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Decentralization and regional government size in Spain

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The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of fiscal decen- tralization on the size of regional governments in Spain, by controlling for economies of scale, interregional heterogeneity and institutional framework. We study it over 1985 to 2004 using a panel dataset of seventeen spanish regions. The results can be easily summarized. Firstly, it supports the classic public goods theory of a trade-off-between the economic benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Secondly, it doesn’t reject the “Leviathan” hypoth- esis and neither does the “common pool” hypothesis. Thirdly, by contrast, the paper partly rejects the “Wallis”’ hypothesis. It argues that government size is mediated by financial resources obtained through intergovernmental grants, consistent with welfare economics and positive economic policies. We conclude that later advances in the decentralisation process must be compatible with the goal of reducing fiscal imbalances that emanate from the vertical structure of fiscal power.

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Government size Fiscal decentralization “Leviathan” hypothesis Vertical imbalances Flypaper effect

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Citation

Cantarero, David e Patricio Perez (2012). "Decentralization and regional government size in Spain". Portuguese Economic Journal, 11(3):211-237

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Springer Verlag

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