till the Assyrians that continuously instigate and attempted to conquer the region and succeeded. Even after the Sargon II's campaigns (in ca.713 BC and ca.708 BC), the resistance to the Assyrian presence maintained and prevail for short period of time, when Sennacherib marched over the Ellipi territory. These territories around the Assyria border were always under pressure and highly influenced by its

monarch knew what the punishment for traitors was. As the Sennacherib's *Annals* described emphatically this catchy episode:

> "[I overwhelmed all of his wide land like fog. I destroyed, devastated, (and) burned with fire the cities Mar'ubištu (and) Akkuddu, cities of his royal house, together with thirty-four fortified cities and small(er) settlements in] their [en]virons, which were without number, [then I cut down their orchards (and) poured deathly quiet over their fertile fields]. (In this manner) I reduce to desolation [the land Ellipi to] its full [extent]"[708].

The main reference in the Assyrian Art[709] reliefs about this particular episode only showed four cavalryman – two *mušarkisu ša pēṯal qurubte/*bodyguard cavalryman and two lancers/mounted spearmen – chasing three enemy horsemen equipped with spears. It must had been a terrifying view to see the Assyrian cavalry units to easily reach the Ellipi[710] city's walls, and directly confront the rebellious horsemen. On the other hand, it could have been difficult to flank the Ellipi's army because of the surrounding mountainous area.

That could exult the Sennacherib's pursue of a cohesive and weighted military campaigns through revenge with the propose to annihilate every single rebellious and traitorous people within and out of the Assyrian Empire – which were many. Still the main trait is that against all odds one by one the cities and its rulers fall towards the wings of the Assyrian advance. Moreover, in the mountains of Zagros there was a characteristic and valuable activity that was horse breeding, as the region and its inhabitants were known, as well as by early used of horseman in conflicts.

Yet, the early relief appearance of this Zagro-Armenian horseman equipped with weapons belong to the archaeological representations' pieces from royal palace of the reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II[711]. The Sennacherib's cavalry was much heavier and

culture (see CAMERON 1936: 161-162; LIVERANI 2014: 557; DEZSŐ 2016: 50; MELVILLE 2016: 146, 179; FRAHM (ed.), FUCHS 2017: 264).

[708] RINAP 3/1 2.28-29.

[709] DEZSŐ 2012: 34.

[710] PARPOLA, WHITHING (ed.), COLE 1997: 33.

[711] DEZSŐ 2012: 13.

more effective than the previous periods, the use of iron armours and weapons used by the binomial. Even the jackboots were an improvement detail that was crucial in the mountain or muddy terrains, the Assyrian cavalrymen were also the first one to understand that the cavalry units could become heavier and more aggressive in battle because of their weight.

The Sennacherib's *LÚpētḫallu* or *ša pētḫallu*[712] (cavalryman) was known to be distinguished using weapons that characterised each squadron within the cavalry regiment, like the mounted archers, the mounted spearmen and bodyguards as they were heavy and light. The Sennacherib's cavalryman had this "modern" similarities to what it known as the late roman or medieval knights, what drives most of the times many scholars to referred in an anachronical way that the cavalry only truly appeared in the late 8th century.

Because this Assyrian cavalry unit was equipped with iron, had an intrinsic relation with his horses (which composed the binomial) with professional *status militaris*. They also had a primarily role in battle, as well as a very strong structural hierarchy, etc. This theme will be better developed in the next topic.

[712] The etymology of the designation *LÚpētḫallu* or *ša pētḫallu* comes from the Hittite language and from the Babylonian text, as far as its accrued to refer about it really sense, but certainly means "messenger" rather than "mounted warrior". On the other hand, since 10th century the concept of *cavalier* change itself during the formation of the Assyrian Empire and its military campaigns, for a more warlike sense, the numerous contexts obliged a more utterly distinguished terminology. The early sense given to an "mounted messenger" changed within the Assyrian language. So, in the Sargon II's reign, it was given a different name – to express the many characteristics that existed between both – the nomenclature used in Assyrian was *LÚkallāpu* to refer to the "mounted messenger" and *LÚpētḫallu* or *ša pētḫallu* to the "cavalryman" (see DALLEY 1985: 37).



Figure 3: This is a representation of the Assyrian cavalry charging the enemy dating the reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II (ca.865-860 BCE). The cavalry was already known. This representation comes from a gypsum wall relief from the North-West Palace (Room B, panel 9) at Nimrud (called Kalḫu in the modern-day Iraq), however, currently housed in the British Museum, London.

3.3 Assyrian Cavalry: *Status Militaris* and *Modus Operandi*

As it was possible to understand by the chronological timeline adopted for this Dissertation and from the early topic, as well as by frequent references along in the discussed topics aborded will now be fulfilled. The essence of the Assyrian cavalry characteristics is a theme purposeful that was left to the end, imperatively the *status militaris*, the professionalization, and *modus operandi* in battle.

The problematization about this theme leaves a lot of questions that need to be answered to determinate the little details about the hierarchical structure of the Assyrian cavalry and its reforms. So, the disturbing questions are the following, how numerous was the cavalry regiments? How hierarchically structured was the cavalry? How did the military recruitment for the Assyrian cavalry work? When did the Assyrian cavalry acquire his *status militaris*? Had the cavalry professionalization a direct or indirect impact on the Assyrian army? How the cavalry tactical comportment/*modus operandi* in the theatre of battle was shown? Was the poly-ethnicity within the Assyrian army and cavalry corps a reality? And in what way? And finally, how and when is licit to really discuss the cavalry structure?

Hence, in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I as it was already discussed, the cavalry corps shared the hierarchical structure and *modus operandi* with the war chariot regiments, till the reign of Sennacherib. Futhermore, the pertinence of the reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II that at last stabilized the Assyrian kingdom, allowed a more conducive structural reforms specially in the army.

The relevance of Aššurnaṣirpal II's reforms within the Assyrian army began by the creation of *kiṣir šarri* (king's unit), referring it as well to a permanent *kiṣir šarrūti* (royal corps). This royal corps was directly under the command of the king. As it is culturally known Mesopotamian mental structure was regulated by a decimal system, so, the royal cavalry corps perhaps contain approximately 1000 cavalrymen. As Tamás Dezső referred that:

> "[…] the Assyrians were probably not the only people who used horsemen in their armies, but most probably they were the first to organise regular

> cavalry units and use them as an independent arm"[713]. Then, the Aššurnaṣirpal II cavalry was the first regular cavalry known. This regular cavalry known as *ANŠE.pét-ḫal* (bodyguard cavalry) that were depicted in the Aššurnaṣirpal II's palace reliefs in two distinguished types[714], the *ṣāb kabābi* (lancers) and the *ṣāb qašti* (archers).

The Aššurnaṣirpal II's cavalry *modus operandi* in battle it's the same that came from the 12th century, from the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, they fought in pairs[715]. This typology of cavalry fighting is frequently represented in both types of cavalry corps; for example, the mounted archer is shooting and his *ṣāb azmarî* (partner) protect with the shield. An important, and maybe decisive improvement in Ancient Near Eastern knowledge was that, like the Stephanie Dalley well referred: "Horses were not shod at this date"[716]. And in this period the cavalry still not fights in formation, but in teams as a corps.

In the reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II the poly-ethnicity within the cavalry regiment was, as far as it's known only from Assyrians. The representations only denote and referred to the Assyrian people, even in the *Annals* were not mentioned other ethnic groups related to the cavalry.

