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**A SOCIO-POLITICAL VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE CASE OF EUROPE***

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* The views expressed in the paper do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the United Nations Secretariat.

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A. INTRODUCTION

The evaluation of the socio-political impacts of Latin American and Caribbean migration to Europe is a complex practical task, given the immense variety among the sending and receiving countries. Despite geographical proximity, Latin American and Caribbean countries display important differences, related to their economic, social and political statuses and their historical links. In the migration field, for example, historical links between former empires and ex-colonies are known to be of crucial importance to understand current flows. Regarding Europe, the diversity is at least as large, since there are deep differences between the North, West, South and East of the continent. Indeed, Latin American and Caribbean immigrants spread all over Europe, but their reasons and timing of migration and the socio-political contexts of reception are diverse.

Despite this variety, the examination of current data about the presence of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants in Europe lead us to some main conclusions. First, taking into account the relative volume of foreign inflows in each country, there is a privileged stream directed to Southern European countries, namely Spain and Portugal and, to a lesser degree, Italy. The overall volume of these flows seems to have largely augmented in recent years, reflecting the current trend for acceleration of international migration flows worldwide. Second, the enumeration of European citizens with a Latin American and Caribbean background enlarges this picture, since other European countries' past colonial links and its current presence in the area have brought other particular waves to the continent.

In this paper, reference will be made to all Latin American and Caribbean inflows to Europe and its social and political impacts, but attention will be mainly driven to migration into Southern Europe, particularly Spain, Portugal and Italy. Topics to be explored include the factors, economic and other, explaining recent immigration; the economic incorporation of immigrants; the social framework of flows, including reactions from local populations to immigrants; and the tentative and multiple policy responses to immigration, focussing when possible on the Latin American and Caribbean inflow. The fragile balance between a demographic and an economic need for immigration, and a social and political mostly defensive reaction, will be highlighted, as well as some probable trends in the field.

The paper will be organised as follows. In the first section, data will be examined regarding the presence of foreign nationals and foreign born population in several European countries, particularly the main receiving ones, including Northern, Western and Southern European countries. Among foreign nationals and foreign born, the amount of individuals coming from Latin American and Caribbean countries will be highlighted. Due to the higher relative presence of Latin Americans and Caribbean immigrants in Southern Europe – Latin Americans heading to Latin Europe -, data on Spain, Portugal and Italy will be detailed.

In the second section, the economic, social and political framework of immigration in Europe and, particularly, Southern Europe will be referred. Taking into account, whenever possible, the situation of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants, attention will be driven to the overall debate about immigration and immigration control in Europe. Regarding the Southern European case, particularly Spain, Portugal and Italy, an observation will be made about the reasons explaining the migration turnaround and the recent upsurge of foreign inflows, the main modes of incorporation in the labour market, the contexts of social reception and the policies designed to control inflows and to integrate immigrants.

B. IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE – THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CASE

1. Europe

Despite the troubles and hesitations, at the social and political level, which immigration is causing in Europe, an indisputable fact is that Europe is becoming a continent of immigration. In table 1 some of the main data about the presence of foreign population in Europe is displayed, from 1980 until the present. Referring only to the main receiving countries in Europe, namely Northern, Western and Southern European countries - mostly of which formed the European Union (EU) of 15 member-states before the recent enlargement to the East -, the trend for a structural increase of immigration is evident. In most of the countries the number of foreign nationals increased strongly between 1980 and 2003. The sharpest increases have been doubtless in Southern European countries, namely Spain, Italy and Portugal, along with some Northern ones, namely Finland, where the absolute number of foreigners augmented by a factor from 5 to 9. In the majority of other countries the number doubled or tripled in the same time-span.

The fact that the increase was not higher in most of the countries, and the actual decrease in the number of foreigners in others (such as France and Belgium), require an elaboration of the argument. The sharp increase occurred in Southern Europe (more significant than the one of Finland, where the figures are much smaller) resulted from its condition of latecomer to immigration in Europe (King *et al.*, 2000; Ribas-Mateos, 2004; Venturini, 2004). Between the 1970s and 1980s these countries underwent a deep migration turnaround, ceasing its main condition of emigration countries and becoming immigrants' receiving societies. Western countries and some of the Northern ones were undergoing a strong immigration since the end of the Second World War. As a result, countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom had already increased their foreign population before 1980, disallowing a more significant growth in recent years.

Complementarily, some of the slow increases and actual decreases in the foreign stock in some European countries resulted from the gradual settlement of foreign populations and their progressive acquisition of national citizenship (whenever that it is possible, since citizenship rules vary from country to country, or desired by the immigrants). The actual decline of foreign population, in recent years, in France and Belgium, is only explained by the acquisition of French and Belgium nationalities by first generation and, mostly, second and third generation immigrants (rigorously, people with an immigrant background). The use, in migration statistics, of data on foreign-born population can conceal some of these problems – although the sliding of the immigrants' offspring into the national population requires other alternative measuring (some data on foreign born will be examined later on).

In table 2 the relative weight of foreign population in European countries is highlighted. Disregarding the slower increase of Western and Northern countries and the progressive melting of foreign citizens into national populations, the rates already attained are generally high. Besides the extreme case of Luxembourg, counting almost 40 per cent of foreigners in its territory, Switzerland stands ahead, with 20 per cent. A group of countries, including Austria, Germany and Belgium, register between 8 to 10 per cent of foreigners, followed by others ranging between 4.5 and 6 per cent, including France and the United Kingdom. Meaningfully, Southern Europe still lags behind, given the newness of flows. Considering that several immigrants, and mainly their offspring, have already gained local citizenship - a frequent situation in the countries where such possibility has been higher (such as France) - those rates could still be higher. The presence of foreigners and citizens with an immigrant background in most of Europe parallels today, in quantitative terms, the one of traditional countries of immigration, such as the USA and Canada, what confirm the new status of Europe at the world level.

National origins of foreign population vary deeply from country to country. This variation results from the complex causalities associated with migration flows. If migration was decided on pure economic

grounds, as assumed in some theoretical frameworks, it should be expected a more or less random distribution of migrants across the world, according to economic differentials. In this case, geographical distance would be the main obstacle to overcome. The assumption of imperfect markets, where information failures and insufficiencies occur, explains better the unexpected directions that migrations often assume. A range of other theories, including migration systems theory, world systems theory and institutional theories, offer a complementary understanding of migration paths (see Massey *et al.*, 1998). Considering migration systems theory, for example (see Kritz *et al.*, 1992), movements between pairs of countries deeply linked by historical, economical, social and cultural connections may be expected, including migrations from the ex-colonies to former empires. Better information, easiness of integration and better transportation explain the post-colonial nature of many flows.

In the European case, diverse types of causalities have been in motion. The role of geography is visible in movements linking Eastern to Northern and Western Europe since the 1990s. The presence of Poles in Germany, for example, could be anticipated given the economic differentials and the contiguity of these countries. In the same sense, the flows that linked, between the 1950s and 1970s, Southern and Western Europe, could be expected, carrying emigrants in a contiguous international labour market. Sets of flows uniting distant world countries, at the most disparate locations, to particular European ones are also frequent. Evidence show that migrations from Asia, particularly from Commonwealth countries such as India and Pakistan, are frequent in the United Kingdom; migrations from French-speaking African countries, such as Morocco and Algeria, are frequent to France; and migrations from Portuguese-speaking countries, including African ones (Cape Verde, Angola and others), are usual in Portugal (for recent data on national origins of immigrants in Europe, per country, see Salt, 2005; for an overview of immigration in Europe in recent decades, see ahead).

