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Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms

dc.contributor.authorAhlberg, Joakim
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-11T08:48:10Z
dc.date.available2018-06-11T08:48:10Z
dc.date.issued2009-04
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.citationAhlberg, Joakim (2009). "Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms". Portuguese Economic Journal, 8(1):3-14pt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10258-009-0042-zpt_PT
dc.identifier.issn1617-982X (print)
dc.identifier.issn1617-9838 (online)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagpt_PT
dc.subjectMulti-Unit auctionpt_PT
dc.subjectCommon value auctionpt_PT
dc.subjectDiscrete auctionpt_PT
dc.subjectGame theorypt_PT
dc.titleRevenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanismspt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceLisboapt_PT
oaire.citation.endPage14pt_PT
oaire.citation.issue1pt_PT
oaire.citation.startPage3pt_PT
oaire.citation.titlePortuguese Economic Journalpt_PT
oaire.citation.volume8pt_PT
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

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