According to with the annalistic inscriptions as well as the descriptions of Aššurnaṣirpal II's battles was exalted, essentially the *modus operandi* of the cavalry corps as it were referred in the battling episode with the *āl šarrūti*[717] (royal city) of Zamru. The Zamua territory was mountainous one, the ruler Ameka tried to protect his city Zamru. The *Annals* of Aššurnaṣirpal II mentioned that the Assyrian monarch crossed the River Lallû, and marched through the Mount Etinu, on a harsh terrain for

[713] DEZSŐ 2012: 148.
[714] FRAHM (ed.), DALLEY 2017: 526.
[715] About the problematic battling disposition and *modus operandi* of the Assyrian horseman fighting in pairs, it's a question that have till now any evidence that the fighting in earlier times had happen in other form. Although, every Assyriologist, Military historians and Archaeologist simply assume – based on the Assyrian iconography – that the Assyrian cavalry *modus operandi* was like it appeared in the reliefs (see DALLEY 1985: 37; NOBLE 1990: 63-64; O'CONNELL 1995: 122; DEZSŐ 2012: 14).
[716] FRAHM (ed.), DALLEY 2017: 527.
[717] IKEDA 1979: 76.

the war chariot regiments and *LÚ.zuku* (infantry). The Assyrian army tried to reach the city of Zamru but instead sacked the surrounding areas, as it was referred in the *Annals*:

> "I removed from the mountain his (Ameka's) property, possessions, many bronze utensils, bronze tubs, bronze casserole(s), bronze bowls, bronze tureens, the treasure of his palace, (and) his store house. Returning to my camp I spent the night"[718].

After the earnt rest of Aššurnaṣirpal II returns to action immediately with other strategy that didn't involve climbing the mountain, so, as it was *praxis militaris* within the Assyrian approach to war, he sieged "from the foot of the Mount Elaniu"[719]. It is mentioned in the Aššurnaṣirpal II's *Annals* referred explicitly that: "I deprived him of his horses", which means that the siege tactics had the goal to totally cut off any attempt to escape. Therefore, Ameka tried to climb the Mount Sabua in attempt to flee from the sieged that was settled on the bottom of the mountain.

Consequently, Aššurnaṣirpal II had a bold and long-term strategy that allowed the destruction of several surrounding cities from the region of Zamua, as it was described in the *Annals*:

> "I razed, destroyed, (and) burnt the cities Zamru, Arasidku, Ammaru, Parsindu, Iritu, Suritu, his fortified cities, together with 150 cities in the environs of his (region). I turned (them) into ruin hills"[720].

Aššurnaṣirpal II and his army waited before the plains of the city of Parsindu to ambush the Ameka's troops that tried to flee or even counterattack the Assyrian siege. Thus, he sends the cavalry and the light infantry troops. The cavalry of Aššurnaṣirpal II most likely had a preponderant role in the imminent confront, the

[718] RIMA 2, p. 206, 1 ii 64-65a.
[719] RIMA 2, p. 207, 1 ii 68.
[720] RIMA 2, p. 207, 1 ii 68-69.

Annals descriptions mentions that just count only in this conflict 50 enemies' deaths. The punishments were applied by the Assyrian terror standards as it was mentioned:

> "I cut off their heads (and) hung (them) on trees of the courtyard of his palace. I captured 20 soldiers alive (and) spread (them) out in the wall of his palace"[721].

It's important to mention that in the period reign of Aššurnaṣirpal II the Assyrian army still used the bronze weaponry – despite contemplating the Iron Age from an academic historiographical and archaeological perspective. It seems like a contradiction but it's a logical move, since the use of iron took centuries to fully being used by all the civilized people of the Ancient Near East, Anatolia and Oriental Mediterranean regions. The Assyrian bronze equipment was gradually changed by the successive reforms and economically *status quo* from each and subsequent period.

So, the cavalrymen of Aššurnaṣirpal II are represented by riding in pursuit of the enemy, with the rider seated with his knees drawn up and his heels pressed back[722], it's an old way to ride and an unstable posture, with only resource of stability while ridding being the stirrup. Mounting a horse would have been particularly unstable, but by the time of Tiglath-pileser III's reign it's possible to observe the differences between the representations. As it was already discussing earlier, the stirrup may have existed in various materials maybe leather or rope.

The *unūt tāhāzi* (military equipment) like the armours were of bronze and scales as it appeared in the Assyrian bas-reliefs. Still, the cavalry regiment had few distinct characteristics like the hemispherical helmet from the lancer's corps and a rounded bronze shield and a spear, on the other hand, the mounted archers used a pointed helmet and a bow.

The representations reveal that there is a predominance of the use of the bow in the cavalry. As Amy E. Barron referred that the "Ashurnasirpal II's cavalry is also

[721] RIMA 2, p. 207, 1 ii 72a.
[722] *SAAB* IV/1: 63.

shown bearing round shields which appear to be a little larger in size than those on the Balawat Gates"[723]. Therefore, it's imperative to emphasize the necessary and crucial will of the Assyrians monarchs to constantly income of horses by a form of taxation, tributes and other imposts over all the conquered territories that were imperious to secure.

In the reign of Šalmaneser III however, from the ethnic perspective, this wasn't altered as far as the historians, anthropologist, and archaeologists represented in the inscriptions from the Imgur-Enlil/Balawat Gates[724]. Consequently, the *Annals* of Šalmaneser III didn't mention any foreigner auxiliar units, which means that the *KUR.Aš-šur.KI-a-a*[725] (the Assyrians) were the predominant ethnic group within the Assyrian army, primarily in the cavalry regiment.

As stated in the *Annals* of Šalmaneser III, it's possible to emphasize the fact that the Assyrian army acts and is represented categorically by the actions of the king, and thus, there is an excessive personalization in the figure of king. This centralized and personalized attitude wasn't so evident in other previous Assyrian monarch reigns, i.e., a strong autocratic attitude and policy.

The cavalry only appeared explicitly mentioned when Šalmaneser III during a campaign captured a city and from the spoils of war he acquired the enemy's war chariots, teams of horses, cavalry, and other spoils. Nevertheless, the *Annals* clearly show the intentions of Šalmaneser III and the consequences of a military strategy, when he deprived the use of the enemy's cavalry and war chariots which were previously captured.

Hence, to better comprehend Šalmaneser III's reign and the cavalry role it's imperative to establish an intertextuality between the Imgur-Enlil Gates inscriptions and iconography and the *Annals*. The Imgur-Enlil inscriptions male known that the horses and the soldiers unproportionally represented primarily the horse is incredibly small, the artist clearly had difficulties with the proportions. The details show incongruencies between the early and later representations, the inscriptions and the

[723] BARRON 2010: 124.
[724] KUAN 2016: 22-27.
[725] FALES 2016: 190.

sculptures, as well as from the infantryman and the cavalryman. The cavalry military equipment didn't suffer any relevant transformation.

In fact, in more attentive consideration the campaign towards Ḫamath was the clearest example of the Šalmaneser III's cavalry strategic role in the Near Eastern warfare. So, in the 11th[726] regnal year (ca.849 BC) Šalmaneser III fought for the third time 12 or 15 kings of the seashore. But in his 14th regnal year Šalmaneser III gathered approximately, as it is referred in the *Annals*, an army of 120,000[727] troops and march till it was possible to cross the Euphrates. The number of Assyrian troops seems to be a little exaggerated, however, this historiographical mentality was important to reference that the enemies were always unproportionally more in scale three to one.

Again, the objective of this 11th regnal year Syrian campaign was to annihilate the constant re-emerging of coalition of the Ḫamathite Irḫulēnu, the Damascene Hadad-ezer/Adad-idri and the 12 or 15 kings of the seashore. The most interesting thought is that they gathered more troops that the Assyrians, as it was usual in the propagandistic, political, historical texts that marked the descriptions of any battle in the Ancient World.

The upper registers of the Imgur-Enlil Gates of Šalmaneser III (Plates LXXII-LXXIV)[728] were divided into three parts. It's possible to observe in the bas-reliefs as in the inscriptive subtitles about the campaign towards Ḫamath that the narrative includes a scene with the Assyrian cavalry and war chariots chasing the Ḫamathite soldiers. In this inscription most of the Ḫamathite's war chariot were represented fleeing and passing across the walled city Aštammaku. Nonetheless, it also shows the Assyrian war chariot and cavalry attacked by all sides, specially by the flanks where both the regiments were split in two and advance simultaneously in a coordinated attack (Plate LXXII).