Regarding migrations uniting Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries to Europe, links of the post-colonial type, reinforced by the large economic imbalances between sending and host countries, may be easily admitted. Table 3 displays data about the volume and relative weight of nationals from South America, Central America and Caribbean countries in several European countries. Due to conflicting sources and divergent concepts, data in this table do not coincide with former tables. Notwithstanding methodological difficulties, the picture of the migration links between these regions is very clear. In quantitative terms, Spain displays the higher amount of LAC nationals, with over one million individuals. Italy and Germany lag behind, with around 100 thousand, followed distantly by France, with less than 50 thousand.

Maybe more important than these figures are the relative ones, displaying the weight of LAC immigrants compared to all other immigrants (see table 3). In this respect, Spain takes again the lead, with an astonishing 40.6 per cent – this is to say, almost 41 in every 100 foreigners in Spain come from that area of the world. Next is Portugal, with 13.3 per cent, and Italy, with 7.9 per cent. The high quantitative volume of LAC immigrants in countries like Germany and France seems to stand more on the sheer demographic size of these countries than on any particularly privileged link.

Regarding the internal distinction between South and Central America and Caribbean countries, different directions are again evident. Portugal and Spain (and also Austria, with a much lesser volume) are the countries where Southern American immigrants are dominant, with more than 90 percent of all immigrants from this region. Central American immigrants seem to be relatively more present in Germany, with around 10 per cent, besides some Nordic countries with lesser immigrants (Finland and Denmark). Finally, Caribbean countries are relatively more represented in France, with more than 1/3 of the total, and Switzerland, with 1/5 of the total (the same as in Luxembourg, with much lesser immigrants).

This kind of data reflects a large disparity of political histories, social and economic relations and cultural affinities between countries, including the case of former empires. It also reflects an accumulation of

inflows occurred during different periods of time, in different global contexts. The relative importance of Southern American immigrants in Spain and Portugal results from the former presence of these Southern European countries in the region. Social and cultural affinities (including at the linguistic level), family roots (and the corresponding benefits in the host country), as well as reciprocal information, makes easier an international migration path. The presence in Italy also results from cultural affinities, linguistic similarity and family roots, arising from Italian emigration in the region (see ahead).

In general, the presence of LAC immigrants in all European countries seems to be linked to two main motives. At the one hand, we are faced with waves of refugees, fleeing from civil turmoil, military conflicts and political dictatorships of the region. For example, significant emigration linked Chile to Norway and Sweden after the 1970s, started with political exiles and continued afterwards (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 114-115). Political immigrants from Latin America also headed to Spain and Portugal in the 1970s (Arango, 2000). At the other hand, immigration is a result of economic motives. For example, recent Latin American immigration to Spain and Portugal is a typical labour flow. In short, political and economic migrations, involving single individuals or entire families, occurred in different time periods and contexts, make the interpretation of current data rather complex.

A complementary set of data must yet be observed. As mentioned earlier, immigration in a given country can be observed in a variety of ways. Two major perspectives are the one of foreign citizens in the country, which has been just observed, and the one of foreign-born citizens. The first restrains observation to non-nationals, which are the focus of many of the current debates on immigration and immigrants' integration. However, this perspective fails because foreigners may sometimes not be immigrants, because immigrants may sometimes not be foreigners and because some of the immigrants' descent is not captured. The second perspective has the advantage of measuring immigrants that, meanwhile, acquired the citizenship of the host country and also colonial or post-colonial situations of migrants coming from to the peripheries to central cores. Its major disadvantage is gathering in the same packet foreigners and nationals, that display many differences on migration strategies and social integration patterns, and also disregarding some of the immigrants' offspring.

In any case, the observation of data on foreign born citizens allows us to enlarge the characterization of LAC immigrants in Europe. Table 4 displays data on people that were born in LAC countries and that currently resides in several European countries (this data is based on a recent OECD database on the theme – see Dumont and Lemaître, 2005). As mentioned, some of these immigrants have always had the nationality of the host country (for example, migrations from the French Caribbean islands to France), others may have had it or lost it meanwhile (for example, migrations from Jamaica to the UK or Suriname to the Netherlands), others may have immigrated as foreigners and meanwhile acquired the local citizenship, and finally others may still remain foreigners (the case of former tables).

The current picture significantly enlarges former observations. Taking the quantitative volume of flows, the highest volume is again the one of Spain, with more than 800 thousand individuals (some of the differences between these data and the ones mentioned before are due to an earlier date of observation), followed by the United Kingdom (which did not figure in table 3) and the Netherlands, both with more than 300 thousand. Taking the relative figures (weight of LAC individuals amongst all foreign born), Spain takes again largely the lead, with almost 39 per cent, followed by the Netherlands (19.5 per cent) and again Portugal (11.6 per cent) (unfortunately, data for Italy is missing, what conceals the possibility of reinforcing the role of all Southern European countries). Finally, observing the distinction between Latin American (South and Central America) and Caribbean immigrants, the most striking issue to retain seems to be the very large number of Caribbean immigrants in the United Kingdom (71 per cent of all immigrants coming from the LAC region), Netherlands (29.6 per cent) and France (23.7 per cent).

From this last set of observations, some new insights are allowed – besides the reinforcement of conclusions reached previously. The former or current political presence of European countries in the

region and its consequences over migrations seems to be the main novelty to retain. The Caribbean possessions, either former or current, of the United Kingdom, Netherlands and France, explain its significant inflows. In most of the cases, these individuals migrated within a single national entity. These flows may be depicted as having a colonial or post-colonial status, when movements respect to population with a native background.

A further point to stress is that the same kind of figures on foreign born, but now considering non-European destinations, remind us that the USA are, by far, the most important destination for LAC immigrants. Among the 15 million and 600 hundred thousand persons born in Latin America and now residing in one developed country (the figures respect only to OECD countries), around 13 and a half million (86.2%) live in the USA. Regarding the Caribbean countries, among the 5 million and 300 thousand that inhabit in a foreign country, 4 million and a half reside in the USA (84.6%) (Dumont and Lemaître, 2005: 7 and 31) (for a comprehensive view of LAC emigration in the world, see Castles and Miller, 2003: 144-152 and Cohen, 1995; on Caribbean emigration, see Simmons and Guengant, 1992).

In synthesis, LAC immigrants are spread all over Europe – Northern, Western and Southern European countries. The time period of these migrations is very diverse, as well as migrants' motivations, strategies, socio-economic characteristics and even legal status. Some of the movements displayed the characteristics of a political flow - and migrants may have today the status of refugees, may have acquired citizenship or may remain as regular immigrants. Other movements were typically economic oriented flows. These may have occurred earlier, in the period of mass legal migrations to Europe during the “30 glorious years”, in the case of colonial and post-colonial flows, or later, mainly in the case of recent inflows to Southern Europe. Some flows may have involved co-nationals moving in the framework of a single nation-state, whilst others grouped immigrants moving to foreign nations.

Regarding the migrants' characteristics, flows may have gathered low skilled workers, whilst others may have involved highly skilled personnel. Many of the politically induced migrations involved highly skilled individuals fleeing from their countries. It also must be stressed that the Caribbean is one of the world areas registering a higher brain drain (Dumont and Lemaître, 2005: 14-17). Finally, the reasons to choose a particular destination in Europe may have varied, resulting from previous or current connections between countries and from diverse other factors. In short, a deeper understanding of international migration linking these regions of the world, and its social and political impacts, is a complex task.

