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Corporate governance and earnings quality : international evidence

dc.contributor.authorGaio, Cristina
dc.contributor.authorRaposo, Clara
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-25T13:03:22Z
dc.date.available2022-07-25T13:03:22Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractWe examine the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality worldwide. Results suggest a substitute relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality. We find that the country effect is extremely relevant in shaping this relationship. Indeed, this relation is more pronounced in developed countries, in countries with strong investor protection. Our findings are consistent with the view that poor accounting information may force firms to adopt costlier corporate governance mechanisms, in particular in environments in which they are effective. Likewise, in such environments, firms with better quality accounting information may not need to invest so much in costly governance mechanisms.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.citationGaio, Cristina, and Clara Raposo. (2014). “Corporate governance and earnings quality: international evidence”. Journal of Accounting and Finance 14.3 ) pp. 52-74:pt_PT
dc.identifier.issn2158-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24973
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherNorth American Presspt_PT
dc.subjectCorporate Governancept_PT
dc.subjectEarnings Qualitypt_PT
dc.subjectDeveloped Countriespt_PT
dc.subjectStrong Investor Protectionpt_PT
dc.titleCorporate governance and earnings quality : international evidencept_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

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