The siege involved the Assyrian infantry climbing over the city's wall of Aštammaku with a scaling-ladders (Plate LXXV), protected by archers that were shooting from a distance and they were also protected by war chariots, where Šalmaneser III appeared represented (Plate LXXIV). It's a dramatic scene for the

[726] RIMA 3, p. 105, 29 12b-20.
[727] RIMA 3, p. 47, 8 45´.
[728] KING (ed.) 1915: 34.

Ḫamathite forces and was demonstrate the capacity of the Assyrian cavalry and Šalmaneser III's long-term strategy, the capturing of Aštammaku city was just an episode. In a total of eighty-six/nine cities that were capture all in the Ḫamath region.

In the bas-reliefs of Imgur-Enlil from the reign of Šalmaneser III represented the Ḫamathite prisoners and described the enormous number of spoils of war including horses (Plates LXXIV-LXXVII)[729]. The terminology is *ekēmu*, as the Assyriologist Shiego Yamada properly translate like "to take way (by force)"[730]. However, the references from this particular year from the reign of Šalmaneser III, this dramatic episode is referred in the *Annals*:

> "I captured, razed, destroyed, (and) burned the city Aštammaku (Abtammaku), together with eighty-nine (other) cities. At that time [Hadad]-ezer (Adad-idri), the Damascene, (and) Irḫulēnu, the Ḫamatite, together with twelve kings of the land Ḫatti on the shore of the sea, trusted in their united forces (and) I fought with them (and) defeated them. I put to the sword their fighting men"[731].

Yet, it is in the Tiglath-pileser III's reign that the Assyrian cavalry had the most drastic reforms, as Duncan Noble referred, "Light cavalry has always turned into heavy cavalry, particularly immediately after a war"[732]. The Tiglath-pileser III's cavalry was shown to distinguish ways armoured and unarmoured and the horses wore any armour, as far as it possible to appeared represented. The cavalry fought in pairs, as it demands the ancient Assyrian military tradition, even though one of the reforms that is particularly significative was that the cavalry fought in pairs and in battle formations. The iconography was indeed useful to better explain the concept in which the cavalry *modus operandi* would have in battle.

The Tiglath-pileser III's iconography gave a special focus to the lancers/spearman cavalry corps because it was the first cavalry force to be represented

[729] Idem *ibidem*: 34.
[730] YAMADA 2000: 228.
[731] RIMA 3, p. 76, 16 75´-81´.
[732] *SAAB* IV/1: 64.

armoured. So, the military equipment of the armoured cavalry differed from the unarmoured cavalry. Then, the armoured cavalry military equipment suffered a few adjustments, the scale-armour[733] had an additional piece a kilt that reached to the knee. The cavalry lancer's corps were represented with a long spear, which allowed the observation of the *modus operandi* of the cavalry as a light. All known representations of the Tiglath-pileser III's cavalry are barefoot.

The differences were minimal in the cavalry representations, i.e., Tamás Dezső referred as: "relatively homogenous"[734]. The differences were more visible, as well as the references from the latest period of the Tiglath-pileser III's reign. However, the representations of cavalry lancer's corps were, according to with Tamás Dezső[735], a total 6 cavalrymen were represented what translates to an approximated 4,4% of all the inscriptions. The war chariot still was an important regiment in this period, even though any war chariot curiously appeared represented in the Tiglath-pileser III's sculptures.

The lack of detailed sources of information about the Tiglath-pileser III's cavalry made known that many times some reforms were attributed to the reign of Sargon II and maybe some cavalry reforms that had taken place earlier. Plus, the lack of archaeological material and documental artifacts doesn't contribute to a view of the full picture or even a more detailed comprehension of his reforms, as well as the articles and studies in this matter.

Then, the Tiglath-pileser III's cavalrymen are represented with a more stable posture, which means that there may have been a very relevant reform, an innovation that allowed to add more weight and the better method of development of the heavy cavalry. The lancer's cavalry corps represented without bow and a long spear and the rider with his legs stretched out – most probably provided using a stirrup – marked a turning point within the Assyrian cavalry. In fact, this development may have been the first step to a more incisive and tactical use of the cavalry in battle.

However, the Tiglath-pileser III's cavalry need to acquire a hierarchical structure that allowed a more autonomous corps in the battlefield, even with all the

[733] BACKER 2011: 7-8.
[734] DEZSŐ 2012: 21.
[735] DEZSŐ 2012: 154.

reforms the cavalry still fought in pairs and with the war chariots. Consequently, the most innovating reform within the cavalry corps was the constitution of a company of ten cavalrymen, commanded by the *emanthulu*/*LÚ.GAL 10* (Chief of Ten), equipped with scaled-armours. The best cavalrymen that fought both ways were dispatched for the King's Guard, equipped with the inherent panoply.

Thus, the genesis of cavalry training was based on a team composed of a lancer (who used a shield) and an archer[736] forming a pair which, in turn, integrated with five more teams of two elements. Thus, it was a creation of a solid base of training and hierarchy. Though the aggregation of 5 pairs forms a platoon, to later be added to 5 more platoons, forming one company of 50 horsemen, there being a Chief of Fifty who commanded a company. Still, there were the Chiefs of Hundred who commanded a battalion, that is, two companies of 50 horsemen i.e., a *kiṣru* (cohort), who answered all these Chiefs, to a *rab kiṣir ša pitḫalli*[737] (Captain of Cavalry). Although, this is the hierarchical base of the Assyrian cavalry, which lasted until the Achaemenid Persian period, with a cavalry regiment of 1000 horsemen[738].

Then, the creation of smaller cavalry detachments, maybe an equivalent to the roman imperial *turma*[739]. These aggregations of horsemen had the special function to secure some areas to patrol and this small cavalry detachment were given to the cohort command officer within the Ten, the *rab kiṣir ša pitḫalli* (Cavalry Captain). This cavalry Captain's had a distinctive hairdressing "Eunuch"-style[740], which was visually is easy to be recognized, specially by the similarities to an "Eunuch" that were high officials of the king. About the reforms of Tiglath-pileser III Fabrice De Backer referred as: "In this respect, one could compare the military reforms of Tiglath-pileser III with the creation of the *Compagnies d'Ordonnance* of Charles VIIth of France, to reinforce the loyalty of soldiers, against their loyalty to the dangerous Neo-Assyrian aristocracy and lower the costs of the standing army"[741].

[736] SCURLOCK 1997: 494.
[737] BACKER 2014: 24.
[738] DEZSŐ 2012: 50-51.
[739] SPEIDEL 2005: 133.
[740] The similar in appearance of these cavalry officials to the administrative high-ranking officials of the Assyrian king are puzzling to the eyes of strangers to these Ancient Near Eastern World, but even to the scholars it's difficult to distinguish them.
[741] BACKER 2014: 25.

Yet, in order to sustain this constant need of horse income – for better and bigger horses – and to respond an increased number of military effectives that composed the cavalry and war chariots regiments. The Assyrians during the Middle Assyrian Period had a system of recruitment so-called *ilku* (labour services). This recruitment system had for its primarily idea "land for service" – this mentality perdure for centuries – which connects the political centralized power of the Assyrian king and all the provinces of empire. Furthermore, beneath of this legal and civil obligation occurred another system of recruitment the *šukurrum*[742] or *ṣab šarri*[743] (military service).

Therefore, the recruitment system that conjures the military service is the most pertinent for the present question, as far as it is known in the provincial armies and even to the standing professional Assyrian army resort to this system. It would system feed itself from the various areas of economic income from the "four conners of the empire". The mass deportations, the enslaved system, the recent conquered peoples and lands, the spoils of war, the commercial transactions, the important goods, and even from the proprietary citizens ("nobles"). All these factors permitted an increase of troops, including to the cavalry regiments. As Mario Liverani referred about the *ilku*-system for the standing Assyrian army:

> "[…] the *ilku*-system which applied both to the heartland and to the provinces: everyone was required to serve, perhaps seasonally, whether in civic works or in the army, or else to provide a substitute"[744].