2. Southern Europe

As mentioned, Southern European countries, particularly Spain, Portugal and Italy, are among the main recipients of LAC immigrants, particularly if we take into account the volume of foreign citizens in each country, disregarding the movements occurred between former colonies and among a common national entity after the Second World War. With the exception of Spain, which surpasses one million foreigners coming from LAC countries, the predominance of Southern European countries mainly result from the relative assessment of their foreign inflows. In quantitative terms, other European countries dispute the primacy – although none reaches the volume Spain. However, in relative terms LAC immigration is more present in Southern Europe, with a share varying between 41 per cent (Spain) and 8 per cent (Italy) of all foreign immigrants (table 3).

Recent foreign immigration in Southern European countries is depicted in tables 5 to 8. It is known that, after a migration turnaround registered between the mid 1970s and 1980s, strong increases in foreign immigration were witnessed. Taking the most recent figures, including recent regularisation processes, and grouping both long-term and medium-term residence permits (conditions that are not fully met in data presented in table 2), the relative importance of foreign immigration in these countries reaches nowadays the average levels of Northern and Western Europe. Increases in foreign immigration were strong from the 1980s and knew an even stronger upsurge after the late 1990s. Many of these inflows were dominated

by irregular immigrants, what lead to the launch of several regularisations programmes. In fact, these Southern countries are known for repeated amnesties, started in the mid-1980s, the latest occurring in Portugal in 2001, Italy in 2002 and Spain in 2005 (for a general overview of Southern European immigration, see King *et al.*, 2000 and Venturini, 2004).

The situation of Spain is portrayed in table 5 (due to differences in sources and methodology, these figures do not coincide with previous ones). In methodological terms, important divergences exist regarding the best statistical mean of measuring immigrants (in this case, foreign citizens). Besides the endemic presence of irregular immigration (also common to Portugal and Italy), there are conflicting figures resulting from the number of resident permits and registers at the municipal level (see Cangiano and Strozza, 2004). Both series are displayed in table 5 – which, however, does not include further 700 thousand immigrants, which became legal after the most recent amnesty of 2005 (The Economist, 2005). Looking at both series, the primacy of Latin American immigrants (including Caribbean) is visible. They represent between 28 per cent and 39 per cent of all foreigners, either considering the resident permits or the municipal registers. After them, the main foreign presence comes from the EU and Northern Africa. Taking particular nationalities, Ecuador and Colombia are among the three main nationalities in the country, right after Moroccans. These are followed by Peru, Dominican Republic and Argentina (besides China and Romania) in the group of the eight main nationalities (on recent immigration in Spain, see Arango, 2000 and Cornelius, 2004, among others).

The situation in Portugal is displayed in table 6. This table groups both long-term (residence permits) and temporary (permits to stay, valid for one year and renewable) legal permits. Regarding the Latin American component, it is just the third main world region of foreign immigration in the country, but its weight has augmented in recent years - as suggested by the 21 per cent of permits to stay (all them granted in the 2001 regularisation). Among LAC countries the overwhelming predominance goes to Brazil, which is one of the three main foreign nationalities in the country, together with Ukraine and Cape Verde (on recent immigration in Portugal, see Peixoto, 2002 and Baganha *et al.*, 2005, among others). In Italy (see table 7), the Latin American component is still of a lesser volume, gathering around 9 per cent of the foreigners, either possessing a residence permit or having applied for the 2002 regularisation. No LAC country figures among the six main nationalities in the country (on recent immigration in Italy, see Calavita, 2004, among others).

Individual LAC nationalities represented in recent foreign immigration in Spain, Portugal and Italy are also displayed in table 8 (again, due to differences in source and methodology, figures do not coincide with some of the previous). The single countries with a major presence in Southern Europe are Ecuador (with circa 444 thousand immigrants in the region), Colombia (235 thousand), Argentina (128 thousand), Peru (95 thousand) and Brazil (82 thousand). All these nationalities are more present in Spain, although Peruvians and Brazilians are also highly present in Italy and Portugal. Considering the weight of the different LAC nationalities per Southern European country, the main groups in Spain are Ecuador, Colombia and Argentina, but a very significant volume also come from Peru, Bolivia, Dominican Republic and others. In Portugal, the largely predominant nationality is Brazil; and, in Italy, Peru and Brazil.

Briefly, the Latin American connections of Southern European countries prevail in these figures. The movements linking former colonies with their European cores are visible in the Spanish and Portuguese case. These flows reflect direct linguistic similarities: Spanish-speaking immigrants go to Spain, whilst Portuguese-speaking ones go to Portugal. The role of former Southern European emigrants (Spaniards, Portuguese and Italian) to the LAC region is also felt. Previous family links in Europe brought several immigrants, either moving through paths in which more information and social support was available, or using ancestral links as a strategic means of obtaining easier EU access or EU citizenship. For example, the number of Argentineans claiming citizenship or dual citizenship has been considerable in Spain and Italy (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 117-118). Brazilians of Portuguese descent prefer going to Portugal, where

integration is considered easier and there is an easier access to citizenship, and Brazilians of Italian descent target Italy. Wider research on the role of former family roots and on the migration strategies and paths of these immigrants, which may use their ancestral countries just as a step to access other EU countries or the USA, seems currently to be lacking.

The large economic imbalances existing between the sending LAC areas and the Southern European hosts, along with other push and pull mechanisms – including the civil unrest and political problems of some of the sending areas –, contributed to the materialisation of migrations. Other social and political factors have meanwhile reinforced the flows, such as the role of informal social networks, making easier the movement from one country to another; smuggling networks, useful in circumventing barriers in those directions; and political agreements between pairs of countries, including bilateral agreements signed by Spain with some LAC countries and special conditions existing for Brazilians in Portugal (see ahead).

C. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

1. Europe

Europe, and particularly its Western and Northern components, has become a *de facto* region of immigration since the Second World War. The economic growth that followed the recovery from the war and lasted during the “30 glorious years” was accompanied by strong immigration waves, which gradually changed the image of this part of the continent. These immigrants filled the labour market needs resulting from the concentration of investments and production in the more developed countries. Most of the immigration flows were firstly supposed to be temporary. The famous “guestworker” system was in place, and figured a gradual return of immigrants to their home countries. However, a large part of immigrants settled in their European host countries (for a synthesis of immigration in Europe since 1945, see Cohen, 1995; Massey *et al.*, 1998 and Castles and Miller, 2003).

Regarding national origins, many of the immigration flows were intra-European ones in a first phase, since the Southern European countries contributed to fill the labour market gaps of its Western and Northern counterparts. But a gradual diversification of national origins was observed. At the one hand, inflows rapidly included the whole European periphery - Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Turkey and Northern Africa. At the other hand, inflows linked the European colonies or ex-colonies to their actual or former colonial powers, particularly in the case of the United Kingdom, France and Netherlands.

In what concerns LAC countries, inflows in this epoch mainly occurred in the framework of colonial or post-colonial ties. A widespread migration was observed from the Caribbean colonies to the UK, mainly between 1945 and the early 1970s; in 1962 strong restrictions were set to the immigration of Commonwealth workers, but flows of family reunion continued until the early 1970s. Also during this period, inflows linked the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique to continental France; in this case, only internal migrations were observed, since the migrants kept the French citizenship. Finally, a strong inflow linked Surinam to the Netherlands after the mid 1960s; the inflow peaked just before the independence of the territory in 1975. In most cases, Caribbean immigrants occupied low skilled manual jobs and faced exclusion and marginalization in their European hosts. Their situation paralleled the one of other foreign immigrants, but was aggravated by ethnic and racial cleavages (on these migrations, see Simmons and Guengant, 1992; Castles and Miller, 2003: 73-75).

