Publicação
Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth
| dc.contributor.author | Zalabardo, José L. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-16T10:40:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-16T10:40:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-11 | |
| dc.description.abstract | I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false. | pt_PT |
| dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/25905 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.peerreviewed | yes | pt_PT |
| dc.publisher | Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia | pt_PT |
| dc.relation.publisherversion | www.disputatio.com | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Reflective knowledge | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Truth | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Pragmatism | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Meaning | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Sensitivity | pt_PT |
| dc.title | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth | pt_PT |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.endPage | 171 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.startPage | 147 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.title | Disputatio | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.volume | Vol. VIII, nº 43 | pt_PT |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | article | pt_PT |