Consequently, the human resources were provided to the cavalry regiment troops from the provinces as well as horses, and in the Tiglath-pileser III's reign occurred the recruitment of officers for the bodyguard cavalry that were englobed in this *ṣab šarri*.

[742] FRAHM (ed.), DALLEY 2017: 522.
[743] LIVERANI 2014: 503.
[744] FRAHM (ed.), DALLEY 2017: 526.

In this sense, to have a more objective and clear idea the inscriptions appointed to a number that approximately may had been the total of effectives troops that had the Assyrian army, that were ten thousand to twenty thousand[745] only in 9th century. Then, its licit to understand that the Tiglath-pileser III's cavalry had a preponderant role, as well as a progressively increasing *modus operandi* in the military campaigns. The Assyrian army had developed the extent arm to became more aggressive, more flexible, faster, versatile, cheaper, light and heavy – the cavalry corps.

Due to this reality, during the expansion campaigns principally after ca.745 BC progressively integrate other ethnical groups toward the recruitment of auxiliary troops within the Assyrian army became more and more frequent. The ethnicity within the Assyrian army complexifies itself and changes essentially in the province garrisons, two types of systems within the army constituting a professional and semi-professional. As Tamás Dezső referred:

> "The army of the first phase of the Empire (till 745 B.C.) was the army of the expansion, while in the second phase (after 745 B.C.) it reflected the expansion and integration of conquered peoples"[746].

So, Tiglath-pileser III tried to achieve stability in his conquered territories needed to firstly resolve the Babylonic problem, this southern frontier its of extremely importance not just because of the shared culture but by the economic income and market. Babylonia wasn't just a city or a mere conquered region, the Babylonic culture influence within the Assyrian culture and past is clear and overwhelming for the Assyrians. The Tiglath-pileser III's ambition was already discussed, but the Babylonic (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri reign deserved three long years of war with the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III.

During the 17th *palû* (ca.729 BC, the 16th year) of the Tiglath-pileser III's reign the rebelled Babylonic king (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri (ca.731-729 BC) assumed the kingship of Babylonia, immediately after the defeated Babylonic Chaldean Dynasty. (Nabû)-

[745] LIVERANI 2014: 503.
[746] DEZSŐ 2012: 164.

mukīn-zēri rebelled against the weak and ephemeral Babylonic king Nabû-šuma-ukīn II which permitted him to reclaim the throne of Babylonia. As it appears described in the Babylonic Chronicles:

> "ITI II UD [$^{meš(?)}$ $^{(m)}$*Šu*]*ma*-[*úkîn*] *šarru-ut Bābìli*^{ki} *īpuš*[^{uš}] / For one mouth and two days (Nabu)-[shu]ma-ukin (II) ruled Babylon"[747].

At the same time, the (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri's actions came to the attention of the Assyrian monarch Tiglath-Pileser III, who was campaigning in Syria against the rebelled city of Damascus. The three further years of the Tiglath-pileser III's reign were dedicated to pursuing the supporters (maybe Elamites) of (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri till he could assume the throne and crown of Babylonia.

Yet, the war and the pursuing for (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri had already begun, although, a report written to Assyrian monarch Tiglath-pileser III from the Babylonian battlefront about the (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri's rebellion (ca.731 BC) mentioned the Assyrian cavalry. Still, the report mentioned that an Assyrian army unit composed by three war-chariot, a stated number of cavalry and five hundred archers commanded by a *šandabakku* official[748] had marched towards Babylon.

Another report (Plate XVIII, ND. 2499) from the rebellion battlefront mentioned that a *gudūdu* (military detachment) of the *rab šāqê* (Chief Cupbearer) Aššur-ēṭir was received in Calaḫ, and were composed by "*Side B. (I) 3 GIŠ.GIGIR (2) 20 pit-ḪAL (3) 100? a-ri-tu (4) 50 BAN? (5) 50 KAL? (6)* ^{uru}*kal-ḫa*/(Side B) note of 3 chariots, 20 riding horses[749] and 100? shields, 50 bows? 50?..... (received in?) Calaḫ"[750].

These reports evidenced the role of the Assyrian cavalry *modus operandi* and his directly participation in the various missions that were needed during time of the

[747] *ABC* 1, p. 72, 17.
[748] SAGGS 1952: 28.
[749] As it was already discussed *pitḫalu* clearly means "cavalry" even though Barbara Parker translated as "riding horses".
[750] PARKER 1961: 36.

Babylonic rebellion. As it appears, the Assyrian king received warning reports too, probably from some cavalry patrols commanded by a *rab kiṣir ša pitḫalli* (Cavalry Captains) or even spies. For example, as Tamás Dezső referred about:

> "Another letter mentions an enemy contingent of 250 horsemen and [...] infantry, gathered to attack Assyrian forces in Babylonia during the Mukin-zēr rebellion in 731 B.C."[751].

Therefore, Tiglath-pileser III sent envoys to Babylonia, trying politically gain the thrust of the people and to a peaceful outcome of this shank situation, promising amnesty and a privileged status, as well as with discharge of taxations and *corvée* imposts. But the Babylonians refused this generous offer[752]. Then, after this incomprehensible refuse Tiglath-pileser III took the liberty to advanced further into Babylonic territory hunting for (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri, nonetheless, he wasn't in Babylon but in Sapê/Šapīya. The Assyrian army reached the rebelled Babylonic monarch in ca.729 BC besieging the city, as it was the Assyrian *praxis militaris*, and the *Annals* described:

> "I confined Mukīn-zēri of (the land Bīt) Amukāni (lit. "son of Amukāni") to Sapê (Šapīya), his royal city. I inflicted a heavy defeat upon him before his gates"[753].

However, apparently (Nabû)-mukīn-zēri resisted approximately one year (till ca.728 BC), despite of the fact that he was defeated by Tiglath-pileser III. So, after the eradication the Babylonic rebel king Tiglath-pileser III became the first Assyrian to be officially recognized Chronographically. In addition, Tiglath-pileser III assumes the

[751] DEZSŐ 2012: 52.
[752] BEAULIEU 2018: 196-197.
[753] RIMA 3, p. 119, 47 23b.

title as "king of Babylon"[754] and Assyria at the same time, as it descripted in the Babylonic Chronicles:

> "The third year of Mukīn-zēri, Tiglath-pileser went down to Babylonia (Akkad), ravaged Bit-Amukani and captured Mukīn-zēri. Mukīn-zēri reigned three years over Babylon. Tiglath-pileser ascended the throne of Babylon"[755].

An opportunity that makes Tiglath-pileser III a king with two crowns, and one of the most powerful men of time, where were united two kingdoms and the birth of the Mesopotamian culture and civilization.

Hence, Sargon II grew up with his father's legacy and learnt how to strengthen the Assyrian Empire. Consequently, the reforms within the cavalry regiments were much more significative in the reign of Sargon II, as well as the size of the cavalry regiments increase exponentially, especially the bodyguard cavalry. The Assyrian cavalry regiments reached the one thousand[756] effectives, but the Assyrian army at the high point of the imperial period may reached to ten thousand or fifteen thousand[757] cavalrymen.

From the Sargon II's reign exited a significative number of representations in the bas-reliefs representing cavalry are approximately total of 9,4%[758]. Compared to the number of representations of the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, there was an increase. As it was *praxis* in the Assyrian iconographical representations the cavalry was represented fought in pairs[759], even in the reign of Sargon II. The cavalry was represented unarmoured, with a long lance, a bow[760], a quiver, a sword and a pointed

[754] BEAULIEU 2018: 197.
[755] *ABC* 1, p. 72, 19-23.
[756] DEZSŐ 2016: 173.
[757] Idem *ibidem*: 174.
[758] DEZSŐ 2012: 19.
[759] NADALI 2010: 128.
[760] However, the mounted archer also had a fundamental role within the cavalry regiment, even though the representation preferred to essential represent the lancers corps. The mounted archer already the so-called the Parthian shot – is instead an Assyrian shot – was a shot in pursing that happen when a mounted

helmet. Sargon II brought the standardization[761] of the cavalry iconographical representations, with especial preference by the cavalry lancers corps.