After the mid-1970s, new patterns of immigration emerged. A general restriction on the immigration policy was set in every European immigrant receiving country. This followed the economic downturn that was observed at that time and the deep restructuring of the world economy. Economic changes were reflected, among other factors, in the delocalisation of production to developing countries, the growing

importance of services and information technology activities, and the gradual erosion of stable jobs and careers. Despite restrictions, immigration continued, although in different forms. Among the main characteristics of the inflows, during this period, reference must be made to the role of family reunion, the increase of asylum-seekers and refugees, and the structural presence of irregular and illegal immigration (Castles and Miller, 2003).

Policy changes also reflected the increased social concern and growing politicization of immigration issues in Europe. Since the 1970s, the evidence of immigrants' settlement and the increased visibility of a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Europe, coupled with the characteristics of the national and global new economic framework, created new challenges for public opinions and governments. Fears of threatened national identities and culture, claims that unemployment resulted from immigration flows, worries about the weaker character of welfare states, coupled with a general feeling of uncertainty about the future, explain the problems involving immigration in the continent (Cornelius *et al.*, 2004).

Despite a widespread reluctance towards immigration, the need for structural and durable immigration is often acknowledged, as well as integration policies are tentatively put forward (Cornelius *et al.*, 2004). The main arguments in favour of a continuing immigration are the economic and demographic needs of European societies. The need of promoting social and political inclusion of immigrants is made obvious by the potential and actual conflicts that result from prolonged exclusion and discrimination of large fractions of the population - either involving immigrants or the second generation, which often displays local citizenship. As Cornelius and Tsuda (2004: 42) underline, restrictive policies are currently sometimes designed mainly by symbolic reasons, in order to appease local electorates. European governments have become increasingly aware of the need of (a better managed) immigration, converging to policies that point to more effective control and improved integration.

Despite the convergence of European immigration policies, reinforced by the gradual path for a common immigration policy in the EU, the fact is that many national prerogatives still exist in this field (see Geddes, 2000). Evidence indicates that the path to a common policy has been undermined by continued claims for sovereignty and privileged relationships at the world level. Several common initiatives do already exist, expressed in the Schengen agreement and recent EU directives about migration. But European nation-states still maintain a number of specific national initiatives, including the ultimate resort of the citizenship law. Regarding the LAC case, it may be expected that some privileged migration flows may continue to occur in the European case. Some will depend on the individual strategies of immigrants themselves, following well known migration paths. Others will depend on the role of governments. As it will be seen in next section, some privileged relationships among some LAC and European countries, such as Spain and Portugal, have led to a renewed flow in this direction.

2. Southern Europe

As mentioned before, between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, the countries of Southern Europe, particularly Spain, Portugal and Italy, underwent a deep migration turnaround, mainly expressed in the decrease of emigration and the strong growth of immigration. The causes for immigration were several: the economic growth since the 1970s, reinforced, in the case of Spain and Portugal, with the adhesion to the EU in 1986; the nature of the economic development, based in services (and a large volume of construction), a large informal economy and a growing demand for flexible labour; the characteristics of the welfare state and the role of the family in welfare delivery; the growing aspirations and education levels of local populations, driving them away from the less desirable jobs in the labour market; the decreasing supply of workers, mainly due to demographic reasons; and the use of these countries as "waiting rooms" by immigrants, before setting off to their more developed European partners (King, 2000; Ribas-Mateos, 2004).

The fact is that, from the 1970s and mainly the late 1980s, foreign immigration was always on the increase. Nationalities of immigrants varied from the beginning, as they are still diverse among these Southern countries. In the beginning, migrants came mostly from Africa, Latin America and Asia and, from the early 1990s, also from Eastern Europe. The international connections of the Southern European countries helped to define the origin of their migrants. The most exemplary case was Portugal, which until the late 1990s had an immigration largely based in Portuguese-speaking populations. Spain also anchored itself in its Latin America connections, although the presence from Morocco was felt from the beginning. Italy had the more heterogeneous national composition of flows from the beginning (for a review of the size and origin of immigrant flows, see Venturini, 2004: 23-31).

The type of economic demand largely conditioned the type of immigrants and their modes of incorporation in the labour market. In all these countries, foreigners are inserted in a polarised occupational structure, although the low bottom segment has become gradually predominant. The professional and technological needs of expanding and modernising economies were partially met by foreigners. A small but significant segment of highly skilled and high social status occupations has been mostly filled by EU professionals. However, some non-European immigrants also have been inserted in this sector. Regarding LAC countries, this was mainly the case of the first wave of South American citizens – Argentines, Chileans and Uruguayans - that headed into Spain since the 1970s (Arango, 2000) and the first wave of Brazilians that settled in Portugal during the 1980s and early 1990s (Peixoto, 2002; Baganha *et al.*, 2005). In Italy, reference also exists to Brazilians performing highly skilled jobs (Calavita, 2004: 357).

However, the large majority of immigrants were targeted to low skilled and low status segments in the labour market, and this mode of incorporation was always expanding. Many of the activities filled by immigrants were part of the informal economy. It is known that the informal economy, particularly work activities done outside legal, regulatory and contractual obligations and the recourse to tax evasion, was already a structural feature of the economies of the Southern European countries. But the constraints imposed by the new global order became often satisfied by the use of immigrants in the informal framework, as a low-paid and flexible labour force, reinforcing its structural role (Mingione and Quassoli, 2000).

As argued by Ribas-Mateos (2004), the high labour demand in the informal market must be coupled with other characteristics of Southern European societies to explain immigration. The weak character of the welfare state helps to understand not only the low enforcement of immigration rules (and the related high presence of illegal immigrants), but also the structural existence of informal activities and the growing trend for privatization of welfare delivery. However, despite its weakness, some welfare state benefits (such as unemployment allowances) contributed to keep national citizens away from the less desirable segments of the labour market.

Another characteristic of these societies is the role of the family, explaining why both social reproduction and several production activities are held in its framework. Social reproduction activities include general domestic work and care for children and elderly. One of the main segments which immigrants targeted - in this case female immigrants - was precisely the domestic service. Regarding production activities, these national economies are largely based in small and medium sized family owned firms, which are often immersed in forms of informal activity. Furthermore, the role of families as “safety nets” also contributed to keep nationals out of the job market, as exemplary occurs with the tardy departure of young adults from their parents’ households.

As a result, most of the immigrants occupied segments of the labour market that were left aside by natives, representing the lowest paid, more precarious and lowest socially ranked jobs. The main economic sectors employing immigrants, varying between countries, have been agriculture, construction (male workers), industrial manufacturing, personal services (sales, catering and tourism), street-hawkers,

domestic service and sex industry (in the latter cases, female workers) (on domestic service and the sex industry, see Campani, 2000 and Ribas-Mateos, 2002). Most of the LAC immigrants were targeted to those segments. That was mainly the case of the second wave of migrants from LAC countries in Spain, dominated by citizens from Central America and the Andean region, arrived since the 1990s (Arango, 2000); the second wave of Brazilians that arrived in Portugal since the end of the same decade (Padilla, 2005); and most of the immigrants coming from the LAC region to Italy (Campani, 2000; Mingione and Quassoli, 2000). In some cases their presence is clear in ethnic and gendered segments of the labour market. For example, many of the Dominicans in Spain and of the Peruvians in Italy are women working in the domestic sector (Arango, 2000 and Calavita, 2004).