Sargon II gave great importance to the cavalry – so much that his royal personal guard was a *kitullu perru* (cavalry regiment) commanded by his twin brother Sîn-aḫu-uṣur – that escorted the king very closely and for everywhere. Then, the hierarchical structure and in the nomenclature of the cavalry regiments suffered some alterations.

They were primarily divided in the small groups of the cavalry like the *pētḫalli šēpē* (personal guard) – maybe approximated to the roman *turmae praetoriae*[762]. It's possible that there was a unit or maybe regiment of *pētḫal qurubte* cavalry, there is no collusive hypothesis about the definition and sense of sources. A slight reference is needed to the better understanding of the chain of command in the cavalry corps, thus, the cavalry team commander/officer was called as *rab urâte* and the cavalry cohort commander was called as *rab kiṣir*.

Some of the nomenclature about the differences in the cavalry regiments in the Sargon II's sources – the *Annals*, the Nimrud Horse Lists or even in the inscriptions – are still unclear today. On the other hand, for sure it's known that the *pētḫal qurubte* is the Assyrian name from the Sargonide period to the regular cavalry bodyguard unit which the number of effectives were one thousand[763] cavalrymen. The *pētḫal qurubte*[764] cavalry could form in two similar battle formations during the Sargon II's reign which were particularly innovative. The Sargonic cavalry could form in two wings *qurbūtu imitti* (right wing bodyguard) and the *qurbūtu ša šumēli* (left wing bodyguard), they were one of each side of the king – what I call the "wings of Sargon".

The *modus operandi* of the cavalry during the Sargon II's reign had a strictly and highly important way, as it was Assyrian *praxis militaris* the cavalry engaged essentially in raids, cavalry skirmishes[765], ambushes and flanking tactics in open fields

archer turns backward to shoot the enemy that tried to pursue him (see LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1987: 138; SCURLOCK 1997: 495).

[761] LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1987: 138.

[762] SPEIDEL 2005:15, 18.

[763] Idem *ibidem*: 6-7.

[764] DEZSŐ 2012: 29.

[765] MELVILLE 2016: 194.

battles. These reforms were possible also observed in some equestrian innovations[766] like the breed of horses, the method of harassing with the import of foreigner experts.

It was already mentioned above the royal roads during the reign of Sargon II, it's possible to mention more in-depth another intriguing question about the supply chain logic in the Assyrian provincial territories during the military campaigns. One of the clearest sources about this matter is a letter from an Assyrian official called Ṭāb-ṣil-Ēšarra to Sargon II which evidenced the provision of grain for horses and the cavalrymen.

The letter doesn't specify the route taken, the cavalry regiment probably stopped in some *bēt mardēti* (waystations), villages, and cities before reaching the meeting point in Kār-Aššur. Probably to gather for a military campaign, as Tamás Dezső[767] puts the hypothesis to the Media region.

This Assyrian official referred the details about the grain supply inventory and the difficulties to feed horses and soldiers that need to rest and being fed. Possibly, since there were a numerous cavalry regiment and the supplies in one provincial city, village, or a *bēt mardēti* weren't sufficient. So, the forces were divided as it described in the letter (ABL 97):

> "To the king, my lord: your servant Ṭab-ṣill-Ešarra. Good health to the king, my lord! May Aššur and Mullissu bless the king, my lord! As to what the king, my lord, wrote to me: "Suppose you are staying at home, how do you feed (your horses)?"
>
> Half of my horses are fed in the Barhalza province, the other half eat at the [... of the ci]ty of *Issete* in the *domestic quarters* of [...]; my cavalry [and...are *sta*]*tioned* in the tax collection centre of the province of [...]. Their [....."[768].

[766] ELAYI 2017: 251.
[767] DEZSŐ 2016: 189.
[768] *SAA* I: 88-89.

Therefore, the number of sources from Sargon II's reign about these rare little details permitted to have a more extensive understanding of the logistical proceedings before, during and after a military campaign. An army that rests and is well fed can be more effective in war, as Tamás Dezső referred "The Assyrians used every opportunity to feed their horses […]"[769].

This royal road system was transversal to all conners of the Empire granted that any march of the Assyrian army occurred faster, with minimum of conditions and would get to any province, region, and territory under the Assyrian control. Hence, the most interesting fact it's the perseverance and care of the Assyrian policy to the army. By the time of Sargon II's reign the army was mostly and already professional, standing army that had a *status militaris*.

A professionalized army in the Assyrian Empire is comprehended as a full-time job, where an individual that had a profession that was remunerated by his career and years of service. For example, a soldier was recruited for a profession to integrate the army who will serve all years and where he was necessary to be dispatched. The troop that is evident in which better fit in this context is the *kiṣir šarrūti* (royal corps) was a full-time professionalized military unit. Yet, the professional troops were the core of the Assyrian army, that correspond to the bodyguard units and the standing cities units and an considered as a homogenous army.

Although, the cavalry units had a special treatment because of the binomial relation, so, it depends where they came from and how good was the relation between the horse and the men. As it was referred brilliantly by Tamás Dezső:

> "[…] since their special relationship with their horses (who needed an all-year-round care) could not rive the animals from the men"[770].

Still, the semi-professional soldier was composed by the provincial units (for example the governor's entourage were part professionals part semi-professionals),

[769] DEZSŐ 2016: 190.
[770] DEZSŐ 2016: 8.

mainly by the king's men. Then, the core of the semi-professional armies was composed by masters of archery and spearmen, shepherds (specially from the Arameans tribesmen), deportees and captives, that constitute the auxiliary troops. These semi-professional units were normally a part-time[771] job, which means that depends on the need were recruited or integrated in the provincial units.

Therefore, there also existed the non-professional soldiers which correspond to the local troops, some enlisted captives or deported peoples. They composed the local ranks and most of time were integrated in the army, which may had propitiated the increasing of status within the army to a semi-professional unit after successive years in campaign.

The Assyrians created the basis of another economy of war level definition that constantly turns around towards the effort of war, and the persistent extent of the empire borders. The *status militaris* was an inevitable condition to this army which secured the permeance of service and progressively career within the army's hierarchy.

So, the quality of the troops was reflected by the level of professionalization and this *status militaris* also constituted a social status which meaning that an Assyrian military had a respectable position within the Assyrian society[772]. For example, some of the semi-professional auxiliary troops were ^{LÚ}*itu'āyu*/Itu'ean archers and the ^{LÚ}qurrāyu/Qurrean's spearmen considered by Assyrians as premium[773] forces within the ranks of the army. Even though it wasn't an issue if they were from a distinctive ethnic group, who owned the respect by the admirable service done in benefit of the Assyrian Empire.

Nonetheless, the cavalrymen benefit from the war economy too. They were paid in order to give the possibility for soldiers to buy their own horses, receiving twenty Manû (Mine), which means that were able to buy a horse for one Mine each. However, due to the fact that the spoils from the military campaigns allowed the abundance of horse trade. This leads to drop of the prices to buy a horse meant that they were relatively accessible to a soldier's salary[774]. There is an investment policy

[771] DEZSŐ 2016: 10.
[772] DEZSŐ 2016: 11.
[773] GREKYAN 2010: 85.
[774] DEZSŐ 2016: 179-180.

from the king to streamline the horse trade, thus, having a higher profit for the army, which could buy more horses in lower price.

The most profitable way feed this war economy was to keep investing in military campaigns, like what happened during the Sargon II's reign and after him. The Sargonide cavalry gathered considerable number of spoils of war which permitted to reach the larger numbers of military effectives and professionalized cavalrymen. Consequently, the battle of Mount Uauš was what better described the Assyrian cavalry *modus operandi* in battle, where it's possible to understand the Assyrian war tactics in battle.

Hence, before the battle of Mount *Ú-a-uš*/Uauš/Wauš that took place during the 8th *palû* of Sargon II's reign in a campaign against Ursâ/Rusâ I (ca.719-713 BC, 8th year) from Urarṭu and Mitatti of Zikirtu in ca.714 BC[775] (Sargon II's 8th campaign). This battle had the objective to put an end to the Urartian incursions in the Mannean territory. Then, at the request for help from the Assyrian vassal Ullusunu[776] the king of Mannea to Sargon II proportionate a geopolitical change.

Sargon II was well received by its vassal in his fortress, but at the same time, the king of Assyria had an extremely different temper with the other Mannean king called Mitatti of Zikirtu. Mitatti had allied himself with Rusâ I which had caused a particular tense environment, as well as was considered a provocation attempted. This action perpetrated by Mitatti advanced with an incursion with Urartian troops in Assyrian territory. The *casus belli* were clear, and the Assyrian was inevitable.

Rusâ I confronted directly Sargon II and chose the battle localization obviously in a unfamiliar territory for the Assyrians, with the purpose to demoralize the Assyrian army. This obliged the Assyrian to march towards a rough terrain to control the Mount of Uauš. The Urartian king Rusâ I set his camp in the ravine of Mount Uauš (located near to the Mount Sahend, east of Lake Urmia). The Assyrian army had destroyed and marched extensively distances – approximately five hundred miles – to respond to this

[775] LIVERANI 2014: 490-491.

[776] Sargon II made a slight reference about exquisite horse tributes from king Ullusunu, as "I receive from him this tribute of huge trained horses, […]" (see FOSTER 2005: 794).

Urartian provocation, the fatigue and a demoralized army was patent. So, the ravine of the Mount Uauš was strategically chosen.

The Assyrians had six infantry divisions – as it was *praxis militaris* had named the divisions with Sumerian-Akkadian gods like Adad, Nergal, Ištar, Sîn, Šamaš and Aššur – the cavalry regiment occupied the flanks of army and side of king Sargon II. The "Wings of Sargon II" the cavalry regiment[777] was led by his twin brother, the SUKKAL.MAH/*sukallu dannu* (Grand Vizier)[778] Sîn-aḫu-uṣur. The march was ruth, the ravine was a narrow passage, which meant that the Assyrian divisions only could march one at time and in line, as well as the cavalry regiments.

Rusâ I may have thought that the rough terrain would break the Assyrian moral and any chance for an Assyrian defeat clearly was a presumptuous attitude. To put plainly, the Assyrians were deeply demoralized, and the physical and psychological fatigue had taken a substantial role within the Assyrian army. It wasn't an easy battle for the Assyrians, the battle was *a priori* almost lost.

The Urartian moral wasn't high, and so, the home ground advantage was a fact and major reason for the confidence. Still, Sargon II had many odds against him, and the conjecture wasn't totally favourable for the Assyrian side, so, the best defence is to attack. Due to fact that the Assyrian fatigue was high the army needed some kind of shock therapy.

After the first Assyrian infantry divisions reached the Urartian battle formations Sargon II, didn't wait for the remain divisions to organize the battle line. As it was custom, the gathered forces organized themselves in a battle line formation and had a full view of the enemy forces, and only after that attack in the "classic way". The Assyriologist Sarah Melville appointed the characteristic of the Assyrian march and battle formation:

> "Marching in column into a mountain pass, the army must have been spread over several miles. Subsequent events compel us to believe that in his

[777] DEZSŐ 2012: 23.
[778] DALLEY 1985: 33.

approach to the battlefield Sargon maintained the marching order described early in the campaign"[779].

Therefore, Sargon II ordered to the firsts Assyrian infantry divisions to reach the battlefield to attack[780]. The first infantry divisions were the Adad division, followed by the Nergal division, the Aššur and the Šamaš division. The first two divisions attacked fast and furiously towards the first line of the Urartian defence. The next two infantry divisions that advanced faster to push and break the first and second line of Urartian defence. The Sargon II's *Annals* described this *momentum* graphically:

"I could not relive their fatigue, nor give them water to quench to thirst, nor pitch my tent, nor strength the wall the camp; I could not send my warriors (ahead) nor gathered together my equipment (army), what was right and left could not be brought (turned) to my side, I could not watch the rear. I was not afraid of his masses of troops, I despised his horses, I did not cast a glance at the multitude of his mail-clad(?) warriors"[781].

The cavalry followed, but only after, the four infantry divisions reached the battlefield and were already clashing with the Urartian army. The Assyrian cavalry was crucial in this battle primarily because were used to flank[782] from both sides – like two wings – and destroy the confused and at the time demoralized Urartian army. A few lines from the Sargon's *Annals* perfectly described this magnific episode:

"With my single chariot and the horse(men) who got my side, who never leave (me) either in a hostile or friendly region, the troop, the command of Sîn-aḫu-uṣur, I plunged into his mist like a swift (*lit*. frightful) javelin, I defended him, I turned back his advance; I killed large numbers of his

[779] MELVILLE 2016: 131.
[780] FAGAN, TRUNDLE (ed.) 2010: 83.
[781] *ARAB* 2.154.
[782] SCURLOCK 1997: 500-503.

> (troops), the bodies of his warriors I cut down like millet (?), filling the mountain valleys (with them). I made their blood run down the ravines and precipices like a river, dyeing plain, countryside and highlands red like a royal robe (?)"[783].

The episode clearly described the intent to give some emphasis to the provoked destruction by the Sargon II's cavalry regiment and may even had attacked by distance[784] with the mounted archers and the javelins the Urartian central forces. Then, as JoAnn Scurlock referred "[…] Sargon immediately took the front and centre divisions […]"[785]. The collapse of the Urartian centre was inevitable and a consequence of the *blitzkrieg* warfare strategy of Sargon II. The Sargon II's *Annals* described this *momentum* in a particular hyperbolic and metaphoric expression, who clearly reveals the break of the Urartian centre "[…] like ants in distress […]"[786].

The battle of the Mount Uauš was an outstanding Assyrian victory, and the Sargon II's letter to the god Aššur described the moments before the battle. These important records of the moment in the sense that was already mentioned earlier by João Gouveia Monteiro and Miguel Gomes Martins in his essay of the "Scars of War". So, the letter recorded the scars after the battle of the Mount Uauš about the devastation left behind, as was by the translation of François Thureau-Dangin:

> "Leur récolte, leur fourrage je brûlai. Les magasins (où le grain) était amoncelé j'ouvris: une immense quantité de grain je fis manger à mes troupes"[787].

The Sargon II's Letter to Aššur poetic quality gives over the description on the remaining episodes is very particular and the words carefully used, which

[783] *ARAB* 2.154.
[784] FAGAN, TRUNDLE (ed.) 2010: 91.
[785] SCURLOCK 1997: 499.
[786] *ARAB* 2.155.
[787] "Their harvest, their fodder I burned. The stores (where the grain) were piled up I opened: an immense quantity of grain I made my troops eat" trad. by Nuno Arrais de Castro (see TCL III 186).

demonstrates the distinct attitude of Sargon II when he talks with the god Aššur. These letters were personal and intimate. And finally, to conclude as Josette Elayi beautifully exposed:

> "The eighth campaign of Sargon is well-known from the Annals and other inscriptions, but mainly from his famous letter to "Aššur, father of the gods," probably written by Nabû-šallimšunu, the royal scribe, in which he recounted the events of this campaign in detail. This letter is full of geographic details and written in an unusually rich prose"[788].

Therefore, advancing a bit in the chronology between in the reign of Sennacherib the achieved a relevantly high number of sculptures represent a total of 13,3%[789] in a total of 232 representations of cavalrymen occupied the Assyrian Art during this reign. The representations show that the horses were still represented as unarmoured, but the cavalrymen panoply is same as were wear in the earlier reign of Sargon II.