Regarding the immigrants' characteristics, wide research must be done to examine the demographic and socio-economic attributes of different national groups in different contexts. In the case of LAC immigrants, demographic data suggest that female immigrants have had an increasing active role in the migratory paths, frequently being the first movers, either being single or married (Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000). A higher proportion of female immigrants in the LAC inflow has mainly occurred in Spain and Italy. The fact that specific labour market niches, particularly the domestic service, exerted a strong pull effect, increased the opportunity for independent female immigration. Regarding social and economic data, the low skilled jobs that these immigrants mostly occupy do not necessarily match with their situation in the home countries. Evidence for Brazilians in Portugal (Padilla, 2005) and for Peruvians in Italy (Reyneri, 2004) suggests that their educational level is considerable. It is well known that immigrants are rarely selected among the poorest of the poor, since they lack the resources (information and capital) needed to migrate (and this is mainly true in the case on inter-continental migration). Elaborating this assertion, available data suggest that many of the migrants come from low-middle or middle classes and, sometimes, from youth elites (Reyneri, 2004 and Padilla, 2005).

Needless to say, the level of social integration of immigrants in the host countries varies deeply with nationalities and timing of arrival. Regarding LAC immigrants, the first waves arrived since the 1970s display good levels of integration, sometimes comparable to EU citizens, and in some cases already acquired local citizenship (Arango, 2000). Most recent waves of LAC immigrants are in a very different condition: they often stay for a long time as undocumented immigrants and are affected by several problems, including housing, employment (low wages, bad working conditions, instability and unemployment) and access to health.

Regarding the context of social reception, some characteristics of the Southern European societies explain why the new immigration flows were not problematic in the first years or are still not too problematic. Firstly, the fact that these countries regarded themselves as long standing emigration countries contributed to the notion that some reciprocity should exist in this field, leading to tolerance and acceptance of immigration. Secondly, many of the inflows displayed cultural and linguistic affinities with the nation, what may have eased some of the first and ulterior contacts. Thirdly, most of the immigrants' jobs were viewed as non desirable by the natives, contributing to an assessment, at least in a first phase, of non competition in the labour market. Fourthly, the recent democratic nature of some of these societies, such as Spain and Portugal, may have led to a higher admission of inclusion and concession of rights to foreign nationals (Arango, 2000: 267).

Furthermore, several groups in these societies have shown a pro-immigrant stand. As Cornelius and Tsuda (2004: 7) suggest, "(...) the public itself is not monolithic but consists of many disparate groups with varying interest and concerns". In Southern European countries, important sectors of the civil society, including trade unions, the Catholic Church and several NGOs, have been active in defending immigrants' rights. Also employers have often lobbied in favour of increased immigration. All these facts explain why most public opinion surveys display a considerable degree of tolerance towards immigrants or, at most, a polarised view on the theme, and why extreme right anti-immigrant political parties have

been absent in these countries – with the partial exception of Italy (on most of these aspects, see King *et al.*, 2000; Calavita, 2004; Cornelius, 2004).

However, some positive aspects of the social reception of immigrants must not conceal that some objective discrimination frequently occurs, and that the level of public acceptance is decreasing since the late 1990s (Calavita, 2004; Cornelius, 2004). The confinement of immigrants to the less desirable, low-paid, low status and unprotected segments in the labour market is a first indicator of objective exclusion from many national social rights. Evidence also exists about lines of ethnic and racial discrimination towards immigrants, mainly resulting from the alleged deviation from national identity and culture (King *et al.*, 2000; Calavita, 2005). Claims that the immigrants are taking jobs away from the natives are increasing, although research does not support this view. Fears of insecurity and links with criminality are augmenting, although they are sometimes overemphasized by the media and result from a biased police approach (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002: 218-9; Quassoli, 2004). Finally, the recent upsurge in the immigrants' volume, the permanence of structural unemployment and the recent events linking terrorism with immigrant based communities – all explain why public opinions are becoming more critical and why governments find it so hard to deal with the theme (on public opinion reactions, see Cornelius *et al.*, 2004; Cornelius, 2004; and Calavita, 2004).

Immigration policy in these Southern European countries displayed a hesitant path along the time (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). Regarding immigration control, many of the national dispositions result directly from EU obligations. The main concern, in this field, is the surveillance of EU external borders, to avoid the vulnerability of the Schengen space. The argument most often expressed is that Spanish and Italian borders (much more than the Portuguese) are amongst the more porous in the EU, given its contiguity with some of the most important emigrant sending regions of the world. EU and national concerns are the reason why, until recently, the main focus of Southern European immigration policies have been control, not integration. In the words of Solé (2004: 1214), these countries have, until now, mostly produced “laws which dealt with control of entry, stay and productive activities rather than long-term residence and socio-cultural integration”. Initiatives to control the entry of immigrants involved, among other instruments, a more forceful visa policy, the definition of quotas and the establishment of bilateral agreements. However, the amount of illegal immigration in these countries, giving place to successive amnesties, demonstrates how harsh the conditions still are for effective control.

Since the mid-1990s, gradual initiatives on integration were set. These included access to basic rights, such as housing, work, health and education; right to family reunion; measures against discrimination (on a gender, ethnic, religious or racial basis); increased cooperation between the national government, regional and local authorities, NGOs and immigrants; creation of special councils or departments dealing with issues of immigration; and some tentative access of immigrants to the sphere of political rights (on integration policies, see Solé, 2004). Immigrants' rights were often attributed according to the legal status: only legally resident or working immigrants could be entitled to them. It is true that successive amnesties existed to legalise irregular foreigners. Spain had undergone six operations of regularisation, since 1985 and 2005; Portugal three, between 1992 and 2001 (two other less wide legalisations existed afterwards); and Italy five, between 1986 and 2002. However, the effectiveness of these amnesties is arguable, since many only conceded temporary statuses, and many immigrants fell again in illegality (see, for the Spanish case, Arango, 2000: 261). Furthermore, illegal immigration is still endemic. Regardless this problem, it must be stressed that the gradual granting of rights to immigrants admitted, at least implicitly, the possibility of long-term permanence and settlement of immigrants and their families.

From another perspective, immigration policy in these countries has been evolving between largely contradictory signals and demands. Demographic and economic trends all suggest that immigration is a structural need of Southern European societies. The fact that their demographic profiles are among the most fast-declining and ageing in the world accounts for this need (see Koslowski, 2002 and Cornelius *et al.*, 2004). Pressure from employers and active civil society organisations defending immigration is also

accountable for an overt policy in the area. Lessons learned from Western and Northern European societies, telling that immigrants' settlement requires sound integration policies in order to avoid social tensions and overt conflicts, lead to the launching of integration initiatives.

At the opposite side, an increasing reluctance towards immigration on the part of public opinions, and the fact that governments are directly accountable by their electorates, suggest that, at least, a harsh rhetoric of control be put in place (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004). But efforts of control are not only symbolic, since real concern exists that an oversized immigration will undermine efforts for integration and will reinforce tensions and conflicts. Furthermore, the fact that national identities and cultures are based in a myth of ethnic homogeneity (massive foreign immigration is a recent feature of contemporary history in these countries) explains why immigration will not be more than tolerated in the next few years. An anti-immigration stand exists currently in all right wing Southern European political parties (with the partial exception of Portugal), and a restrictive position on immigration is part of mainstream politics (Calavita, 2004; Cornelius, 2004). Reluctance to immigration and frequent discrimination will probably last for long.

Regarding LAC countries, some particular features of their relationship with Southern European countries have already brought advantages to their immigrants and may announce better conditions in the future. Firstly, common historical roots, similar national cultures, similar languages and, sometimes, family links, may have eased, or may continue to ease, some of the immigrants' paths and integration. As Cornelius (2004: 410) admits, "Latin Americans are hardly perceived by Spaniards as 'foreigners', given their shared linguistic and cultural attributes". In this country, public opinion expresses a higher degree of acceptance of Latin American immigrants (Cornelius, 2004: 420). In Portugal, a widespread rhetoric of "brotherhood" exists since a long time with Brazil, which is expressed in frequent relationships and, often, mutual support, among citizens of both countries (Feldman-Bianco, 2001). This privileged links do not conceal the possibility of discrimination. Studies about Brazilians in Portugal, for example, confirm the existence of some forms of daily and workplace discrimination (Padilla, 2005). Further work must be made on the degree of problems felt by immigrants of LAC nationality, but a case exists for a smoother integration of these immigrants.