The cavalrymen had the same panoply were a pointed helmet, a scale armour and only the weaponry differs were represented all the using swords. However, the mounted archers were represented using the bow combined with a quiver and the lancers corps a long lance. The used of iron weapons were already commonly in the Sennacherib's reign, so, the cavalry weaponry[790], as well as of all the army was made of iron. The cavalry officers were represented dismounted wearing a complete weaponry panoply, i.e., with a sword, a bow, a bow case, a lance, and a mace.

The hierarchical structure of the cavalry was incomparable more defined, composed the regular lancer's corps and the regular mounted archer's corps were too represented in his individual *modus operandi*. The armoured cavalry could indicate a reform of Sennacherib which may have had result in a distinct change within the cavalry putting some weight, i.e., the creation of the heavy cavalry[791]. And probably

[788] ELAYI 2017: 134.
[789] DEZSŐ 2012: 20.
[790] LITTAUER, CROUWEL 1987: 138.
[791] DEZSŐ 2012: 20.

may had been separated definitively two arms within the cavalry the armoured and the unarmoured cavalry. The cavalry was the major support arm of the Assyrian infantry and the great weapon of the Assyrian army[792].

The Sennacherib's military reform had one of the most important details that perdure till today in the cavalry regiments, added to the military equipment the jackboots[793]. Yet, the Assyrian horse equipment theme was particularly developed by Tamás Dezső[794] that gives special attention to the representation of the saddlecloth. The was found that existed four types of saddlecloths for horses, represented on palaces bas-reliefs from the Sennacherib and Aššurbanipal reigns.

The most relevant type to this topic is the saddlecloth first type because it was the one that the regular cavalry (lancers and mounted archers) exclusive used. However, the bodyguard cavalry used all the four and maybe the first type only in battle context. This saddlecloth first type had a form of an animal leg and was made by animal skin. Hence, the representation of the Assyrian equipment is clearly distinct from other ethnic groups, in this case the auxiliary troops that were integrated in the Assyrian army.

It was possible to differentiate the Assyrian auxiliary troops just by their equipment, their weaponry and armour. They usually wore a headband trailing down the neck, a tunic, a short kilt, and geometric patterns as well. This means that they were also from another ethnical group, as the Assyrian philology could prove. They were unarmoured, had bow or a spear, a bow quiver, and were represented barefoot and without shield. These characteristics clearly define that the Assyrian auxiliary troops were in comparison as the light infantry contingent.

Some of these characteristics from the auxiliary troops tend to approximate their equipment to the Assyrian panoply, as well as a progressive tendency to *Assyrianized* the foreign troops getting weaponry with more quality. As Davide Nadali refers:

[792] NADALI 2005: 225.
[793] DEZSŐ 2012: 22.
[794] Idem *ibidem*: 24.

> "This would suggest that the auxiliary soldiers with pointed helmets can be considered to all intents and purposes as Assyrians, for they are holding typically Assyrian weapons, metallic tower-shields with bosses and a central support"[795].

So, it's possible to understand the Assyrian tactical thinking about the battle formation and *praxis militaris* in the battlefield. The more common Assyrian battle formation scheme was to put the auxiliar spearmen as frontline, behind them the auxiliary archers and in the rear follow the Assyrian infantry and sometimes the cavalry. Even though the spearmen regiment was always the frontline in battle, as well as in sieges, which means that composed on of the most important role in Assyrian tactical thinking. The bas-reliefs of the Sennacherib's palace about the siege of Lachiš revealed much information about the siege tactics[796] and battle formations, as David Nadali's[797] studied emphasized.

The Sennacherib's reign extent to the from the late 8th century and to the begging of the 7th century. Thus, the Assyriologists mentioned that the Assyrian cavalry had many changes, such as the increasing number of cavalrymen in battlefield. The Assyrian cavalrymen could approximately achieve the five thousand cavalry troops in battle, which means that the Assyrian cavalry had a decisive role in battle. And the Sennacherib's heavy cavalry had definitely was a consequence of the increasing weight in the Ancient Near Eastern Warfare. Even the horse was armoured, obviously not an everyday panoply, maybe wear it only in battle theatre. Clearly, the Assyrian heavy cavalry wasn't used in skirmish, pursuits or even raids, because were ineffective due to their flexibility and weight. Instead, they were used to flank and break through infantry lines or even in direct confront with other cavalry corps.

These heavy cavalry corps were lancers, but the existed the mounted archers in heavy sense, as Tamás Dezső pertinently referred about the similarities with a Greek-Macedonian cavalry "Alexander the Great and the *diadokhoi* for example show a preference for such tactics (Granicus (334 B.C.); Issus (333 B.C.); Gaugamela (331

[795] NADALI 2005: 224.
[796] *SAAB* XVIII: 275.
[797] Idem *ibidem*: 227-228.

B.C.); Raphia (217 B.C.)). In these battles the decisive blow was delivered by a furious charge of the heavy cavalry wheeling onto the rear of the line of the enemy infantry, while the Macedonian phalanx engaged frontally. In these battles the phalanx became one of the many interdependent elements of the armies"[798].

The Assyrian heavy cavalry is the first heavy cavalry recorded in the Military History and the one that give the archetype of what is a heavy cavalry, which was replied towards centuries, although, the essence is the Assyrian cavalry. Then, the Sennacherib's cavalry proved his proficiency in many war theatres during all the eighth military campaigns. Including, in some smaller conflicts like the one that occurred before his 8th campaign (ca.690 BC) towards Babylonia, the conflict in North Arabian Desert against Te'elḫunu[799], the Queen of the Arabs and Ḫazael. Unfortunately, the sources are few and not detailed enough about the role of the cavalry in this conflict.

Yet, Sennacherib had other moments that deserve a close attention analysis about the *modus operandi* of the Assyrian cavalry in battlefield. Although, in the Sennacherib's 4th year reign (ca.701 BC) a coalition of Levantine cities had revolted by instigation of the Israelites and the Egyptian. Sennacherib didn't hesitate to march against the king Lulî of Tyre smashing the rebellion and pacificating the buffer cities and kingdoms[800] between the Assyrian Empire and the borders of Egypt.

The Egyptians had become rather accomplices with the Israelite *lmlk* Hezekiah, which justified the full force attack of Sennacherib's 3rd campaign against the core of all the problems in the Western border, the kingdom of Judah. In a first phase Sennacherib invades the Syrian territory and taking Ṣidqâ and Ashkelon, and marched south in direction to city of Ekron were the pro-Assyrian governor Padî had been overthrown. So, was launched the *casus belli* as the Sennacherib's *Annals* remarkably referenced:

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[798] DEZSŐ 2012: 50.

[799] EPH'AL 1974: 108-11; KAHN 2014: 26; BENNET 2021: 105-112, 215.

[800] The Levantine cities and kingdoms appear described in the Biblical Texts like "Gederot, Bet-Dagon, Naamah and Makkedah: sixteen cities in all, with their villages. Libnah, Ether, Achan, Jiftah, Asenah, Necib, Queila, Aczib, and Marecha: nine cities in all, with their villages. Ekron with its dependent cities and villages; from Ekron to the west, all the neighbouring cities of Ashdod, and their villages; Aždod, with its dependent cities and villages; Gaza, with its dependent cities and its villages, to the torrent of Egypt and the Great Sea, which is its boundary" (see *Josh.*15,41-47).

> "(As for) the governors, the nobles, and the people of the city Ekron who had thrown Padî, their king who was bound by treaty and oaths to Assyria, into iron fetters and had handed him over Hezekiah of the land Judah in the hostile manner, they became frightened on account of the villainous acts they had committed"[801].

Therefore, the Ekron rebels called for aid to the Egyptians after delivered Padî to Hezekiah[802], and for doing so they secured their influence and the opened rebellion against the might of the Assyrian Empire. Instead, Sennacherib and the Assyrian army intercepted the marching Egyptian army near to a city called Eltekeh[803] not far from Ekron. The magnitude about this particular battle was emphasized by Karen Radner when she referred that: "In 701 BC the Assyrian army met Egyptian troops on the battlefield, for the first time since the battle of Qarqar in western in 853 BC"[804]. For this campaign Sennacherib gathered an overwhelming army, so larger that was worthy of reference in the rabbinic literature like the Bavli Talmud:

> "Rabbi Judah said in the name of Rav: Wicked Sennacherib advanced against Israel with 45,000 princes, each enthroned in a golden chariot, accompanied by his ladies and concubines, with 80,000 warriors in coats of mail and 60,000 swordsmen running in front of him and numerous cavalry (b. Sanh. 95b)"[805].

The Assyrian army was extremely numerous – according to the Talmudic text reached the two thousand and six hundred Assyrian troops. Still, the Rabbinic-Talmudic literature specifically referred that the Assyrian cavalry consumed all the

[801] RINAP 3/1 4.42.
[802] 2*Kgs* 18:13, 19:36; *Is* 36:1, 37:37; 2 *Chr* 32:1–23; FRAHM (ed.), FRAHM 2017: 184.
[803] ARMSTRONG, TRUNDLE (ed.) 2019: 49.
[804] RADNER 2012: 475.
[805] KALIMI, RICHARDSON (ed.) 2014: 352.

waters they crossed due to the numerous cavalry regiments, the cavalrymen needed to drink water too, so, were two beings drinking from the same water source.

The Egyptian-Kushite army looked at a terrifying view when they faced the large Assyrian army, thus, the Egyptian-Kushite army defeat[806] was practically inevitable and corroborated accordingly with all the available sources. So, this Eltekeh battle was definitely an open field battle despite of the fact that main sources don't provide any detail about it. Although for sure it wasn't a city's siege because the fact that the Assyrian almost ambushed the Egyptian-Kushite army. Surely Sennacherib attacked immediately the Egyptian-Kushite army – the battle may have been short – due to the absence of details and relevance in the *Annals* description.

In this battle, the role of the heavy Assyrian cavalry would have been a definitive, the devastating impact, the weight allied with the shock tactics would categorically annihilate any force in its way. As the trace of devastation of villages, cities, and kingdoms so they show up, nonetheless, the sources don't have descriptive details about it. Still, the Sennacherib's *Annals* have descriptive sequence of the episode developed:

> "In the plain of the city Eltekeh, they sharpened their weapons while drawing up in battleline before me. With support of (the god) Aššur, my lord, I fought with them and defeated them"[807].

After the defeat of the Egyptian-Kushite army appeared a very interesting political-diplomatic detail about the capture of the *DUMU.MEŠ LUGAL.MEŠ KUR.mu-ṣu-ra-a-a*[808] (Egyptian princes – *lit*. "the sons of the Egyptian kings"). This fact catapulted the Assyrian international diplomacy to another level, and disarmed the Egyptian arrogant and rebelling attitude, as well as the Hezekiah's. Sennacherib had just begun his campaign, which means that the following levels escalated towards the

[806] NA'AMAN 1974: 34; RUSSELL 1991: 160; GALLAGHER 1999: 11; CHAVALAS 2006: 374; YOUNG 2012: 79; ELAYI 2018: 64.
[807] RINAP 3/1 4.44.
[808] RINAP 3/1 4.45.

gates of Jerusalem. And the famous and overwhelming victory in the siege of Lachiš deserved a marvellous description in a room of palace of Nimrud[809].

Sennacherib wouldn't rest till Hezekiah was put under his domain, the Assyrian army marched toward the kingdom of Israel and Judah. The kingdom of Israel was obliterated and was never rebuilt; and the kingdom of Judah were put to its knees and under pressure of the Assyrian political, military and diplomatic control. To conclude, this campaign was so aggressively important that appeared many times described in the Sennacherib's *Annals*, the Bible, the Rabbinic Talmud, Herodotus, or even Flavius Josephus.

Finally, the Assyrian king Sennacherib was a remarkable king, a ruler with an iron fist and could be characterized in many ways as a builder, a reformer, a punisher, a demon. Instead, Sennacherib described himself like other kings after him, as king of four conners of the World, a king of Universe, a king of Sumer and Akkad, king of Babylon or even king of the Arabs. After all, in ca.701 BC Sennacherib[810] just respond to the Hebrew arrogance with a warning, and the heavy cavalry would not leave his side, so, the response was eternalized to all the ones who faced the might of Assyrian Empire, in particular biblical line:

> "[…] the God of Hezekiah will not be able to deliver his people from my power"[811].

[809] D'AGUIAR 2020: 55-87.
[810] FRAHM 2023: 191-213.
[811] 2*Chr*. 32:17.

CONCLUSION

The theme this Dissertation is very difficult to conclude, as any historical study is in fact never concluded. Each one of the problematics already discussed deserved a closer and attentive study. The complexity inherited to any theme was closely considered with a propose to achieve another and better understanding for the contexts, circumstances, idiosyncrasies inhered respectively to each theme. All the studies, articles, sources, and analysis appointed to the reign of Tiglath-pileser I's for the creation of cavalry corps. The conjugation of all the factors from the 14th century to 8th century were difficult to aliened chronologically in a single attentive historical analysis.

These Dissertation had a carefully readding of the many sources, articles, scientific studies in various academic areas which crossing the historical-philosophical, religious-military, anthropological-linguistic, and economic-archaeological evidence. The archaeological studies, artifacts and articles were crucial to this study, as well as the profoundly analysis of the History of Art from the Late Bronze Age to the Early Iron Age. The linguistic nomenclature used is extremely important by the proximity of the linguistic problems and interpretations, which the specialised discussion was crucial and contribute to a more factual and intrinsic crossed many ethno-linguistic groups.

Yet, the level of detail on the various issues addressed was due to an imperative need to complement in depth and rigorous way facing the various historic-philosophical, archaeologic-anthropological issues that have taken place over these three years.

The analysis of practical cases according to the available documentary sources proved to be a necessity throughout this study, especially regarding Iron Age battles and the *modus operandi* of the Assyrian cavalry in these warlike contexts. As once said G. W. F. Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* who pertinently referred that "the periods of happiness are the blank pages of history"[812]. Finally, some hypotheses were presented after thoughtful reflection and some cross-reading, as well as the respective criticisms in a generalized sense and in the specificity of each

[812] HEGEL, HOFFMEISTER, NISBET, FORBES 1975: 79.

prerogative. Therefore, having in this sense the objective of introducing the specificity of the question about the Assyrian cavalry to a level of discussion.

The difficulties and the flaws about this theme are many by the restricted access to more information and studies, but by far are compared to the tremendous and deep analysis made in these three long years which make this Dissertation highly complex. Many aspects about this Dissertation represents the complexity of the theme itself that grows with an analytical thinking that mature with time and the major questions and rough paths that I had to cross.

Yet, it isn't exhausted all the questions or problematic themes that could have been talked about. The Assyrian cavalry and its *modus operandi* are by far the most interesting theme in the Military discussion which could be in any book of Military History.

In this sense *We* have decided to write the present Dissertation in English language with a propose of divulgation and importance of these theme and new approach about Assyrian Warfare. However, that doesn't change the fact this is a work of Portuguese Academy and my contribute to it. The absent of works about the Ancient Near East culture, medicinal, war, society, political, religions, art, and archeologically themes are a big flaw within the Portuguese Academic studies. The few Portuguese studies that I know of and read about that correlated with this theme I tried to bring same light and importance.

In general, I tried to make some connection with the Ancient Near Eastern culture and the Iberian Peninsula during the Late Bronze Age and the Iron Age, because existed. So, the Assyrian weren't so far away. It's the first age of internationalization of known world. And the cavalry invention was so "revolutionary" that spread fast and even directly influenced culturally some people for example like the Scythians. Which for some historians were they that bring the cavalry to the Near Eastern civilizations but as the present Dissertation could proof were the Assyrians that created the cavalry.

To conclude, the Assyrian representations, the texts, the history, the culture, the war, the religion, innovations, reforms, etc, all that characterized this civilization

it’s beyond any historical comprehension, but certainly is the most complete. The “wings” of the Assyrian Lion were the ones that build the Assyrian victory.

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