Secondly, Southern European countries face increasing challenges from contradictory belongings. In the international arena, their loyalties and identities are immersed in the European context to which they belong, their national diasporas in the world, and the international links resulting from their historical ties. Regarding the LAC context, the political engagement that Spain has long revealed in building an Iberoamerican community of nations must be stressed (Cornelius, 2004: 410). Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking LAC countries, as well as Portugal, are partners in this initiative, whose maximum expression are regular summits of their political leaders. Portugal has a complementary commitment to all Portuguese-speaking areas of the world, including Brazil, which form since 1996 the Community of Lusophone Countries (Feldman-Bianco, 2001; Horta, 2004). The same intertwined belongings are expressed in links resulting from the former descent of Southern European emigrants in LAC countries. An accrued possibility of granting citizenship exists in all cases - and it is known that, for the foreseeable future, national citizenship rules will remain largely exterior to EU regulations (Geddes, 2000).

Taking into consideration the above arguments, some specific measures enacted by Southern European countries towards LAC in the field of migration can easily be understood. Despite the EU regulations and the enforcement of the Schengen agreement, some particular initiatives have been until now under the individual assessment of those countries. In the field of visa policy, several LAC countries are exempt from visa to be admitted as tourists in the EU, following the special relationship they have with Spain (namely countries of the Southern cone) and Portugal (the case of Brazil). However, visa restrictions were imposed by Spain on Andean and Caribbean countries during the 1990s, such as Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic and Cuba (Cornelius, 2004: 410). As stated by Cornelius (2004: 410),

“restricting entries from Latin America was a much more politically and diplomatically sensitive step than restricting them from the Maghreb countries”.

Special bilateral agreements have also been signed between these countries. In the field of immigration policy and labour recruitment, Spain negotiated bilateral agreements with LAC countries, namely Ecuador, Dominican Republic and Colombia (other countries were Morocco, Nigeria and Romania) (Cornelius, 2004: 415-6). Portugal and Brazil have had an intense diplomatic exchange, sometimes conflicting, on migration issues (Feldman-Bianco, 2001). The last expression of this relationship was the concession of a special amnesty for Brazilian undocumented immigrants in 2003. Finally, citizenship regulations have always conceded rights to the descent of former emigrants in the LAC countries and, in some cases, exert positive discrimination regarding those countries (such as the Portuguese law regarding Portuguese-speaking foreigners).

D. CONCLUSION

Despite its reluctance, Europe has become a continent of immigration. All foreseeable trends indicate that this pattern will last for long, turning the old continent into an increased multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society. The notion of a crisis of adaptation is a possible perspective to explain the negative attitudes expressed by public opinions and the rhetoric on immigration control put in place by governments. The argument is that, at the contrary to what occurred with long standing immigration countries (including the Americas), immigration is not a founding myth of these societies. In historical terms, foreign immigration into Europe started too recently, mainly after the Second World War - although European states conceal also too often that they had a multi-ethnic character before the setting of modern nation-states (Koslowski, 2002: 171-2). In this sense, it is possible that the presence of immigrants will be felt, in the medium-term, as a new structural feature of the continent.

If difficulties towards the reception of foreign immigrants may be expressed in the case of the Western and Northern Europe, they must be reinforced in the case of Southern Europe. In this context, immigration only started in the last two decades of the former century, transforming rapidly the profile of these countries' populations. Used until recently to be areas of emigration, countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy started to view themselves as immigrants receiving societies, facing similar challenges as their European partners.

Social and political reaction towards immigration has thus been intense in all these frameworks. The main mode of economic incorporation of foreign immigrants throughout Europe has been in the low bottom segments of the labour markets: low-paid, precarious and low socially ranked jobs. The frailty of immigrants was reinforced in recent years, with the global economic restructuring that created the need for a cheap and flexible labour force. The growth of illegal immigration can be explained by these economic conditions. As Calavita (2004: 369) argues, “(...) those characteristics that make so-called Third World immigrants attractive to certain sectors – their invisibility, marginality, and vulnerability – are the same qualities that make it difficult to control their employment (through employer sanctions) or legalize them (through regularization programs)”. It can be argued that the structural weakness of immigrants has been particularly intense in Southern Europe, which coupled the reception of immigrants with economic restructuring: their long tradition of informal economy and the current needs of economic adaptation created conditions for a widespread presence of powerless immigrants.

Regarding LAC immigrants, their presence in many European contexts is visible. Foreigners and foreign born coming from LAC countries are spread all over Western, Northern and Southern Europe. The timing, conditions, strategies and status of movements have been, however, extremely variable. Observing the data, several movements can be found: colonial and post-colonial inflows coming from the Caribbean possessions of European countries (namely the United Kingdom, France and Netherlands);

inflows of a political nature, endemic to the LAC context, setting off immigrants to several European locations (particularly countries long known for welcoming refugees, such as the Nordic ones, and the Iberian countries); and a typical economic migration, mainly directing immigrants to Southern European locations.

Disregarding the colonial and post-colonial movements, which mainly took place in the “30 glorious years” of economic expansion, and using relative figures, most of the current economic migration links LAC immigrants to Southern Europe, namely Spain (by far the most large receiver), Portugal and Italy. These flows have strongly augmented in recent years, and seem to be fully in line with the contemporary aspects of migration in a globalized world (Castles and Miller, 2003: 7-9). Although immigrants come often from middle classes or even youth elites in its origin countries, they are targeted to the most undesirable segments of the labour markets, performing low skilled jobs in personal services, domestic service and construction, among other sectors; reveal increased gender segmentation; and display frequent irregularity.

LAC immigrants have followed some of the international paths that could be anticipated by migration theories, and have also benefited from initiatives taken in their host countries. Spanish-speaking LAC immigrants headed mostly to Spain. Today, the presence of nationals from Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Dominican Republic and Argentina is high in this country, together with other LAC nationalities. A first wave of these immigrants, in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly originated in the Southern cone of the continent (and integrated more easily in the Spanish society), but the most recent and larger wave comes from the Andean region and the Caribbean (and display the integration problems above described). In the case of Portugal, it is mainly the Brazilian presence that is felt - also in two waves, displaying similar characteristics to Spain; whilst in Italy nationals from Peru and, in a lesser degree, Brazil are the more numerous.

Reasons for migration were several. As known by migration systems theory, the former presence, as colonial powers, of Spain and Portugal in the LAC region has propelled many movements. Better information, cultural and linguistic similarities and family links makes easier the migration path. In the same vein, the presence of emigrants from Spain, Portugal and Italy in the region created the potential for flows. These immigrants may settle using straight family lines or may use them as a means of obtaining easy EU access and citizenship. Finally, policy initiatives have favoured immigration from LAC. The multiple belongings, and related diplomatic links, displayed by Southern Europe, particularly Spain and Portugal, such as the commitment for an Iberoamerican community of nations, have led to policies that benefited LAC immigrants.

In short, there are multiple reasons that explain why Latin America migrates to Latin Europe. Former historical links, cultural and linguistic affinities, family links and diplomatic channels, all suggest that a special route exists for current and future migrants coming from the LAC region. This also explains why social integration is potentially easier for immigrants coming from this region. As a wider observation of the globe clearly suggests, these privileged routes may not be used when the choice of destination is made. The overwhelming presence of LAC immigrants in the USA reveals that history is not enough to forecast migrations. The easier access does not also mean that a rapid social integration occurs. However, a case for a Latin system of international migrations can be easily acknowledged, and flows in this direction will probably last.

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TABLES

Table 1
*Stock of foreign population in selected European countries,
 1980-2003 (thousands)*

	1980	1990	2000	2003
<i>European Union 15</i>				
Austria	282.7	456.1	698.6	755.1
Belgium (a)	-	904.5	861.7	850.1
Denmark	101.6	160.6	258.6	271.2
Finland	12.8	26.3	91.1	107.0
France (b)	-	3607.6	3263.2	-
Germany	4453.3	5241.8	7296.8	7334.8
Greece (c)	213.0	229.1	281.5	433.1
Ireland	-	80.8	126.5	223.1
Italy (d)	298.7	781.1	1388.2	2194.0
Luxembourg	94.3	110.0	159.4	174.2
Netherlands	520.9	692.4	667.8	702.2
Portugal (e)	49.3	107.8	207.6	238.7
Spain	182.0	407.7	895.7	1647.0
Sweden (f)	421.7	483.7	477.3	476.1
United Kingdom	-	1875.0	2342.0	2865.0
<i>Non-EU</i>				
Norway	82.6	143.3	184.3	204.7
Switzerland (g)	892.8	1100.3	1384.4	1471.0

Notes: (a) Data for 1990, 2000 and 2002.

(b) Data for 1990 and 1999.

(c) 2000 does not include population aged less than 15 years.

(d) Holders of residence permits.

(e) Holders of residence permits, in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2001.

(f) Some cases of holders of short-term permits are not included.

(g) Data do not include seasonal stay permits and frontier workers.

Sources: Salt, 2003 and 2005

Table 2
*Stock of foreign population as a percentage
of total population in selected European countries,
1980-2003 (per cent)*

	1980	1990	2000	2003
<i>European Union 15</i>				
Austria	3.7	5.9	8.7	9.4
Belgium (1)	-	9.1	8.4	8.2
Denmark	-	3.1	4.9	5.0
Finland	0.3	0.5	1.8	2.1
France (2)	-	6.3	5.6	-
Germany	7.2	8.2	8.9	8.9
Greece (3)	2.2	2.3	2.6	3.9
Ireland	-	0.8	3.3	5.6
Italy (4)	0.5	1.4	2.4	3.8
Luxembourg	25.8	28.6	36.8	38.9
Netherlands	3.7	4.6	4.2	4.3
Portugal (5)	0.5	1.1	2.0	2.3
Spain	0.5	1.0	2.2	4.0
Sweden (6)	5.1	5.6	5.4	5.3
United Kingdom	-	3.3	3.9	4.8
<i>Non-EU</i>				
Norway	2.0	3.4	4.1	4.5
Switzerland (7)	14.1	16.3	19.3	20.1

Notes and sources: see Table 1.

Table 3
*Population of foreign citizenship, by nationality, in selected European countries -
 Nationals from South America, Central America and The Caribbean,
 2004 or latest available year*

	Latin America and The Caribbean					Other nationalities	Total
	South America	Central America	Caribbean	Other	Total		
<i>Number</i>							
Austria (a)	2657	242			2899	514791	517690
Denmark (e)	3075	616	425		4116	261308	265424
Finland (f)	920	256	221		1397	105606	107003
France (b)	25357	3950	17355		46662	3216524	3263186
Germany (d)	70152	10628	16929	55	97764	7237828	7335592
Italy (c)	88543	8321	19220		116084	1348505	1464589
Luxembourg (c)	601	45	187		833	161452	162285
Netherlands (e)	17161	1390	2222		20773	678827	699600
Portugal (f)	34385	364	548		35297	230064	265361
Spain (f)	1016007	28131	80151	39	1124328	1647872	2772200
Sweden (e)	15787	1777	1380		18944	455155	474099
Switzerland (f)	27732	2823	7999		38554	1585032	1623586
<i>Percentage (Total = 100)</i>							
Austria (a)	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	99.4	100
Denmark (e)	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	1.6	98.4	100
Finland (f)	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.0	1.3	98.7	100
France (b)	0.8	0.1	0.5	0.0	1.4	98.6	100
Germany (d)	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	1.3	98.7	100
Italy (c)	6.0	0.6	1.3	0.0	7.9	92.1	100
Luxembourg (c)	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.5	99.5	100
Netherlands (e)	2.5	0.2	0.3	0.0	3.0	97.0	100
Portugal (f)	13.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	13.3	86.7	100
Spain (f)	36.6	1.0	2.9	0.0	40.6	59.4	100
Sweden (e)	3.3	0.4	0.3	0.0	4.0	96.0	100
Switzerland (f)	1.7	0.2	0.5	0.0	2.4	97.6	100
<i>Percentage (Latin American and the Caribbean = 100)</i>							
Austria (a)	91.7	8.3	0.0	0.0	100		
Denmark (e)	74.7	15.0	10.3	0.0	100		
Finland (f)	65.9	18.3	15.8	0.0	100		
France (b)	54.3	8.5	37.2	0.0	100		
Germany (d)	71.8	10.9	17.3	0.1	100		
Italy (c)	76.3	7.2	16.6	0.0	100		
Luxembourg (c)	72.1	5.4	22.4	0.0	100		
Netherlands (e)	82.6	6.7	10.7	0.0	100		
Portugal (f)	97.4	1.0	1.6	0.0	100		
Spain (f)	90.4	2.5	7.1	0.0	100		
Sweden (e)	83.3	9.4	7.3	0.0	100		
Switzerland (f)	71.9	7.3	20.7	0.0	100		

Notes: (a) 1/1/1991
 (b) 8/3/1999
 (c) 1/1/2001
 (d) 1/1/2002
 (e) 1/1/2003
 (f) 1/1/2004

Source: calculations by the author, based on Council of Europe, 2004, except Portugal (INE/SEF)

Table 4
*Stock of total foreign-born population, by region of origin,
in selected European countries - Individuals born in
Latin America and The Caribbean, 2001 or latest available year (a)*

	Latin America and the Caribbean			Other nationalities	Total
	Latin America	Caribbean	Total		
<i>Number</i>					
Austria	6054		6054	996478	1002532
Belgium	20387	3976	24363	1074832	1099195
Denmark (b)	9208	785	9993	351060	361053
Finland (b)	1817	261	2078	129370	131448
France (c)	79987	24836	104823	5763419	5868242
Germany (b)	47578		47578	10208506	10256084
Greece	5486	1128	6614	1116026	1122640
Ireland (d)	2793	688	3481	396535	400016
Luxembourg	1562	274	1836	140816	142652
Netherlands (e)	221626	93326	314952	1300425	1615377
Norway (f)	15133	1268	16401	317368	333769
Portugal	74949	914	75863	575609	651472
Spain	744221	95979	840200	1332001	2172201
Sweden (b)	59965	2840	62805	1014791	1077596
United Kingdom	95357	232940	328297	4537266	4865563
<i>Percentage (Total = 100)</i>					
Austria	0.6	0.0	0.6	99.4	100
Belgium	1.9	0.4	2.2	97.8	100
Denmark (b)	2.6	0.2	2.8	97.2	100
Finland (b)	1.4	0.2	1.6	98.4	100
France (c)	1.4	0.4	1.8	98.2	100
Germany (b)	0.5	0.0	0.5	99.5	100
Greece	0.5	0.1	0.6	99.4	100
Ireland (d)	0.7	0.2	0.9	99.1	100
Luxembourg	1.1	0.2	1.3	98.7	100
Netherlands (e)	13.7	5.8	19.5	80.5	100
Norway (f)	4.5	0.4	4.9	95.1	100
Portugal	11.5	0.1	11.6	88.4	100
Spain	34.3	4.4	38.7	61.3	100
Sweden (b)	5.6	0.3	5.8	94.2	100
United Kingdom	2.0	4.8	6.7	93.3	100
<i>Percentage (Latin America and Caribbean = 100)</i>					
Austria	100.0	0.0	100		
Belgium	83.7	16.3	100		
Denmark (b)	92.1	7.9	100		
Finland (b)	87.4	12.6	100		
France (c)	76.3	23.7	100		
Germany (b)	100.0	0.0	100		
Greece	82.9	17.1	100		
Ireland (d)	80.2	19.8	100		
Luxembourg	85.1	14.9	100		
Netherlands (e)	70.4	29.6	100		
Norway (f)	92.3	7.7	100		
Portugal	98.8	1.2	100		
Spain	88.6	11.4	100		
Sweden (b)	95.5	4.5	100		
United Kingdom	29.0	71.0	100		

Notes: (a) Most data are based on the 2001 Census, except when indicated.

(b) 2003 (countries with yearly registration systems)

(c) 1999

(d) 2002

(e) 1995-2000

(f) Variable

Source: calculations by the author, based on Dumont and Lemaître, 2005

Table 5
Legal foreigners in Spain - 2003

	Resident permits		Municipal registers (padron)	
	Number (thousands)	%	Number (thousands)	%
<i>Total</i>	1324.0	100.0	2664.0	100.0
<i>Areas of citizenship</i>				
European Union	356.0	26.9	588.0	22.1
Other developed countries	35.0	2.6	60.0	2.3
Eastern Europe	102.0	7.7	317.0	11.9
Northern Africa	304.0	23.0	417.0	15.7
Rest of Africa	63.0	4.8	105.0	3.9
Asia	98.0	7.4	129.0	4.8
Latin America	365.0	27.6	1048.0	39.3
<i>Main countries of citizenship</i>				
Morocco	282.0	21.3	379.0	14.2
Ecuador	115.0	8.7	390.0	14.6
Colombia	71.0	5.4	245.0	9.2
China	46.0	3.5	51.0	1.9
Peru	39.0	2.9	56.0	2.1
Romania	34.0	2.6	137.0	5.1
Dominican Rep.	32.0	2.4	44.0	1.7
Argentina	28.0	2.1	109.0	4.1

Source: Cangiano and Strozza, 2004

Table 6
Legal foreigners in Portugal - 2003

	Resident permits (RP)		Permits to stay (PS)		Total (RP + PS)	
	Number (thousands)	%	Number (thousands)	%	Number (thousands)	%
<i>Total</i>	250.7	100.0	183.7	100.0	434.4	100.0
<i>Areas of citizenship</i>						
European Union	69.8	27.8	0.0	0.0	69.8	16.1
Other developed countries (a)	11.3	4.5	0.1	0.1	11.4	2.6
Eastern Europe (b)	7.2	2.9	100.4	54.7	107.7	24.8
Palop (c)	112.0	44.7	24.5	13.3	136.5	31.4
Rest of Africa	6.6	2.6	5.6	3.0	12.3	2.8
Asia	10.7	4.3	14.1	7.7	24.8	5.7
Latin America	32.7	13.0	38.8	21.1	71.5	16.5
<i>Main countries of citizenship</i>						
Ukraine	0.5	0.2	64.3	35.0	64.8	14.9
Brazil	26.6	10.6	37.7	20.5	64.3	14.8
Cape Verde	53.9	21.5	8.6	4.7	62.5	14.4
Angola	25.7	10.3	8.4	4.6	34.1	7.8
Guinea-Bissau	20.2	8.1	4.5	2.4	24.7	5.7
Moldova	0.0	0.0	12.6	6.9	12.6	2.9
Romania	0.8	0.3	10.8	5.9	11.6	2.7

Notes: (a) Except Europe

(b) Including developed non-EU European countries

(c) Portuguese-speaking African countries

Source: Cangiano and Strozza, 2004 and INE/SEF

Table 7
Legal foreigners in Italy - 2002

	Resident permits (RP)		Applications for regularisation (AR)		Total (RP + AR)	
	Number (thousands)	%	Number (thousands)	%	Number (thousands)	%
<i>Total</i>	1448.4	100.0	700.0	100.0	2148.4	100.0
<i>Areas of citizenship</i>						
European Union	140.1	9.7	0.2	0.0	140.3	6.5
Other developed countries	79.0	5.5	0.9	0.1	79.9	3.7
Eastern Europe	432.3	29.8	412.4	58.9	844.7	39.3
Northern Africa	266.9	18.4	85.7	12.2	352.6	16.4
Rest of Africa	135.0	9.3	34.2	4.9	169.2	7.9
Asia	271.5	18.7	94.6	13.5	366.1	17.0
Latin America	123.1	8.5	72.2	10.3	195.3	9.1
<i>Main countries of citizenship</i>						
Romania	83.0	5.7	143.0	20.4	226.0	10.5
Morocco	167.9	11.6	53.7	7.7	221.6	10.3
Albania	159.3	11.0	54.1	7.7	213.4	9.9
Ukraine	12.6	0.9	106.6	15.2	119.2	5.5
China	62.1	4.3	35.6	5.1	97.7	4.5
Philippines	67.7	4.7	11.8	1.7	79.5	3.7

Source: Cangiano and Strozza, 2004

Table 8
*Legal foreigners, by nationality, in Spain, Portugal and Italy -
 Nationals from South America, Central America and Caribbean countries,
 2004 or latest available year*

	Spain	Portugal	Italy (a)	Total	Spain	Portugal	Italy (a)	Spain	Portugal	Italy (a)
					<i>Percentages (line=100)</i>			<i>Percentages (column=100)</i>		
<i>South America</i>										
Argentina	119357	575	7679	127611	93.5	0.5	6.0	10.6	1.6	6.6
Bolivia	47558	51	1179	48788	97.5	0.1	2.4	4.2	0.1	1.0
Brazil	33867	28956	19003	81826	41.4	35.4	23.2	3.0	82.0	16.4
Chile	25685	244	3302	29231	87.9	0.8	11.3	2.3	0.7	2.8
Colombia	225312	453	9170	234935	95.9	0.2	3.9	20.0	1.3	7.9
Ecuador	433110	221	10342	443673	97.6	0.0	2.3	38.5	0.6	8.9
Peru	62207	253	32706	95166	65.4	0.3	34.4	5.5	0.7	28.2
Uruguay	28625	103	1219	29947	95.6	0.3	4.1	2.5	0.3	1.1
Venezuela	35041	3470	3497	42008	83.4	8.3	8.3	3.1	9.8	3.0
Other	5245	59	446	5750	91.2	1.0	7.8	0.5	0.2	0.4
<i>Central America</i>										
Mexico	16422	265	2797	19484	84.3	1.4	14.4	1.5	0.8	2.4
Other	11709	99	5524	17332	67.6	0.6	31.9	1.0	0.3	4.8
<i>The Caribbean</i>										
Cuba	35781	445	7047	43273	82.7	1.0	16.3	3.2	1.3	6.1
Dominican Rep.	43405	63	11114	54582	79.5	0.1	20.4	3.9	0.2	9.6
Other	965	40	1059	2064	46.8	1.9	51.3	0.1	0.1	0.9
<i>Other America</i>	39			39	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	1124328	35297	116084	1275709	88.1	2.8	9.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: (a) 2001

Source: Council of Europe, 2004 (except Portugal - INE/SEF)